“Legal Theories Are Not ‘New Facts’: The Tenth Circuit’s Clarification of § 2244(b)(2)(B) in In re: Meza”

1. Introduction

On 31 July 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an unpublished order in In re: Martin Meza, No. 25-2075, denying a New Mexico state prisoner’s request for authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although the court’s disposition is brief and procedural, it squarely addresses a recurring question in post-conviction practice: when can a petitioner rely on a new legal interpretation—as opposed to newly-discovered facts—to satisfy the stringent gateway in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)? The Tenth Circuit held that a reinterpretation of existing case law, no matter how creatively framed, is not a “factual predicate” that was previously undiscoverable through due diligence.

The decision therefore cements a principle that will resonate throughout habeas jurisprudence: only new evidence of fact, not fresh legal argument, can unlock the successive-petition gate in § 2244(b)(2)(B). Below, we unpack the court’s reasoning, the precedents it relied on, and the likely impact of this clarification on future litigants.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Matheson, McHugh, and Rossman) denied Martin Meza’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition. Mr. Meza sought to raise five claims:

(1)-(3) A double-jeopardy challenge—rooted in Herron v. State, 805 P.2d 624 (N.M. 1991)—asserting that ten counts of sexual abuse should have been charged and punished as, at most, two offenses.
(4) A confrontation/Brady violation concerning alleged rape-kit evidence and related testimony.
(5) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to translate an audiotaped confession conducted in Spanish.

Applying § 2244(b)(3)(C), the court held that none of the proposed claims met either prong of § 2244(b)(2): no claim relied on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, and no claim was based on previously undiscoverable facts capable of establishing actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) – Governs successive habeas petitions and sets out the “gate-keeping” requirements.
Herron v. State, 805 P.2d 624 (N.M. 1991) – New Mexico Supreme Court decision adopting a multi-factor test for whether closely-related sexual acts constitute one or several offenses for double-jeopardy purposes.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) – Landmark case imposing upon prosecutors the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.

Notably, the panel did not cite any Supreme Court precedent beyond statutory references; instead, it grounded its decision squarely on the statutory text of § 2244(b) and the procedural posture.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Rejection of “legal theory as fact” – For Claims 1-3, Mr. Meza re-invoked the Herron double-jeopardy framework, insisting that if Herron had been correctly applied he would have been charged with fewer counts. The Tenth Circuit categorically ruled that a petitioner’s interpretation of existing case law—no matter how new to him—is not a “factual predicate” under § 2244(b)(2)(B). Because Meza had raised the same Herron argument in state proceedings as early as 2005-2006, he could not plausibly claim the theory or its underlying facts were previously undiscoverable.
Temporal availability of evidence – Claim 4 relied entirely on the trial transcript, confirming that Meza knew the underlying facts at the moment of trial. That knowledge defeats § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)’s “due diligence” requirement.
Failure to show actual innocence – Claim 5, alleging counsel’s failure to translate a Spanish-language confession, lacked any proffer as to what an English transcript would reveal and why no reasonable juror could still convict. Without a plausible innocence showing, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) could not be satisfied.
Absence of a new, retroactive constitutional rule – None of Meza’s claims implicated a Supreme Court decision issuing a new rule of constitutional law that the Court had declared retroactive on collateral review— the only path under § 2244(b)(2)(A).

3.3 Potential Impact

While unpublished, the decision is persuasive authority in the Tenth Circuit and influential elsewhere because it tightens the definition of “factual predicate.” Its key implications include:

Constraining creative pleading. Post-conviction lawyers often re-package old legal arguments as “new evidence.” In re: Meza forecloses that strategy within the Tenth Circuit, reducing docket clutter and reinforcing finality.
Guiding district courts. Trial courts confronted with successive petitions now have explicit circuit-level confirmation that reinterpretations of precedent—standing alone—cannot justify reopening a conviction.
Encouraging thorough first petitions. Petitioners must marshal all available legal theories and evidence in their initial § 2254 applications; otherwise, they risk permanent procedural foreclosure.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 2254 Petition – A lawsuit in federal court by a state prisoner claiming that their custody violates the U.S. Constitution.
Successive Petition – Any § 2254 petition filed after a first one has been decided. Filing such a petition requires prior authorization from the appropriate Court of Appeals.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) – Allows a successive petition if it relies on a new Supreme Court rule made retroactive.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B) – Allows a successive petition if (i) new facts were previously undiscoverable with due diligence, and (ii) those facts, if proven, establish innocence with “clear and convincing evidence.”
Prima Facie Showing – A minimal evidentiary threshold that allows a claim to go forward; here, the petitioner had to present enough to warrant further review of his habeas claims.
Double Jeopardy – Constitutional protection against being tried or punished twice for the same offense.
Brady Material – Evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecution must disclose.
Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to cross-examine witnesses against them.

5. Conclusion

In re: Meza may not transform substantive criminal law, but it meaningfully clarifies the procedural scaffolding of post-conviction relief in the Tenth Circuit. By holding that a re-examination of existing case law cannot constitute a “new factual predicate,” the panel reinforced a bright-line rule: § 2244(b)(2)(B) is reserved only for genuinely new evidence of fact, not freshly articulated legal theories. The decision promotes finality, preserves judicial resources, and sets a clear roadmap for practitioners: develop all legal theories early and rely on unmistakably new evidence if seeking the rare permission to file a successive habeas petition.