“If the Motion Is Not Properly Filed, the Claim Is Waived” – The Eleventh Circuit’s Clarification of Speedy-Trial Waiver and COVID-Related Delay in United States v. Francisco Louis

1. Introduction

In United States v. Francisco Louis, No. 23-10643 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar but legally thorny issue: how do COVID-19 court shutdowns, coupled with a defendant’s own tactical continuances, square with statutory and constitutional speedy-trial guarantees? Defendant-appellant Francisco Junior Louis was convicted of a six-store armed robbery spree. On appeal he raised an array of issues, the most prominent being claimed violations of (1) the Speedy Trial Act (STA) and (2) the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause.

The panel (Chief Judge William Pryor, and Judges Grant and Luck, with Judge Grant writing) held that:

Louis waived all statutory STA protections because his only dismissal motion was filed pro se while he was still represented by counsel, contravening a local rule.
His Sixth-Amendment claim failed under the four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo because he showed no actual prejudice and large portions of the delay were either pandemic-driven or requested by him.
His remaining challenges—sufficiency of the evidence, a flight instruction, admission of lay identification testimony, and refusal of a “shoe-fitting” demonstration—were meritless.

While the court did not break entirely new ground, it crystallizes two important take-aways that will resonate in future litigation:

Invalid motions do not toll or preserve Speedy Trial Act rights; if counsel does not move for dismissal, the right is lost, even when a represented defendant files his own motion.
COVID-19 continuances, coupled with defendant-requested delays, remain legitimate reasons under both the STA “ends-of-justice” calculus and the constitutional Barker analysis.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After a ten-day robbery spree in April 2020, Louis was arrested, charged with six Hobbs Act robberies, and ultimately sentenced to 218 months’ imprisonment. The key chronology:

State custody: May 2020 – Jan. 7 2021
Transfer to federal custody / first federal appearance: Jan. 7 2021
Indictment returned: Apr. 29 2021 (112 days post-custody transfer)
Trial commenced: Mar. 1 2022 (306 days post-indictment)

The government obtained four continuances pre-indictment, all premised on pandemic restrictions. Post-indictment, Louis himself moved for three continuances to prepare for trial.

On appeal the Eleventh Circuit:

Deemed the Speedy Trial Act argument waived under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) because no timely dismissal motion was filed by counsel, and Local Rule 11.1(d)(4) barred the represented defendant’s pro se filing.
Applied Barker and held that (a) a 14-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, but (b) pandemic conditions and defendant-initiated continuances justified the delay, and (c) Louis exhibited no actual prejudice.
Found the evidence overwhelming, the flight instruction proper, the detective’s lay opinion admissible, and the shoe demonstration rightfully excluded under Rule 403.
Affirmed the conviction and sentence in full.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) – Four-factor test for Sixth-Amendment speedy-trial claims; drove the constitutional analysis.
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) – Requirement that STA “ends-of-justice” continuances be supported by on-the-record findings; cited but ultimately bypassed because of waiver.
United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2024) – Confirms waiver of STA rights if no timely dismissal motion; dispositive precedent for the panel’s waiver holding.
United States v. Vargas, 97 F.4th 1277 (11th Cir. 2024) & United States v. Dunn, 83 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) – Upheld COVID-19 continuances; relied upon to treat pandemic delay as justified and “neutral.”
United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2009) & 5th Cir./old 11th Cir. cases (Walters, Edwards) – Clarified that delay is measured from arrest or indictment whichever is earlier; the panel reaffirmed earlier-arrest rule under prior-panel precedent.
Pattern Instruction & Evidence Cases (Williams, Pierce, Ware) – Guided rulings on flight instruction and lay opinion testimony.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory Waiver.

Local Rule 11.1(d)(4) bars represented litigants from filing their own motions without substitution. Because Louis’s counsel never moved to dismiss, the STA’s dismissal remedy was permanently lost under § 3162(a)(2). The panel characterized this as a true “waiver,” not mere “forfeiture,” and therefore refrained from plain-error review. The court also highlighted the practical point that, had a valid motion been filed, the district judge could have supplied explicit “ends-of-justice” findings.

B. Constitutional Analysis (Barker).

Length of delay – 14 months cleared the “presumptively prejudicial” threshold.
Reason for delay – Divided into (i) pandemic-caused grand-jury and jury-trial shutdowns and (ii) defendant-requested continuances. Both are neutral or count against the defendant, thus the factor did not weigh against the government.
Assertion of right – Louis presented a mixed record: he complained early, but later waived his rights three times to secure continuances; therefore, the factor “barely” favored him.
Prejudice – Because the first three factors did not weigh “heavily” against the government, Louis needed to show actual prejudice (e.g., lost witnesses or faded memories). He showed none; indeed, the continuances benefitted him by facilitating trial preparation.

C. Other Issues.

Sufficiency – Abundant physical evidence, surveillance footage, and behavior (high-speed chase, disposing of satchel, incriminating jail calls).
Flight instruction – Under Williams, flight may evidence consciousness of guilt; here, less than two-weeks’ gap, same getaway car, gun, and merchandise justified the instruction.
Lay identification testimony – Detective Wever observed Louis days after the robberies and possessed familiarity unavailable to jurors; under Rule 701 and Pierce/Ware the testimony was helpful and admissible.
Shoe demonstration – Trial court excluded under Rule 403; low probative value (size already admitted), high potential to mislead (defendant could “act” the fit). Citing Gaskell, the panel affirmed the discretion.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

1. Clarifies STA Waiver Mechanics. The decision underscores that only counsel’s timely motion preserves STA rights. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit can now cite Louis to foreclose statutory speedy-trial claims where defendants file defective pro se motions while represented.

2. Reinforces Pandemic “Ends-of-Justice” Continuances. Although COVID-19 disruptions have ebbed, back-logged districts continue to rely on pandemic continuances; Louis adds appellate heft to those decisions and signals continued leniency when delays are pandemic-related and partial.

3. Heightens Strategic Stakes for Defense Counsel. Because an invalid motion equates to a complete waiver, defense lawyers must vigilantly track STA clocks and file proper motions—or risk malpractice exposure.

4. Sixth-Amendment Prejudice Standard. The case reiterates that “actual prejudice” remains a high bar when early factors do not heavily favor the accused; defendants who also request continuances face an even steeper climb.

5. Evidentiary Guidance. The opinion provides a concise roadmap for admitting lay identification testimony post-Ware, and for excluding theatrical demonstrations with minimal probative value.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Speedy Trial Act (STA): A federal statute requiring indictment within 30 days of arrest and trial within 70 days of indictment, subject to “excludable time” such as continuances granted for the “ends of justice.” Violation normally mandates dismissal of charges, but only if the defendant moves for dismissal before trial.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture: “Waiver” is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and bars appellate review. “Forfeiture” is an inadvertent failure to assert a right, still reviewable for plain error. Here, filing no valid motion = waiver.
Barker Factors:
1. Length of delay
2. Reason for delay
3. Defendant’s assertion of right
4. Prejudice to defendant
All four are balanced; only egregious government-caused delay ordinarily leads to dismissal.
Ends-of-Justice Continuance: A court order that pauses STA clocks if the judge finds, on the record, that justice is better served by delay (e.g., pandemic shutdowns).
Lay Identification Testimony: Non-expert opinion by a witness that a person shown in a photo/video is the defendant; admissible when the witness has a basis (familiarity, vantage point) making her more reliable than jurors.
Rule 403 Balancing: Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by dangers like unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Francisco Louis is less a doctrinal revolution than a sharp reminder of procedural rigor. Statutory speedy-trial rights are powerful, but they are also fragile: if counsel does not properly invoke them, they vanish. Constitutionally, delays born of public-health crises and defendant-sought continuances rarely justify reversal in the absence of concrete prejudice. The opinion bolsters pandemic-era continuances, clarifies the line between waiver and forfeiture, and offers practical evidentiary guidance regarding flight instructions and identification testimony. As courts navigate post-pandemic backlogs and as pro-se-curious defendants test their own motions, Louis will sit squarely at the intersection of procedure, strategy, and constitutional criminal law.