“Meaningful Change, Not Mere Compliance”: Termination of Parental Rights After Recurring Domestic Violence and Failed Improvement Efforts in In re C.F. and I.F.

“Meaningful Change, Not Mere Compliance”: Termination of Parental Rights After Recurring Domestic Violence and Failed Improvement Efforts in In re C.F. and I.F.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re C.F. and I.F., No. 25‑19 (Nov. 25, 2025), affirms the termination of a father’s parental rights following a second round of abuse and neglect proceedings grounded in chronic domestic violence and its impact on the children.

While issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure (and thus not intended as a broad precedential opinion), the Court’s analysis is significant in three key respects:

  1. It underscores that recurring domestic violence after a prior, successful improvement period can support a finding that there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correcting conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future, justifying immediate termination without less restrictive alternatives.
  2. It reiterates that mere procedural compliance with services (“going through the motions”) is insufficient; courts look for actual and meaningful behavioral change, particularly in domestic violence dynamics.
  3. It reinforces that a post-dispositional improvement period cannot be granted absent a written motion, applying West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610 and State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson.

The decision thus operates as a sharp reminder that parents in abuse and neglect proceedings must demonstrate genuine transformation, not simply attendance at programs, and that statutory formalities around improvement periods are strictly enforced.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The First Abuse and Neglect Case (2021–2023)

In 2021, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition involving two children, C.F. and I.F. The allegations included:

  • Domestic violence between the petitioner father (M.F.) and the mother;
  • Substance abuse by both parents; and
  • The mother’s untreated mental health issues.

Both parents were granted post-adjudicatory improvement periods and, critically, successfully completed them. As a result, they regained custody of the children in January 2023, and the earlier case was dismissed.

B. The Second Abuse and Neglect Petition (November 2023)

Less than a year after regaining custody, DHS filed a second petition in November 2023. The new allegations focused again on:

  • Domestic violence between the parents, with the children disclosing “multiple new incidents of violence” between the couple;
  • The father’s failure to protect the children from this violence by remaining in the relationship; and
  • Serious functional impacts on the children:
    • “Severe dysfunctional behaviors”; and
    • Repeatedly falling asleep in school, indicative of household turmoil and sleep disruption.

C. Adjudication (April 2024)

At the April 2024 adjudicatory hearing:

  • The father stipulated that he:
    • Failed to protect the children; and
    • Remained in a relationship with the mother despite a long history of domestic violence.
  • The circuit court accepted the stipulation and adjudicated him as an abusing and/or neglecting parent for both children.

Following adjudication, the father moved in writing for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The circuit court denied that motion, emphasizing:

  • The father had already received and completed a prior post-adjudicatory improvement period in the earlier case;
  • Despite those services, the same domestic violence issues recurred; and
  • He had multiple “opportunities to separate” from the mother but had chosen not to.

D. Disposition (November 2024)

At the November 2024 dispositional hearing:

  • DHS reiterated that:
    • The prior improvement period had not produced durable change;
    • The domestic violence and turmoil resurfaced rapidly after case closure.
  • The father testified that:
    • He and the mother had “talked about” obtaining a divorce, but no papers had been filed;
    • They still resided together, which he claimed was only for financial reasons;
    • He acknowledged that resources existed to help him separate from the mother;
    • He was participating (on his own initiative) in:
      • Marital counseling,
      • Drug screening, and
      • Parenting classes;
    • But he had not engaged in services specifically targeting domestic violence.

The circuit court found this unpersuasive. It explicitly stated it was:

“not persuaded by the [petitioner's] new allegations that they are separating or divorcing; that they are trying to address their issues and start services; that they are only still living together due to financial issues; and that their marital strife is the cause of the discord.”

The circuit court further found that:

  • The father would “simply go through the motions and do everything that is required of him, without making any actual or meaningful changes or improvements.”
  • There was no reasonable likelihood he could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, given his demonstrated inadequate capacity to solve these problems “on his own or with help.”
  • The children had “suffered grievous psychological injuries with physical manifestations” because of the household turmoil, adversely affecting:
    • Sleep,
    • Schooling,
    • Mental health, and
    • Physical health.
  • Termination of the father’s parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare.

The mother’s parental rights were also terminated, and the permanency plan for both children became adoption by their current placement.

At disposition, the father made an oral motion for a post-dispositional improvement period. The circuit court denied the motion, and the father appealed.

E. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the father raised two primary arguments:

  1. The circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights instead of imposing a less restrictive dispositional alternative, such as allowing additional time for him to formalize a separation or divorce from the mother.
  2. The circuit court erred by denying his post-dispositional improvement period, which he requested orally at the dispositional hearing.

He did not meaningfully challenge the denial of his earlier written motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and focused instead on the dispositional stage.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Appeals, applying the standard of review from In re Cecil T., affirmed the circuit court’s December 9, 2024, dispositional order.

A. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court held that:

  • Under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), a circuit court may terminate parental rights without using a less restrictive alternative when:
    • There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
    • Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.
  • Consistent with syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., which reaffirmed syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., termination may be ordered “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when those statutory criteria are met.
  • Based on the record, there was ample evidence that:
    • The same domestic violence issues recurred despite a prior successful improvement period; and
    • The children were seriously harmed by the tumultuous home environment.
  • The father’s claimed intention to separate or divorce, and his explanation that he cohabited with the mother for financial reasons, were credibility determinations for the circuit court, which the Supreme Court would not second-guess.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights without giving him additional time or utilizing a less restrictive option.

B. Denial of a Post-Dispositional Improvement Period

On the improvement period issue, the Court held:

  • West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(A) requires that a written motion be filed as a precondition to granting a post-dispositional improvement period.
  • Under syllabus point 4 of State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, a circuit court may not grant such an improvement period unless the respondent files a written motion.
  • Here, the father only made an oral motion for a post-dispositional improvement period and never filed a written motion. Thus, he did not meet the statutory requirement and was entitled to no relief on that ground.
  • Even if the circuit court’s denial were understood as a ruling “on the merits,” the same evidence supporting termination (ongoing domestic violence, lack of meaningful change, harm to the children) supplied a sufficient evidentiary basis to deny a post-dispositional improvement period.

The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Procedural Framework

1. Abuse and Neglect Proceedings in West Virginia

West Virginia’s child welfare statutes (primarily Chapter 49 of the West Virginia Code) establish a two-stage structure:

  • Adjudicatory stage: The circuit court determines whether a child is abused and/or neglected and whether the respondent is an “abusing” or “neglectful” parent.
  • Dispositional stage: If adjudication is positive, the court chooses among a range of dispositional options, including:
    • Return of the child under supervision;
    • Temporary custody or guardianship with relatives or DHS;
    • Custodial or guardianship arrangements with concurrent planning; and
    • Termination of parental rights under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6).

In between adjudication and disposition, parents may be granted “improvement periods” to attempt rehabilitation and demonstrate capacity to safely parent.

2. Improvement Periods: Post-Adjudicatory vs. Post-Dispositional

An “improvement period” is a statutorily authorized time during which:

  • The parent engages in services;
  • DHS provides support and monitoring; and
  • The court evaluates whether the parent can correct the conditions of abuse/neglect.

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610 provides for different types of improvement periods, including:

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: After the parent has been adjudicated as abusive or neglectful but before final disposition.
  • Post-dispositional improvement period: After disposition, often in circumstances where some less-than-termination disposition was initially chosen, or where the court is willing to consider another attempt at rehabilitation despite a very serious posture of the case.

Key features:

  • Improvement periods are discretionary, not automatic.
  • The parent must show by clear and convincing evidence that:
    • They are likely to fully participate in the period; and
    • The improvement period would serve the child’s best interests.
  • For a post-dispositional improvement period, § 49‑4‑610(3)(A) requires a written motion—a key point in this case.

3. The “No Reasonable Likelihood” Standard for Termination

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights where:

  1. There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  2. Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

The statute further defines “no reasonable likelihood” (see § 49‑4‑604 and related subsections) to include circumstances such as:

  • Chronic, repeated, or severe abuse or neglect;
  • Failure to respond adequately to or benefit from services designed to correct conditions;
  • Demonstrated inability or unwillingness to change harmful behavior patterns.

In this case, the father’s inability to achieve lasting change after receiving extensive services in a prior case, combined with rapid recurrence of the same domestic violence dynamics, squarely fit that framework.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court began by reciting syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., which sets the standard of review for appeals in abuse and neglect cases:

  • Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and
  • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This framework is central because the father’s arguments—particularly regarding his intentions to separate from the mother and his alleged progress—essentially asked the Supreme Court to reweigh factual determinations and credibility, which are heavily insulated from appellate second-guessing.

2. In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

Syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y. (quoting syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M.) holds:

Termination of parental rights may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future.

The Court invoked this line of precedent to reject the father’s core argument: that the circuit court should have employed a less drastic disposition—effectively, a further delay or another improvement period while he purportedly finalized a divorce or separation.

Through Kristin Y. and R.J.M., the Supreme Court emphasized again that:

  • When statutory conditions for termination under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) are met, the circuit court is not required to try every lesser option first.
  • Children are not to be kept in limbo while a parent cycles through repeated, unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation.

3. Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997)

The Court quoted Michael D.C. to remind that appellate courts do not second-guess the trial court’s credibility judgments:

“A reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is uniquely situated to make such determinations and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such determinations.”

This principle was pivotal because the father’s appellate argument hinged on his testimony that:

  • He and the mother were in the process of separating/divorcing;
  • They cohabited only for financial reasons; and
  • They were seeking to address their marital and domestic issues.

The circuit court expressly found these claims not credible. The Supreme Court refused to disturb those findings, reinforcing that:

  • Promises of future change, unsupported by concrete action (e.g., no divorce filing, continued cohabitation, no DV‑specific services), may be discounted by the trial court.
  • Appellate courts will not reweigh such determinations.

4. State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730, 2021 WL 5355634 (2021)

Syllabus point 4 of P.G.-1 v. Wilson holds that a circuit court may not grant an improvement period under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610 unless the respondent files a written motion requesting it.

The Supreme Court relied on this to:

  • Reject the father’s challenge to the denial of his post-dispositional improvement period outright; and
  • Clarify that the formality of a written motion is a mandatory statutory prerequisite, not a trivial or waivable technicality.

The decision thus reconfirms that:

  • Improvement periods are creatures of statute;
  • Courts are constrained by statutory conditions in granting them; and
  • Failure to comply with procedural requirements (like filing in writing) is itself fatal to such a request.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Termination Without Less Restrictive Disposition

The father’s primary argument was that he should have been given more time to separate from the mother and that a less restrictive dispositional alternative (short of termination) should have been chosen. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in rejecting that argument can be distilled into three themes.

a. Recurrence of Domestic Violence After Services Demonstrates Inadequate Capacity to Change

The Court placed heavy weight on the recidivism of the underlying problem:

  • In the first case, both parents completed a post-adjudicatory improvement period with DHS services and regained custody.
  • Within roughly ten months, DHS had to file a second petition alleging the same core issue: domestic violence in the home, now with documented severe harms to the children.

From this, the circuit court—and in turn, the Supreme Court—reasoned that:

  • The father had already been given a full opportunity to address domestic violence within the structured context of an improvement period.
  • His relapse into the same pattern of conduct signaled an inadequate capacity to correct those conditions “on his own or with help.”
  • This recurrence supported a finding of no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future.
b. Meaningful Change vs. “Going Through the Motions”

A critical aspect of the circuit court’s reasoning—endorsed by the Supreme Court—was its focus on substance over form in evaluating the father’s claimed progress:

  • The father highlighted that he was attending counseling, drug screenings, and parenting classes.
  • But he had not undertaken domestic-violence-specific interventions.
  • The circuit court concluded that he was likely to “simply go through the motions and do everything that is required of him, without making any actual or meaningful changes or improvements.”

The Supreme Court’s acceptance of this analysis underscores:

  • Compliance with service plans (showing up, signing in, completing tasks) is not, by itself, sufficient;
  • Courts look for demonstrable change in:
    • Living arrangements;
    • Relationships (e.g., truly ending a violent partnership);
    • Behavior patterns;
    • Insight into the impact on children.

In domestic violence cases in particular, the decision suggests an expectation that parents will:

  • Remove children from continued exposure to the violent relationship; and
  • Engage expressly in domestic violence treatment or batterer intervention, not just generic counseling.
c. Children’s Welfare and the Gravity of Harm

The circuit court’s finding that the children suffered:

  • “Grievous psychological injuries”;
  • Physical manifestations of psychological distress; and
  • Sleep and school disruption,

was central to the conclusion that termination was “necessary for the welfare of the child.” The Supreme Court:

  • Accepted those findings as supported by the record; and
  • Viewed them as justification for not prolonging uncertainty through additional or delayed interventions.

This highlights that:

  • Domestic violence is recognized as a serious form of child maltreatment, even where the child is not the direct physical target; and
  • Psychological harm, especially when manifested physically (e.g., sleep disturbance, somatic symptoms), can satisfy the statutory welfare concerns underpinning termination.

2. Deference to Credibility Findings

The father’s request for additional time hinged almost entirely on his own testimony:

  • He and the mother planned to divorce;
  • They were only living together due to finances; and
  • They were attempting to address their issues.

The circuit court did not believe these assertions. The Supreme Court, invoking Michael D.C., underscored that:

  • Credibility determinations belong to the circuit court, which sees and hears witnesses firsthand;
  • An appellate court “is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such determinations.”

This strongly signals that, absent concrete corroboration (e.g., filed divorce papers, separate housing, documented DV-specific treatment), vague future-oriented promises will carry little weight on appeal.

3. Denial of a Post-Dispositional Improvement Period

The Court analyzed this issue on two independent grounds.

a. Procedural Non-Compliance: Failure to File a Written Motion

First, the Court applied West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(A) and P.G.-1 v. Wilson:

  • A written motion is a statutory requirement for any improvement period under § 49‑4‑610.
  • The father made only an oral motion at disposition.
  • Because the statutory prerequisite was not met, he was “entitled to no relief” on this claim.

This is a procedural holding with practical significance for practitioners: oral requests will not suffice; the motion must be reduced to writing and filed to trigger the court’s authority to grant an improvement period.

b. Substantive Unsuitability: No Basis to Grant Improvement Period

Second, the Court stated that:

  • Even assuming the circuit court’s denial was on the merits (rather than due to procedural deficiency), the same evidence underpinning:
    • The finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction; and
    • The termination of parental rights
  • also supported denial of a post-dispositional improvement period.

Given:

  • The short time between case closure and new petition;
  • The repeated domestic violence;
  • The severe harm to the children; and
  • The father’s lack of DV-specific remediation and ongoing cohabitation with the mother;

the Court found no abuse of discretion in denying further rehabilitative opportunities.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Abuse” and “Neglect” in a Domestic Violence Context

In West Virginia, a child can be deemed “abused” or “neglected” not only if the parent directly harms the child, but also if:

  • The child is exposed to domestic violence between adults in the household, especially where that exposure causes or risks serious physical or emotional harm; or
  • A parent fails to protect the child from such violence when it is within the parent’s power to do so (e.g., by separating, seeking protection, or refusing to cohabit with the abuser).

Here, the father’s adjudication rested on his failure to protect and his decision to remain in a long‑standing violent relationship with the mother, rather than on direct physical abuse of the children.

2. “No Reasonable Likelihood” the Conditions Can Be Corrected

This phrase is a statutory standard. It does not mean “zero chance,” but rather that, in view of the history and evidence:

  • It is unrealistic to expect the parent to fix the problems in the near future;
  • Even if the parent claims willingness, their past failures to change, especially after receiving services, show a pattern that is unlikely to reverse soon.

In practice, factors like:

  • Repeated prior interventions;
  • Brief periods of apparent improvement followed by relapse;
  • Superficial or checklist-style participation in services; and
  • Persistent denial, minimization, or continuation of harmful relationships;

all feed into this determination.

3. “Less Restrictive Alternatives” to Termination

A “less restrictive alternative” is any disposition that stops short of completely extinguishing parental rights, such as:

  • Temporary placement with relatives;
  • Long-term guardianship;
  • Supervised visitation while the parent continues services; or
  • A trial home placement under stringent oversight.

However, Kristin Y. and R.J.M. make clear that:

  • The court is not obligated to use these alternatives if it finds:
    • No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future; and
    • Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
  • In such cases, the law prefers finality and permanency for the child over indefinitely prolonging parental rehabilitation efforts.

4. Post-Adjudicatory vs. Post-Dispositional Improvement Periods

The distinction between the two can be summarized:

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period:
    • Requested after adjudication;
    • Often the first significant “chance” to rehabilitate;
    • Denial may rest on lack of evidence the parent will participate or benefit.
  • Post-dispositional improvement period:
    • Requested after a dispositional order (often where rights have not yet been fully terminated or where the court is contemplating more severe measures);
    • Statutorily requires a written motion;
    • Typically granted, if at all, where there is a strong, new basis to believe that rehabilitation is now realistically achievable and consistent with the child’s interests.

In In re C.F. and I.F., the father:

  • Did file a written motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period (denied by the circuit court); but
  • Made only an oral motion for a post-dispositional improvement period (insufficient under § 49‑4‑610 and P.G.-1).

5. Memorandum Decisions Under Rule 21

The Supreme Court issued this decision as a “memorandum decision” under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such decisions:

  • Are typically used where the Court finds:
    • No new or significant questions of law are presented; and
    • A written, signed opinion would have limited precedential value.
  • Nevertheless provide important guidance and are part of the body of persuasive authority on how existing precedents and statutes are applied to recurring factual patterns—such as domestic violence recidivism after prior improvement periods.

E. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

1. For Trial Courts

This decision reinforces several points for circuit judges:

  • It is appropriate—and statutorily supported—to deny additional improvement periods and proceed to termination where:
    • The parent has already had a full opportunity to engage in services;
    • The same conditions recur; and
    • The child’s welfare is being significantly compromised.
  • Courts may, and should, differentiate between:
    • Formal compliance (attendance, checklists); and
    • Substantive change (actual cessation of domestic violence, separation from dangerous partners, stable and safe home environments).
  • Explicit findings about the children’s psychological and physical harm from household turmoil strengthen the legal basis for termination and withstand appellate scrutiny.

2. For DHS and Child Welfare Practitioners

The case supports DHS and guardians ad litem in:

  • Arguing that repeat cases following prior improvement periods can justify aggressive dispositional recommendations, including termination;
  • Documenting not only the conduct (domestic violence) but also its impact on children (sleep disturbance, school functioning, mental health) to meet the “welfare” prong of § 49‑4‑604(c)(6);
  • Insisting on domestic-violence-specific services when DV is the core issue, rather than accepting generic counseling as sufficient.

3. For Parents’ Counsel

For attorneys representing parents, the decision offers several clear lessons:

  • File written motions for any requested improvement period—especially at the post-dispositional stage. Oral motions are insufficient under § 49‑4‑610 and will be fatal on appeal.
  • Prepare to present solid, objective evidence of:
    • Concrete steps toward ending violent relationships (e.g., filed divorce petitions, separate residences, protective orders where appropriate);
    • Completion of and success in DV-specific treatment or batterer intervention programs; and
    • Changes in day-to-day conduct that reduce risk to children.
  • Advise clients that:
    • “Going through the motions” is not enough; judges look at outcomes and behavior; and
    • Courts will give significant weight to prior failed efforts and recidivism when assessing “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.

4. For Domestic Violence Cases More Broadly

The decision contributes to the ongoing jurisprudence that:

  • Domestic violence is not a private marital issue when children are present; it is a central child protection concern.
  • Parents who remain with violent partners and expose children to ongoing turmoil risk being adjudicated as neglectful or abusive, even if they are not the direct perpetrators of violence.
  • Court orders will look skeptically at:
    • Vague promises of future separation;
    • Explanations that financial dependency justifies continued cohabitation in a dangerous home; and
    • Service participation that does not target the core problem (here, DV) in a meaningful way.

V. Conclusion

In re C.F. and I.F. is a pointed application of West Virginia’s child welfare statutes and longstanding precedents to a recurring and difficult context: chronic domestic violence resurfacing after an earlier, seemingly successful case closure.

The decision reaffirms that:

  • When a parent has already had a meaningful opportunity to address abuse or neglect through an improvement period, and the same conditions recur with significant harm to the child, a circuit court may:
    • Find “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction in the near future; and
    • Terminate parental rights without deploying lesser alternatives.
  • Courts are entitled to insist on genuine behavioral change, not just formal compliance with services.
  • Strict adherence to procedural requirements—such as the written motion prerequisite for post-dispositional improvement periods—is mandatory, and failure to comply will bar relief.

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re C.F. and I.F. provides clear, practical guidance for stakeholders in abuse and neglect proceedings: children’s need for safety and permanency, especially in the face of repeated domestic violence, will not yield indefinitely to parental requests for “one more chance,” particularly where those requests lack both procedural regularity and credible evidence of meaningful, lasting change.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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