“Infancy in Arms” –
McCoy v. ATF and the Recognition of a Historical ‘Infancy Doctrine’ Limitation on Commercial Fire-Arm Sales

1. Introduction

In Joshua McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), the federal provision that bars licensed firearms dealers from selling hand-guns to persons aged 18–20. Four named plaintiffs—each between 18 and 20—sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the restriction violated their Second Amendment rights. The Eastern District of Virginia agreed. On appeal, however, a divided Fourth Circuit reversed, dismissed the suit, and, in doing so, articulated a new lineage of “infancy-based” gun regulations that lower courts may now treat as historically analogous under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Judge Wilkinson’s majority opinion—joined by Judge Heytens (who also concurred separately)—holds that the statute fits comfortably within an Anglo-American tradition that treated those under 21 as “infants” whose commercial contracts were voidable. Drawing on that doctrine, the court declared that regulating commercial sale of hand-guns to that age cohort is constitutionally permissible. Judge Quattlebaum dissented, warning that the majority both misapplied Bruen’s “how and why” test and elevated non-firearms precedents over the Militia Act of 1792 and state practice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The court assumed, arguendo, that 18- to 20-year-olds fall within “the people” protected by the Second Amendment and that the act of purchasing a hand-gun is covered conduct (Bruen step 1).
• At Bruen step 2 the burden shifted to the Government. The majority located a “relevantly similar” principle in the common-law infancy doctrine: because minors’ contracts were unenforceable, commercial sellers faced serious risk and therefore were disinclined to transact with buyers under 21. Congress’s 1968 sales ban is, in the majority’s view, the same in how and why.
• Nineteenth-century state laws barring pistol sales to minors were said to “confirm” and extend the founding-era principle once hand-guns became widespread.
• The panel therefore reversed the district court, vacated the nationwide injunction and class certification, and ordered the case dismissed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – provides the two-step “text + history & tradition” methodology.
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – foundational individual-rights holding; dicta on “long-standing conditions on commercial sale.”
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – clarifies that courts seek principles not molds when identifying analogues.
• Common-law treatises – Coke (Institutes), Blackstone (Commentaries), Comyn, Kent – for the infancy contract doctrine.
• State & territorial statutes 1856-1897 – at least 20 jurisdictions barred pistol sales to under-21s.
• Militia Act of 1792 – deployed mainly by dissent and district court; majority distinguishes it.
• Hosford, Price, Bianchi – Fourth Circuit cases on commercial-sale “conditions.”

3.2 Core Legal Reasoning

The majority’s opinion pivots on analogical reasoning. Because the Founders widely regarded persons under 21 as legally infantes, any contract they executed—including a firearms sale—was voidable at their option. That regime, the court says, made it exceedingly difficult for 18- to 20-year-olds to purchase a handgun from a commercial seller. Thus:

1. How the burden operates: both then and now, a seller faces intolerable risk (financial loss then; criminal liability now) and is therefore unlikely to transact.
2. Why the burden exists: both then and now, lawmakers distrusted the judgment and maturity of those under 21.

Although modern penalties are harsher, the majority calls that difference immaterial because from the minor’s perspective the market effect is the same—no sale. The court rejects the Militia Act of 1792 as evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, stressing that the Act required young militiamen to posses arms, not necessarily purchase them, and that many states placed the procurement duty on parents.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Doctrinally – The case supplies the first published circuit-level endorsement of using non-fire-arm legal traditions (contract incapacity) as Second Amendment analogues. Future age-based or capacity-based firearm regulations (e.g., intoxication, mental-health orders) may now be defended by pointing to analogous civil-liability regimes.
• Inter-circuit Conflict – The Fifth Circuit (Reese v. ATF) took the opposite view in 2025, creating a clean split. Supreme Court review is thus likely.
• Legislative Confidence – Congress and the 21+ states that ban handgun sales to under-21s receive powerful affirmation that such laws remain “presumptively lawful.” State reforms that were on hold pending Bruen litigation may now revive.
• Litigation Strategy – Defendants will scour historical materials outside gun-specific law (e.g., fiduciary duties, surety bonds, age-of-consent rules) to craft analogues— broadening the universe of usable history.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Infancy Doctrine

At common law a person under 21 was an “infant.” Any contract he made—buying goods, promising payment—was voidable at his option. The rule protected youths from exploitation.

Bruen Two-Step Test

Step 1: Does the challenged conduct fall within “the people’s” right to keep and bear arms? If yes, regulation is presumptively unconstitutional.
Step 2: Government must show the regulation is consistent with historical tradition. Courts compare how and why modern and historical laws burden the right.

“Conditions and Qualifications on Commercial Sale”

A phrase from Heller describing historic dealer-side regulations (licensing, record-keeping). The Fourth Circuit says total bans on buyer categories can still be justified only by history, not by this carve-out alone.

5. Conclusion

McCoy v. ATF is a landmark in post-Bruen jurisprudence. By anchoring a modern federal gun-control statute in the 18th-century infancy contract doctrine, the Fourth Circuit broadened the universe of “relevantly similar” historical analogues. Whether that move withstands Supreme Court scrutiny remains to be seen, but the opinion unquestionably reshapes the analytical terrain:

• Age-based commercial restrictions—at least up to 21—now enjoy an appellate imprimatur in one of the Nation’s most influential circuits.
• Litigants must prepare to grapple with non-fire-arm legal history, expanding the historical inquiry well beyond weapons-specific laws.
• A clear circuit split signals that the Court may soon clarify the permissible scope of analogical reasoning under Bruen.

For lawmakers, McCoy is a validation of incremental regulation tailored to commercial channels rather than outright possession bans. For courts, it is a reminder that the quest for “history and tradition” can reach unexpected—and, to some, unsettling—corners of the common law.