“No-Piggyback Appeals”: Seventh Circuit Bars Intervenor Standing When the Enjoined Party Declines to Appeal

Introduction

Cellco Partnership, doing business as Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”), sought municipal permits to install three small-cell poles in Milwaukee’s high-profile Deer District Public Plaza. The City of Milwaukee initially denied the applications on aesthetic grounds; later, under pressure from the plaza’s sub-lessee, Deer District LLC, it asserted that it lacked authority because the Plaza had been leased to private hands. Verizon sued under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) and Wisconsin Statute § 66.0414, won a bench trial, and obtained an injunction compelling the City to issue the permits. The City accepted the result, issued the permits, and Verizon built the poles.

Only Deer District appealed. It attacked the district court’s interpretation of its sub-lease and of § 66.0414 (the state “small-cell” statute) but did not challenge the court’s ruling under the TCA, and—critically—the City itself did not join the appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for want of Article III standing, holding that an intervenor may not “piggyback” on an injunction that binds a non-appealing party when the requested appellate relief would not redress the intervenor’s alleged injury.

Summary of the Judgment

• The injunction ran only against the City of Milwaukee. Because the City did not appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to disturb the judgment to benefit a non-appealing party.
• Standing turned on redressability: even vacating the lower-court order on the state-law and lease grounds would leave the unchallenged TCA holding—and therefore the injunction—intact.
• Relying on Cabral v. City of Evansville and Greenlaw v. United States, the court reiterated that appellate courts cannot provide relief to parties who chose not to appeal, nor issue opinions that would merely be advisory.
• The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Seventh Circuit never reached the merits of Deer District’s substantive arguments.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024)
   Reaffirmed that standing applies with full force on appeal; provided the definitional framework for injury, causation, and redressability. The panel quoted Murthy to emphasise that federal courts may not redress injuries caused by the “independent action of some third party not before the court.”
2. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013)
   Used for the proposition that intervenors and appellants must independently establish Article III standing.
3. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
   Supplied the familiar three-part standing test. The court’s core reasoning turned on the third element—likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.
4. California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659 (2021)
   Quoted to describe redressability as “the relationship between the judicial relief requested and the injury suffered.”
5. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 212 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2000)
   Framed the “critical question” whether an appellate court may alter a judgment that imposes obligations solely on a non-appealing party.
6. Cabral v. City of Evansville, 759 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2014)
   Factually analogous: an intervenor church sought to appeal an injunction against a non-appealing city. The court again found no redressability. Cabral supplied the principal roadmap.
7. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008)
   Articulated the unwritten but well-settled rule that an appellate court will not modify a judgment to benefit a non-appealing party.
8. 1000 Friends of Wisconsin, Inc. v. U.S. DOT, 860 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2017)
   Reaffirmed that a private litigant cannot “step into the agency’s shoes” to continue litigation when the agency elects not to appeal.

Legal Reasoning of the Seventh Circuit

The panel’s analysis operated in two stages:

1. Identify the relief sought. Deer District asked the appellate court to vacate the district court’s conclusions regarding the state statute and the lease.
2. Test redressability. Even if those conclusions were reversed, the injunction grounded in the TCA would survive because Deer District never challenged it. The City—still subject to the injunction—would remain obligated to keep the permits in force. Thus, Deer District’s alleged economic and proprietary injuries would not be alleviated. Any “victory” would be purely advisory.

Key Principles Affirmed or Clarified

• An intervenor must demonstrate its own Article III standing on appeal; it cannot rely on the standing of the original parties.
• Redressability fails when:
  • The injunction runs solely against a party that did not appeal; and
  • The appellant does not challenge the injunction’s surviving legal basis.
• Appellate courts will not issue opinions that do nothing more than declare private rights or resolve hypothetical disputes.
• The decision preserves the separation of powers: courts may not adjudicate beyond the live controversy before them.

Impact on Future Litigation

1. Intervention Strategy. Entities who intervene to protect contractual or property interests must be prepared to appeal alongside (or instead of) the primary defendant and must target all operative grounds of the judgment. Failure to do so risks dismissal.
2. Municipal Telecom Disputes. While the panel did not reach the merits of Wisconsin’s small-cell statute, the decision leaves the district court’s robust reading of § 66.0414—and its broad view of TCA pre-emption—undisturbed, indirectly strengthening wireless carriers’ positions in future permitting battles.
3. Appellate Procedure Doctrine. The opinion fortifies the “no-piggyback appeal” doctrine in the Seventh Circuit and may be cited nationwide to blunt attempts by non-appealing parties to relitigate final judgments via aligned intervenors.
4. Leaseholders of Public Spaces. Private lessees of quasi-public areas may need to negotiate explicit appellate commitments with municipal lessors or reserve their own enforcement mechanisms, rather than relying on litigation brought by the lessor.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Article III Standing

To bring—or maintain—any federal lawsuit (including an appeal) a party must show:

1. Injury-in-Fact – a concrete, particularized harm;
2. Causation – the harm is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and
3. Redressability – a favorable court decision will likely remedy the harm.

Redressability is often the stumbling block for intervenors when the enjoined party is absent.

2. “Right-of-Way” vs. Leasehold

Many cities hold streets and pedestrian malls in “public trust” even when they lease surface rights to private operators. A “right-of-way” typically means land reserved for transportation or utilities where the public (and the city, as trustee) retains substantial control. A commercial lease may grant day-to-day management but rarely eliminates the municipality’s statutory duties under laws such as the TCA.

3. Telecommunications Act (TCA) § 332(c)(7)

This provision prevents local governments from unreasonably discriminating among telecom providers and requires that any denial of cell-site applications be supported by “substantial evidence.” Courts can impose equitable relief—including mandatory injunctions—when municipalities violate these requirements. Once a carrier secures such an injunction, third parties have an uphill battle overturning it unless they can both establish standing and refute all bases for the injunction.

4. Advisory Opinions

Federal courts decide only actual, live controversies; they do not issue abstract rulings about rights unless doing so will change the parties’ concrete legal positions. Here, Deer District admitted it mainly wanted clarification of its lease rights. The court declined, labeling that desire an impermissible quest for an advisory opinion.

Conclusion

Cellco Partnership v. Deer District LLC solidifies a strict, doctrinal boundary around appellate standing: an intervenor cannot bootstrap an appeal when the only party bound by an injunction elects to acquiesce, and when the intervenor leaves untouched the judgment’s operative legal foundation. The Seventh Circuit’s refusal to “rewrite the judgment for the benefit of a bystander” underscores the systemic values of party presentation, judicial restraint, and finality. For practitioners, the case is a cautionary tale: align your appellate strategy with the enjoined party, challenge every underpinning of the injunction, or accept the district court’s decree. For local governments and telecom providers, the ruling leaves the expansive remedies available under the TCA undisturbed, reinforcing the federal statute’s supremacy over municipal gate-keeping when critical network infrastructure is at stake.