“Knowingly,” Not “Intentionally”: Colorado Supreme Court Clarifies Mens Rea for Soliciting for Child Prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)–(b)

Introduction

In Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44, 570 P.3d 1022, the Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en banc, resolved a long-standing division split over the culpable mental state required for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution under section 18-7-402(1)(a) and (1)(b), C.R.S. (2024). The Court held that “knowingly,” not “intentionally,” is the applicable mens rea. This decision overrules the Colorado Court of Appeals’ contrary interpretation in People v. Ross, 2019 COA 79 (“Ross I”), and restores the earlier view expressed in People v. Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1991).

The case arose from online communications between Deshawn Lynn Randolph and an undercover investigator posing as “Nicole,” who stated she was just shy of 18. Randolph offered to arrange sex work for Nicole and was charged under § 18-7-402(1)(a) and (b). He argued at trial and on appeal that the phrase “for the purpose of” in those subsections imports a specific intent element—i.e., that the State must prove he acted “intentionally.” The trial court disagreed, instructed the jury using “knowingly,” the jury convicted on both counts, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that “knowingly,” rather than “intentionally,” is the culpable mental state.

The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Samour and joined by all justices, provides a comprehensive statutory-interpretation analysis, reconciles § 18-7-402’s three subsections, and clarifies how the General Assembly’s post–Model Penal Code mens rea scheme should be applied when a statute is silent. The decision also reiterates that the applicable mental state modifies every element of the offense, including the “purpose” element tied to child prostitution.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court holds that:

Although § 18-7-402(1)(a) and (b) do not expressly designate a culpable mental state, they require one; “for the purpose of” is not itself a mens rea and does not import “intentionally.”
Reading the statute as a whole—and to avoid absurdity and superfluity—“knowingly” is the mens rea that best fits subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b), consistent with subsection (1)(c) which expressly uses “knowing.”
“Knowingly” applies to every element of the offense, including that the defendant’s conduct was undertaken for the purpose of prostitution “of or by a child.”
Ross I’s reasoning equating “for the purpose of” with “intentionally” (via the Model Penal Code’s “purposely”) was erroneous; the MPC’s “purposely” is not the same as Colorado’s “intentionally.”
Accordingly, the trial court correctly instructed the jury using “knowingly,” and the convictions are affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1991): The division held that “knowingly” is the mens rea for § 18-7-402(1)(a) because solicitation “necessarily involves” awareness of one’s conduct. The Supreme Court embraces this reasoning as the correct view and effectively restores Emerterio’s approach.
People v. Ross (Ross I), 2019 COA 79; People v. Ross (Ross II), 2021 CO 9: Ross I read “for the purpose of” as importing “intentionally,” analogizing to the MPC’s “purposely” and relying on dictionary definitions and model jury instructions commentary. The Supreme Court in Ross II did not resolve the mens rea question but clarified that the applicable mens rea—whatever it is—applies to every element. In Randolph, the Court overrules Ross I’s mens rea analysis and relies on Ross II’s all-elements principle.
People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006): Addressed “for the purposes of” in the sexual assault on a child context and held the offense is a general intent crime. The Court emphasized that the General Assembly’s use of “knowingly,” and the omission of “intentionally,” matters. Vigil undercuts the claim that “for the purpose of” signals a specific-intent requirement.
Candelaria v. People, 2013 CO 47: Construed “for the purpose of sexual victimization” in the SVP statute and rejected reading in a specific-intent requirement. This parallel informs Randolph’s conclusion that “for the purpose of” describes an attendant circumstance or reason, not a mens rea.
People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982): On soliciting for prostitution, the Court explained the crime does not require a particular result; the offense is complete upon the proscribed conduct in the presence of the requisite circumstance. Randolph analogizes directly to § 18-7-402(1).
Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000); People v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1984); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1980); People v. Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2001): These decisions reflect the Colorado courts’ default practice of imputing “knowingly” when a non–strict-liability statute is silent on mens rea and the text provides no clear reason to impose a different, more culpable mental state.
People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985); People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65M; People v. Derrera, 667 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1983): These cases explain the architecture of Colorado’s mens rea scheme: “intentionally” is defined relative to results; “knowingly” can attach to conduct, circumstances, or results. Randolph relies on this to show “knowingly” fits § 18-7-402(1)(a)–(b), which require no result element.
Przekurat v. Torres, 2018 CO 69; Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1988): The canon of consistent usage: identical words and phrases (“for the purpose of”) used in different parts of a statute should be construed consistently absent a manifest contrary intent. This is central to harmonizing subsections (1)(a)–(c).
Colorado Ethics Watch v. City & County of Broomfield, 203 P.3d 623 (Colo. App. 2009): A civil case that defined “for the purpose of” by dictionary reference. Randolph relied on it; the Supreme Court rejects its transposition into the criminal mens rea context, especially given the Criminal Code’s explicit definitional scheme.
People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981): Clarifies that “purpose” can be synonymous with the common meaning of “intent,” but not with the technical, statutory mens rea of “intentionally.” Randolph leverages this distinction.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds through several interlocking steps:

Statutory text and whole-statute harmony: Section 18-7-402(1) defines three ways to commit the offense: (a) soliciting for the purpose of child prostitution, (b) arranging or offering to arrange a meeting for that purpose, and (c) directing another to a place knowing such direction is for that purpose. Only subsection (1)(c) expressly says “knowing.” Reading the statute as a whole, the Court gives consistent meaning to the recurring phrase “for the purpose of” across (1)(a)–(c), avoiding an interpretation that would produce an illogical “double mental state” in (1)(c) (i.e., requiring proof that a defendant “knew that his intent” was X).
“For the purpose of” is not a culpable mental state: The Criminal Code cabins culpable mental states to four terms—“intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” “criminal negligence”—ordinarily used to designate mens rea. The legislature did not place “for the purpose of” on that list, nor did it otherwise signal an intent to use that phrase as a standalone mens rea or as a surrogate for “intentionally.”
Legislative design post–MPC: Colorado’s 1971 Criminal Code reform deliberately adopted different terminology from the MPC. The MPC’s “purposely” (which encompasses conduct, circumstances, and result) is not the same as Colorado’s “intentionally” (which the legislature defined strictly in result terms). Ross I’s equation of “for the purpose of” with “intentionally” via the MPC was therefore a mismatch with Colorado’s scheme.
Nature of the elements in § 18-7-402(1): Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) regulate conduct (soliciting; arranging/offering to arrange) plus an attendant circumstance (that the conduct is undertaken “for the purpose of” prostitution of or by a child). There is no result element. Because “intentionally” is defined only in relation to results, it does not fit; “knowingly,” which can attach to conduct and attendant circumstances, does.
Mens rea applies to every element: Consistent with Ross II, the applicable mens rea applies to all elements, including the “purpose” element tied to child prostitution. Thus, under “knowingly,” the State must prove the defendant was aware of what he was doing and that his conduct was undertaken for the purpose of prostitution of or by a child.
Default imputation of “knowingly” when the statute is silent: Where a non–strict-liability statute is silent, Colorado courts generally impute “knowingly” absent a clear reason to do otherwise. Nothing in § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) points to “intentionally,” “recklessly,” or “criminal negligence.”
Model jury instructions and dictionaries are not controlling: The Court declines to follow the model jury instructions’ commentary suggesting that “for the purpose of” imports a culpable mental state. Model instructions are not “forged in the furnace of the legislative process nor the crucible of the adversarial judicial arena,” and the commentary lacked supporting authority. Dictionary definitions likewise cannot displace the legislature’s explicit mens rea framework.

Impact

Uniformity and clarity: The decision resolves a persistent conflict among appellate divisions. Courts statewide now have a definitive mens rea for § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b): “knowingly.”
Charging and proof: Prosecutors need not prove a defendant’s “conscious objective” to cause a particular result (as “intentionally” would require). Instead, they must prove the defendant was aware of his conduct and that the conduct was undertaken for the purpose of prostitution of or by a child. The offense does not require that prostitution actually occur.
Jury instructions and trial practice: Element instructions should track “knowingly” and make clear it modifies every material element, including the “for the purpose of prostitution of or by a child” component. Courts should avoid instructions that equate “for the purpose of” with the statutory mens rea “intentionally.”
General intent categorization: By adopting “knowingly,” the offense is a general intent crime under Colorado’s definitional scheme. This signals the unavailability of defenses limited to specific intent offenses (e.g., voluntary intoxication), paralleling Vigil’s analysis in the sexual-assault context.
Interpretation of “for the purpose of” elsewhere: The Court cautions against reading “for the purpose of” as a de facto mens rea across the Criminal Code. While “never say never,” absent explicit legislative direction, the phrase describes the reason or motivation for conduct, not the culpable mental state.
Subsection (1)(c) harmony: The opinion prevents an illogical doubling of mental states in subsection (1)(c). Construing “for the purpose of” as “intentionally” would have required proof that a defendant “knew his intent,” an incoherent standard. Harmonizing all three subsections around “knowingly” ensures internal coherence.
Model jury instructions revision: The bench and bar should anticipate updates to the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions to reflect this holding and to remove commentary implying that “for the purpose of” supplies the mens rea in § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b).
Pending and future cases: The opinion’s reasoning will likely influence cases such as People v. Dominguez, 2024 COA 32 (cert. granted in part), and any other prosecutions under § 18-7-402(1), as well as judicial treatment of similar wording in other statutes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mens rea in Colorado: Colorado’s Criminal Code ordinarily recognizes four culpable mental states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and criminal negligence. “Intentionally” is about aiming to cause a specific result; “knowingly” is about being aware of one’s conduct, the circumstances, or that a result is practically certain.
Conduct, circumstances, result: Every crime has elements that describe what the defendant did (conduct), the situation around it (attendant circumstances), and sometimes what happened because of it (result). Section 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) has conduct (soliciting; arranging/offering to arrange) and a circumstance (that this is for the purpose of child prostitution), but no required result.
Why “intentionally” doesn’t fit here: Because “intentionally” is defined only with respect to results, it doesn’t match a statute built solely on conduct and circumstances. Using “intentionally” would read a result requirement into a crime that doesn’t have one and would risk making parts of the statute superfluous or incoherent.
“For the purpose of” as used here: The phrase identifies the reason or aim behind the conduct (the purpose of prostitution of or by a child). It is not itself a culpable mental state and does not automatically transform a statute into a specific intent offense.
All-elements principle: Whatever the mens rea is, it applies to all material elements. Here, “knowingly” applies to the conduct and to the “purpose” element, including the “of or by a child” component.

Application to Randolph

Randolph’s theory was that his communications were mere “bravado” to keep “Nicole” engaged until she turned 18, not a genuine intent to arrange child prostitution. He requested a jury instruction defining “for the purpose of” to require an anticipated result “intended or desired,” effectively an “intentionally” standard. The trial court, relying on Emerterio, instructed the jury using “knowingly” and declined his request. The jury convicted.

The Supreme Court affirms. Because § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) require the State to prove Randolph acted “knowingly,” the trial court’s instructions were correct. Under the proper standard, the prosecution needed to prove that Randolph was aware of what he was doing—soliciting and arranging or offering to arrange—and that he did so for the purpose of the prostitution of or by a child. No proof of a “conscious objective” to cause a particular result (nor proof that prostitution actually occurred) was required.

Key Takeaways

The mens rea for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a) and (b) is “knowingly.”
“For the purpose of” does not itself supply a culpable mental state and does not import “intentionally.”
Mens rea applies to every element, including that the purpose of the conduct was the prostitution “of or by a child.”
Section 18-7-402(1) regulates conduct plus an attendant circumstance; it does not require a result. This structural choice dictates “knowingly” over “intentionally.”
Ross I is overruled; Emerterio’s approach is vindicated; the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed.
The decision promotes consistency across § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(c) and aligns with Colorado’s default rule of imputing “knowingly” when a non–strict-liability statute is silent.

Conclusion

Randolph v. People definitively answers the question reserved in Ross II and settles the split created by Ross I: the culpable mental state for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) is “knowingly.” The Court’s careful parsing of statutory text, mens rea definitions, and the structure of offense elements enforces the General Assembly’s post–Model Penal Code design and preserves coherence across the statute’s three subsections. By clarifying that “for the purpose of” delineates an attendant circumstance rather than a mens rea—and by insisting that the applicable mental state modifies every element—the Court provides clear guidance to trial courts, juries, and practitioners. The decision not only harmonizes Colorado precedent but also offers a principled template for construing similarly worded criminal statutes in the future.