“Minor Political Assaults Outside Custodial Context Do Not Constitute Past Persecution”
A Comprehensive Commentary on Singh v. Bondi, 23-6750-ag (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Case Overview. In Singh v. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied an Indian national’s petition for review after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. The ruling clarifies—though in a non-precedential summary order—the evidentiary threshold for “past persecution” where (i) the physical harm is limited, (ii) it occurs outside a custodial setting, and (iii) the applicant relies heavily on uncorroborated future threats.

Parties.

• Petitioner: Mr. Gursameet Singh, a Sikh national from Punjab, India, affiliated with the Shiromani Akali Dal Mann (“Mann Party”).
• Respondent: Attorney General Pamela Bondi, representing the U.S. Department of Justice.

Key Issues.

1. Do two politically-motivated beatings that produce bruising and minor bleeding, without serious medical treatment or detention, rise to the level of past persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)?
2. Absent past persecution, has the applicant demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution or torture—either through individual targeting or a “pattern or practice” against similarly situated Sikhs advocating for Khalistan?
3. What standard of review applies to the IJ/BIA’s fact and law determinations?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit (Judges Raggi, Park, and Merriam) held:

• The IJ correctly found the two beatings did not amount to past persecution because the injuries were minor, involved no prolonged detention, and required only minimal medical intervention.
• The telephone death threats, lacking corroboration and detail, failed to transform the harm into persecution.
• Without past persecution, Singh carried the burden of proving an independent, well-founded fear of future persecution or torture. He fell short: country-conditions evidence showed political opposition parties in Punjab operate freely, with no pervasive targeting of Mann Party members.
• Consequently, his claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief, which demand higher probabilities of future harm, necessarily failed.

The petition for review was DENIED; all interim stays and motions were vacated.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2006)
   Provided the principle that a minor beating may constitute persecution if it occurs during detention/arrest on a protected ground. The court contrasted Singh: assaults happened on public streets, not in custody; hence the Beskovic exception did not apply.
2. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011)
   Reiterated that “persecution is an extreme concept.” The panel relied on this statement to emphasize that not every offensive act— even political assault—crosses the legal threshold.
3. Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820 (2d Cir. 2011)
   Upheld BIA’s finding that a single beating causing no lasting injury is not persecution. The physical parallels made Liu the closest factual analogue, heavily influencing the court’s outcome.
4. Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2014) & Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020)
   Both stress that threats, without more, generally do not equal persecution unless objectively imminent or concrete. The panel found Singh’s vague “two or three” calls fell far below that bar.
5. KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2024)
   Restated standards of review: questions of law de novo; factual findings for substantial evidence. Cited for methodological framing.
6. Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2009)
   Serves as a counter-example: week-long detention with daily beatings was persecution. The comparison underscored why Singh’s facts were insufficient.
7. Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) & BIA’s In re A-M-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 737 (2005)
   Address “pattern or practice” framework. The Second Circuit used these to determine that generalized violence or isolated incidents do not equal systemic or pervasive persecution.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

a. Standard of Harm. The court synthesized its precedent to reinforce a two-part test for physical assaults:

1. Severity of injury (medical treatment, lasting effects).
2. Context (custodial/detention versus open public setting).

Both elements must suggest “extreme” mistreatment. Singh’s bruises, minimal treatment, and lack of detention failed prong (i) and (ii).

b. Treatment of Threats. For threats to qualify as persecution, they must be so imminent or concrete that they cause actual harm or a reasonable probability of harm. Singh provided neither specific content nor origin of the calls.

c. Lack of Corroboration. The court noted absence of police reports, affidavits, or contemporaneous statements showing continued targeting, weakening both past- and future-persecution claims.

d. Country-Conditions Analysis. The court weighed Singh’s evidence against contradictory findings in the same reports: political opposition parties operate freely, and Sikhs face “little or no” discrimination with internal relocation possible. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), this defeated the claimed “pattern or practice.”

e. Knock-On Effect for Withholding/CAT. Because asylum requires only a “reasonable possibility” (≈ 10% chance) of persecution, failure at that stage automatically disposes of withholding (≈ 50% chance) and CAT (“more likely than not” to be tortured) under Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Persuasive Authority. Although a “summary order” lacks precedential value, it holds persuasive weight for IJs and litigants within the Second Circuit—particularly on factual analogues involving minor political assaults.
• Higher Evidentiary Expectations. Applicants relying on limited incidents must now marshal stronger corroboration (medical records, affidavits, police complaints) or show custodial context to meet the past-persecution threshold.
• Pattern-or-Practice Clarification. The case illustrates that cherry-picked adverse incidents cannot override broader reports demonstrating political pluralism or available relocation.
• Procedural Guidance. The order reminds counsel that failure on asylum grounds essentially forecloses withholding/CAT unless distinct torture evidence exists.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Past Persecution: A serious harm—physical, economic, or emotional—inflicted in the past because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social group. Minor harm generally falls short.
• Well-Founded Fear: A reasonable (≈ 10%) chance of future persecution. Must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.
• Pattern or Practice of Persecution: Widespread, systemic mistreatment of a protected group by the government or with its acquiescence. Isolated or sporadic acts do not meet this standard.
• Substantial Evidence Standard: The reviewing court defers to agency fact-finding unless any reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to conclude the opposite.
• Withholding of Removal vs. Asylum: Withholding has a higher burden (“clear probability” ≈ 50% chance) and gives narrower relief (cannot adjust status or travel easily) than asylum.
• CAT Relief: Protection from removal if it is “more likely than not” the individual will be intentionally tortured with government involvement or acquiescence.
• Summary Order: A non-precedential appellate disposition, citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 but lacking binding authority.

5. Conclusion

Singh v. Bondi underscores the Second Circuit’s consistent message: not every politically-motivated assault amounts to legal persecution. Where physical injuries are minor, unaccompanied by detention, and unsupported by credible ongoing threats or systemic targeting, asylum will be denied. While the decision is non-precedential, it provides a rigorous template for evaluating similar claims and highlights the critical role of corroborated evidence—medical, documentary, and country-specific—when asserting persecution rooted in political opinion. Counsel and applicants should read the judgment as a cautionary tale: robust factual development, context, and corroboration remain indispensable to surmount the “extreme concept” threshold built into U.S. asylum law.