“Immaterial” Inconsistencies Are Immaterial: Adverse Credibility in Asylum Cases After Shaibu Salu v. Bondi

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Shaibu Salu v. Bondi, No. 25-3294 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), offers a concentrated illustration of how adverse credibility determinations function in modern U.S. asylum adjudication under the REAL ID Act. Although “not recommended for publication” and therefore non-precedential under circuit practice, the opinion is highly instructive on:

the breadth of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) discretion to make credibility findings;
the heavy deference federal courts owe to those findings under the “substantial evidence” standard;
the use of early immigration interviews (border and credible-fear interviews) to impeach later testimony; and
the way “supporting” documents can undermine, rather than bolster, an applicant’s story.

Petitioner Shaibu Salu, a Ghanaian national, claimed he fled Ghana because of persecution arising from his conversion from Islam to Christianity. After entering at the San Ysidro port of entry in March 2016 without valid documents, he underwent an initial border interview and then a credible-fear interview. He later filed a formal asylum application and ultimately testified at a merits hearing before an IJ in 2021.

Across these four stages—border interview, credible-fear interview, written asylum application, and testimony at the merits hearing—his account changed markedly. The IJ found him not credible, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the Sixth Circuit denied his petition for review.

The central legal issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, in light of:

inconsistencies in Salu’s own statements about key events (conversion, baptism, timing of threats and attacks, and departure from Ghana); and
contradictions between his testimony and the letters he submitted as corroborating evidence.

A secondary issue—though not developed at length in the opinion—was Salu’s challenge to the weight the IJ gave to what he characterized as “immaterial” discrepancies, especially with respect to dates.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Judge John K. Bush, writing for a panel including Judges Boggs and Readler, denied Salu’s petition for review. The court:

Described the statutory and doctrinal framework: To obtain asylum an applicant must demonstrate refugee status based on persecution on a protected ground (including religion) under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The IJ must find the applicant’s testimony “credible, persuasive, and” adequately specific. The IJ is authorized to base credibility determinations on inconsistencies in written and oral statements and may rely on “any inaccuracies or falsehoods” regardless of whether they go to the heart of the claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).
Reaffirmed the standard of review: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), the court must accept the agency’s factual findings, including credibility determinations, unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” This is the familiar, highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard.
Identified two principal bases for the adverse credibility finding:
- Salu’s own inconsistent testimony over time concerning (a) when he began attending church, (b) whether and when he was baptized, (c) when he was threatened and attacked, and (d) when he left Ghana.
- Contradictions between his testimony and his supporting documents, especially letters from purported acquaintances that conflicted with his account of the number of attackers, whether his church was attacked, who financed his travel, how many times he was assaulted, and whether anyone else was attacked with him.
Rejected Salu’s “immaterial inconsistencies” argument: The panel noted that the inconsistencies in this case went to the core of his persecution narrative (conversion, attack, and timing). But even apart from that, § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) expressly allows IJs to rely on “any” inaccuracies “without regard” to whether they go to the heart of the claim. Thus, whether the discrepancies were “immaterial” is itself “immaterial.”
Treated the adverse credibility finding as dispositive: With no independent corroborating evidence to overcome the credibility problems, the adverse credibility determination doomed Salu’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court cited Luna-Romero v. Barr for the proposition that an adverse credibility finding is usually fatal when the applicant’s testimony is the primary evidence.
Noted waiver of the CAT claim: The BIA concluded Salu had waived any challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT relief. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb that conclusion and treated the adverse credibility finding as extinguishing all claims.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1252

The opinion relies centrally on the statutory standard for asylum and credibility determinations set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B):

Subsection (i) defines who qualifies as a “refugee” (persecution based on race, religion, nationality, particular social group, or political opinion).
Subsection (ii) requires that the applicant’s testimony, if relied upon without corroboration, be credible, persuasive, and specific.
Subsection (iii) (the REAL ID Act provision) enumerates the factors for credibility, notably authorizing the IJ to base credibility determinations on:
- inconsistencies between written and oral statements;
- inaccuracies or falsehoods regardless of whether they go to the heart of the claim; and
- “any other relevant factor.”

The opinion also invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) to define the standard of review: the agency’s findings are conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court equates that with the substantial evidence standard.

2. Standard-of-Review Cases

El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2009) – Cited for the proposition that § 1252(b)(4)(B)’s standard is equivalent to the “highly deferential” substantial evidence standard. This reinforces that the court is not free to reweigh evidence but must uphold the agency if its conclusion is reasonably supported by the record.
Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2001), quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) – Reiterates that the reviewing court affirms where the agency’s findings are supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” This language is the classic articulation of the substantial evidence standard in immigration cases.
Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911 (6th Cir. 2023) – Cited for the proposition that when the BIA issues a reasoned opinion and adopts the IJ’s reasoning, the court reviews both. The opinion notes that Kolov has been “abrogated in part on other grounds” by Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025), but that abrogation does not affect the use of Kolov for this procedural point.

3. Credibility and Adverse Credibility Determinations

Luna-Romero v. Barr, 949 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2020) – Quoted twice:
- First, for the broad proposition that an adverse credibility finding is “usually fatal” to asylum, withholding, or CAT relief when the applicant’s testimony is the primary evidence.
- Second, in support of treating inconsistent timelines as a sufficient basis for adverse credibility. The panel notes that it has “found similarly inconsistent chronologies to be sufficient grounds” for adverse credibility, citing Luna-Romero.
Jolon-Velasquez v. Garland, No. 21-3029, 2021 WL 5013818 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2021), and Ruano-Flautero v. Bondi, No. 24-4015, 2025 WL 1939294 (6th Cir. July 15, 2025) – Unpublished decisions cited alongside Luna-Romero to reinforce the line of authority that “inconsistent chronologies” can sustain an adverse credibility finding.

4. Contradictory Corroborating Evidence

Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2016) – Cited for the proposition that contradictions between an applicant’s testimony and his own application documents can justify an adverse credibility finding. In Salu, this principle is extended to additional types of supporting letters that conflict with the applicant’s sworn statements.
Ali v. Bondi, No. 24-3867, 2025 WL 2955172 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) – Another unpublished case, referenced for the idea that contradictions between testimony and external documents such as newspaper articles or medical records likewise support adverse credibility.

Together, these authorities underscore a consistent theme in Sixth Circuit immigration jurisprudence: when testimony is internally inconsistent, or externally inconsistent with the applicant’s own supporting materials, reviewing courts will rarely disturb an adverse credibility determination, particularly after the REAL ID Act expanded the scope of permissible credibility considerations.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Deference to the IJ and BIA

The court begins by clearly situating its role in the statutory framework:

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding and expressly adopted his reasoning.
Under Gilaj and Kolov, the Sixth Circuit reviews the BIA’s decision but also examines the IJ’s opinion insofar as it was adopted.
Under § 1252(b)(4)(B), the panel may overturn the agency only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.

This threshold framing is important: the court does not ask whether it personally would have found Salu credible, but whether the IJ’s decision against credibility falls within the range of reasonable interpretations of the record. This is a narrow scope of review, and the court emphasizes that it is “highly deferential.”

2. Category One: Inconsistent Testimony Over Time

The first prong of the court’s analysis concerns Salu’s shifting story across different stages of the process.

In the border interview (March 2016):

Salu stated he began attending church in January 2016.
He stated that he was physically harmed in February 2016.
He indicated he left Ghana shortly after being harmed on February 24, 2016.
When asked whether he read the Bible, he initially answered “yes,” then moments later admitted: “you said not to lie and I have not read one.”

In the credible-fear interview (June 2016):

He again placed his conversion to Christianity in January 2016.
He reported threats and physical harm in February 2016.
He told the officer he had no conversion ceremony in Ghana, fearing that doing so would get him killed.
He now claimed he had a Bible in Ghana and read it “every night … and sometimes early in the morning,” even quoting passages from the Gospels.

In the written asylum application (December 2016):

He shifted the onset of his interest in Christianity back to January 2015.
He moved the first threats to September 2015.
He asserted that he was attacked on November 7, 2015, by about 15 people because of his conversion.

At the merits hearing (August 2021):

He testified that he began attending church in 2014.
He claimed he was baptized on January 10, 2015, and introduced a baptismal certificate to that effect.
He placed the attack on November 7, 2015.
He testified that he left Ghana in March 2016.

The court emphasizes that this evolving chronology is not a matter of one small discrepancy but a pattern of moving dates and key events:

His conversion date moved from January 2016 in the interviews to January 2015 (or earlier) in later filings and testimony.
A formal baptismal ceremony was initially denied, then later affirmatively claimed and documented.
The date of the attack shifted from February 2016 to November 2015.
His reading of the Bible shifted from never (at the border) to regular and devout (at credible fear) to a still different narrative later.

Given this, the panel finds it entirely reasonable for the IJ and BIA to doubt the reliability of Salu’s account of religious conversion and persecution. Because persecution based on conversion is the heart of his claim, inconsistencies about when and how he converted, when he was attacked for converting, and whether he formally converted are particularly damaging.

The court also explicitly connects this analysis to Luna-Romero, Jolon-Velasquez, and Ruano-Flautero, in which it had upheld adverse credibility findings based on similar inconsistencies in timelines. This places Salu firmly within a line of cases where discrepancies regarding key dates and the sequence of events are enough to sustain a finding of non-credibility.

3. Category Two: Contradictions With Corroborating Documents

The second major pillar of the court’s reasoning is the conflict between Salu’s testimony and the letters he submitted in support of his application. Rather than confirming his account, these letters frequently contradicted it:

Number of attackers: One supporting letter claimed that Salu was attacked by four people, while his asylum application stated that about fifteen people participated in the attack.
Attack on the church and financial support: Another letter asserted that:
- Salu’s church was attacked;
- the letter’s author paid for Salu’s travel; and
- the author attended church with Salu.
But Salu testified that:
- his church had never been attacked;
- the author had not financially assisted him; and
- he did not know the author at all.
Number of assaults: Yet another letter claimed that the author knew Salu from school and that Salu had suffered multiple assaults. Salu testified that he did not know the author and had been physically harmed only once.
Who was attacked: A final letter claimed that its author was attacked along with Salu, whereas Salu testified that he alone was attacked.

Under Bi Qing Zheng and Ali, inconsistencies between testimony and documentary “corroboration” are powerful grounds for adverse credibility. Here, the conflicts are stark enough that the court treats them as “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” of unreliability.

Much as with his shifting oral statements, these documentary contradictions touch core aspects of his narrative: the nature and scale of the alleged attack, who was present, whether his church was a target, and the nature of his support network.

4. The “Immaterial Inconsistencies” Argument

Salu attempted to blunt the impact of these discrepancies by characterizing them as “immaterial matters” and attributing them to “inattentiveness to dates.” The court rejects that position for two distinct reasons.

Factually, the inconsistencies are material to the claim.
The panel notes that these discrepancies concern:
- when Salu converted to Christianity;
- when he was first threatened or attacked for his conversion;
- whether and how often he read the Bible; and
- whether he underwent a formal baptismal ceremony.
These details form the core of his claimed persecution narrative. They are not mere peripheral details or memory slips about minor side issues.
Legally, materiality is not required under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Even assuming arguendo that some inconsistencies were peripheral, the REAL ID Act expressly authorizes IJs to rely on “any inaccuracies or falsehoods … without regard to whether [they] go to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” The court underscores this language and concludes that whether the discrepancies concern “immaterial matters” is itself “immaterial.”

This is the opinion’s most pointed doctrinal statement and provides the basis for framing the decision as standing for the proposition that “immaterial inconsistencies are immaterial” to the lawfulness of an adverse credibility finding. The statute leaves it to the IJ’s discretion to decide how to weigh any inconsistency; appellate courts will not second-guess that weighing absent a compelling reason.

5. Dispositive Effect of the Adverse Credibility Finding

Having concluded that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination, the court treats that finding as dispositive of all three forms of requested protection—asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief—given the absence of independent corroborating evidence.

The court relies on Luna-Romero, 949 F.3d at 295, for the proposition that:

recognizing an adverse credibility finding is fatal when the primary evidence used to support an asylum, withholding, or CAT claim is the petitioner’s own testimony.

Thus, once the IJ reasonably disbelieved Salu’s testimony and the supporting documents were themselves unreliable, there was nothing left in the record compelling a finding of past persecution or a likelihood of future persecution or torture.

Separately, the BIA had concluded that Salu waived any challenge to the IJ’s rejection of his CAT claim. Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion does not delve into the exhaustion doctrine in detail, this reflects the administrative rule that applicants must raise each claim and issue before the BIA to preserve it for judicial review. Here, Salu challenged only the credibility finding, not the CAT ruling, and that omission was deemed a waiver.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of IJ Discretion and Deference

Salu strengthens an already strong message: IJs wield broad discretion to assess credibility, and the REAL ID Act gives them license to consider any inconsistency or inaccuracy regardless of materiality. Federal courts will rarely overturn such findings:

Petitioners face a steep uphill battle: to prevail they must show that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find them credible, not merely that their account is plausible.
Where the IJ identifies “specific, cogent reasons” for doubting credibility—as the BIA found here—federal courts are highly unlikely to intervene.

This decision thus serves as a caution to asylum practitioners: even relatively modest discrepancies, especially when repeated or compounded by documentary contradictions, can be enough to sustain adverse credibility.

2. Heightened Risks From Early Interviews

The court’s reliance on statements made during the border interview and credible-fear interview highlights the risk that applicants’ early, often unrepresented, statements will be used against them:

At the border, Salu denied reading the Bible; later he claimed regular devotional reading and biblical quotation.
He initially said he had no conversion ceremony; later he produced a baptismal certificate.
He first placed his conversion and persecution in 2016; later documents and testimony backdated them to 2015 and even 2014.

Although the opinion does not discuss potential reliability problems of border interviews (such as language barriers, lack of counsel, or confusion), it sends a clear message: applicants should assume that every statement made at any stage will be scrutinized and compared to later filings and testimony. Counsel must prepare applicants accordingly and take particular care to reconcile any discrepancies early in the process.

3. The Double-Edged Nature of Corroborating Letters

The case also underscores that corroborating letters can damage a case if not carefully vetted:

Letters from church members or acquaintances that contradict the applicant’s story can be read as evidence of fabrication or at least unreliability.
If the applicant denies knowing the letter writers or disputes their content, the letters may create the appearance of manufactured or coordinated evidence.

In Salu, the letters raised as many questions as they answered: different numbers of attackers, conflicting accounts of who paid for travel, disagreements about whether the church was attacked, and contradictory claims about who knew whom and who was attacked. The IJ and BIA reasonably treated this patchwork as evidence undermining, rather than bolstering, Salu’s credibility.

4. Clarifying the Role of “Immaterial” Inconsistencies

One of the most significant doctrinal clarifications in Salu is the explicit rejection of an “immaterial inconsistency” safe harbor. The panel’s reliance on the statutory language—“without regard to whether an inconsistency … goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim”—confirms that:

IJs may base adverse credibility findings on any inconsistency they find relevant, including mistakes about dates, numbers, or ancillary facts.
Petitioners cannot reliably shield themselves by labeling discrepancies as “immaterial”; the statute gives the IJ the final say on how much they matter.

While materiality remains relevant as a practical matter—larger, central contradictions are more likely to persuade an IJ—the appellate court will not superimpose a materiality test on credibility determinations where the statute has removed it.

5. CAT Claims and the Need to Preserve Issues

The BIA’s conclusion that Salu waived his CAT challenge is a reminder of the administrative exhaustion requirement:

Applicants must clearly raise CAT (and other relief) issues before the BIA to preserve them for judicial review.
Simply appealing the case generally, or focusing on asylum, may not suffice.

Additionally, Salu, echoing Luna-Romero, confirms that in the Sixth Circuit, where there is no independent documentary evidence of a risk of torture, an adverse credibility finding will usually be fatal to CAT relief as well.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Relief

Asylum – A discretionary form of protection granted to those who qualify as “refugees” under U.S. law. The applicant must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, or political opinion).
Withholding of removal – A related but distinct protection. It is mandatory if the applicant shows it is “more likely than not” that they would be persecuted on a protected ground if removed. The standard of proof is higher than for asylum.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection – Separate from asylum and withholding. The applicant must show it is more likely than not that they will be tortured (severe pain or suffering, intentionally inflicted, with the involvement or acquiescence of a public official) if returned. It does not require a protected ground such as religion, but the standard is high.

In practice, all three often rise or fall with the applicant’s credibility, especially when there is little or no objective corroborating evidence.

2. Adverse Credibility Determination

An “adverse credibility determination” is a finding by the IJ that the applicant is not believable. Under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), the IJ may consider:

inconsistencies between the applicant’s different statements;
contradictions between testimony and documents;
implausibilities in the story; and
other factors such as demeanor.

If the IJ finds the applicant not credible and there is no strong independent evidence to back up the claim, the case is usually lost. This is precisely what happened to Salu.

3. Border and Credible-Fear Interviews

Border interview: An initial screening at or near a port of entry (here, San Ysidro, Mexico). Officers may ask why the person is coming to the United States, whether they fear return to their home country, and similar questions. Statements here are recorded and can later be used to assess consistency.
Credible-fear interview: A more structured interview conducted by an asylum officer for individuals who express fear of persecution or torture. The purpose is to determine whether there is a “significant possibility” that the applicant could establish eligibility for asylum in a full hearing. A positive finding allows the applicant to proceed to an IJ.

In Salu, both these early interviews contained statements that conflicted with later versions of his story, undermining his credibility.

4. Substantial Evidence Standard / “Any Reasonable Adjudicator” Standard

Under the substantial evidence standard (codified in § 1252(b)(4)(B)), a reviewing court:

does not decide what it thinks is most likely true;
asks only whether the agency’s decision is supported by enough evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have reached the same conclusion; and
must uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.

This is a very deferential standard and strongly favors the agency. In asylum cases, especially ones hinging on credibility, this standard makes it extremely difficult for petitioners to overturn adverse findings on appeal.

5. Waiver / Exhaustion

“Waiver” in this context refers to the failure to raise a specific issue in a timely manner before the appropriate body, here the BIA. U.S. law generally requires that:

a noncitizen must first present each distinct claim or argument to the BIA; and
only those claims properly raised and decided by the BIA may then be reviewed by a federal court.

Because Salu did not challenge the IJ’s denial of CAT relief before the BIA, the BIA concluded he waived that claim. Thus, there was nothing for the Sixth Circuit to review on the CAT issue, apart from noting that the adverse credibility finding would in any event be fatal.

V. Conclusion

Shaibu Salu v. Bondi is a compact but instructive illustration of how credibility, consistency, and corroboration interact in modern U.S. asylum adjudication. Its key takeaways include:

Credibility is central. When an asylum claim hinges on the applicant’s narrative and that narrative is found not credible, the claim is generally doomed absent strong independent evidence.
Inconsistencies across time are dangerous. Shifting timelines for conversion, persecution, and departure—especially when combined with inconsistent claims about religious practices—are fertile grounds for adverse credibility findings.
Corroborating documents can hurt. Letters or other documents that do not align with the applicant’s testimony can be treated as evidence of fabrication or unreliability, reinforcing an adverse credibility determination.
“Immaterial” inconsistencies are no safe harbor. The REAL ID Act’s removal of the “goes to the heart” requirement empowers IJs to rely on any inconsistency. Appellate courts will not impose a materiality filter where Congress has explicitly rejected one.
The burden on appeal is heavy. Under the substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must show that no reasonable adjudicator could have found him not credible—a demanding showing rarely met.
Issue preservation matters. Failure to raise CAT (or other) claims before the BIA leads to waiver, cutting off judicial review.

Although non-precedential, Salu reinforces a consistent Sixth Circuit pattern: robust deference to the immigration courts’ credibility assessments, broad acceptance of documentary contradictions as evidence of unreliability, and a strict reading of the REAL ID Act’s permissive approach to the use of “any” inconsistencies. For asylum practitioners and applicants, the case underscores the imperative of internal consistency, careful preparation for every stage of the process, and meticulous alignment between testimony and supporting documents.