“Good Cause” Means More Than Docket Delay; Written Motion Required for Improvement Periods: Commentary on In re J.S.-1 and J.S.-2 (W. Va. Sept. 10, 2025)

“Good Cause” Means More Than Docket Delay; Written Motion Required for Improvement Periods: Commentary on In re J.S.-1 and J.S.-2 (W. Va. Sept. 10, 2025)

Introduction

In re J.S.-1 and J.S.-2 is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the termination of the petitioner father’s parental rights to his twin children. The case centers on three core issues often arising in abuse and neglect proceedings:

  • whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of the dispositional hearing;
  • whether the father was entitled to an improvement period before disposition; and
  • whether termination of parental rights was proper under the statutory framework.

The Department of Human Services (DHS) initiated proceedings shortly after the twins’ premature birth, alleging prenatal drug exposure and ongoing parental substance abuse. Although the father maintained he was “clean,” the record demonstrated multiple methamphetamine positives, extensive noncompliance with call-to-test screening, refusal of sobriety services, sporadic visitation, and a failure to acknowledge a substance use disorder. Importantly, he left the courthouse before his dispositional hearing was called, offering no explanation and making no contact with counsel.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court acted within its discretion to deny a continuance in the absence of “good cause,” properly refused the father’s request for an improvement period—both because he failed to show likelihood of full participation and because no written motion was filed—and correctly terminated parental rights given the statutory findings regarding inability to correct conditions and the children’s best interests.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Standard of review: Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions de novo (Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T.).
  • Continuance: Abuse and neglect continuances “shall be granted only for good cause” (W. Va. R. P. Abuse & Neglect 7(b)); denial affirmed where the father left the courthouse without explanation and the record did not support his claim that he waited for hours.
  • Improvement period: A parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence a likelihood of full participation (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B)), and a written motion is a prerequisite (Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson). The father failed both prongs: ongoing positives and massive noncompliance showed unlikelihood to participate, and the record lacked a written motion.
  • Termination: The record established no reasonable likelihood that conditions could be substantially corrected (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)), including the father’s failure to acknowledge a drug problem (In re Timber M.; In re Charity H.). Termination served the children’s best interests (§ 49-4-604(c)(6)).
  • Outcome: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

  • In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), Syl. Pt. 1. Sets the familiar two-track standard of review: clear error for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions. It frames the appellate lens: the Supreme Court defers to the circuit court’s fact-finding unless left with a firm conviction of error.
  • In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). Confirms that granting a continuance is committed to circuit court discretion, and appellate oversight is “limited and restricted.” The Court relied on this to uphold the denial of a continuance where the father abandoned the courthouse without cause.
  • W. Va. R. P. for Abuse & Neglect Proc. 7(b). “Continuance shall be granted only for good cause.” The Court applied this strictly: docket delay alone—especially without a record showing time waited or reasons for departure—does not constitute good cause.
  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B). A circuit court may grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period only where a parent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, a likelihood of full participation. The father’s repeated positives, 83 missed screens, and refusal of services undermined that showing.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002). Circuit courts may deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely. This principle directly supported the denial here.
  • State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021), Syl. Pt. 4, in part. A court “may not grant an improvement period” unless the respondent “files a written motion.” The appendix record lacked a written motion, providing an independent ground to deny the request.
  • W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) and 7(d)(7). Require pinpoint citations showing how issues were presented below and inclusion of a complete docket sheet. The father’s failure to provide these materials weakened his appellate position on the improvement period issue.
  • In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)). Failure to acknowledge the problem renders it untreatable. The Court invoked this to support the statutory finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction.
  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d). Defines “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected”—including when a parent demonstrates inadequate capacity to solve the problems on their own or with help.
  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). Authorizes termination of parental, custodial, and guardianship rights where no reasonable likelihood of correction exists and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The circuit court expressly made these findings.
  • W. Va. R. App. P. 21. Authorizes memorandum decisions when oral argument is unnecessary. The Court used this streamlined process, signaling the issues were controlled by settled law.

Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of Continuance

Abuse and neglect proceedings operate under a heightened imperative of timeliness. Rule 7(b) permits continuances only for “good cause” and entrusts that determination to the circuit court. Here, the father was physically present at the courthouse but chose to leave before his case was called, offering no explanation and making no contact with counsel. The circuit court even paused to allow counsel to check for messages; none were found. On appeal, the father suggested he had waited nearly three hours due to the docket running behind; the record, however, did not reflect how long he waited or when he left. Absent competent record support explaining the departure or establishing why delay prevented attendance, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

The reasoning is straightforward: a parent who knows a termination is on the docket cannot simply leave without notice and later claim “good cause.” Timely permanency for children and orderly docket management require reasonable diligence, including staying in touch with counsel if circumstances arise. The denial of a continuance therefore harmonizes with both the text of Rule 7(b) and the deference due under Tiffany Marie S.

2) Denial of an Improvement Period

Improvement periods are not entitlements; they are court-managed opportunities conditioned on two independent predicates: (a) a written motion, and (b) clear and convincing proof the parent is likely to fully participate. The father failed both.

  • Procedural prerequisite: Under State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, a written motion is required. The record contained no written motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and the appendix did not include a docket sheet showing such a filing. An oral request at a prior hearing was insufficient.
  • Substantive likelihood to participate: The substantive record was equally fatal: 17 drug screens with five methamphetamine positives; 83 missed call-to-test screens; cessation of check-ins after December 2023; a new positive immediately after the July 2024 hearing; refusal of sobriety services; denial of any drug problem; and sporadic visitation. Those data points made it implausible that the father would “fully participate” in any structured improvement plan. Courts retain discretion to deny an improvement period where improvement is unlikely (In re Tonjia M.).

The Supreme Court endorsed the circuit court’s practical assessment: in the month following his request, the father “made no effort to take advantage of [the court’s] grace.” The lack of both procedural compliance and substantive readiness rendered denial appropriate.

3) Termination of Parental Rights

Termination requires two core findings:

  • no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future (§ 49-4-604(d)); and
  • that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare (§ 49-4-604(c)(6)).

The record supported both. The circuit court found that the father abused drugs before and after the children’s birth; that the twins were born drug-exposed to methamphetamine; that the father knew of the mother’s drug use during pregnancy yet took no action to protect; that he refused services, denied a problem, and failed to comply with call-to-test protocols. The Court reiterated that failure to acknowledge the substance use problem makes it “untreatable” (Timber M./Charity H. line), which dovetails with § 49-4-604(d)’s definition of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.

On best interests, the circuit court stressed the twins’ need for stability and timely integration into a permanent home. The father did not challenge these findings on appeal, and the record (including sporadic visitation and continuing positives) supported the conclusion that permanency through adoption in the current placement served the children’s welfare. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed termination.

Impact and Practice Implications

  • Continuances in abuse/neglect cases face a high bar. Mere docket delay, without more, is not “good cause,” especially when a parent departs the courthouse without contacting counsel. Practitioners should create a record: document arrival times, docket calls, communications with staff, and any emergent circumstances. If a continuance is necessary, ensure contemporaneous notice to the court and counsel.
  • Written motion requirement for improvement periods is strictly enforced. Wilson’s written-motion prerequisite is not a technicality; it is dispositive. File the motion; include proposed terms; and build a record of recent compliance and engagement with services to satisfy the “clear and convincing” likelihood-of-participation standard.
  • Substance use acknowledgment remains pivotal. The Timber M./Charity H. principle continues to govern: denial of the problem undermines treatability and weighs heavily against both improvement periods and reunification.
  • Call-to-test compliance is outcome-determinative. Persistent missed screens (here, 83) and recent positives will foreclose an improvement period and support termination. Counsel should counsel clients to prioritize call-to-test adherence and to promptly remediate any positives with documented treatment engagement.
  • Failure to protect can ground adjudication. Even apart from the father’s own use, his awareness of the mother’s prenatal drug use and inaction to protect the twins supported adjudication. Non-using or less-using caregivers have an affirmative protective duty.
  • Record-building on appeal matters. The Supreme Court cited Appellate Rules 10(c)(7) and 7(d)(7) to highlight missing materials (e.g., written motion, docket sheet). Appellants must ensure the appendix record supports their assignments of error.
  • Memorandum decisions still carry persuasive weight. While rendered under Rule 21 without oral argument, this decision reinforces settled doctrines that will guide circuit courts in day-to-day abuse and neglect dockets.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudicatory hearing: The phase where the court decides whether the child was abused or neglected and whether the parent is an abusing or neglecting parent. Here, the father was adjudicated based on his drug use, refusal of services, and failure to protect against known prenatal exposure.
  • Dispositional hearing: The phase where the court selects a remedy (reunification services, improvement period, termination, etc.) based on the child’s best interests and parental capacity to correct conditions.
  • Improvement period: A time-limited court-supervised plan to remedy conditions. To obtain one after adjudication, a parent must (1) file a written motion and (2) prove by clear and convincing evidence that they will fully participate.
  • Call-to-test program: A random or scheduled drug-screen regime requiring daily check-ins and immediate testing if called. Missed screens typically count as noncompliance.
  • No reasonable likelihood of correction: A statutory finding that the parent cannot, in the near future, correct the conditions of abuse/neglect—either because the problems persist despite help or the parent is unwilling or unable to use available help.
  • Best interests of the child: The central lodestar in dispositional decisions; focuses on safety, stability, continuity of care, and timely permanency (often through adoption when reunification is not viable).
  • Memorandum decision (Rule 21): An appellate disposition without oral argument, used when the law is settled and the outcome is clear. Such decisions are citable and guide practice, particularly on routine but recurring procedural issues.

Key Factual Highlights

  • Twins born prematurely and drug-exposed to methamphetamine.
  • Father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine before and after birth; last known positive in October 2023 and another positive immediately after the July 2024 hearing.
  • 83 missed call-to-test screens; no check-ins after December 2023.
  • Father refused sobriety services and denied having a drug problem; offered an implausible explanation that methamphetamine was in an e-cigarette.
  • Sporadic visitation; poor communication with DHS and counsel.
  • Father left the courthouse before disposition without contacting counsel; motion to continue denied.
  • Mother’s rights also terminated; permanency plan is adoption in current placement.

Conclusion

In re J.S.-1 and J.S.-2 reinforces several settled but critical principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

  • Continuances at disposition require concrete, record-backed “good cause.” Leaving the courthouse without explanation is not good cause, even if the docket runs late.
  • Improvement periods demand strict procedural and substantive compliance: a written motion is mandatory, and the parent must present clear and convincing evidence of likely full participation.
  • Persistent substance use, refusal of services, denial of the problem, and chronic screening noncompliance support findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction and justify termination when necessary for the child’s welfare.

The decision provides practical guidance for counsel and parents alike: file the right papers, build the record, communicate with the court and counsel, comply meticulously with testing and services, and, above all, acknowledge and address the underlying issues. For courts, the case validates firm docket control and timely permanency planning, particularly for medically fragile infants exposed to substances at birth.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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