“No Clearly-Established Right to Be Free from a Non-Deadly Push While Fleeing” – Sealey v. Mancias and the Pleading Burden in Fifth-Circuit Excessive-Force Claims

1. Introduction

Sealey v. Mancias, No. 24-50998 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025), arises from a late-night arrest outside a San Antonio 7-Eleven. While attempting to serve an arrest warrant, Officer Arturo Mancias hand-cuffed Samantha Lee-Ann Sealey. Sealey fled, fell face-first onto the pavement, and sustained injuries she claims were caused by the officer “viciously” pushing her. She sued Officer Mancias under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and sued the City of San Antonio for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services. The district court dismissed both claims, finding the officer qualifiedly immune and the municipal pleading deficient. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The appeal presented two principal issues:

Whether Sealey pleaded facts demonstrating a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Whether that right was “clearly established” for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity.

Although the district court had dismissed on the second qualified-immunity prong (clearly established law), the Court of Appeals opted to start—and effectively end—its analysis with the first prong, holding that the alleged push was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The panel nevertheless also confirmed that, even assuming a constitutional violation, no precedent put the officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit (Judges Davis, Graves, and Wilson, per curiam) affirmed in full. The key holdings are:

Excessive-force claim: Sealey failed to allege facts showing that a reasonable officer would view a quick push to apprehend a fleeing, hand-cuffed arrestee as excessive. Therefore, she did not plausibly plead a Fourth Amendment violation.
Qualified immunity: Even if the complaint stated a violation, the right was not “clearly established” because neither Supreme Court nor Fifth-Circuit precedent “squarely governs” a shove of a fleeing suspect that does not involve deadly force.
Monell claim against the City: Sealey forfeited appellate review by omitting argument in her opening brief.

Accordingly, the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) stands.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Reiterated that excessive-force claims are governed by “objective reasonableness” judged from the perspective of an officer on the scene. The panel relied on Graham to discount “20/20 hindsight.”
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). Cited for the proposition that reasonableness does not invariably hinge on whether the officer could have used “less intrusive means.” This authority underpinned the panel’s refusal to treat the mere existence of alternative tactics as dispositive.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). These cases contribute the modern two-step qualified-immunity test and establish that courts may decide the prongs in either order. The Fifth Circuit invoked this discretionary sequencing to begin with the first prong.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Sealey’s principal authority. The panel distinguished Garner as limited to deadly force against an unarmed suspect—significantly different from a non-deadly shove.
Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam) and City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per curiam). These modern qualified-immunity opinions supply the “existing precedent must squarely govern” formulation used to reject Sealey’s claim.
Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020) and Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021). Provide the Fifth Circuit’s “sky-high” obviousness standard for showing a violation absent directly controlling precedent; the panel found Sealey’s allegations fell short.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743 (5th Cir. 2023). These frame the forfeiture of the municipal claim.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Pleading Failure on Prong One. To survive Rule 12(b)(6), Sealey had to plead facts showing that the shove was clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable. The court underscored three gaps:
- She provided no context regarding the speed or violence of the push.
- She failed to allege an “obvious” safer alternative a reasonable officer would have taken (e.g., verbal commands, waiting for backup).
- She conceded she was actively fleeing, rendering some force foreseeable.
Drawing upon Illinois v. Lafayette, the panel refused to equate reasonableness with “least intrusive means” and held the complaint’s bare assertion of “unnecessary” force insufficient.
Absence of Clearly Established Law (Prong Two). The court next confirmed that, even if a violation were alleged, Sealey identified no controlling or consensus authority treating a shove—non-deadly force—as unconstitutional when used on a fleeing arrestee. Distinguishing Garner (deadly force) and pointing to the lack of analogous cases, the panel found the officer entitled to qualified immunity.
Forfeiture of the Monell claim. Because Sealey’s opening brief challenged only the officer’s dismissal, the municipal claim was abandoned on appeal.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Sealey v. Mancias advances several practical and doctrinal points in Fifth-Circuit jurisprudence:

Pleading Standard Elevated. Plaintiffs must now articulate specific alternative tactics that a reasonable officer would have used. Conclusory allegations that force was “unnecessary” will not suffice.
Qualified-Immunity Strategy. The decision exemplifies the appellate court’s willingness to begin with prong one in straightforward excessive-force cases. Defendants may therefore benefit from arguing both prongs thoroughly at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Non-deadly Force Gap. By declaring no clearly established right against a shove of a fleeing suspect, the panel leaves a lacuna in the law of non-deadly force. Future plaintiffs will have to ground their claims in more factually analogous precedent or develop evidence that crosses the “obviousness” threshold.
Municipal Liability Caution. The forfeiture ruling reinforces a procedural trap—issues not briefed in the opening appellate submission are lost.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A legal doctrine shielding officers from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that, at the time, the unlawfulness was “clearly established” by precedent so specific that every reasonable officer would have understood the conduct to be unlawful.
Clearly Established Law: Requires either binding Supreme Court/Fifth-Circuit authority or a robust consensus of other circuits with materially similar facts. General statements of law or dissimilar fact patterns will not do.
Objective Reasonableness Test: In judging excessive force, a court asks what a hypothetical reasonable officer would have done, considering the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and whether she was actively resisting or fleeing.
Monell Liability: Municipalities can be liable under § 1983 only when the injury results from an official policy or custom—not vicarious liability for employees’ actions.
Forfeiture on Appeal: An appellant waives an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief; mentioning it for the first time in a reply is too late.

5. Conclusion

Sealey v. Mancias delivers a concise yet far-reaching message: in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff seeking damages for non-deadly force during a foot-chase arrest must plead detailed facts showing both objective unreasonableness and a close fit with controlling precedent. The panel’s insistence that plaintiffs articulate reasonable alternatives, coupled with its declaration that no clearly established right prohibited the shove in question, tightens the already narrow path around qualified immunity. Municipal plaintiffs are likewise reminded to preserve every argument at the earliest appellate stage. While the opinion is unpublished, its reasoning will almost certainly be cited by district courts across the circuit when assessing Rule 12(b)(6) motions in excessive-force cases.