“Life Minus Months Still Equals Life”: Second Circuit Reaffirms § 3583(h) Supervised-Release Calculus for § 2252A Revocations and Enforces Oral-Pronouncement Rule

“Life Minus Months Still Equals Life”: Second Circuit Reaffirms § 3583(h) Supervised-Release Calculus for § 2252A Revocations and Enforces Oral-Pronouncement Rule

Note on precedential status: This disposition is a Summary Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but does not have precedential effect. Even so, it provides a clear, up-to-date statement of the Second Circuit’s approach to two recurring supervised-release issues: (1) how to calculate the maximum permissible supervised-release term upon revocation for offenses covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), and (2) the requirement that all conditions of supervised release be orally pronounced in open court.

Introduction

In United States v. Taylor, No. 24-2798 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2025), a panel comprising Judges Raggi, Lynch, and Park largely affirmed the Western District of New York’s revocation sentence for Shane Taylor, who originally pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). After serving a 120-month sentence and beginning supervised release, Taylor admitted a violation for failing to provide probation with advance notice before using computers or connected devices.

Upon revocation, the district court imposed 10 months’ imprisonment and a new five-year term of supervised release. The court stated orally that it was reimposing “all the same standard and special conditions” from the original sentence, but the written judgment added a new special condition requiring polygraph or similar testing. On appeal, Taylor challenged (1) the length of the new supervised-release term, arguing it should have been reduced by the 10-month revocation prison term, and (2) the added polygraph condition.

The case turns on two central legal questions:

  • How § 3583(h)’s “subtraction” rule operates when the underlying offense is one for which § 3583(k) authorizes supervised release of “not less than 5 [years], or life.”
  • Whether a district court may add a special condition in the written judgment that was not orally pronounced at sentencing.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Supervised-release term affirmed: The panel held there was no plain error in imposing a five-year supervised-release term upon revocation without subtracting the 10-month revocation prison term. Under § 3583(h), the relevant cap is the term “authorized by statute” for the underlying offense (here, life under § 3583(k)), not the originally imposed term. Applying United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012), the court reiterated that subtracting a finite number of months from “life” leaves life; thus, a five-year term is within the statutory ceiling and only slightly above the statutory floor.
  • Plea-agreement misstatement harmless: The plea agreement understated the maximum supervised-release term, but the error did not affect Taylor’s substantial rights because he did not claim he would have declined the plea had he been correctly advised, and he did not seek to withdraw his plea.
  • Polygraph condition stricken: Because the polygraph condition appeared only in the written judgment and was not orally pronounced, the panel remanded with instructions to strike it. Citing the Second Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Maiorana, No. 22-1115, 2025 WL 2471027, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025), the court underscored that a defendant has the right to be present for the pronouncement of all sentencing terms; where a written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. See also United States v. Guard, No. 23-6886, 2025 WL 2609446, at *13 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2025).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012): The keystone for the “life minus months equals life” calculus. When § 3583(h) directs subtraction of revocation imprisonment from the “term of supervised release authorized by statute” and that authorized term is life (as with certain sex offenses under § 3583(k)), it is not conceptually possible to subtract finite months from a life term. The maximum remains life. Cassesse also supports a minimal explanation requirement for within-range violation sentences.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h), (k):
    • Section 3583(e)(3) authorizes revocation and imprisonment up to the maximum term authorized for the original offense; § 3583(h) authorizes a new supervised-release term “not [to] exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the [underlying] offense, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation.”
    • Section 3583(k) fixes the authorized supervised-release term for certain sex offenses (including § 2252A) at “not less than 5, or life.”
  • United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019): The panel correctly cabined Haymond to its invalidation of the latter two sentences of § 3583(k) (mandatory minimum reimprisonment based on judge-found facts). It emphasized that Haymond does not undermine the first sentence of § 3583(k), which sets the supervised-release range of five years to life. See also United States v. Mayer, No. 21-0204-cr, 2022 WL 1447380, at *3 (2d Cir. May 9, 2022) (summary order).
  • United States v. Russell, 340 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2003): Distinguished because it interpreted the pre-§ 3583(h) statutory regime, which did not explicitly authorize new supervised-release terms upon revocation. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 698 (2000), explained the later statutory fix; thus, Russell does not control the current § 3583(h) analysis. The Eighth Circuit’s United States v. Palmer, 380 F.3d 395, 398 (8th Cir. 2004), aligns with the Second Circuit in focusing on the term “authorized by statute,” not the originally imposed term.
  • Standards of review and harmless-error cases:
    • United States v. Castillo, 896 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2018), and United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2014): reasonableness review under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
    • United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008): wide latitude for supervised-release conditions.
    • United States v. Reyes, 557 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009), and United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010): plain-error framework when a defendant failed to object below.
    • United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2018): de novo review when a defendant lacked prior notice of a sentencing term; cited for the general principle.
    • United States v. Renaud, 999 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1993), and United States v. Cacace, 289 F. App’x 440 (2d Cir. 2008): where a plea misstates the maximum supervised-release term, the usual remedy is an opportunity to re-plead on correct information. Absent a showing that the defendant would have rejected the plea, resentencing relief is not warranted.
    • United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005): evidences the Second Circuit’s acceptance of streamlined explanations for within-range sentences.
  • Oral pronouncement controls:
    • United States v. Maiorana, No. 22-1115, 2025 WL 2471027, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) (en banc): reaffirms that a defendant has the right to be present for the pronouncement of all sentencing terms; conditions must be orally pronounced.
    • United States v. Guard, No. 23-6886, 2025 WL 2609446, at *13 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2025): where the written judgment adds a condition not orally pronounced, the remedy is to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 3583(h) “subtraction” against a life-authorized term. The core dispute concerned whether the district court needed to subtract Taylor’s 10-month revocation prison term from the five-year supervised-release term it imposed after revocation. The panel held no: under § 3583(h), subtraction runs against the “term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term” (emphasis added), which for § 2252A offenses is “not less than 5, or life” under § 3583(k). Because the authorized maximum is life, Cassesse squarely resolves the “conundrum” of subtracting months from life—one cannot reduce a life-maximum by a finite number of months, so the ceiling remains life. The upshot is that a new supervised-release term up to life remains permissible notwithstanding revocation-time prison credits, and a five-year term is well within that ceiling and only slightly above the five-year minimum.

2) The “authorized” versus “imposed” term, and Russell’s inapplicability. Taylor’s theory—that the total of revocation imprisonment plus reimposed supervised release cannot exceed the originally imposed five-year supervised-release term—misreads the statute. Section 3583(h) expressly keys the permissible new term to the authorized statutory term for the underlying offense, not the originally imposed term. Russell, which treated supervised release differently, interpreted a pre-amendment statutory scheme and has been overtaken by Congress’s revision acknowledged in Johnson. The Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit read the current statute the same way: the statutory authorization governs.

3) Plea-agreement misstatement and plain error. The plea agreement incorrectly described as the “maximum” a five-year supervised-release term reduced by revocation imprisonment—when that is actually the minimum under § 3583(k), not the maximum. Even if the district court should have corrected this at the revocation-admission hearing, relief fails under the plain-error standard because Taylor neither objected below nor argued on appeal that he would have declined the plea had he been told the correct maximum. Under Renaud and Cacace, the absence of prejudice to substantial rights defeats relief.

4) Substantive reasonableness and the adequacy of explanation. The panel found no plain error in the district court’s explanation for imposing five years. For violation sentences within the recommended range, the Second Circuit has long accepted “minimal” explanations. The district court referenced Taylor’s repeated violations, noted his sincerity and family circumstances, and stated it had given the term “very careful” thought. That is sufficient under Cassesse and Fleming.

5) Oral pronouncement controls the conditions; polygraph condition stricken. The district court told Taylor it was reimposing the “same” standard and special conditions from the original judgment. The written judgment, however, added a new special condition mandating polygraph/voice-stress testing. Under the en banc Maiorana and Guard, the oral pronouncement controls, and unpronounced conditions cannot be added later in writing. The appropriate remedy is to remand to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement by striking the added condition. Notably, the panel did not reach the substantive validity of polygraph-related conditions; its decision turns solely on the oral-pronouncement rule.

Impact and Practical Implications

For revocations in § 2252A (and related § 3583(k)) cases:

  • Ceiling remains life despite revocation imprisonment: When § 3583(k) supplies a life-maximum, § 3583(h)’s subtraction mechanism does not cap a reimposed supervised-release term below life. Multiple revocations and attendant prison terms do not erode the statutory ceiling; the practical cap remains life. District courts thus have broad discretion to reimpose lengthy terms (including life), subject to reasonableness and § 3583(d) constraints.
  • Plea drafting and colloquies: Plea agreements in § 2252A cases should accurately state that the authorized supervised-release term is “not less than five years and up to life.” Misstating the maximum can create avoidable litigation. If a misstatement occurs, the likely remedy is the opportunity to re-plead upon correct advisement—not an automatic sentence reduction—absent a showing of prejudice.
  • Sentencing explanations for violation cases: Within-range revocation sentences, particularly those only marginally above the statutory minimum (as here), require only succinct explanations tied to § 3583(e)’s subset of § 3553(a) factors.

For supervised-release conditions practice:

  • Oral pronouncement is dispositive: All standard and special conditions must be stated in open court. If a condition is not orally imposed, it cannot be added later in the judgment. Counsel should carefully listen for and confirm each condition at sentencing.
  • Polygraph and similar testing conditions: While often litigated (implicating Fifth Amendment and § 3583(d) concerns), this case does not speak to their substantive validity. It does, however, reinforce a bright-line procedural rule: unpronounced conditions must be stricken.

Systemic implications: The Second Circuit’s continued adherence to Cassesse stabilizes the revocation calculus in sex-offense cases. Defendants face potentially lengthy or repeated terms of supervised release even after serving revocation prison time. At the same time, the en banc reaffirmation of the oral-pronouncement rule ensures transparency and defendant participation in the imposition of conditions, guarding against after-the-fact additions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release vs. probation: Supervised release follows imprisonment and is part of the sentence; probation is an alternative to imprisonment. Violating supervised release can lead to revocation, imprisonment, and a new term of supervised release.
  • Section 3583(h) “subtraction” rule: After revocation and reimprisonment, the court may impose a new supervised-release term, but the length cannot exceed the statutorily authorized supervised-release term for the original offense, minus the imprisonment imposed on revocation. If the authorized term is life, subtracting months does not reduce the life maximum.
  • Section 3583(k): For certain sex offenses (including § 2252A possession of child pornography), Congress set a supervised-release range of “at least five years and up to life.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Haymond invalidated only the part of § 3583(k) that imposed mandatory minimum prison terms based on judge-found facts—not the supervised-release range itself.
  • Plain-error review: If a defendant did not object in the district court, relief on appeal typically requires showing a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. Misstatements in plea agreements require a showing of prejudice (e.g., that the defendant would have rejected the plea) to warrant relief.
  • Oral pronouncement rule: A defendant has the right to be present when the court imposes sentence, including all conditions of supervised release. If the written judgment conflicts with what the judge said in court, the oral pronouncement controls.
  • Substantive reasonableness and explanation: For revocation sentences that fall within the advisory range and the statutory parameters, courts may provide concise reasons tied to the relevant § 3553(a) factors; exhaustive explanations are not required.

Conclusion

United States v. Taylor is a clear, practical reaffirmation of two bedrock principles in the Second Circuit’s supervised-release jurisprudence:

  • On length: For § 2252A and other § 3583(k) offenses, § 3583(h)’s subtraction rule operates against the statutory authorization (which is life), not the originally imposed term. Consistent with Cassesse, “life minus months still equals life,” so a five-year reimposed term upon revocation is legal and near the statutory minimum.
  • On conditions: The oral pronouncement governs. A special condition—here, polygraph testing—cannot be added in the written judgment if it was not pronounced in open court. The proper remedy is to strike the unpronounced condition.

Although nonprecedential, the order provides reliable guidance to district courts and practitioners. Prosecutors should ensure plea agreements accurately reflect the supervised-release range for § 2252A convictions. Defense counsel should vigilantly protect clients’ oral-pronouncement rights and preserve objections to avoid plain-error hurdles on appeal. District courts should pronounce every condition on the record and ensure written judgments match the oral sentence. In this way, Taylor advances both the statutory design of supervised release for sex offenses and the procedural safeguards that ensure sentencing transparency and fairness.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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