“From Jury-Room to Courtroom Immunity” — Fifth Circuit Clarifies that Presiding over a General Jury Assembly Is a Judicial Act Protected by Absolute Immunity

1. Introduction

In Jones v. King, No. 23-50850 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a fiercely contested civil-rights suit arising out of a political feud in Loving County, Texas. Three local voters claimed that a Justice of the Peace, the county Sheriff, and a Constable orchestrated their arrests during jury qualification as political retribution. They sued the officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of various constitutional rights. The District Court partially denied the officials’ immunity defenses. Both sides pursued interlocutory appeals.

The Fifth Circuit—speaking through Judge Don R. Willett—reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding that:

Presiding over a general jury assembly (i.e., the second stage of Texas jury selection) is a quintessential judicial act shielded by absolute judicial immunity.
Because absolute immunity bars liability for the underlying act, any § 1983 conspiracy claim premised on that act likewise fails.
The court lacks pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal regarding immunity for separate contempt-order conduct.

The decision carves out a precedential rule within the Fifth Circuit:—when a judge qualifies or excuses prospective jurors in a general assembly, the function is judicial—no matter how “administrative” it may appear, and even when no discretion is actually exercised during that session.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true (Rule 12(b)(6) posture), the panel noted that:

Judge Amber King summoned a jury panel for a purported “upcoming trial”.
After swearing in the group, she declared that several members were non-residents, held them in contempt, and ordered their arrest.
The plaintiffs viewed this as political retaliation; the officials framed it as voter-eligibility enforcement.

The District Court granted:

Judicial immunity to Judge King for issuing contempt orders but not for conducting the jury proceeding.
Quasi-judicial immunity to the Sheriff and Constable for executing the contempt orders.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit:

Reversed the District Court’s denial of judicial immunity for the jury-assembly portion, concluding the activity was a judicial act within jurisdiction.
Dismissed the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal challenging other immunity rulings for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) — The Supreme Court’s two-part test (judicial capacity & absence of jurisdiction) anchors the immunity analysis. The Fifth Circuit re-emphasised that only two narrow exceptions pierce absolute judicial immunity.
Davis v. Tarrant County, 565 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009) — Furnished the circuit’s four-factor “judicial-act” test. The panel applied these factors “broadly in favor of immunity.”
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429 (1993) — Established the “nature of the function performed, not identity of actor” principle, enabling comparison between judges and court designees.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) — Distinguished; there the judge’s purely ministerial compilation of jury names lacked judicial character.
Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005); Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1993) — Previous circuit applications of the four-factor test, instructing that not every factor must be satisfied.
Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1990); Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1995) — Provided the rule that a conspiracy claim under § 1983 cannot survive where the underlying act is immunised.
Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2018); Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2009) — Guided the court’s restrictive view of pendent appellate jurisdiction.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Characterising the Function. The panel framed jury qualification in the general assembly as inherently discretionary because Texas judges may excuse jurors for “any reason they deem sufficient”, unlike fixed statutory disqualifications handled by clerks at the “jury wheel” stage.
Applying the Four-Factor Test.
- Normal Judicial Function: Qualifying jurors and hearing excuses has been historically vested in judges.
- Location: Occurred in a courthouse annex — an adjunct judicial space.
- Pending Case Association: Though no case was identified, the assembly was convened “for an upcoming trial”; this factor, even if weak, is not dispositive.
- Visit in Official Capacity: Plaintiffs appeared in response to a judicial summons.
Three of four factors sufficed to deem the act judicial.
Immunity Flow-Down. Absolute immunity for Judge King doomed the conspiracy claim relating to the jury proceeding because § 1983 conspiracies require an actionable constitutional violation.
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Refusal. The plaintiffs’ cross-appeal concerning contempt-order immunity involved distinct acts and legal questions; thus, the court lacked immediate jurisdiction.

3.3 Potential Impact

The ruling is likely to have multilayered effects:

Microscopically (within the Fifth Circuit): Trial judges receive robust protection for activities in the general assembly phase of jury selection. Civil-rights plaintiffs must now carefully distinguish between administrative actions (likely immunised) and clearly non-judicial conduct.
Practically for Court Administrators: The decision blurs the administrative/judicial line, signalling that even seemingly ministerial voir-dire tasks may attract absolute immunity when performed by a judge.
Elections & Political Retaliation Claims: Litigants claiming ‘lawfare’ or retaliatory misuse of jury summonses must overcome an amplified immunity barrier.
Future Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs may pivot to seeking injunctive relief or state-law remedies (disciplinary or electoral) rather than § 1983 damages for comparable conduct.
Doctrinal Clarification: The decision delineates the reach of pendent appellate jurisdiction in immunity appeals, reiterating the Fifth Circuit’s narrow view of that doctrine.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Absolute Judicial Immunity — A doctrine shielding judges from personal liability for damages when acting in their judicial capacity, unless they (a) act non-judicially or (b) lack all jurisdiction.
General Jury Assembly vs. Voir Dire.
- Stage 1 – Jury Wheel: Clerks compile a list of potential jurors from voter/driver records.
- Stage 2 – General Assembly: Prospective jurors gather in court; a judge (or designee) checks broad qualifications and hears excuses.
- Stage 3 – Voir Dire (Panel): Case-specific questioning by attorneys to uncover bias.
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction — A limited doctrine letting appellate courts decide issues not otherwise immediately appealable, but only when those issues are inextricably intertwined with ones properly before the court.
§ 1983 Conspiracy Claim — A claim that two or more persons conspired to violate constitutional rights. It cannot survive if every alleged conspirator is immune for the underlying act.

5. Conclusion

Jones v. King reinforces a broad conception of judicial immunity within the Fifth Circuit, extending the shield to the act of presiding over a general jury assembly, even amid allegations of overt political retaliation. By treating the qualification and excusal of jurors as “quintessential” judicial duties, the court insulates judges from personal civil-rights liability in this sphere and, by ripple effect, immunises associated law-enforcement officers and torpedoes conspiracy theories reliant on the same conduct.

Practitioners should heed two principal takeaways: (1) Challenges to misconduct during jury management must differentiate between discrete administrative acts and inherently judicial functions; (2) Interlocutory appeals on immunity grounds will not open the floodgates to pendent issues unless those issues are truly inseparable. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit locates the remedy for alleged “political lawfare” not in § 1983 but “in the voting booth” and disciplinary fora, thereby shaping the balance between judicial accountability and decisional independence.