“No Continuing Seizure” and the Abandonment Doctrine Reaffirmed:
Carter v. Cook County Sheriff, Seventh Circuit (2025)

1. Introduction

Alexander Carter and eight co-plaintiffs, all former detainees of the Cook County Jail, pursued a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Cook County Sheriff and Cook County, Illinois. They attacked a long-standing “designate-or-destroy” policy that authorises jail officials to destroy a detainee’s government-issued identification card (ID) if the inmate—once transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)—fails to retrieve the card within 45 days (the complaint mistakenly said 60 days). Carter alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure), the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that existing circuit precedent squarely foreclosed each constitutional theory.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit (per Judge Pryor, joined by Chief Judge Sykes and Judge Brennan) held:

1. Fourth Amendment – “Continuing Seizure” theory rejected: Under Lee v. City of Chicago, once a seizure is reasonable when it occurs, continued retention or later destruction does not reopen the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Carter’s attempt to revisit Lee via Bruen, Manuel, and Thompson was unpersuasive.
2. Fifth Amendment Takings – Abandonment doctrine controls: Following Conyers v. City of Chicago and Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, the court found the property abandoned because detainees received clear notice, a retrieval procedure, and a generous window. Therefore, no “taking” occurred. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County did not compel a different result because, unlike Tyler, the Cook County scheme supplied an actual mechanism for the owner to manifest continued interest.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process – No fundamental right implicated: Because the claim was purely about personal property, rational-basis review would apply, but Lee/Doherty bar substantive-due-process challenges where adequate state remedies exist and there is no separate constitutional violation. Carter alleged neither.

Consequently, the dismissal was affirmed in full.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003) – cornerstone precedent foreclosing any “continuing seizure” theory once an initial lawful inventory seizure occurs. The panel declined to overrule Lee, finding subsequent Supreme Court cases inapposite.
• Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989) – earlier rejection of prolonged-detention/continuing-seizure arguments, extended by Lee.
• Conyers v. City of Chicago, 10 F.4th 704 (7th Cir. 2021) – virtually identical property-retrieval window (30 days) upheld; established that abandonment coupled with fair notice defeats Takings and Due Process claims.
• Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, 49 F.4th 1124 (7th Cir. 2022) – reaffirmed Conyers, clarified that property-based substantive-due-process challenges collapse unless independent constitutional violations exist.
• Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) – legitimises inventory searches at booking.
• Supreme Court Decisions Invoked by Plaintiffs (New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, Manuel v. City of Joliet, Thompson v. Clark, and Tyler v. Hennepin County) – the panel meticulously distinguished each, concluding none displaced the Seventh Circuit’s settled jurisprudence.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion is essentially a reaffirmation exercise:

1. Fourth Amendment
   • The “inventory” seizure when a detainee is booked is per se reasonable (Lafayette).
   • Lee’s central holding: Once that initial seizure is lawful, the Fourth Amendment provides no vehicle for challenging how long officials keep the property.
   • Attempted reliance on Bruen’s historic-tradition methodology was rejected because Bruen is a Second Amendment case and did not sub silentio invalidate Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
   • Manuel and Thompson both deal with liberty (detention), not property, and scrutinise initial probable-cause determinations, not post-seizure retention.
2. Fifth Amendment / Takings
   • Prerequisite: Plaintiff must still own the property; truly abandoned property has no owner, hence no taking.
   • Abandonment is assessed under state property law but tempered by federal due-process concerns.
   • The 45-day designate-or-destroy notice satisfies due process because it (a) identifies what was seized, (b) explains how to reclaim it, (c) states a clear deadline, and (d) places the burden on the owner to act—mirroring Conyers.
   • Tyler exception rejected: unlike the Minnesota statute condemned in Tyler, Cook County’s procedure does offer a meaningful mechanism for the owner to retain the property.
3. Fourteenth Amendment / Substantive Due Process
   • No “fundamental right” to have government courier personal effects to a new prison facility.
   • Per Lee, where only property is at issue, a plaintiff must show inadequate state remedies or an independent constitutional violation before the court even engages in rational-basis review; Carter showed neither.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although the decision does not forge entirely new doctrine, it solidifies the Seventh Circuit’s triad of Lee–Conyers–Kelley-Lomax and sends several practical messages:

• Correctional & police agencies within the circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin) can continue inventory-and-destroy regimes provided: clear written notice, reasonable retrieval window, and a workable proxy system are in place.
• Takings-Clause litigants must confront the abandonment hurdle first; Tyler will not assist where a reclamation pathway exists.
• Fourth-Amendment advocates seeking to relitigate “continuing seizure” theories will face an uphill battle absent Supreme Court intervention.
• Due-process plaintiffs dealing with property-only claims must plead the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies.
• By reaffirming the inventory doctrine, the decision could influence debates about body-camera retention, digital evidence, and vehicle tows, where “initial-seizure vs. retention” arguments frequently arise.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Continuing Seizure: The idea that after a lawful seizure, every day the government keeps the item counts as a “new” seizure. The Seventh Circuit rejects this for property.
• Abandonment (Property Law): When an owner, by words or conduct, shows an intent to relinquish rights. If property is abandoned, no compensation is owed if the government disposes of it.
• Takings Clause: The constitutional rule that if the government takes non-abandoned private property for public use, it must pay “just compensation.” No compensation is required for abandoned property.
• Substantive vs. Procedural Due Process: Procedural DP concerns how the government acts (notice, hearing); Substantive DP examines what the government does—whether it infringes fundamental rights.
• Rational-Basis Review: The most deferential constitutional test; a policy survives if any conceivable legitimate purpose is served.

5. Conclusion

Carter’s appeal offered the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to revisit two decades of “continuing seizure” and abandonment precedent. The court declined, instead underscoring three consistent themes: (1) lawful inventory seizures end the Fourth Amendment inquiry; (2) property abandoned through a fair, well-publicised retrieval process is outside the Takings Clause; (3) substantive due process rarely rescues purely economic property claims when state remedies exist. The decision fortifies administrative latitude for jails and police departments while signalling that constitutional challenges must either demonstrate flawed initial seizures, inadequate notice, or the absence of meaningful recovery procedures. Unless the Supreme Court intervenes, Carter v. Cook County Sheriff cements the Seventh Circuit’s approach to detainee-property disputes for the foreseeable future.