“Meaningfully-Constrain” Test Confirmed: The Second Circuit Upholds 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) in United States v. Perez

1. Introduction

On 19 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a significant post-Bruen firearms decision in United States v. Perez, No. 24-162-cr. The three-judge panel (Robinson, Pérez, and Nathan, JJ.) affirmed the conviction of Steven Perez—known as “Lucha El”—for transporting firearms from South Carolina into New York in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and for conspiracy under § 371.

Perez’s sole appellate argument was that § 922(a)(3) infringes the Second Amendment because it bars private, unlicensed interstate transport and receipt of guns. The Court disagreed, holding that:

Section 922(a)(3) is a commercial sale regulation that does not “meaningfully constrain” the core right to “keep and bear Arms” and is therefore presumptively constitutional under the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
Even if the statute did burden protected conduct, it is consistent with founding-era traditions regulating the movement of arms across political borders and disarming those perceived as dangerous.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying the two-step “text-and-history” framework dictated by Bruen, the panel:

Step 1 – Text: Reaffirmed its 2012 precedent United States v. Decastro, holding that § 922(a)(3) “only minimally affects the ability to acquire a firearm” and therefore does not even implicate—let alone infringe—the textual right to keep and bear arms.
Step 2 – History: Alternately found that colonial and founding-era laws restricting export, import, and transport of firearms, gunpowder, and ammunition constitute relevant historical analogues supporting § 922(a)(3).

Disposition: Judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – Recognized individual right to keep and bear arms but labeled “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” as “presumptively lawful.” That language undergirds the Second Circuit’s treatment of § 922(a)(3) as a sale regulation.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) – Incorporated the Second Amendment against the states; cited for the same commercial-sale caveat.
United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) – Earlier Second Circuit decision upholding § 922(a)(3) because it left “ample alternative means” to obtain firearms. The panel explicitly reaffirms its vitality post-Bruen.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – Replaced means-end scrutiny with a strict text-and-history test. Perez marks one of the first appellate applications of that test to a federal commerce-based gun rule.
Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186 (2d Cir. 2023) – Upheld extensive state dealer regulations; emphasized the need for a “meaningful constraint” on access before step-two history is required. Perez extends that reasoning to a federal statute.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – Clarified how to use historical analogues (“why & how” inquiry) and sanctioned modern laws that disarm dangerous individuals. The panel leans heavily on Rahimi’s “relevantly similar” standard.
Antonyuk v. James (Antonyuk II), 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024) – Provided Second Circuit guidance on comparing founding-era and Reconstruction-era evidence and on counting historical laws; Perez follows that approach.
Other supportive cases: Teixeira v. County of Alameda (9th Cir.), Oakland Tactical (6th Cir.), Rocky Mountain Gun Owners (10th Cir.).

3.2 Legal Reasoning Explained

Commercial-Sale Safe Harbor. Building on Heller and Gazzola, the panel treats § 922(a)(3) as a condition on the manner of acquisition, not on ownership or carry. Unless the statute “meaningfully constrains” acquisition, it never reaches step 2.
Minimal Burden Finding. The Court emphasized that New York residents may (1) buy guns in-state, (2) buy out-of-state through an in-state Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL), or (3) themselves secure an FFL. Perez’s only complaint was the loss of anonymity when using a straw purchaser—an interest the Second Amendment does not protect.
Reaffirmation of Pre-Bruen Precedent. Bruen did not disturb Decastro’s factual finding about minimal burden; Decastro also did not engage in forbidden means-end balancing, so stare decisis applies.
Historical Analogy (Alternate Holding).
- Founding-era statutes restricted export, import, and even in-colony transfer of arms and powder—e.g., 1794 federal export ban, Massachusetts and Connecticut powder laws, Virginia three-mile rule.
- Many aimed at preventing weapons from reaching those deemed dangerous (Native Americans, foreign powers, criminals), paralleling § 922(a)(3)’s purpose of thwarting traffickers circumventing state checks.
- Under Rahimi’s “why & how” test, exact symmetry (seller vs. buyer) is unnecessary—both categories regulate cross-border movement.
No Contrary Tradition Shown. Perez offered no founding-era evidence of a broad right to import privately purchased firearms across borders, so even a small set of government analogues sufficed.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

Federal Statutes Fortified. The ruling strengthens other GCA provisions that hinge on interstate elements (§§ 922(a)(1), (a)(5), (g)(8), etc.) by codifying an analytic route to upholding them.
Commercial-Sale Litigations. Courts now have an appellate blueprint: determine whether the contested rule “meaningfully constrains” access; if not, the inquiry ends.
Forum-Shopping for Straw Purchases Curtailed. Defendants cannot exploit Bruen to invalidate transport restrictions simply because their home state’s laws are tougher.
Historical-Evidence Expectations. Perez confirms the Second Circuit’s stance that litigants must supply contrary analogues to defeat a modest government showing; one side cannot win by pointing to “too few” laws alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Commercial-Sale Regulation: Rules that govern where, when, or by whom firearms may be bought or sold—background checks, dealer licensing, safe-storage requirements, etc. They differ from bans on possession or carry.
“Meaningfully Constrain” Test: An acquisition rule implicates the Second Amendment only if it materially hinders ordinary, law-abiding citizens from obtaining guns. Inconvenience or loss of anonymity is not enough.
Text-and-History Framework (Bruen):
1. Does the challenged law regulate conduct protected by the plain text (“keep” or “bear”)?
2. If yes, is the regulation “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” (using relevant analogues)?
Historical Analogue: A past law need not be identical; it must impose a similar burden for a similar reason (“how and why”).
Straw Purchaser: Someone who buys a firearm on behalf of another to conceal the true buyer’s identity—illegal under federal law.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Perez cements the Second Circuit’s post-Bruen jurisprudence: federal and state rules that condition the commercial flow of firearms survive constitutional scrutiny so long as they do not substantially block law-abiding citizens from owning or carrying guns. By reaffirming Decastro and deploying a robust historical analysis as an alternative ground, the Court provides lower courts with a clear, dual-track methodology for evaluating ancillary Second-Amendment challenges. The decision will likely insulate a host of interstate trafficking provisions from future attacks and clarifies that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to purchase firearms anonymously across state lines.