“Loss of Confidence” as a Stand-Alone, Legitimate Reason
Fifth Circuit Commentary on Glover v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government

I. Introduction

Thomas L. Glover, a Black law-enforcement veteran, was hired as the first Black Chief of Police for the Lafayette Police Department (“LPD”) in December 2020 and terminated ten months later by Lafayette’s Mayor-President Joshua Guillory. Glover alleged racial discrimination under Title VII, §§ 1981 and 1983, claiming that his firing was prompted by pressure from a predominantly White police union unhappy with his disciplinary decisions. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (“LCG”) countered that Guillory and the Chief Administrative Officer had simply “lost confidence” in Glover after he allegedly misrepresented facts to a councilmember and to the Civil Service Board. The district court granted summary judgment to LCG; the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, with Judge Higginson dissenting.

The case squarely presented two recurring Title VII questions:

• Does appointing a same-race “interim” successor defeat the prima facie element that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class?
• At step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, can an employer’s generalized statement of “loss of confidence” suffice as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, thereby shifting the burden back to the plaintiff to prove pretext?

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit, reviewing de novo, assumed arguendo that Glover had established a prima facie case, but nevertheless affirmed summary judgment because:

1. LCG articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—loss of confidence flowing from two specific alleged misrepresentations.
2. Glover produced no evidence that the stated reason was pretextual or that race was a motivating factor. Conclusory assertions, anecdotal “faction” remarks, and speculation about union pressure did not suffice.
3. Even shifting explanations or the timing of LCG’s reasons did not create a material fact issue absent evidence linking those shifts to racial animus.

Judge Higginson dissented, arguing that the majority bypassed the “shifting reasons” evidence, which could permit a jury to infer pretext, and that the district court never evaluated this step.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning draws heavily on classic Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court discrimination jurisprudence:

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Three-step burden-shifting framework for circumstantial Title VII evidence.
• Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000) – “Same actor inference” when the same person hires and fires.
• Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004) – Mixed-motive alternative (plaintiff can show protected trait was a motivating factor).
• Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 2016) – Step-two burden is only one of production, no credibility assessment.
• Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2003) – Requirements for stray remarks to be probative of discrimination.
• Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2002) – Inconsistent explanations can evidence pretext.

The majority acknowledged Gee and Laxton but maintained they did not apply because Glover’s record lacked a link between inconsistencies and race.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Prima Facie Case. The district court ruled Glover failed at step one because his immediate successor, Wayne Griffin, was also Black. On appeal, the panel noted an unresolved Fifth Circuit question—whether an “interim” hire counts as a replacement—but assumed in Glover’s favor that the prima facie showing existed. This assumption strategically shifted focus to steps two and three.
2. Step Two – Legitimate Reason. LCG’s “loss of confidence” statement, anchored in two alleged misrepresentations, was supported by sworn testimony and therefore satisfied the Heinsohn minimal burden of production.
3. Step Three – Pretext / Mixed Motive.
   • Pretext Route: Glover needed evidence that LCG’s stated reason was false and that the real reason was race. He offered only conclusory affidavits and undefined “faction” remarks, which failed Palasota.
   • Mixed Motive Route: Even if loss of confidence was genuine, Glover could prevail if race was another motivating factor (Rachid). Again, the record was too scant to draw an inference that race, rather than disagreement over discipline, motivated the firing.
4. Handling of Shifting Explanations. The majority effectively treated timing inconsistencies (e.g., crime-statistics rationale emerging later) as immaterial without proof of racial bias. The dissent countered that lack of contemporaneous documentation and shifting narratives should go to a jury under Gee/Laxton.

C. Impact on Future Litigation

• Codifies “loss of confidence” language. Employers in the Fifth Circuit can now point to this opinion to argue that a generalized but documented “loss of confidence” satisfies step two, so long as some admissible evidence supports it.
• Raises evidentiary bar at step three. Plaintiffs must present more than anecdotal or speculative evidence; they must connect inconsistencies or hostile remarks directly to protected traits.
• Leaves “interim replacement” question open. The panel again skirted resolving whether an interim successor counts for prima facie purposes, preserving a split among district courts and ensuring continued litigation of that niche issue.
• Same-Actor Inference Reaffirmed. The opinion underscores that when the same decision-maker hires and fires within a short window, plaintiffs need especially compelling evidence of discriminatory motive.
• Municipal Employers. For public entities, the case illustrates the importance of contemporaneous documentation; the dissent warns that the absence of such records may fuel jury issues in future cases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title VII. Federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
• McDonnell Douglas Framework. Three-stage process: (1) employee makes minimal prima facie showing; (2) employer produces a legitimate reason; (3) employee proves the reason is pretext or that discrimination was a factor.
• Same-Actor Inference. If the same person hired and fired the employee within a short period, courts presume discrimination is less likely.
• Pretext. A false reason offered to hide the real discriminatory motive.
• Mixed Motive. Case where both legitimate and illegitimate (discriminatory) reasons contributed to the employment decision.
• Summary Judgment. A procedural device allowing courts to dispose of a case when no factual disputes require a trial.

V. Conclusion

Glover v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government fortifies employers’ ability to rely on a broadly stated “loss of confidence” as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason at step two of McDonnell Douglas. Unless plaintiffs can marshal concrete, non-speculative evidence linking that stated reason to discriminatory animus, summary judgment will likely be upheld. The case also demonstrates the persuasive heft of the same-actor inference and leaves unresolved the thorny issue of whether an “interim” successor qualifies as a replacement for prima facie purposes. The divided panel reminds litigants that contemporaneous documentation and consistent decision-making rationales remain the safest route for employers, while plaintiffs must diligently develop admissible evidence of causation—not merely context—to survive the pretext gauntlet.