“Notice-and-Knowledge” as the Linchpin of Retaliation:
Collymore v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In Collymore v. City of New York, No. 23-1304 (2d Cir. May 7 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of New York and three supervisory employees. Robin Collymore—an African-American female administrator—claimed she was discriminated against and retaliated for protected complaints when her supervisors scheduled recurring lunchtime meetings that allegedly violated her collective-bargaining agreement and exacerbated chronic migraines. The district court (Swain, J.) rejected all federal, state, and local claims; the Court of Appeals agreed.

While the decision was issued as a “Summary Order” and therefore lacks precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1, it offers a detailed reiteration of the governing principles for Title VII, § 1983, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL retaliation and discrimination claims. In particular, the Court underscores that employer knowledge of both (i) the employee’s protected activity and (ii) the factual predicate of the alleged adverse action is indispensable to proving causation and pretext. Absent evidence that defendants knew of a contractual lunch-hour guarantee or medical limitations, scheduling midday meetings could not plausibly be retaliatory.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Federal retaliation (Title VII & § 1983): Even assuming lunchtime meetings were “materially adverse,” plaintiff produced no evidence that defendants (1) knew of any contractual right for an uninterrupted 12–2 p.m. break or (2) understood that her migraines precluded attendance. Accordingly, employer’s stated business reason was unrebutted and not pretextual.
  
• State & City retaliation (NYSHRL & NYCHRL): Same result. NYSHRL parallels Title VII; NYCHRL requires only that retaliation play “any part,” yet plaintiff still failed to raise a triable fact that meeting schedules were motivated, even in part, by retaliation.
• Race & Sex discrimination: Plaintiff’s pay-disparity, workload, and hostile-environment theories lacked admissible comparators or specific incidents. Generalized claims of rudeness were “petty slights.” Sexual-harassment claims based on co-worker touching failed, and plaintiff forfeited reliance on the 2019 NYSHRL amendments by not raising them below.
• Procedural holdings: The district court properly maintained supplemental jurisdiction after extensive discovery; Second Circuit declined to entertain new factual theories first raised on appeal.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Order canvasses cornerstone Second Circuit authorities that shape discrimination litigation:

• Zann Kwan v. Andalex (737 F.3d 834): established the tri-partite burden-shifting scheme for retaliation and clarified “but-for” causation at step 3.
• Vega v. Hempstead UFSD (801 F.3d 72): extended the Zann Kwan framework to § 1983 equal-protection retaliation.
• Kessler v. Westchester DSS (461 F.3d 199): defined “materially adverse action” post-Burlington Northern.
• Figueroa v. Mazza (825 F.3d 89) & James v. NYRA (233 F.3d 149): recited summary-judgment and “genuine dispute” standards.
• Meiri v. Dacon (759 F.2d 989): warned against defeating summary judgment with conclusory allegations.
• Mihalik v. Credit Agricole (715 F.3d 102): charted the distinct, plaintiff-friendly NYCHRL approach requiring only that discriminatory motive play “any” role.
• Banks v. GM LLC (81 F.4th 242) & Bart v. Golub (96 F.4th 566 (2024)) for NYSHRL parity with Title VII.

By systematically applying these precedents, the panel demonstrated the resilience of the burden-shifting architecture, while clarifying how minimal factual showings remain prerequisite at each stage.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Federal Retaliation Claims

1. Prima facie stage: Court assumed plaintiff engaged in protected activity and meetings were “materially adverse,” avoiding a definitive ruling on that contested element.
2. Legitimate reason: Defendants supplied a workplace-administration rationale—regular team-wide lunch meetings are routinely scheduled and employees may eat during them.
3. Pretext/But-for causation: Plaintiff needed evidence that (a) supervisors knew of her contractual right or medical restriction; and (b) scheduling decisions were retaliatory. No union contract was produced; no accommodation request was made; e-mails lacked migraine references. The purported causal link was therefore “speculative.”

2. State & Local Retaliation

NYSHRL mirrors Title VII, so the federal analysis controlled. For NYCHRL, although the causation bar is lower, the factual deficit was the same—no evidence connecting motive to action.

3. Disparate-Treatment & Hostile-Environment

Without payroll records or comparator resumes, claims of pay disparity or uncompensated hours could not reach a jury. Hostile-environment allegations consisted only of “rude” tone and handful of non-race-specific incidents—insufficiently severe or pervasive. Under NYCHRL, such conduct was a “petty slight.”

4. Forfeiture & Procedural Discipline

The panel emphasized that appellate courts will not entertain brand-new factual theories (e.g., 2016 termination memo) or retroactive-amendment arguments never raised below, absent manifest injustice.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Reaffirmation of the “Knowledge” Requirement. Employees must demonstrate that decision-makers were actually aware of rights (contractual or medical) allegedly infringed. This “notice” component is critical both to establishing causation and to rebutting employer legitimacy.
2. Practical Guidance for Employers. Routine operational meetings—even if inconvenient—will rarely constitute adverse or retaliatory if employees can still eat, request rescheduling, or otherwise be accommodated. Employers should document business reasons and remain responsive to explicit requests.
3. Evidence Matters—Not Allegations. The Order is a stark reminder that conclusory statements, without documentation or corroboration, fail at summary judgment. Plaintiffs should marshal comparator data, e-mails referencing protected traits, or testimony linking decision-makers to protected activity.
4. NYCHRL’s Lower Standard Has Limits. Though NYCHRL drops the “material adversity” and “but-for” thresholds, it is not a free pass. Plaintiffs still need some evidence from which a jury could infer discrimination or retaliation.
5. Supplemental Jurisdiction Endorsed. Where federal claims are disposed at summary judgment after full discovery, district courts may—and often should—retain and resolve pendant state-law claims to avoid duplicative litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order

A non-precedential decision of the Second Circuit. It can be cited (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1) but lacks binding authority.

Prima facie Case

The initial, minimal factual showing needed to shift the burden to the employer. Under Title VII retaliation that means (i) protected activity, (ii) employer knowledge, (iii) adverse action, (iv) causal link.

Materially Adverse Action

An action that might dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining. Lower threshold than “ultimate employment decision.”

But-For Causation

Retaliation must be the determining factor for an adverse action, not merely one of several motives, under Title VII (post-Nassar).

Petty Slight or Trivial Inconvenience

Under NYCHRL an employer avoids liability if the challenged conduct amounts only to minor annoyances.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Federal courts may hear state-law claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” (28 U.S.C. § 1367). They may decline once federal claims drop out, but often retain when discovery is complete.

5. Conclusion

Though non-precedential, Collymore provides an instructive roadmap for plaintiffs and employers alike. The Second Circuit underscored that retaliation and discrimination cases rise or fall on the plaintiff’s ability to connect the dots—through admissible evidence—between the protected trait/activity and the challenged action. Mere assertions of unfairness, or reliance on workplace inconveniences such as lunch-hour meetings, will not suffice without proof that supervisors knew of contractual entitlements, medical constraints, or prior complaints and nevertheless acted with retaliatory or discriminatory intent. Future litigants should heed the Court’s insistence on concrete particulars at each burden-shifting stage, particularly when invoking the broader protections of the NYCHRL. Ultimately, Collymore reinforces the centrality of documented notice and contemporaneous evidence in establishing causation and overcoming summary judgment.