“More than the Principal”: The Sixth Circuit Confirms Courts May Award Pre-Judgment Interest under the MVRA

1. Introduction

United States v. Irene Michelle Fike, No. 24-5857 (6th Cir. June 10, 2025) presented the appellate court with a deceptively narrow question: may a sentencing judge tack pre-judgment interest onto a restitution order imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, when the statute does not expressly mention interest? The defendant—an accountant who stole over $363,000 from her client—argued the answer was “no.” The Sixth Circuit answered “yes,” thereby aligning itself with the majority of federal circuits and establishing controlling precedent within the Sixth Circuit. The ruling clarifies that “full” restitution under the MVRA embraces the time value of money and that district courts wield equitable discretion to award interest whenever it is needed to make a victim whole.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The district court ordered Ms. Fike to pay:

Principal loss: $363,657.67
Pre-judgment interest (2018 – May 2024): $42,209.41
Total restitution: $405,867.08

On appeal, Fike challenged only the interest component, contending that:

The MVRA is silent on interest, therefore interest is impermissible;
Even if permissible, the interest calculation was speculative.

Judge Davis, writing for a unanimous panel (Gilman, Davis, Mathis, JJ.), rejected both arguments. The court held that:

“The MVRA gives district courts discretion to award pre-judgment interest as part of restitution when that interest is necessary to make the victim whole.”

Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reliance on the victim’s sworn, itemized declaration, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the full restitution order.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mann, 814 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1987) — long-standing Sixth Circuit authority allowing equitable award of pre-judgment interest “even in the absence of statutory authority.” Provided historical foundation.
United States v. Cox, 665 F. App’x 457 (6th Cir. 2016) — unpublished decision noting MVRA does not forbid interest; cited to show Sixth Circuit had not foreclosed the practice.
Majority-view circuit cases under the MVRA/VWPA: Qurashi (2d Cir.), Gordon (9th Cir.), Fumo (3d Cir.), Alexander (8th Cir.), Huff (11th Cir.), Hoyle (4th Cir.), Patty (10th Cir.), Simpson (7th Cir.), Rochester (5th Cir.). Collectively illustrated national consensus that interest is available to achieve “full amount” restitution.
Western Hills Farms, LLC v. ClassicStar Farms, Inc., 727 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2013) — re-affirmed equitable discretion to grant interest as “complete compensation.”
Statutory anchors: MVRA §§ 3663A(b)(1) (return or value of property) and 3664(f)(1)(A) (full amount without regard to defendant’s economic circumstances).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual Hook — “Full Amount of Each Victim’s Losses.”
Section 3664(f)(1)(A) requires restitution equal to the “full amount” of the victim’s losses. The court reasoned that because money has a time value, mere repayment of principal years later is not “full” compensation.
Statutory Flexibility via § 3663A(b)(1)(B).
Congress directed courts to use whichever of two dates (loss date or sentencing date) yields the higher value. That acknowledgment of changing value implicitly accommodates time-based adjustments, including interest.
Equitable Tradition.
Even where statutes are silent, courts sitting in equity routinely award interest to avoid unjust enrichment (citing Mann).
No Express Prohibition.
The MVRA’s silence on interest is not a prohibition; it simply leaves the matter to judicial discretion.
Standard of Review.
On factual amount: abuse-of-discretion. On legal authority: de novo. The panel found no legal error, nor a “definite and firm conviction” of miscalculation error.
Reliability of Evidence.
The victim’s sworn declaration, with a compound-interest table tied to money-market rates at Morgan Stanley, bore “sufficient indicia of reliability.” The court emphasized that exactitude is not required; reasonable approximation suffices under § 3664(e).

3.3 Anticipated Impact

Binding Precedent in the Sixth Circuit. District judges in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee can now confidently award pre-judgment interest in MVRA cases.
Upward Restitution Exposure. Defendants face potentially significant additional liability—particularly in long-running frauds—beyond the principal loss amount.
Plea Negotiation Dynamics. Parties must address interest calculations when stipulating restitution. Boiler-plate references to “amount stolen” are now incomplete.
Procedural Expectations. Victims should submit itemized, sworn interest computations; defendants should be prepared to propose alternative rates if they wish to challenge reasonableness.
Alignment with National Consensus. The decision harmonizes the Sixth Circuit with nine sister circuits, promoting uniformity and reducing forum-shopping incentives.
Future Litigation Questions. The opinion leaves room for debate over (a) choice of interest rate, (b) compounding frequency, (c) tax or market adjustments, and (d) how interest interacts with “lost income” under § 3663A(b)(2) or (a)(4).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

MVRA (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act): A federal statute requiring courts to order restitution to victims of certain crimes—mainly fraud and property offenses—regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay.
Pre-Judgment Interest: Interest calculated on the amount of money wrongfully taken or withheld, running from the date of loss to the date of judgment. It compensates the victim for the inability to use that money productively.
Time Value of Money: An economics principle stating that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow because today’s dollar can be invested to earn a return.
Abuse-of-Discretion Standard: A deferential appellate review asking whether the lower court made “a clear error of judgment.” The appellate court does not substitute its own calculation unless firmly convinced the lower court was wrong.
Compound Interest: Interest calculated not only on the initial principal but also on accumulated interest from previous periods—“interest on interest.”

5. Conclusion

United States v. Fike cements the principle that “full restitution” under the MVRA means truly full—covering both the stolen principal and the economic value of its wrongful detention. By recognizing the judiciary’s discretionary power to award pre-judgment interest, the Sixth Circuit brings its jurisprudence in line with the overwhelming majority of circuits, provides clear guidance to district courts and litigants, and strengthens the statutory promise that crime victims will be made whole. Future MVRA cases in the circuit will now revolve less around the “whether” and more around the “how much” when it comes to interest, ushering in a new layer of analytical rigor at sentencing.