“No Second Bite at the Probate Apple” — Utah Supreme Court Declares the Savings Statute Inapplicable to § 75-3-107’s Three-Year Probate Deadline

Introduction

In In re Estate of Davies, 2025 UT 36, the Utah Supreme Court resolved a long-simmering tension between two Utah statutes:

Utah’s “Timing Statute” for probate proceedings, Utah Code § 75-3-107, which bars the commencement of informal probate or formal testacy proceedings more than three years after a decedent’s death and makes the presumption of intestacy “final.”
Utah’s general “Savings Statute,” Utah Code § 78B-2-111, which ordinarily gives litigants one additional year to re-file an action that was timely but dismissed on non-merits grounds after the original limitations period has expired.

The dispute pitted four grandchildren of the late Beverly Davies (“Grandchildren”) against a fifth grandchild, Jodi Kittinger (“Granddaughter”). Granddaughter filed a timely probate petition within three years of Davies’s death but allowed the case to languish; it was dismissed without prejudice. Nearly seven years after death—just inside the Savings Statute’s one-year grace period—she refiled. The district court held the refiling was saved by § 78B-2-111, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Savings Statute cannot revive probate petitions filed outside the three-year window fixed by § 75-3-107.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, the Court unanimously concluded that the specific language of § 75-3-107 (“may not be commenced more than three years after the decedent’s death”) irreconcilably conflicts with and therefore displaces the more general Savings Statute. Consequently:

Granddaughter’s second petition—filed almost seven years after death—was prohibited.
The presumption that Davies died intestate became final upon the lapse of the three-year period when the first petition was dismissed.
The district court’s denial of Grandchildren’s partial summary judgment motion was reversed and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with the high court’s opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Estate of Strand, 2015 UT App 259 — Classified § 75-3-107 as a “statute of repose” and rejected equitable tolling. Although not controlling, Strand set the analytical stage; the Supreme Court agreed with its outcome (no extension) but rested its decision on statutory, not equitable, grounds.
McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21 — Held that the Savings Statute co-exists with most statutes of limitation unless a contrary legislative intent is evident. The Court distinguished Huard, emphasizing the absence of conflicting statutory text in that case, unlike § 75-3-107’s prohibitory language here.
Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40 — Explained that the Legislature need not “speak plainly” to displace the Savings Statute; implied intent suffices. Davies relies heavily on Craig to reject the district court’s demand for an explicit disavowal.
Standard Federal S&L v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991) — Drew a line between permissive limitation language (“may be commenced”) and prohibitory language (“is barred”). The Court invoked this distinction, noting that § 75-3-107’s use of “may not” tracks the latter, barring late filings.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia, Waite, Jensen — Discussed the characteristics of statutes of repose vs. limitations. The Court ultimately deemed the label immaterial, but the cases informed its understanding of legislative motives (certainty and repose).

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Interpretation Framework

Utah courts look first to plain statutory language, harmonizing related provisions and giving effect to every word. Where two statutes conflict, the more specific governs over the general (lex specialis derogat legi generali).

2. Dissecting § 75-3-107 (the Timing Statute)

Subsection (1) employs mandatory, prohibitory words—“may not be commenced more than three years after death.”
Subsection (3) imposes an automatic, final presumption of intestacy once three years elapse without a will in probate.
The statute embeds its own limited exceptions, signaling the Legislature consciously weighed which circumstances merit flexibility and which do not.

3. Comparing the Savings Statute’s Operation

Section 78B-2-111 operates generically: when “the time limited by law” has expired after a non-merits dismissal, a “plaintiff” may re-commence within one year. Its silence on probate matters makes it subordinate to a conflicting, probate-specific command.

4. The Conflict and Its Resolution

The Savings Statute says a litigant may commence a new action after the primary period expires.
Section 75-3-107 says a probate petitioner may not do so. Both prescriptions cannot simultaneously be true.
Applying Craig and Lyon v. Burton, the Probate Code’s specific, prohibitory language controls; the general remedial statute yields.

5. Policy Balancing

The Probate Code reflects two competing policies: (a) honoring testamentary intent and (b) ensuring prompt, efficient estate administration. The three-year limit is the Legislature’s chosen balance. Allowing the Savings Statute to tack on an extra year would upset that balance, extend uncertainty for heirs and creditors, and undermine the “final” presumption of intestacy.

Impact on Future Practice

Probate Counsel Diligence — Lawyers must vigilantly prosecute probate petitions once filed; dismissal for inactivity can be fatal if three years have passed.
Estate Planning Strategy — Testators should ensure personal representatives understand the urgency of timely filings. Backup representatives may be advisable.
Litigation Posture — Heirs contesting late-filed wills now have a powerful, dispositive defense: the Savings Statute is off the table.
Statutory Interpretation — Reaffirms that Utah courts will privilege specific, prohibitory language over general remedial statutes, even without an explicit statement of preclusion.
Legislative Considerations — If policymakers wish to extend flexibility (for example, when a will surfaces late), an express amendment to § 75-3-107 will be necessary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of Limitations: A filing deadline measured from when a claim “accrues” (i.e., when the injury or legal wrong occurs).
Statute of Repose: A filing deadline measured from an event other than injury (e.g., product sale, construction completion, or—here—death), intended to give defendants closure.
Savings Statute: A rule that lets a plaintiff re-file within one year after a timely case is dismissed on procedural grounds when the original limitation period has run out.
Informal Probate vs. Formal Testacy: Informal probate is a registrar-driven, largely administrative process to admit a will. Formal testacy is a court proceeding—usually needed if the will’s validity is contested.
Presumption of Intestacy: The legal assumption that a person died without a valid will; assets are distributed under the state’s intestacy scheme.

Conclusion

In re Estate of Davies crystallizes a significant point of Utah probate law: the three-year window in § 75-3-107 is absolute, save for its own enumerated exceptions. Parties cannot look to the Savings Statute for a second chance. The Court’s decision promotes finality, discourages probate dormancy, and clarifies the hierarchy of statutes—specific prohibitory language trumps general remedial provisions. Estate planners, litigators, and trial courts must now navigate probate timelines with heightened precision, knowing that “no second bite at the probate apple” is the governing rule in Utah.