Case Overview

Case: United States v. Cristian Chaverra Moreno (captioned below as “Chevarra”)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Non-Argument Calendar; Not for Publication)
Date: September 25, 2025
Panel: Judges Grant, Lagoa, and Kidd (per curiam)
Docket No.: 23-11693
Disposition: Convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) affirmed.

This unpublished decision clarifies, within the Eleventh Circuit, that the “high seas” for purposes of the Constitution’s Felonies Clause and the MDLEA encompass waters beyond any nation’s territorial sea—including a foreign state’s contiguous zone. Relying on recent circuit authority holding that a foreign Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is part of the “high seas,” the court extends that reasoning to the contiguous zone, concluding that a stateless go-fast vessel interdicted there is subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.

Introduction

In September 2022, U.S. Coast Guard officers embarked on a Royal Netherlands Navy ship observed a go-fast boat traveling at high speed approximately 71 nautical miles north of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela. During pursuit, the crew—including the defendant, Cristian Chaverra Moreno—jettisoned packages overboard. Ten packages were recovered; field tests indicated cocaine with a total at-sea weight of 326 kilograms.

Chaverra Moreno pleaded guilty—without a written plea agreement—to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), (b), and related statutes. On appeal, he mounted a jurisdictional challenge: he argued the government failed to establish the MDLEA’s “subject-matter jurisdiction” because his vessel was not seized on the “high seas,” but instead (by his calculation) within the contiguous zone of Bonaire (Netherlands) or a Venezuelan island.

The key issues were:

• Whether a guilty plea waives a challenge to MDLEA “subject-matter jurisdiction.”
• Whether seizure in a foreign contiguous zone qualifies as on the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause and the MDLEA’s reach to stateless vessels.
• Whether the government established the jurisdictional predicates based on the record facts.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. First, the court reiterated that subject-matter jurisdiction challenges under the MDLEA are not waivable by guilty plea. Parties may stipulate to facts bearing on jurisdiction, but cannot stipulate or waive jurisdiction itself. Applying that framework, the court held the record facts—unchallenged by the defendant at the plea—established jurisdiction.

Substantively, the court held that waters beyond a nation’s territorial sea are part of the “high seas.” Building on United States v. Alfonso (2024) and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar (2025), which held that a foreign nation’s EEZ lies within the “high seas,” the panel concluded the same is true for a foreign state’s contiguous zone. Because the vessel here was stateless and interdicted beyond any territorial sea—whether in a contiguous zone or not—the MDLEA applied, and the district court had authority to adjudicate.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• MDLEA framework and government’s burden
  • United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 588 (11th Cir. 2020): The government bears the burden to establish the MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirements.
  • United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1114 n.25 (11th Cir. 2002): Left open the precise burden of proof standard on jurisdictional facts; the panel again did not resolve that question.
• Non‑waivability of subject-matter jurisdiction
  • United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2016): Subject‑matter jurisdiction cannot be waived; parties can stipulate to jurisdictional facts, but the court decides if those facts suffice.
  • United States v. Betancourth, 554 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2008): Subject‑matter jurisdiction challenges are not waived by plea.
• “High seas” and maritime zones
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, Nos. 24‑6177 & 24‑6691 (May 19, 2025): Held that a foreign nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; Congress may apply the MDLEA in EEZs.
  • United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1381–82 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. petition pending, No. 25‑5506: Reaffirmed Alfonso; Congress is not constrained by international law in defining/punishing felonies on the high seas via the MDLEA.
  • United States v. Davila‑Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1268 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 (1969)): “High seas” are international waters beyond any nation’s territorial seas.
  • United States v. Hidalgo‑Gato, 703 F.2d 1267, 1269 n.4, 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 1983): Described maritime zones (then using three‑mile territorial sea) and treated the contiguous zone as functionally akin to a border for search standards; importantly, it recognized the high seas extend seaward of territorial waters.
  • United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003): Acknowledged modern 12‑nautical‑mile territorial sea of foreign nations.
• Statutory anchors
  • 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a), (b), (e): Prohibitions apply extraterritorially; offenses include possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
  • 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a), (b): Substantive offense and conspiracy liability.
  • 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A): “Vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” includes a “vessel without nationality.”

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in three steps: (i) non-waivability, (ii) what counts as “high seas,” and (iii) application to the facts.

First, the panel reaffirmed that subject‑matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by a guilty plea. Although the government argued waiver, Eleventh Circuit law is clear: a defendant may still raise a jurisdictional challenge on appeal. However, defendants can (and here did) accept the government’s factual proffer; the court then decides if those facts satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites.

Second, applying Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the panel endorsed an original‑public‑meaning interpretation of “high seas”: at the Founding, the high seas were the waters beyond any nation’s territorial sea. Special modern zones (EEZs, contiguous zones) did not exist. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit treats all waters beyond the territorial sea as “high seas” for constitutional purposes. In Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, that meant EEZs are high seas. Here, the panel extended the same reasoning to the contiguous zone—also beyond the territorial sea—and thus within the “high seas.”

Third, the court applied this to the case facts. The government proffered that: (a) the vessel was a stateless go‑fast, (b) interdicted approximately 71 nautical miles north of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, and (c) in “international waters of the Caribbean Sea.” Even accepting the defendant’s contention that the position might have fallen within the contiguous zone of Bonaire or a Venezuelan island, that still lies beyond the territorial sea. Therefore, under the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, the seizure was on the high seas. Because the vessel was stateless, it was a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and the MDLEA applied.

Notably, the court again left unresolved the precise burden of proof on the government for MDLEA jurisdictional facts (preponderance vs. beyond a reasonable doubt), as in Tinoco. It simply held that the unchallenged facts here sufficed under any applicable standard.

3) What This Decision Adds

Although unpublished and non‑precedential, the opinion is significant in its application of Alfonso/Canario‑Vilomar beyond the EEZ to the contiguous zone. It squarely states that a foreign contiguous zone—like an EEZ—is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause and MDLEA purposes because it lies beyond the territorial sea. The holding therefore directly addresses a recurring defense argument that interdictions within a foreign state’s contiguous zone fall outside Congress’s constitutional reach.

4) Likely Impact

• Geographic clarity for interdictions: Within the Eleventh Circuit, interdictions of stateless vessels beyond any nation’s territorial sea—whether in an EEZ or a contiguous zone—fall comfortably within the MDLEA. This reduces litigation over fine-grained zone distinctions so long as the government can show the interdiction occurred outside the territorial sea.
• Plea and litigation strategy: Defendants may still raise non‑waivable subject‑matter jurisdiction challenges on appeal. But where the government’s proffer establishes “international waters” and statelessness—and the defendant does not dispute those facts—courts are likely to reject jurisdictional challenges summarily. Defense counsel seeking to preserve such issues must build a factual record at the plea or trial stage that squarely contests location and status (e.g., claims of nationality).
• Constitutional footing of the MDLEA: The decision reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s originalist Felonies Clause approach: international law constructs do not limit Congress’s constitutional power to reach conduct on the high seas. With Canario‑Vilomar currently the subject of a pending cert petition, there remains a possibility of further Supreme Court guidance, but Alfonso certiorari was denied.
• Operational practice: In combined operations (like U.S. Coast Guard on a Royal Netherlands Navy platform), the absence of a flag claim (statelessness) plus interdiction outside territorial seas will continue to ground MDLEA prosecutions, even when near other nations’ maritime zones.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Territorial sea vs. contiguous zone vs. EEZ vs. high seas:
  • Territorial sea: A belt of sea adjacent to a state’s coast (today generally up to 12 nautical miles) over which the state has full sovereignty.
  • Contiguous zone: The band of sea just beyond the territorial sea (today up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline) where a state may enforce certain limited laws (e.g., customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary) to prevent infringement in its territory.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Extends from the edge of the territorial sea up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, where the coastal state has sovereign rights for resource-related purposes, but not full sovereignty.
  • High seas (as used by the Eleventh Circuit for Felonies Clause analysis): All waters beyond any nation’s territorial sea. On this understanding, both the contiguous zone and the EEZ are part of the “high seas.”
• Stateless vessel: A boat without nationality, including where no master or person in charge makes a claim of nationality or registry. The MDLEA expressly provides that such vessels are “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” enabling prosecution regardless of location outside territorial seas.
• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Empowers Congress to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit reads this power according to its Founding-era meaning; modern international law zones do not restrict the Clause’s scope.
• MDLEA extraterritorial reach: The statute applies even when conduct occurs “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (46 U.S.C. § 70503(b)), provided the vessel falls within the statutory definition of one “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
• Subject‑matter jurisdiction challenge not waivable: A guilty plea does not waive the ability to challenge MDLEA jurisdiction on appeal, although defendants can be bound by factual stipulations or uncontested government proffers bearing on jurisdictional facts.

Application to the Record

The government’s pre‑plea proffer stated that the go‑fast was:

• In the “international waters of the Caribbean Sea,” approximately 71 nautical miles north of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela;
• “Stateless” because no crew member identified a person in charge or claimed nationality.

The magistrate judge advised that the government would need to prove the offenses occurred on the high seas on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Chaverra Moreno pleaded guilty without disputing the proffer. On appeal, he argued that the vessel could have been in a contiguous zone. The court held that even if so, that zone lies beyond the territorial sea and is therefore the “high seas”; with the vessel stateless, MDLEA jurisdiction was satisfied.

The result follows directly from Alfonso/Canario‑Vilomar (EEZ = high seas) and the court’s understanding of maritime geography (contiguous zone also lies beyond territorial seas), fortified by Hidalgo‑Gato and McPhee.

Practical Takeaways

• For prosecutors: Make a clear record that the interdiction occurred beyond any foreign territorial sea and that the vessel was stateless (or otherwise within § 70502’s jurisdictional categories). A simple “international waters” proffer tied to coordinates/distance typically suffices.
• For defense counsel: If contesting MDLEA jurisdiction, develop and preserve factual disputes at the plea or trial stage—especially about location relative to any territorial sea or about nationality/registry claims. Pure legal arguments about contiguous zones or EEZs falling outside the “high seas” are unlikely to succeed in the Eleventh Circuit.
• On burdens: The Eleventh Circuit has not definitively fixed the burden of proof for jurisdictional facts under the MDLEA. Absent a dispute of material fact, courts will find jurisdiction where the record clearly places the interdiction beyond a territorial sea.
• On precedential weight: This opinion is unpublished; within the Eleventh Circuit it is persuasive rather than binding. But it aligns with published circuit authority and signals how panels will treat contiguous-zone arguments going forward.

Conclusion

United States v. Cristian Chaverra Moreno reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s robust view of the MDLEA’s constitutional and statutory reach. Extending the logic of Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the court holds that a foreign contiguous zone—like a foreign EEZ—is part of the “high seas” because it lies beyond the territorial sea. Consequently, stateless drug-trafficking vessels interdicted in a foreign contiguous zone are “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and prosecutions under the MDLEA may proceed.

The decision also reiterates two important procedural points: subject‑matter jurisdiction challenges are not waived by a guilty plea, but courts may decide jurisdiction based on undisputed proffered facts; and where those facts place the interdiction outside the territorial sea and establish statelessness, MDLEA jurisdiction will be found. In the broader legal context, the opinion underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s commitment to an originalist reading of the Felonies Clause that treats all waters beyond territorial seas as the “high seas,” unaffected by later-developed international-law maritime zones.