“Jumping Through Hoops” Is Not Enough: Acknowledgment of Abuse as a Prerequisite to Improvement Periods and the Termination of Custodial Rights in West Virginia – Commentary on In re E.A., C.A., and M.A.

“Jumping Through Hoops” Is Not Enough: Acknowledgment of Abuse as a Prerequisite to Improvement Periods and the Termination of Custodial Rights in West Virginia

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re E.A., C.A., and M.A., No. 24-710 (Nov. 4, 2025), reaffirms and sharpens a central theme of the state’s abuse and neglect jurisprudence: formal compliance with services is not, by itself, sufficient either to obtain an improvement period or to avoid termination of custodial or parental rights. What is required is meaningful acknowledgment of the problem and demonstrated protective capacity.

In this case, Petitioner Mother (H.A.) appealed from an order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County terminating her custodial rights to two of her children, C.A. and M.A. (she did not appeal as to her daughter E.A.). The mother argued that the circuit court erred by (1) denying her a post-adjudicatory improvement period and (2) terminating her custodial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing that:

  • Parents bear the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are likely to fully participate in an improvement period.
  • Genuine acknowledgment of the abuse or neglect is a prerequisite to meaningful treatment; failure to acknowledge renders an improvement period futile.
  • Where there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse/neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, courts may terminate custodial rights without resorting to less restrictive alternatives.

The decision applies established doctrine to a common but difficult scenario: a non-offending or “less-offending” parent who, despite participating in services, continues to align with an abusive partner and disbelieve a child victim of sexual abuse. The Court’s analysis illustrates the central role of parental insight and credibility in abuse and neglect outcomes.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Abuse and Neglect Proceedings in the Circuit Court

The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) initiated an abuse and neglect proceeding in December 2023, alleging:

  • The father sexually abused E.A.
  • The parents engaged in domestic violence in the children’s presence.
  • The family home was unfit.

An amended petition added allegations that:

  • The father tested positive for alcohol.
  • Both parents were addicted to controlled substances and/or alcohol.

A second amended petition alleged that the mother failed to protect the children from physical and sexual abuse. Thus, the case quickly evolved from one focused primarily on the father’s affirmative misconduct to one centering also on the mother’s failure to protect.

At the preliminary hearing, the circuit court ordered the mother to participate in services, including parenting and adult life skills classes and drug screening. These services are typical in West Virginia abuse and neglect cases and are often the core of an “improvement period” – a structured, monitored opportunity for the parent to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect.

B. Adjudication: Mother’s Admissions

The proceedings included two adjudicatory hearings:

  1. February 2024 adjudicatory hearing:
    The mother admitted that she:
    • Failed to provide the children with suitable housing, and
    • Abused substances.
  2. August 2024 second adjudicatory hearing:
    The mother further admitted that she:
    • Failed to protect the children from physical and sexual abuse.

Based on these admissions, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusing and neglecting parent.

It is important to note that these admissions later become a focal point: although the mother technically “admitted” failure to protect, at disposition she continued to minimize and deny key elements of the abuse (particularly E.A.’s sexual abuse). The Supreme Court implicitly underscores that a bare legal admission is not the same as genuine acknowledgment for treatment purposes.

C. Motion for Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

After adjudication, the mother moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The guardian ad litem for C.A. and M.A. supported this motion, noting the children’s close bond with their mother.

The matter proceeded to a dispositional hearing in November 2024. DHS presented evidence that:

  • The mother consistently blamed others (including E.A.) for the proceedings.
  • She continued to believe that E.A. was lying about the sexual abuse.
  • She continued to reside with the father until his arrest.
  • She maintained contact with the father even after his incarceration, despite knowing that this harmed her reunification efforts.

The mother, in turn, testified that:

  • She complied with all ordered services.
  • She obtained employment and housing.

The circuit court acknowledged her compliance but concluded this was insufficient, finding that “participation alone is not enough.” The court characterized her actions as “jump[ing] through the hoops” without genuine insight or change, emphasizing that:

  • She failed to take responsibility.
  • She minimized her own behavior.
  • She took no meaningful steps to indicate she would protect the children from the father.

On this basis, the circuit court:

  1. Denied the post-adjudicatory improvement period.
  2. Found there was no reasonable likelihood that she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future.
  3. Found termination of her custodial rights was necessary for the children’s welfare.
  4. Terminated her custodial rights to all three children, but – because of the close bond with C.A. and M.A. – limited the order to custodial rights rather than full parental rights as to her.

By contrast, the father’s parental rights were fully terminated. He pled guilty to criminal charges of sexually abusing E.A., and was sentenced in March 2025.

D. Permanency Plans and Scope of Appeal

The opinion notes the following permanency plans:

  • E.A. and C.A. – Legal guardianship in their current placements.
  • M.A. (seventeen years old) – Continued residential treatment until majority.

Crucially, the mother explicitly stated in her appellate brief that she does not challenge the termination of her custodial rights to E.A., acknowledging that E.A. is thriving in foster care and should remain there. Accordingly, the appeal concerns only the termination of her custodial rights to C.A. and M.A.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, applying the usual mixed standard of review from In re Cecil T., affirmed the circuit court’s order.

The Court held:

  1. Denial of Improvement Period: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because:
    • Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), the burden was on the mother to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that she was likely to fully participate.
    • Despite service compliance, she failed to genuinely acknowledge the underlying problems, particularly her failure to protect the children from physical and sexual abuse.
    • She continued to blame E.A. and maintained contact with the offending father, showing she was not truly motivated to change.
    • Per In re Timber M. and In re Charity H., failure to acknowledge the problem makes it untreatable and renders an improvement period futile.
  2. Termination of Custodial Rights: The termination of her custodial rights to C.A. and M.A. was proper because:
    • The circuit court found “no reasonable likelihood” that she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future, and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare – findings she did not challenge on appeal.
    • Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.), such findings authorize termination without requiring less restrictive alternatives.
    • The Supreme Court would not reweigh the evidence or disturb the circuit court’s credibility determinations, per Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C. and In re D.S..

The decision is issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure and concludes by affirming the October 30, 2024 order.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. Improvement Periods – W. Va. Code § 49-4-610

Under West Virginia law, an “improvement period” is not automatic. It is a discretionary period in which a parent is given an opportunity, with support and monitoring, to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect.

For a post-adjudicatory improvement period specifically, W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) requires that:

“The court may grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period if the parent or custodian demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.”

Thus, the parent bears the burden, and the standard is “clear and convincing evidence” – a relatively high civil standard requiring a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the evidence presented.

2. Termination of Custodial/Parental Rights – W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), a circuit court may terminate parental or custodial rights when:

  • There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  • Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

West Virginia case law, notably In re R.J.M. and In re Kristin Y., has long held that once these criteria are satisfied, the court is not required to attempt less restrictive alternatives first.

3. Standard of Review – In re Cecil T.

Appellate review in abuse and neglect cases is governed by a dual standard:

  • Findings of fact are reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard – they will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.
  • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This standard, drawn from Syllabus Point 1 of In re Cecil T., gives substantial deference to trial courts’ factual and credibility determinations.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court cites Cecil T. for the standard of review:

“On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”

This framework explains why the Supreme Court refuses to reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility assessments: the circuit judge, who heard the witnesses, is in the best position to evaluate truthfulness, insight, and sincerity – all central to this case.

2. In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)

The opinion quotes Timber M., which in turn quotes Charity H.:

“Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem… results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”

This principle is critical to the Court’s decision. It provides the doctrinal backbone for denying improvement periods where a parent:

  • Continues to deny or minimize the abuse or neglect.
  • Refuses to recognize the other parent or partner as a source of danger.
  • Disbelieves the child victim’s account without legitimate basis.

In this case, despite formal admissions, the mother persisted in believing that E.A. was lying about sexual abuse and maintained a relationship with the offending father. Under Timber M. and Charity H., this lack of genuine acknowledgment rendered an improvement period futile.

3. In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)

The Court relies on Tonjia M. for the proposition:

“The circuit court has the discretion to refuse to grant an improvement period when no improvement is likely.”

This underscores that an improvement period is a privilege, not a right. The trial court must be persuaded that there is a real prospect of change. In In re E.A., C.A., and M.A., the circuit court expressly found the mother:

  • Was not “truly motivated to change,” and
  • Was merely “jump[ing] through the hoops” of services.

Under Tonjia M., once the court makes such a finding – and it is supported by the record – it has full authority to deny an improvement period.

4. Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997)

The decision quotes Michael D.C. to emphasize the appellate court’s deference to the circuit court on issues of credibility:

“A reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is uniquely situated to make such determinations and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such determinations.”

In this case, the circuit court found the mother’s behavior and testimony indicative of superficial compliance and ongoing denial. The Supreme Court explicitly declines to disturb these credibility findings, which effectively control the outcome on both the improvement period and termination issues.

5. In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

The Court quotes Syllabus Point 5 of Kristin Y., which incorporates R.J.M.:

Circuit courts are permitted to terminate parental (or custodial) rights “even without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood… that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

This is crucial because the mother, implicitly or explicitly, argued that something less than termination should have been attempted. The Court reiterates that, under settled law, once the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” and “necessary for welfare” findings are made, termination is authorized and less restrictive options are not required.

6. In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025)

Finally, the Court cites In re D.S.:

“We… do not reweigh the evidence.”

This citation reinforces a broad and consistent theme: abuse and neglect appeals are not fresh trials; they are reviews for legal error and clear factual error. Where the circuit court’s findings are supported by the evidence, the Supreme Court will not revisit witness credibility or re-balance competing evidence.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The core question on this issue was whether the mother demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that she was likely to fully participate in an improvement period, as required by W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B).

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in several steps:

  1. Service compliance is necessary but not sufficient.
    The mother had:
    • Participated in parenting and adult life skills services.
    • Engaged in drug screening.
    • Obtained housing and employment.
    The circuit court expressly recognized this but found that “participation alone is not enough.”
  2. Genuine acknowledgment of the problem is a prerequisite to effective treatment.
    Applying Timber M. and Charity H., the Court reiterated that without such acknowledgment, problems become “untreatable,” and an improvement period is a “futility” – which the law does not require at the expense of the child.
  3. Evidence of non-acknowledgment and ongoing risk:
    The record, as described in the opinion, showed that the mother:
    • “Consistently blamed others,” including E.A., for the abuse and neglect case.
    • Continued to believe that E.A. was lying about being sexually abused by her father.
    • Resided with the father until his arrest.
    • Maintained contact with the father during his incarceration, knowing that contact jeopardized her reunification prospects.
    These actions demonstrate that she remained aligned with the perpetrator and disbelieving of the victim.
  4. Finding of lack of motivation and protective capacity.
    The circuit court concluded that the mother:
    • Was not “truly motivated to change.”
    • Only wanted to “jump through the hoops” necessary to regain custody.
    In other words, her outward compliance masked an internal resistance to change and a lack of protective insight.
  5. Appellate deference to credibility and motivation findings.
    Relying on Michael D.C., the Supreme Court refused to disturb the trial court’s credibility and motivation findings.
  6. Conclusion on improvement period:
    Given these facts, the Court held the circuit court had ample basis to determine that the mother failed to meet her burden under § 49-4-610(2)(B). It therefore found no error in the denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period, underscoring that a court may refuse an improvement period “when no improvement is likely” (Tonjia M.).

The key doctrinal takeaway is that “full participation” in an improvement period requires more than showing up and completing tasks; it requires honest engagement with the underlying issues and a willingness to sever allegiance to abusive partners when necessary to protect children.

2. Termination of Custodial Rights to C.A. and M.A.

The mother also challenged the termination of her custodial rights. The Supreme Court’s treatment of this issue is notably brief but decisive.

  1. Statutory findings by the circuit court:
    The circuit court explicitly found:
    • There was no reasonable likelihood that the mother could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future; and
    • Termination of her custodial rights was necessary for the children’s welfare.
  2. Mother did not challenge these findings on appeal.
    The opinion is clear that the mother did not contest these core statutory predicates for termination. Without such a challenge, her termination argument was structurally weak: once those findings stand, W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) squarely authorizes termination.
  3. Less restrictive alternatives not required.
    The Court relied on Kristin Y. (citing R.J.M.) to reiterate that when the statutory grounds for termination are established, a circuit court is not obligated to attempt less restrictive options first.
  4. No reweighing of evidence.
    Any invitation by the mother to reconsider the factual case for termination was rejected under In re D.S., which confirms that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence in abuse and neglect appeals.
  5. Result: Affirmance of custodial termination.
    The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court acted within its authority in terminating the mother’s custodial rights to C.A. and M.A., particularly given her persistent failure to demonstrate protective capacity.

Notably, the circuit court stopped short of terminating her full parental rights, likely in recognition of the bond with two children. The permanency plans (guardianship and residential treatment for an older youth) reflect a nuanced use of West Virginia’s tools: terminating custody while allowing for some residual rights or relationships, where safe and appropriate, but ensuring that day-to-day decision-making and placement remain secure for the children.

D. The Role of Guardians ad Litem and DHS

The opinion briefly mentions that:

  • The guardian ad litem (GAL) for C.A. and M.A. supported an improvement period, emphasizing the “close bond” with the mother.
  • DHS, by contrast, presented evidence highlighting the mother’s ongoing denial and risk factors.

The Court’s affirmance, despite the GAL’s recommendation, highlights two important points:

  1. The GAL’s position is influential but not controlling.
    The circuit court must give significant weight to the GAL’s views, but it retains independent responsibility to assess safety, risk, and statutory requirements. Emotional bond alone cannot trump unresolved safety threats.
  2. DHS’s risk-focused evidence was decisive.
    The mother’s continued relationship with the offender and disbelief of the victim – together with the substance abuse and home conditions acknowledged at adjudication – convinced the court that she could not adequately protect her children.

E. “Custodial Rights” versus “Parental Rights”

The opinion carefully distinguishes between:

  • Termination of the father’s parental rights, and
  • Termination of the mother’s custodial rights.

Under West Virginia law, “parental rights” typically encompass the full set of legal rights and responsibilities concerning a child, including decision-making, consent, and, in many cases, rights to visitation and association (subject to court orders). “Custodial rights” relate more specifically to the right to physical custody and day-to-day caregiving.

By terminating only the mother’s custodial rights:

  • The circuit court removed her from the custodial role and eliminated any right to automatic reunification.
  • However, some residual rights (e.g., potentially limited visitation, notice of proceedings, or input) may remain, depending on subsequent orders and statutory provisions.

The permanency plan of legal guardianship (rather than adoption) for E.A. and C.A. is consistent with this partial severance: guardians assume day-to-day decision-making, while the legal parent retains a more attenuated, court-regulated status.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Reinforcement of Acknowledgment as Central to Reunification

This decision fits squarely within – and reinforces – a long trend in West Virginia: in abuse and neglect cases, especially those involving sexual abuse and domestic violence, a parent’s willingness to acknowledge the abuse and the perpetrator’s role is often the single most important factor in determining whether reunification is possible.

Practically, this means:

  • Parents cannot expect to secure improvement periods or avoid termination by mere attendance at classes or completion of tasks.
  • They must:
    • Clearly articulate understanding of what happened.
    • Recognize the risk posed by abusive partners.
    • Demonstrate concrete steps to protect their children going forward (e.g., ending contact with the abuser, obtaining protective orders, engaging in trauma-informed counseling).

B. Sexual Abuse and “Failure to Protect” Cases

The case underscores a recurring pattern: a non-abusing parent (often a mother) who fails to protect the child victim from a sexually abusive father or partner, and then continues to:

  • Disbelieve or minimize the child’s report.
  • Maintain loyalty or emotional alignment with the abuser.

In re E.A., C.A., and M.A. confirms that:

  • Such a parent is treated as an “abusing” parent by virtue of “failure to protect.”
  • Ongoing denial or minimization is itself a present and future safety risk.
  • Even strong bonds with the children cannot outweigh unresolved safety concerns.

C. Practice Implications for Counsel and Parents

For practitioners:

  • Parent’s counsel must focus not only on service compliance but on helping the client develop genuine insight and an ability to articulate that insight clearly on the record.
  • DHS counsel should, as in this case, build a record about:
    • Ongoing contact with abusers.
    • Attitudes toward the child’s disclosures.
    • Minimization or externalization of blame.
  • Guardians ad litem must balance the child’s expressed wishes and emotional ties with objective safety assessments. A “close bond” may counsel for more gradual permanency planning, but not at the expense of safety.

D. Appellate Strategy Lessons

The opinion offers a cautionary note on appellate strategy:

  • The mother did not challenge the circuit court’s core statutory findings of “no reasonable likelihood” and “necessity for welfare.”
  • As a result, the Supreme Court had little room, doctrinally, to intervene, and the termination decision was effectively insulated from serious challenge.

Appellate counsel in abuse and neglect cases must directly engage with:

  • Whether the record genuinely supports a “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
  • Whether termination is truly necessary for the child’s welfare, especially where partial measures or structured visitation might reasonably ensure safety.

E. Use of Custodial Termination and Guardianship

The Court’s acceptance of custodial (rather than full parental) termination reflects the flexibility available under West Virginia law to tailor dispositional outcomes:

  • Full parental termination may be necessary for adoptive placements and for severely unfit parents.
  • Custodial termination with guardianship may be more appropriate:
    • Where the child is older.
    • Where a complete legal severance is not clearly in the child’s best interest.
    • Where bonds exist but ongoing day-to-day contact is unsafe.

The decision implicitly endorses this nuance: safety is non-negotiable, but complete legal extinction of the parent-child relationship is not always required.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Abuse and Neglect Case Phases: Adjudication vs. Disposition

  • Adjudicatory hearing: The court decides whether the child has been abused or neglected and whether the parent is an “abusing” or “neglecting” parent. This is where the mother in this case admitted to substance abuse, unsuitable housing, and failure to protect.
  • Dispositional hearing: After adjudication, the court decides what to do about it – whether to grant an improvement period, remove the child, return the child with conditions, terminate rights, or craft another permanency plan.

2. Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a court-supervised time (often up to 3–6 months, sometimes extendable) during which:

  • The parent must follow a case plan (services, counseling, substance treatment, etc.).
  • The goal is to correct the conditions that led to the abuse/neglect petition.

It is not guaranteed; the parent must prove entitlement and show a realistic prospect of change.

3. Clear and Convincing Evidence

This is a middle-level standard of proof between “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) and “beyond a reasonable doubt” (criminal standard). It requires evidence that makes the fact to be proved highly probable or reasonably certain.

In this case, the mother had to meet this standard to show that she would fully participate in an improvement period.

4. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Substantial Correction

This phrase refers to a predictive judgment by the court: based on the parent’s history, behavior, and response to services, does it appear reasonably likely that the parent can fix the problems in the near future (generally, within a timeframe consistent with the child’s needs)?

If the answer is “no,” then the statute supports termination of rights once it is also shown that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

5. Necessary for the Welfare of the Child

This is the best-interest inquiry in statutory form. The court must determine that:

  • Continuing the parent’s custody or legal status would harm or unduly risk the child’s safety, stability, or emotional well-being; and
  • Severing custody or parental rights will better serve the child’s overall welfare, including safety, permanency, and emotional needs.

6. Standard of Review: Clear Error vs. De Novo

  • Clear error (factual findings): The appellate court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings simply because it might have reached a different conclusion. It must find that the lower court was plainly wrong.
  • De novo (legal conclusions): The appellate court freely reviews legal issues such as interpretation of statutes or legal standards, without deference to the trial court.

In abuse and neglect cases, this dual standard tends to favor affirmance unless there has been a clear misuse of legal standards or obviously unsupported factual findings.

VI. Conclusion

In re E.A., C.A., and M.A. does not radically alter West Virginia abuse and neglect law, but it sharply reaffirms and clarifies a critical principle: parents cannot preserve or regain custody merely by “jumping through the hoops” of service participation. Meaningful acknowledgment of abuse or neglect, including recognizing the child’s credibility and the danger posed by abusive partners, is essential.

The decision:

  • Confirms that an improvement period requires clear and convincing evidence of likely full participation, which includes genuine insight and motivation to change.
  • Reasserts that failure to acknowledge abuse makes the problem “untreatable,” and an improvement period a futile exercise.
  • Reaffirms that once there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future, and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, courts need not pursue less restrictive options before terminating custodial or parental rights.
  • Illustrates the appellate court’s consistent deference to circuit courts on credibility and factual determinations in abuse and neglect cases.

In the broader legal context, the case continues West Virginia’s emphasis on child safety, trauma recognition, and realistic assessments of parental protective capacity. It sends a clear message that in cases of sexual abuse and domestic violence, the non-offending parent’s steadfast support for the child – and unequivocal rejection of the abuser’s conduct – is non-negotiable if custody is to be preserved or restored.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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