“It’s the Remedy, Not the Claim”: The Texas Supreme Court Narrows the Redundant‑Remedies Doctrine in Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24‑0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), sits at the intersection of administrative law, constitutional free‑speech protections, and professional‑licensing regulation.

The case arises from an unusual enforcement action: the Texas Medical Board (“TMB”)—whose historic mission is to regulate the practice of medicine—issued a cease‑and‑desist order against a congressional candidate for calling himself “Dr. Gonzalez” and a “physician” during a political campaign, even though he has an M.D. but no medical license. The Board asserted that this violated the Medical Practice Act and the Healing Art Identification Act, specifically relying on Texas Occupations Code § 104.004.

Gonzalez responded not only with constitutional arguments (First Amendment and Texas Constitution Article I, § 8) but also with an ultra vires claim alleging that TMB exceeded its statutory authority by regulating a non‑licensee’s campaign speech. The lower courts, however, largely disposed of his lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, invoking the “redundant‑remedies doctrine” to hold that he should have pursued review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

The Texas Supreme Court uses this case to clarify two important points:

• The redundant‑remedies doctrine bars declaratory‑judgment claims only when another statutory scheme provides the same remedy—not merely when it allows the same claims to be raised.
• Agencies cannot create judicial‑review jurisdiction by rule; only statutes (or constitutional imperatives) can do that.

On the merits of the underlying speech issue, the Court deliberately says very little—except this pointed closing line:

If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.

The opinion thus primarily reshapes Texas administrative and remedial doctrine, while clearing the way for future, more substantive litigation about the constitutional limits on professional‑title regulation in campaign contexts.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Justice Sullivan, Justice Hawkins not participating) holds:

1. Redundant‑remedies doctrine narrowed. The court of appeals wrongly held that Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim and his as‑applied constitutional claim were barred by the redundant‑remedies doctrine because he could have brought them in a timely petition for judicial review under the APA. The Supreme Court holds instead that:
   • What matters is whether the APA would have provided the same remedy, not just whether it would have allowed the same issues to be raised.
   • Here, APA review could at most have set aside the specific cease‑and‑desist order; it could not provide the prospective declaratory and injunctive relief Gonzalez seeks to protect future campaign speech.
   • Consequently, his ultra vires claim and as‑applied constitutional claim are not barred as “redundant,” and must be allowed to proceed.
2. Facial constitutional challenge remains. The court of appeals had already held that Gonzalez’s facial challenge to Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 was not barred by the redundant‑remedies doctrine, because a facial ruling “goes beyond reversal” of a single agency order. TMB did not file a cross‑petition for review, so that aspect stands. The Supreme Court confirms that the facial challenge remains live on remand.
3. Substantial‑evidence challenge dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Gonzalez’s attempt to obtain “substantial evidence” review of the Board’s cease‑and‑desist order fails. He disclaimed reliance on the APA and instead argued that an (already repealed) TMB rule created a right to judicial review without a time limit. The Court holds:
   • Judicial review of agency orders exists only if granted by statute or required by the Constitution.
   • An agency rule cannot create or expand district‑court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature has provided.
   • Because Gonzalez pointed to no statute authorizing substantial‑evidence review independent of the APA, the trial court correctly dismissed that claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court therefore:

• Reverses in part and remands for further proceedings on:
  • Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004;
  • his as‑applied constitutional challenge; and
  • his ultra vires claim.
• Affirms dismissal of his substantial‑evidence claim for want of jurisdiction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Statutory Background

1. The parties

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr. holds both a medical degree (M.D.) and a law degree (J.D.). He chose to practice law rather than medicine; he is licensed as an attorney but has never been licensed to practice medicine in Texas. He also taught as an adjunct at the University of Texas and is a member of the American Board of Legal Medicine.

The respondent, the Texas Medical Board, is the state agency charged with licensing physicians and enforcing the Medical Practice Act and related statutes, including the Healing Art Identification Act and Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 (regulating misleading advertising and use of professional titles in the “healing arts”).

2. Campaign speech and the Board’s order

While running for Congress, Gonzalez branded himself publicly as “Dr. Gonzalez” and as a “physician.” In a campaign profile, he wrote:

By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney. I adopted a motto years ago which appears on my office's logo. It says in Latin, "Vocatus ad Sanandum," which means, "Called to Heal." My calling to serve in medicine was to heal the sick. My calling to serve in law is to heal my fellow man who is wronged by a third party. My most recent calling, to serve in the United States House of Representatives, is to contribute to the healing and a return to civility to our nation.

A complaint alleged that these statements amounted to falsely “holding himself out as a physician” and using the title “Dr.” in violation of the Medical Practice Act and § 104.004. TMB opened an investigation and conducted a hearing.

The Board concluded that Gonzalez had violated the statutes and issued a cease‑and‑desist order commanding him to stop using:

• “doctor,”
• “physician,” and
• “Dr.” (as in “Dr. Gonzalez”)

unless he “designat[ed] the authority giving rise to th[ose] title[s].” In practical terms, this meant that his campaign materials—and even live campaign statements—would have to disclose that he holds an M.D. but is not licensed to practice medicine, or else he would have to stop using those titles altogether. The Board warned that violations could lead to civil penalties of $5,000 per violation.

After his motion for rehearing was overruled by operation of law, Gonzalez waited 81 days before suing in Travis County district court—well beyond the 30‑day filing deadline for judicial review under the APA, if the APA applied.

3. Gonzalez’s claims and requested relief

Although his petition articulated several theories, the Court helpfully condenses them into four:

1. Substantial‑evidence challenge to the cease‑and‑desist order (i.e., that it lacked evidentiary support).
2. As‑applied constitutional challenge to Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 as applied to him and his campaign speech.
3. Facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004, on the ground that it broadly prevents anyone with a medical or other doctoral degree from truthfully describing their education and training.
4. Ultra vires claim: TMB exceeded its statutory authority by regulating him at all because he is not a licensed physician and did not practice or attempt to practice medicine in Texas.

He sought:

• reversal of the cease‑and‑desist order;
• a declaration that TMB exceeded its statutory authority;
• temporary injunctive relief barring enforcement of the order pending final judgment; and
• “such other and further equitable relief to which the plaintiff is entitled both at law and in equity.”

That last, general request for relief becomes important when the Supreme Court construes the breadth of his claims on remand.

B. Procedural History

1. Trial court (Travis County district court).
   The trial court dismissed all claims for want of subject‑matter jurisdiction, accepting TMB’s argument that the court lacked power to hear the suits, primarily because Gonzalez had failed to timely invoke APA review.
2. Court of appeals (Third Court of Appeals).
   In Gonzalez v. Tex. Med. Bd., 716 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023), the court of appeals:
   • Held that the APA applied to the cease‑and‑desist proceedings and that they constituted a “contested case.”
   • Concluded that the 30‑day deadline in Texas Government Code § 2001.176(a) for seeking judicial review applied and that Gonzalez’s suit was untimely.
   • Applied the redundant‑remedies doctrine to hold that:
     • his ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims were barred because he could have raised them in a timely APA petition; but
     • his facial constitutional challenge was not barred, because a declaration that § 104.004 is facially unconstitutional would “go beyond reversal” of the cease‑and‑desist order.
   • Remanded only the facial challenge to the district court.
3. Supreme Court of Texas.
   Gonzalez petitioned for review. The TMB did not file a cross‑petition, so the Supreme Court could not reconsider the court of appeals’ decision to allow the facial challenge to proceed. The Court:
   • Held that the redundant‑remedies doctrine does not bar Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims.
   • Affirmed dismissal of the substantial‑evidence claim on a different ground—lack of statutory authorization for judicial review independent of the APA.
   • Remanded for further proceedings on the facial challenge, the as‑applied challenge, and the ultra vires claim.

C. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the keystone precedent. It involved eyebrow threaders challenging Texas cosmetology licensing laws. The Court in Patel allowed a declaratory‑judgment action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”) to proceed, notwithstanding the existence of administrative enforcement and review mechanisms, because:

• APA judicial review was limited to reversing specific citations; and
• the plaintiffs sought broader, prospective relief—injunctions and declarations invalidating the statutes themselves.

Patel articulated the modern, remedial‑based formulation of the redundant‑remedies doctrine:

The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.

And hence, if plaintiffs seek more than reversal of particular orders—such as prospective relief against the future application of statutes—UDJA relief is not redundant. In Gonzalez, the Court explicitly invokes this reasoning and extends it, insisting that courts focus on remedies, not merely on whether the same claims could have been raised through another procedural channel.

2. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

Jones is cited to reinforce that redundancy is about the relief actually obtainable in an alternative avenue, not about overlapping legal theories. The Court notes that in Jones it observed that plaintiffs “could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant and thus improper” (emphasis added), underscoring the remedial focus.

3. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)

This case is cited to demonstrate that even facial constitutional challenges can be raised in the course of APA review of a contested‑case proceeding. The point is strategic: if the ability to raise a claim inside the APA were enough to trigger the redundant‑remedies bar, even Gonzalez’s facial challenge—which the court of appeals allowed—would be barred. That would contradict Patel and the court of appeals’ own reasoning.

4. King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017)

King Street Patriots is referenced to emphasize the usual judicial practice: adjudicate as‑applied constitutional challenges before facial ones. The Supreme Court points out that the court of appeals’ decision to remand only the facial challenge, while dismissing the as‑applied claim, would put the trial court in a procedurally awkward position, contrary to the normal order of analysis.

5. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich is seminal on ultra vires suits. It holds that sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials in their official capacities seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ultra vires acts—actions beyond their statutory or constitutional authority. The Court cites Heinrich to remind that on remand, Gonzalez may need to name individual state actors as defendants rather than the agency itself.

6. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental Casualty is key to the jurisdiction analysis. It establishes that:

There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order . . . violates a constitutional right.

And further, in a footnote that the Court reiterates:

[A]n agency's rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature's own enactments.

This principle decisively undercuts Gonzalez’s argument that a TMB rule could create review jurisdiction independent of the APA and without a statutory deadline.

7. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963)

Chemical Bank recognized that in some circumstances there may be an inherent constitutional right to judicial review of administrative action. The Court notes this doctrine but explicitly states that Gonzalez did not invoke it, and therefore the Court need not address it.

8. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

Serafine is a federal Fifth Circuit decision involving a candidate for public office who was barred from using the title “psychologist” in campaign materials without a license. The Fifth Circuit held that this restriction violated her First Amendment rights.

The Texas Supreme Court invokes Serafine as a “cf.” citation, underscoring how unusual it is for a professional licensing board to intervene in the realm of campaign speech. It signals that the constitutional questions lurking beneath Gonzalez—professional titles, licensing, and political expression—have already drawn serious scrutiny in federal courts.

9. Administrative law scholarship on “contested cases”

The Court cites Robert W. Hamilton & J. J. Jewett III, “The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review,” 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976), to suggest that the statutory term “contested case” may refer only to adjudicative hearings mandated by statute, not those an agency chooses to provide voluntarily. This observation casts doubt on the court of appeals’ broader approach to the APA’s “contested case” definition, but the Supreme Court expressly declines to resolve the dispute here because it isn’t outcome‑determinative given Gonzalez’s abandonment of APA review.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Clarifying the redundant‑remedies doctrine: Remedies, not claims

The redundant‑remedies doctrine, as applied in Texas, generally provides that courts will not entertain an action under the UDJA when the same claim could be pursued through another avenue that offers an adequate remedy (often APA review). The core concern is avoiding parallel or duplicative litigation and preventing litigants from using the UDJA to evade statutory review limits.

The court of appeals applied this doctrine by asking whether Gonzalez could have raised the same claims—constitutional and ultra vires—in a timely APA petition. It answered yes, then deemed those UDJA claims barred as redundant, except for the facial challenge.

The Supreme Court corrects this framework in two steps:

1. Petition construction: Gonzales sought more than reversal of a single order.
   The court of appeals characterized all but the facial claim as challenging “only the cease‑and‑desist order.” The Supreme Court rejects this as an “unfairly cramped interpretation.”

   Reading the petition more broadly, the Court notes that Gonzalez sought:

   • a declaration that TMB lacked statutory authority to regulate him (because he was not a licensee and had not practiced medicine); and
   • a declaration that, even if authorized by statute, the Board’s application of § 104.004 to his truthful campaign speech would violate the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.

   The “plain thrust” of these claims, the Court explains, is to obtain protection against any future adverse action by TMB based on his self‑description as a “doctor” or “physician” in the political arena—not merely to vacate the specific cease‑and‑desist order. Such prospective protection goes beyond what APA review could have delivered.

2. Proper focus: Whether the APA could provide the same remedy, not the same claim.
   The Court then states, in direct reliance on Patel, that redundant‑remedies analysis must concentrate on the scope of available relief:

   But it doesn't matter whether Gonzalez could've brought the same claims. What matters is whether the APA would've afforded him the same remedy—that's why we call it the redundant‑remedies doctrine, not the redundant‑claims doctrine.

   Under the APA, judicial review of a contested‑case order permits the court to reverse or remand the specific order if, among other things, it violates constitutional or statutory provisions. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(A). However, that review is limited to the order at issue; it does not authorize general, free‑standing declarations about future conduct or prospective injunctions against future enforcement.

   Thus, just as in Patel (where plaintiffs sought “prospective injunctive relief against future agency orders based on the statutes and regulations”), Gonzalez seeks forward‑looking protection for his campaign speech beyond the fate of one order. Because the APA cannot supply this broader remedy, UDJA and ultra vires claims aiming at prospective relief are not redundant and may proceed.

2. Application to specific claims

a. Facial versus as‑applied constitutional challenges

The court of appeals recognized that a facial invalidation of § 104.004 “would go beyond reversal of the cease‑and‑desist order” and thus allowed that claim to proceed. The Supreme Court agrees that this is correct under Patel, but observes that exactly the same reasoning undercuts dismissal of the as‑applied claim.

An as‑applied challenge, in this context, means Gonzalez seeks a declaration that applying § 104.004 (and related statutes) to his particular conduct—truthful references to his degrees and status during a political campaign—violates the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution. That declaration, if granted, would:

• not merely reverse the specific cease‑and‑desist order, but
• also prohibit TMB from applying those statutes in the same way to him in the future.

The Court further emphasizes that the “usual” judicial practice is to resolve as‑applied challenges before tackling facial ones. Limiting the remand to the facial challenge would therefore distort standard constitutional adjudication methodology and risk unnecessary broad rulings before the specific contours of the law’s application are fully explored.

b. The ultra vires claim

Gonzalez also alleges that TMB acted ultra vires—beyond its statutory powers—by regulating him, a non‑licensee who did not practice or attempt to practice medicine. The precise merits of that claim are left for the district court, but the Supreme Court’s remedial analysis applies in the same way:

• If Gonzalez is right that TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate his campaign speech in this manner, a declaration so holding will protect him from future enforcement efforts on the same basis.
• APA review, by contrast, could only vacate the specific order; it cannot itself yield a general declaration that “TMB has no authority to regulate this type of speech or to proceed against this individual in this way.”

Accordingly, the ultra vires claim—like the as‑applied and facial challenges—seeks remedies that go beyond what APA review could provide and is not barred by the redundant‑remedies doctrine.

c. Substantial‑evidence claim and the APA

Gonzalez’s “substantial‑evidence” claim stands on different footing. “Substantial evidence” review is the APA’s classic mode for judging the factual sufficiency of agency decisions: did the agency have enough evidence to support its findings and order?

The court of appeals analyzed this claim within the APA framework, concluded that the cease‑and‑desist proceedings were a “contested case,” and held that the judicial‑review petition was time‑barred under the 30‑day deadline of Texas Government Code § 2001.176(a).

The Supreme Court, however, takes a more direct route: Gonzalez explicitly disclaimed reliance on the APA and argued instead that an old TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (2017), since repealed) provided an independent, no‑deadline right to seek judicial review of cease‑and‑desist orders. That argument crashes into Continental Casualty:

• There is no general right to judicial review of agency action absent a statute.
• Agency rules cannot create or expand district‑court jurisdiction beyond what statutes authorize.

Because Gonzalez pointed only to an agency rule, and not to any statute, as the source of review authority, his substantial‑evidence challenge was jurisdictionally defective. The Court therefore affirms dismissal of that claim for want of jurisdiction, without deciding whether the APA applied, whether the proceedings were a “contested case,” or whether the petition was untimely.

3. Jurisdiction, agency rules, and inherent constitutional review

The Court explicitly restates the baseline rule: Texas courts have jurisdiction to review agency orders only when:

1. a statute grants that right; or
2. the Constitution itself requires access to judicial review.

Gonzalez did not argue that he had an inherent constitutional right to judicial review of the TMB order, so the Court leaves that doctrine untouched.

The more immediate consequence is the clear reaffirmation that agencies cannot “bootstrap” their way into judicial scrutiny schemes of their own design. If the Legislature has not conferred judicial‑review jurisdiction by statute, an agency rule purporting to create it is ultra vires and void insofar as it purports to bind the courts. This preserves the Legislature’s primacy over the structure of judicial review and prevents agencies from engineering their own jurisdictional regimes.

4. The unresolved “contested case” question

The opinion contains a significant, if non‑dispositive, observation about what qualifies as a “contested case” under the APA. The court of appeals and some prior decisions had effectively treated any proceeding in which an agency actually holds a hearing as a “contested case,” regardless of whether a statute mandated such a hearing.

The Supreme Court points to scholarship suggesting that “contested case” more likely refers to proceedings in which a statute requires an adjudicative hearing. If that interpretation were adopted, some agency actions accompanied by discretionary hearings might fall outside APA review entirely.

Because Gonzalez chose not to rely on the APA, the Court declines to resolve this definitional issue. Nonetheless, the signal is clear: future litigants—and perhaps the Legislature—should anticipate renewed scrutiny of what exactly triggers APA “contested case” treatment.

E. Impact and Implications

1. For professional licensing boards and non‑licensees

Historically, agencies like TMB have primarily regulated licensees—those who have sought and obtained state authority to practice a profession. Here, however, the Board acted against a non‑licensee whose only alleged misconduct was campaign speech invoking his academic credentials.

The Court’s decision has several practical consequences:

• Non‑licensees can invoke ultra vires and constitutional claims. Individuals subject to cease‑and‑desist orders or similar actions, even if not licensees, may bring UDJA and ultra vires suits seeking prospective relief where APA review would be inadequate or unavailable (for example, when the APA’s deadlines have passed or when proceedings arguably are not “contested cases”).
• Agencies cannot rely on redundant‑remedies to insulate themselves from forward‑looking challenges. Boards may still argue that a particular UDJA suit is barred as redundant, but they must demonstrate that the alternative remedy offers the same breadth of relief—not merely that the same issues could have been aired in an APA appeal.
• Increased exposure to structural and constitutional suits. This decision may encourage more litigants to frame their disputes as broader statutory or constitutional challenges—especially where they fear recurring enforcement over time—knowing that such claims are not automatically barred by the availability of one‑off APA review.

2. For campaign speech and the use of professional titles

Substantively, the most intriguing aspect of the case is the underlying constitutional issue the Court did not decide: may a state medical board:

• forbid a person with a medical degree from calling himself a “physician” or “doctor” in campaign speech if he lacks a medical license; or
• require him to append disclaimers in political communications specifying that he is not licensed to practice medicine?

Those questions directly implicate:

• the First Amendment’s protection of political speech, which lies at the core of constitutional free‑speech doctrine; and
• the Texas Constitution’s speech clause (Article I, § 8), which the Texas Supreme Court has on occasion interpreted more protectively than the federal First Amendment.

The Court’s comparison to Serafine v. Branaman signals awareness that federal courts have already found similar professional‑title prohibitions in campaign settings to violate free speech. In Serafine, the Fifth Circuit rejected Texas’s effort to prevent an unlicensed candidate with a psychology background from calling herself a “psychologist.” The parallels are stark.

On remand, the district court will likely have to grapple with:

• whether the challenged statutes impose content‑based or speaker‑based restrictions on political speech;
• whether any such restrictions satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny;
• the distinction (if any) between commercial advertising regulations and political messaging; and
• whether requiring disclaimers mid‑speech (or on campaign materials) is an unduly burdensome “compelled speech” requirement in the political arena.

The Supreme Court’s closing admonition that TMB must “defend [its] position on the merits” suggests skepticism toward the Board’s expansive view of its power over political discourse, even as the Court studiously avoids prejudging the constitutional outcome.

3. For the redundant‑remedies doctrine in Texas administrative law

Doctrinally, Gonzalez refines and narrows the redundant‑remedies doctrine in important ways:

• Remedy‑focused inquiry. Courts must ask: Does the alternative statutory mechanism (typically the APA) provide the same range of relief the plaintiff seeks under the UDJA or in an ultra vires suit? If not, the UDJA claim is not redundant.
• Availability versus adequacy. The mere availability of APA review is not enough to bar a UDJA or ultra vires claim. The alternative remedy must be genuinely adequate in scope and forward‑looking effect.
• Prospective constitutional and ultra vires suits preserved. Where a plaintiff seeks to prevent future enforcement on constitutional or authority‑based grounds, APA review limited to reversing a single order will rarely be “redundant.” This strengthens the role of UDJA and ultra vires actions as tools for systemic or prospective challenges to agency behavior.

This opinion thus cements Patel’s logic and cautions lower courts against reading redundant‑remedies so expansively that it effectively nullifies UDJA and ultra vires relief in the administrative context.

4. For pleading, amendment, and appellate practice

The Court also highlights several practical lessons for litigators:

• Broad reading of pleadings and general prayers. The Court resists a narrow reading of Gonzalez’s petition, noting his request for “such other and further equitable relief.” It hints that, under Texas pleading rules, plaintiffs can often obtain all relief their pleadings and evidence support under a general prayer. This favors a more generous construction of claims at the jurisdictional stage.
• Amendment on remand. The Court notes that, because TMB did not file a cross‑petition for review, the facial‑challenge remand is final. On remand, however, Gonzalez may amend to:
  • add explicit claims for prospective constitutional relief; and
  • name appropriate state actors (individual officials) as defendants in an ultra vires posture consistent with Heinrich.
• Necessity of cross‑petitions. By pointing to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1, the Court quietly reminds practitioners that any party wishing to alter the court of appeals’ judgment must file its own petition for review. TMB’s failure to do so foreclosed Supreme Court reconsideration of the remand on the facial challenge.

5. For agency rulemaking and judicial review design

Finally, Gonzalez sends a clear institutional message: the architecture of judicial review is the Legislature’s prerogative, not the agencies’.

• Agencies may create internal procedural regimes, including hearings and reconsideration processes, but they cannot declare that their decisions will (or will not) be subject to judicial review on their own authority.
• If the Legislature has not provided a statutory review avenue, recourse must be sought through constitutional means (e.g., inherent right to review, if applicable) or via ultra vires actions, not via agency rules.

This ensures both separation of powers and democratic accountability in how and when Texans may challenge administrative power in the courts.

IV. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)

The UDJA (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 37) allows a person to ask a court to:

• declare what a statute or regulation means; and
• declare whether a statute, rule, or governmental action is constitutional or within legal authority.

It is often used to:

• challenge the validity of statutes or rules; and
• seek forward‑looking guidance about legal rights and obligations.

2. Redundant‑remedies doctrine

This doctrine prevents use of the UDJA when another legal mechanism already offers an adequate remedy. The concern is efficiency and respect for legislative design: courts don’t want litigants to bypass a specific statutory review process by re‑labeling their dispute as a declaratory‑judgment action.

Gonzalez clarifies that the doctrine is triggered only when the alternative process offers the same or broader remedy. If the alternative remedy—for example, judicial review under the APA—can only reverse a single agency order and cannot provide prospective relief, then a UDJA suit seeking broader declaratory or injunctive relief is not redundant.

3. Ultra vires

“Ultra vires” is Latin for “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires suit alleges that a government official is acting outside the authority granted by statute or the constitution. In Texas:

• sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials in their official capacities seeking to stop ultra vires actions; but
• the suit must be directed at the officials themselves, not the agency as such, and must seek purely prospective (future‑oriented) relief.

In Gonzalez, the ultra vires theory is that TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate a non‑licensed attorney’s political self‑description as a “doctor” or “physician” in the absence of any attempt to practice medicine.

4. Facial versus as‑applied constitutional challenges

• Facial challenge. Argues that a law is unconstitutional in all or virtually all of its applications. If successful, the statute (or the offending portions) is effectively struck down and cannot be enforced against anyone in any context.
• As‑applied challenge. Argues that a law is unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of the plaintiff’s situation, but may be constitutional in other contexts. If successful, the plaintiff gains protection from the law’s application in that setting, but the statute remains on the books and enforceable elsewhere.

Courts usually prefer to decide as‑applied challenges first, because they are narrower and may avoid the need to decide a sweeping facial invalidation. Gonzalez reinforces that practice.

5. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and “contested cases”

The Texas APA (Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2001) sets out how agencies:

• conduct rulemaking; and
• adjudicate “contested cases” (disputes in which legal rights must be decided after an opportunity for a trial‑type hearing).

In “contested cases,” the APA typically provides:

• procedural protections (notice, opportunity to be heard, etc.); and
• a right to judicial review in district court, subject to strict deadlines (often 30 days) and limited remedies (reversal, remand, or affirmance of the specific order).

Whether a proceeding is a “contested case” depends on the statutory framework and, perhaps, on whether a hearing is required by statute rather than provided voluntarily by the agency—an issue the Court flags but leaves unresolved here.

6. Substantial‑evidence review

Under the APA, courts review agency factual determinations under a “substantial evidence” standard. This is deferential to the agency:

• The question is not whether the court would reach the same conclusion, but whether some reasonable evidence in the record could support the agency’s decision.
• Courts do not re‑weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes anew.

In Gonzalez, this type of review was never reached because the court lacked jurisdiction outside the APA.

7. Sovereign immunity and judicial review

“Sovereign immunity” generally protects the State and its agencies from being sued without consent. In the administrative context:

• Legislatures may waive immunity by providing statutory rights to judicial review.
• Even absent such statutes, courts may hear:
  • constitutional claims challenging the validity of statutes or actions; and
  • ultra vires suits against officials seeking to stop unauthorized actions.

Gonzalez underscores that these judicial pathways exist regardless of whether the APA is invoked, provided plaintiffs can surmount sovereign‑immunity limits in the ways the Texas Supreme Court has recognized.

V. Conclusion

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is not yet the definitive word on the constitutional limits of professional licensing boards’ regulation of campaign speech. That fight is still to come in the district court on remand. But the decision is nonetheless important for what it firmly establishes about Texas administrative and remedial law.

First, it definitively cabins the redundant‑remedies doctrine: courts must focus on whether alternative statutory schemes offer the same remedy, especially prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. Mere availability of APA review does not automatically bar UDJA or ultra vires suits, particularly when plaintiffs seek protection against future enforcement actions and structural constitutional violations.

Second, it reaffirms that judicial review of agency orders is a matter of legislative design and constitutional necessity, not agency grace. Agencies cannot, by rule, create or expand judicial‑review jurisdiction; any such attempt is ineffective against the courts.

Third, by allowing Gonzalez’s facial and as‑applied constitutional challenges and ultra vires claim to go forward, the Court opens the door to serious scrutiny of attempts by professional licensing boards to regulate political speech through title‑usage restrictions and compelled disclaimers. In the shadow of Serafine and the Supreme Court’s growing skepticism of overbroad “professional speech” regulations, this promises to be a significant battleground for future Texas jurisprudence.

In sum, Gonzalez stands as a robust reaffirmation that:

• litigants may seek meaningful, prospective constitutional and ultra vires relief even when they have missed or foregone APA review; and
• professional licensing agencies cannot assume that their regulatory reach extends unchallenged into the heartland of political expression.

The case will now return to the district court, where the constitutional clashes over truthfully using the titles “doctor” and “physician” in a political campaign, and the scope of TMB’s statutory authority over non‑licensees, will finally be litigated “on the merits” the Supreme Court has insisted upon.