“Minor Policy Deviations Are Insufficient to Establish Pretext” – Commentary on the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Wendy Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s August 2025 decision in Wendy Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, No. 24-1470, is a far-reaching employment–discrimination ruling that tightens the evidentiary standards employees must satisfy at the summary-judgment stage. Nurse Wendy Lohmeier—claiming discrimination, retaliation, and statutory violations under Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, and the Illinois Human Rights Act—challenged her termination after the disappearance of controlled opioids at Gottlieb Memorial Hospital. The Court, speaking through Judge Jackson-Akiwumi, affirmed summary judgment for the Hospital, emphasizing that:

• a single or minor deviation from internal policy will rarely demonstrate pretext;
• comparators must be “genuinely similar,” factoring in differentiating circumstances such as observable impairment; and
• where an employer undertakes an independent, multi-source investigation, discriminatory animus by co-workers will not be imputed to the decision maker.

Combined, these holdings crystallize a new practical rule: plaintiffs must tie alleged procedural irregularities to discriminatory motive with something more than speculation—otherwise their claims will not reach a jury.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After opioids went missing on October 12 2018, several nurses reported that Lohmeier appeared impaired. She was escorted for a fitness-for-duty exam, drug-tested, suspended, and ultimately fired. She sued on multiple theories, but the district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude:

• the Hospital discriminated on the basis of national origin or color (Title VII);
• the Hospital retaliated for protected activity (Title VII, FMLA);
• she was “disabled” under the ADA or denied a reasonable accommodation; or
• the Hospital interfered with legitimate FMLA rights.

Critically, the Court held that the Hospital’s modest policy lapses (allowing Lohmeier to finish charts and drive herself home) did not, without more, create a triable issue of pretext.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) – Governs summary-judgment standards; Court viewed facts in Lohmeier’s favor but required specific evidence.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Traditional burden-shifting framework; Lohmeier failed at the comparator stage.
• Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) – “Totality of evidence” approach; even viewed holistically, evidence fell short.
• Lesiv v. Illinois Central R.R., 39 F.4th 903 (7th Cir. 2022) – Refines comparator analysis; used to reject Lohmeier’s claimed comparators.
• Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2012) – Minor departures from policy are insufficient absent supporting evidence; cornerstone for the “minor-deviation rule.”
• Martino v. MCI, 574 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 2009) & Grant v. Trustees of IU, 870 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2017) – “Cat’s Paw”/proximate-cause doctrine; blocked attribution of co-workers’ bias to the Hospital.
• Numerous ADA/FMLA cases (Brooks, Preddie, Collins, Lutes) supplied statutory baselines the plaintiff could not meet.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Comparator Deficiency. Because Lohmeier’s observable impairment differentiated her from every other nurse on duty, she failed the fourth McDonnell Douglas prong.
2. Minor-Deviation Rule. Echoing Hanners, the Court declared that small, isolated departures from policy (here, allowing Lohmeier to chart and drive) do not create an inference of discrimination absent corroborating evidence.
3. Independent Investigation Shield. The decision-making committee relied on multiple statements, security logs, and sworn interviews. Under Martino, this independent inquiry severs liability even if some witnesses harbored bias.
4. ADA Disability Threshold Not Met. Lohmeier presented no evidence that shingles pain, or post-termination PTSD, substantially limited a major life activity.
5. FMLA Notice Requirements. A vague, “TBD” request does not place an employer on notice of a qualifying serious health condition, defeating both interference and retaliation theories.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

The opinion will likely reverberate well beyond the healthcare sector:

• Litigants must marshal concrete evidence—policy deviations must be substantial, repeated, or coupled with other indicia of bias.
• Employees relying on “cat’s paw” theories must prove the employer’s decision was wholly dependent on a biased report; independent corroboration now breaks the causal chain.
• Comparators will be scrutinised for qualitative similarity, not merely sharing a job title. Observable performance differences are legitimate differentiators at summary judgment.
• FMLA plaintiffs should ensure initial medical certifications contain definitive information; “indeterminate” entries imperil claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Judgment – A procedural device letting a judge decide a case without trial when no material factual disputes exist.
• Pretext – A false reason given by an employer to hide true, unlawful motives (e.g., discrimination). Claimants must show the stated reason is both false and a cover for discrimination.
• Comparator – A co-worker whose treatment is compared to the plaintiff’s to prove unequal treatment. Must be similarly situated “in all material respects.”
• Cat’s Paw Liability – An employer may be liable for the discriminatory animus of a non-decision maker if the employer’s decision relies solely on that person’s biased input.
• Major Life Activity (ADA) – Fundamental activities such as walking, seeing, working, caring for oneself. Disability exists only if these are substantially limited.
• FMLA Notice – Employees must tell their employer not just that they are sick, but the nature, timing, and expected duration of a serious health condition.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Lohmeier crystallises a pivotal principle: isolated policy lapses and speculative claims are not enough to survive summary judgment in discrimination suits. Plaintiffs must link alleged irregularities directly to discriminatory intent, buttressed by credible comparators or substantive proof of bias. For employers, the decision underscores the protective value of prompt, well-documented, multi-source investigations. For employees and counsel, it is a cautionary tale about the evidence required to convert workplace suspicion into a viable federal case.