“No Categorical ‘Idiocy’ Exemption”: Sixth Circuit Clarifies the Boundary between Ford Competency Claims and Atkins Intellectual-Disability Claims in Successive Habeas Petitions

1. Introduction

In In re: Byron Lewis Black, No. 25-5677 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a late-stage capital habeas filing framed as a “Ford competency” petition but premised on the common-law concept of “idiocy.” Byron Lewis Black, on Tennessee’s death row since 1989, sought to avoid execution set for August 5, 2025, by arguing that his lifelong cognitive impairments render him incompetent under Ford v. Wainwright. The district court transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals as an unauthorized “second or successive” application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); Black moved for remand, authorization, and a stay of execution.

The core issue: may a condemned prisoner resurrect previously litigated Atkins-type intellectual-disability claims under the rubric of “idiocy” to avoid the gate-keeping provisions governing successive habeas petitions? The Sixth Circuit answered “no,” holding that:

A claim resting on intellectual-disability evidence—even if re-packaged as “idiocy”—is not a Ford competency claim; it is barred if previously adjudicated.
Only current rational-understanding claims, conforming to Panetti v. Quarterman and Madison v. Alabama, qualify as Ford-type and avoid the successive-petition bar.
Because Black’s petition reiterates an already-decided Atkins claim, authorization under § 2244(b) is denied, the motion to remand is denied, and a stay of execution is refused.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit:

Denied Black’s motion to remand the transferred petition to the district court, reaffirming that the filing is “second or successive” under § 2244(b).
Denied authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition because the claim was previously raised and adjudicated, and no new rule of constitutional law or newly-discovered facts supported it.
Denied a stay of execution after applying the equitable factors of Workman v. Bell, finding no likelihood of success on the merits.

In doing so, the court drew a bright line between:

categorical exemptions from execution based on intellectual disability (Atkins), and
fact-specific inquiries into a prisoner’s present rational understanding of the reason for execution (Ford, Panetti, Madison).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45 (6th Cir. 1997) – Authority for district courts to transfer improperly filed second/successive petitions to the Court of Appeals.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) – Bars execution of the “insane,” launching competency-to-be-executed doctrine.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) – Categorical Eighth Amendment bar on executing the intellectually disabled.
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) – Clarifies that Ford requires a prisoner to possess a “rational understanding” of the State’s reason for execution.
Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019) – Reiterates Panetti standard, extending protection to some dementia cases but rejecting categorical diagnoses as controlling.
In re Tibbetts, 869 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2017) – Unripe claims (e.g., Ford) are not “successive” until an execution date is set.
Franklin v. Jenkins, 839 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2016) – Reinforces § 2244(b)(1) bar on re-litigated claims.
In re Hill, 81 F.4th 560 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc) – Recent guidance on distinguishing “old” versus “new” claims for § 2244 purposes.

Collectively, these cases supplied the doctrinal scaffolding: If a claim repeats what has been decided (Franklin), it is barred; if it ripened only when an execution date was set (Tibbetts), it may pass; but Ford claims must meet the Panetti/Madison “rational understanding” test.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Characterization of the Claim. The court meticulously parsed Black’s pleadings and expert evidence, finding that he alleged a categorical bar (“idiots cannot be executed”) rather than a present-competency deficiency. That rendered the claim substantively indistinguishable from the Atkins intellectual-disability argument litigated (and lost) in 2000–2017.
Successive-Petition Analysis. Because the claim was “presented in a prior application,” § 2244(b)(1) commanded dismissal. Black tried to invoke the “unripe at the time” exception (Panetti/Tibbetts), but the court held ripeness irrelevant where the same claim was previously raised and dismissed as unripe; it was still the same claim.
Ford/Panetti Boundary. Under Madison, the sole Ford inquiry is whether the prisoner can rationally understand the State’s rationale for execution. Black’s filings omitted that element and, tellingly, his own expert opined that he possessed such understanding. Thus, no Ford claim existed.
No Gate-Opening Under § 2244(b)(2). Black failed to show new, previously undiscoverable facts or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. Progressive brain deterioration did not matter because competency (rational understanding) remained intact.
Stay of Execution Factors. With no likelihood of success, equitable considerations favored the State’s interest in finality.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

The decision’s significance extends beyond Black’s case:

Strategic Framing Limits. Capital litigants in the Sixth Circuit cannot re-package intellectual-disability evidence as “Ford competency” by invoking historical labels such as “idiocy.” The court will look past nomenclature to substance.
Clarifies Ripeness Doctrine. Where a Ford claim was raised earlier and dismissed as unripe, the petitioner must later satisfy the Panetti standard; he cannot shift theories to evade § 2244(b).
Reaffirms Finality. The ruling fortifies § 2244(b)’s gatekeeping, curbing late-breaking petitions that recycle old grounds under creative headings.
Guidance for District Courts. Encourages immediate transfer of mislabeled petitions to the Court of Appeals, avoiding piecemeal litigation.
Substantive Eighth Amendment Doctrine. Affirms that competency-to-be-executed is a functional, not categorical, inquiry centered on rational understanding.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Second or Successive Petition: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), a habeas application filed after a first one is “second or successive.” Such petitions are tightly limited; most repeat claims are automatically dismissed unless based on new law or facts.
Ford Competency Claim: Asks whether, today, the prisoner grasps why the State seeks to execute him. Mental illness or dementia matters only insofar as it destroys that rational understanding.
Atkins Intellectual-Disability Claim: A categorical Eighth Amendment bar: if a defendant was intellectually disabled at the time of the crime (subaverage IQ and adaptive-functioning deficits before age 18), the death penalty is prohibited altogether.
Ripeness: A claim is “unripe” when the factual trigger (e.g., an execution date) has not yet occurred. Ford claims typically ripen only when execution is imminent because competency is judged contemporaneously.
Idiocy (Common Law): Historical term describing severe, lifelong cognitive deficits; important in old English law but doctrinally superseded by modern distinctions between Atkins and Ford standards.

5. Conclusion

In re Byron Lewis Black cements a critical doctrinal distinction: Ford competency claims are narrow, fact-specific, and judged at the eve of execution, whereas Atkins intellectual-disability claims are categorical and subject to successive-petition restrictions once litigated. Attempts to breathe new life into old Atkins contentions by invoking antiquated labels like “idiocy” will be treated as successive and barred.

The Sixth Circuit’s ruling thus reinforces habeas finality, provides crisp guidance on the Ford/Atkins boundary, and underscores that genuine Ford claims must squarely engage the Panetti/Madison rational-understanding test, not historical abstractions. Future capital litigants in the circuit now have a clearer roadmap—and a sterner warning—regarding the limits of post-conviction innovation.