“Enterprise-Activity Venue” in Ohio RICO Prosecutions:
A Comprehensive Commentary on State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Brown (2025-Ohio-2804) clarifies, for the first time in a published opinion, how venue is determined in prosecutions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32—the state RICO statute. The case involves Kenneth Brown, a Lucas County resident and member of the Tecumseh Street Gang, who was tried in Henry County even though he never personally set foot there for criminal purposes. Brown challenged venue, arguing that the county in which he was indicted lacked a nexus to his conduct. The Court disagreed, announcing a new rule: venue is proper in any county where “any member” of the criminal enterprise participates in enterprise affairs, irrespective of the defendant’s personal presence in that county.

The litigation pits Brown (appellant) against the State of Ohio (appellee), with amici curiae participation by the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association and the Ohio Attorney General. Chief Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion, joined by five justices; Justice Fischer concurred in judgment only.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Affirming the Third District Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:

1. Armijo, a drug reseller who “fronted” cocaine purchased from Brown’s nephew in Lucas County and resold it in Henry County, was “associated with” and “participated in the affairs of” the Tecumseh Street Gang enterprise.
2. Because Armijo’s activities were undertaken on behalf of that enterprise in Henry County, venue for prosecuting any member of the enterprise, including Brown, was proper in Henry County pursuant to R.C. 2923.32.
3. The evidence was legally sufficient to establish venue, and the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329 (1997)
  Recognized that Ohio patterned R.C. 2923.32 on the federal RICO statute. The Court relied on this lineage to import federal RICO concepts (e.g., associated-in-fact enterprise, conspiracy principles) into Ohio law.
• State v. Beverly, 2015-Ohio-219
  Quoted for the “remarkably open-ended” definition of “enterprise,” supporting the conclusion that membership in a gang subset and its external resellers can constitute a single enterprise.
• United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2001)
  Cited to show that venue for federal RICO prosecutions may lie where any act of racketeering occurred. This federal reasoning was transplanted into Ohio’s venue analysis.
• United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2015)
  Addressed the significance of “fronting” drugs. The Supreme Court used these cases to treat fronting plus repeat transactions as evidence of a conspiracy, thus transforming a buyer–seller relationship into enterprise participation.
• State v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671; State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991)
  Provided the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard applied by the Court.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority employed a two-step analysis:

1. Association with the Enterprise
   Relying on federal conspiracy doctrine, the Court deemed Armijo “associated with” the Tecumseh Street Gang because (a) she knowingly resold cocaine on credit fronted by a gang member; (b) she made multiple such transactions; and (c) the credit arrangement demonstrated mutual trust and a shared stake in the resale proceeds—key indicators of conspiratorial agreement.
2. Venue Extension
   Having established Armijo’s association, the Court held that her activities in Henry County were activities of the enterprise itself. Because Brown was a member of that same enterprise, R.C. 2923.32 allows prosecution “in any county where the enterprise operated.” The Court analogized this to federal RICO venue doctrine under 18 U.S.C. §1965, citing Crozier.

The Court dismissed Brown’s reliance on the “buyer–seller” cases because Armijo’s conduct involved fronting and multiple redistributions, facts that elevate the relationship to a conspiratorial level.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Prosecutorial Reach — County prosecutors may now pursue RICO charges in any county touched by an enterprise member’s conduct, enhancing flexibility for multi-county investigations.
• Law-Enforcement Strategy — Task forces can concentrate resources and indict multiple defendants in the county most favorable for trial (jury pool, resources, witness convenience), provided at least one enterprise act occurred there.
• Defense Considerations — Defendants must be prepared to litigate venue far from their personal activities. Motions to sever, transfer, or challenge venue will require stronger factual showings post-Brown.
• Judicial Economy — Consolidated enterprise prosecutions may reduce duplicative trials across counties, but courts should monitor for potential unfair prejudice stemming from geographical disconnect.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Enterprise: Any informal or formal group of individuals working together for a common purpose—even if they lack a legal structure. A street gang, a subset of that gang, and outside resellers can be one “enterprise.”
• Pattern of Corrupt Activity: At least two predicate offenses (e.g., drug trafficking) that are related and not isolated. The pattern shows ongoing criminal conduct.
• Venue: The particular county where a criminal case is tried. Unlike “jurisdiction” (court’s power), venue concerns the proper place. Ohio’s state constitution (Art. I, §10) and Crim.R. 18 specify venue requirements.
• Fronting: Supplying drugs on credit, expecting payment after the reseller’s sale. Courts view fronting as evidence of trust and shared enterprise goals, often converting a simple sale into a conspiracy.
• Sufficiency vs. Manifest Weight: “Sufficiency” asks, “Could any rational juror find guilt if the evidence is believed?” “Manifest weight” asks, while re-weighing the evidence, whether the jury clearly lost its way such that reversal is required. The former is a legal question; the latter is factual and rarely reviewed by the Supreme Court in non-capital cases.

5. Conclusion

State v. Brown sets a new, enterprise-centric rule for venue in Ohio RICO prosecutions: the county where any member of the enterprise acts is a permissible forum for all members. Grounded in federal RICO precedent, the decision widens the prosecutorial map, stresses the significance of conspiratorial ties such as fronting, and underscores the flexible, expansive design of Ohio’s corrupt-activity statute. Future litigants should note the Court’s willingness to examine sufficiency and manifest-weight claims but also its admonition that such challenges be properly framed. As multi-county criminal enterprises grow increasingly complex, the “enterprise-activity venue” doctrine of Brown will undoubtedly shape both strategic charging decisions and defense tactics across Ohio.