“Move Over” Means Move Over: Second Circuit (Nonprecedential) Clarification That N.Y. VTL § 1144-a(b) Mandates a Lane Change (When Safe), Supporting Reasonable Suspicion for a Traffic Stop

Introduction

In United States v. Overton, No. 24-2071-cr (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress arising from a highway traffic stop in New York that led to the recovery of a firearm and narcotics. Defendant-Appellant Kori E. Overton entered a conditional guilty plea to (1) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (2) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and (3) possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and reserved his right to challenge the suppression ruling.

The appeal centered on whether a New York State Police trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Overton’s vehicle for violating New York’s “Move Over” law as applied to hazard vehicles—New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1144-a(b). Overton advanced two principal arguments: (1) that § 1144-a(b) does not require a lane change (but merely “due care”) when passing a tow truck displaying amber lights on the shoulder, and (2) that the district court clearly erred in crediting the trooper’s testimony that a safe lane change was available but not made. He also argued the stop was pre-planned or pretextual and challenged the reliability of confidential informants, although the panel did not reach the latter issue.

Although issued as a summary order with no precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision offers a lucid, text-and-history-based reading of § 1144-a(b) that will be persuasive in future litigation: whenever it can be done safely, the statute mandates moving out of the lane adjacent to a hazard vehicle displaying amber lights. That statutory violation supplied reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and, consequently, justified the denial of suppression.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed the judgment and the denial of suppression.
On de novo review of statutory meaning, the court held that N.Y. VTL § 1144-a(b)’s “due care shall include” language requires a motorist on a parkway or controlled-access highway to move from the lane adjacent to a shoulder where a hazard vehicle (including a tow truck) is displaying amber lights—if the lane change can be made safely (i.e., consistent with § 1128(a)).
Trooper Ahigian’s credited testimony that Overton passed a tow truck with amber lights while remaining in the right lane, despite an open left lane, provided reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
The trooper’s subjective motivations and the asserted “pre-planned” nature of the stop were legally irrelevant under Whren v. United States; the objective facts controlled.
A mis-citation on the ticket to § 1144-a(a) (emergency vehicles) rather than § 1144-a(b) (hazard vehicles) did not defeat reasonable suspicion where the facts supported a violation of subsection (b).
The district court’s credibility findings, grounded in coherent testimony not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, were entitled to “special deference” and were not clearly erroneous.
Because the stop was justified by a traffic violation, the panel did not reach alternative informant-based grounds for reasonable suspicion.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited, and How They Shaped the Decision

United States v. Santillan, 902 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited for standards of review—clear error for factual findings and de novo for questions of law and mixed questions like reasonable suspicion. Also reiterates that the reasonable-suspicion threshold is “not high.”
United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 2019): Emphasizes “special deference” to credibility determinations at suppression hearings. This bolstered the district court’s decision to credit Trooper Ahigian’s account of an available, safe left lane.
United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2019): Confirms that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure and outlines the reasonable suspicion standard and the “totality of the circumstances” approach from the vantage point of a trained officer.
United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016): Reiterate that traffic stops must be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and that reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts, not a mere hunch.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. Foreste, 780 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1998): Establish the objective nature of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry for traffic stops: pretext and subjective intent do not invalidate a stop supported by an objectively observed violation.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985): Provides the high bar for overturning credibility-based factual findings—“virtually never” clear error when testimony is coherent, plausible, and not contradicted by extrinsic evidence.
United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2009): Confirms that reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation suffices to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.
New York authorities on “Move Over” duties: People v. Gonzalez, 62 Misc. 3d 130(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2018); People v. Kohl, 62 Misc. 3d 26 (N.Y. App. Term. 2018); People v. Krahforst, 43 N.Y.S.3d 734 (N.Y. City Ct. 2016). Although these cases interpret § 1144-a(a) (emergency vehicles), they employ the same “shall include” language and have read the provision to require a lane change (when safe). The Second Circuit relies on this parallel reasoning to interpret § 1144-a(b) (hazard vehicles).
Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Hudson Excess Ins. Co., 147 F.4th 249, 266 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that New York courts give considerable weight to legislative history, including the Governor’s Bill Jacket, in discerning statutory meaning. The panel uses this to confirm that § 1144-a(b) was designed to require drivers on controlled-access highways to move over when passing hazard vehicles.

2) The Court’s Statutory Interpretation of N.Y. VTL § 1144-a(b)

Section 1144-a(b) governs “hazard vehicles”—including tow trucks—displaying amber lights. It imposes a general duty of “due care” and then states that, on parkways and controlled-access highways, such due care “shall include, but not be limited to,” moving from a lane that contains or is immediately adjacent to the shoulder where the hazard vehicle is present, provided the movement otherwise complies with New York’s lane discipline rules (notably § 1128(a), which requires that a lane change be made only when safe).

Overton argued that the lane change is merely an example of “due care,” not a mandatory component. The Second Circuit rejected this position, reading the phrase “shall include” as prescribing a mandatory action within the due-care obligation whenever it is feasible: if it can be done safely, a motorist must move over. The words “but not be limited to” do not dilute that requirement; they simply recognize that due care could entail additional precautions (for example, slowing down significantly, increasing following distance, or other measures) depending on the circumstances.

The panel’s reading is reinforced by:

The statutory cross-reference to § 1128(a), making safety the limiting condition on the obligation to change lanes.
Parallel state-court interpretations of § 1144-a(a) for emergency vehicles—using identical “shall include” language—to require a lane change when safe.
Legislative history (Bill Jacket) for the 2011 amendment adding § 1144-a(b), which aimed to fix the gap where drivers were not required to move over for hazard vehicles. The history underlines a legislative intent to mandate lane changes when passing hazard vehicles on controlled-access roadways if it can be done safely.

3) Fourth Amendment Reasoning and Application

The reasonable-suspicion standard is modest but requires specific and articulable facts. The credited testimony established that:

A tow truck with amber lights activated was on the shoulder (a “hazard vehicle” within § 1144-a(b)).
Overton passed the tow truck while traveling in the right lane adjacent to the shoulder.
The left lane was open; nothing prevented a safe lane change.

Taken together, these facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Overton committed a traffic infraction—failing to move over when it was safe to do so—permitting the stop under the Fourth Amendment (Stewart; Gomez).

The panel rejected Overton’s pretext argument as immaterial under Whren: even if an officer subjectively hoped to stop a driver for reasons unrelated to the traffic violation, an objectively supportable traffic infraction supplies constitutional justification for the seizure. The same objective lens explains why a mis-citation to § 1144-a(a) on the ticket did not undermine the stop: the relevant question is whether the observed facts support reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction, not whether the officer perfectly labeled the subsection at the roadside.

On the factual dispute, the court deferred to the district judge’s credibility determination under Anderson v. Bessemer City, noting the absence of extrinsic evidence that contradicted the trooper’s coherent account of his vantage point and the open left lane. The panel thus found no clear error.

Note: The opinion references September 15, 2020 as the date of the stop in its case overview and later mentions “September 15, 2024” in recounting testimony. That latter reference appears to be a benign typographical error that does not affect the legal analysis.

4) Likely Impact and Practical Implications

Although a summary order that lacks precedential effect, Overton is likely to be cited for its persuasive value in both federal suppression litigation and New York traffic prosecutions involving § 1144-a(b). Key implications include:

Clarified duty under § 1144-a(b): On controlled-access highways and parkways, “due care” includes a mandatory lane change (when safe) around hazard vehicles with activated amber lights. Slowing down alone may be insufficient if a safe lane change is available.
Enforcement and training: Law enforcement officers can rely on an observed failure to move over—when the adjacent lane is safely available—as an objective basis for a stop. Departments should train officers to document safety conditions (e.g., traffic flow, lane availability, road conditions) to withstand suppression challenges.
Defense strategies: Challenges will most effectively focus on safety and feasibility—whether traffic or roadway conditions truly permitted a safe lane change—and on evidentiary development (dashcam video, diagrams, lighting conditions, and vantage points) rather than on the semantics of “due care.”
Pretext is a dead end: As reaffirmed here, subjective motivations are irrelevant under Whren; the objective existence of a traffic infraction controls.
Mis-citations won’t carry the day: Even if an officer cites the wrong subsection, suppression will be denied if the facts objectively support a different, valid basis for the stop.
Broader “Move Over” enforcement: The decision aligns the hazard-vehicle subsection with state-court readings of the emergency-vehicle subsection, signaling a consistent, strict operationalization of New York’s “Move Over” law across categories of protected vehicles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order: A nonprecedential appellate disposition that may be cited for persuasive value under FRAP 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 but is not binding precedent.
Conditional Guilty Plea: A plea in which the defendant reserves the right to appeal a specified pretrial ruling (here, denial of suppression). If the appeal succeeds, the defendant may withdraw the plea.
Reasonable Suspicion: A lower threshold than probable cause. It requires specific, articulable facts, viewed under the totality of circumstances, that criminal or traffic wrongdoing may be afoot. It is “not a high” standard.
Clear Error vs. De Novo Review: Appellate courts review fact-finding (especially credibility determinations) for clear error, a deferential standard. Legal conclusions and mixed questions like whether facts amount to reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo (fresh look).
Pretextual Stop (Whren): Even if an officer’s subjective intent is to investigate unrelated crime, a traffic stop is constitutional if an objectively supportable traffic violation is observed.
N.Y. VTL § 1144-a(b) (Hazard Vehicles): Imposes a duty of due care; on controlled-access highways and parkways, due care “shall include” moving out of the lane adjacent to a hazard vehicle with amber lights if it can be done safely. The safety qualifier is enforced via § 1128(a) (no lane change unless it can be made “with safety”).
Bill Jacket (New York Legislative History): A compilation of legislative materials accompanying an enacted bill; New York courts give it considerable weight when discerning legislative intent.

Conclusion

United States v. Overton supplies a clear and textually anchored reading of New York’s “Move Over” law for hazard vehicles: on controlled-access highways and parkways, moving out of the lane adjacent to a tow truck or similar hazard vehicle with amber lights is not merely suggested—it is required when it can be done safely. This statutory violation furnished reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, rendering the officer’s subjective motives and ticket mis-citation immaterial under well-settled Fourth Amendment doctrine. The district court’s credibility findings, entitled to strong deference, sealed the outcome.

Though nonprecedential, the order provides cogent guidance for courts and practitioners: future suppression litigation will likely turn on concrete, fact-intensive questions about safety and feasibility of the lane change (lane availability, traffic, speed, lighting, weather, and vantage). For motorists in New York, the lesson is straightforward and practical—if a hazard vehicle with amber lights is on the shoulder of a controlled-access highway and it is safe to do so, move over. Failure to do so can lawfully trigger a stop and its consequences.