“Facial-Defense Strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Commentary on Holmes v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, No. 22-3032 (7th Cir. June 20 2025)

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Holmes v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office adds a significant gloss to the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The appellant, Eric D. Holmes, an Indiana prisoner, sought to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asked to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court and, ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Holmes had already amassed three “strikes” and therefore was barred from IFP status.

The central controversy involved whether dismissals that rest on affirmative defenses—specifically (1) the Heck bar and (2) absolute judicial immunity—count as “strikes” when those defenses appear on the face of the prisoner’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit answered “yes,” thereby establishing what this commentary calls the “facial-defense strike” doctrine.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The court affirmed the district court’s denial of IFP status and dismissal of Holmes’s action.
• It held that when an affirmative defense is plainly ascertainable from the face of the complaint (including incorporated documents and judicially noticeable public records), a dismissal on that basis is a Rule 12(b)(6) “failure-to-state-a-claim” dismissal and therefore a strike under § 1915(g).
• This rule applies to:
  • Dismissals under Heck v. Humphrey (claims that necessarily impugn an un-invalidated conviction).
  • Dismissals based on absolute judicial immunity.
• The panel distinguished situations where immunity or another defense is not evident from the pleadings; in such cases, dismissal would not necessarily generate a strike.

3. Analysis

a. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion assembles an array of intra- and inter-circuit authority:

• Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020) – Supreme Court clarification that § 1915(g) strikes accrue from dismissals at any stage that are based on the enumerated grounds.
• Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) – Key holding that courts may invoke affirmative defenses at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage when the defense is plain on the face of the complaint.
• Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) – The substantive bar against § 1983 actions that imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.
• Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 372 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2004) – “Pleading oneself out of court” doctrine.
• Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999) – Characterizing Heck as an affirmative defense.
• Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2010) – Requirement that the entire case be dismissed on strike-qualifying grounds.
• Sister-circuit decisions—Ball v. Famiglio (3d Cir.), Harris v. Harris (9th Cir.), Thompson v. DEA (D.C. Cir.), etc.—were used to show consensus that some immunity-based dismissals can be strikes when obvious.

b. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. § 1915(g) Textual Hook. The statute lists dismissals for actions that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim.” Rule 12(b)(6) failures therefore equate to strikes.
2. Rule 12(b)(6) vs. 12(c). Although affirmative defenses are ordinarily adjudicated under Rule 12(c) (judgment on the pleadings), Jones v. Bock permits a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal when the defense is irrefutable on the pleadings alone.
3. Expansive Definition of “Face of the Complaint.” The “face” includes (a) the complaint proper, (b) materials incorporated by reference, and (c) public records susceptible to judicial notice (Tellabs).
4. Application to Heck. Holmes’s filings and publicly available dockets revealed that his conviction was intact; thus the Heck bar was obvious, making the dismissal a failure to state a claim.
5. Application to Judicial Immunity. Because Holmes sued judges for statements made in opinions—quintessential judicial acts—the complaint itself showed absolute immunity, again justifying Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and a strike.
6. Avoiding Superfluity. The panel harmonized its ruling with PLRA screening provisions that explicitly mention immunity (§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, 1997e(c)). Immunity-based strikes are limited to cases where the defense is “impenetrable”; otherwise, dismissal may occur at screening (no strike) or later (potential strike on other grounds).

c. Impact on Future Litigation

• Practical Litigation Effect. Prisoners must now anticipate that any complaint revealing an affirmative defense “on its face” can both be dismissed and count as a strike, shrinking the scope for strategic pleadings.
• Administrative Efficiency. District courts may more confidently employ Rule 12(b)(6) at screening when searchable dockets or incorporated exhibits verify Heck bars or immunity, knowing that dismissals will count toward § 1915(g).
• Inter-Circuit Harmony. By aligning with the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits’ approach (and refining the Third and Ninth), the Seventh Circuit reduces forum-shopping incentives and promotes uniform PLRA application.
• Doctrinal Clarity. The decision articulate’s an “exception within an exception”: immunity is generally not a strike ground, unless the defense is incontrovertible from the pleadings.
• Increased Burden on Repeat Filers. Inmates with a history of facially defective suits will encounter quicker “three-strike” accrual, effectively gating off IFP status sooner.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• PLRA “Three-Strikes” Rule (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Think of this as a “traffic-ticket” system for prisoner lawsuits: three qualifying dismissals and the inmate pays the full filing fee up front, unless in imminent danger.
• Affirmative Defense. A legal reason the defendant can win even if the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true (e.g., “You can’t sue me because I’m immune”). Usually asserted after the complaint, but sometimes obvious immediately.
• Rule 12(b)(6) vs. 12(c). Both dismiss a case early, but 12(b)(6) is for legal insufficiency of the complaint itself, while 12(c) is for when pleadings show the defendant undeniably prevails (often via a defense).
• Heck Bar. If success in a § 1983 suit would necessarily suggest a prisoner’s conviction is invalid, the suit is blocked until the conviction is overturned.
• Absolute Judicial Immunity. Judges cannot be sued for acts undertaken in their judicial capacity and within jurisdiction—even if the acts are alleged to be wrongful.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Holmes crystallizes a key PLRA question: When does a dismissal grounded in an affirmative defense qualify as a “strike”? The answer, per Judge Kirsch’s writing, is “whenever the defense is so transparent that the plaintiff has pled himself out of court.” By confirming that both Heck-based and judicial-immunity-based dismissals can satisfy § 1915(g) under these conditions, the court endorses a pragmatic yet textually anchored rule that will shape prisoner-civil-rights dockets across the circuit. Litigants, counsel, and courts must now reckon with the “facial-defense strike” doctrine—an evolution likely to accelerate the rate at which meritless or barred actions exhaust a prisoner’s IFP privileges, while simultaneously conserving judicial resources for claims that survive preliminary scrutiny.