“Duty Over Autonomy” – The Florida Supreme Court Confirms Trial Judges Must Consider All Record Mitigation Even When the Self-Represented Defendant Objects
Commentary on Steven J. Lorenzo v. State of Florida, No. SC2023-0539 (Fla. June 19 2025)

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Steven J. Lorenzo v. State of Florida addresses the convictions and death sentences imposed on Steven J. Lorenzo for two brutal 2003 murders. Beyond the horrific facts, the opinion is notable for two procedural holdings:

1. Re-affirmation of a trial court’s broad discretion to allow – and continue to allow – a competent defendant to represent himself.
2. Clarification that, notwithstanding a capital defendant’s self-representation and stated wish to restrict mitigation, the sentencing judge has an independent duty to examine and weigh all mitigating evidence that appears in the record, including material compiled by standby counsel without the defendant’s current endorsement.

Because the second point had not previously been squarely confronted where the defendant expressly disavowed standby counsel’s earlier mitigation package, the ruling crystallises a new precedent at the intersection of Faretta autonomy and the court’s Muhammad/Marquardt obligation to ensure a reliable capital sentencing record.

Summary of the Judgment

Lorenzo pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. After a non-jury penalty phase, the trial court found four aggravating factors, rejected five statutory mitigators, and recognised six non-statutory mitigators of slight-to-moderate weight. It sentenced Lorenzo to death on both counts. On direct appeal, Lorenzo – still pro se – raised two narrow issues:

• The trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself.
• The court erred by considering a 2020 mitigation memorandum prepared by standby counsel over his objection.

The Supreme Court affirmed in full. It held that the Faretta inquiry was exhaustive and Lorenzo was competent. It further held that the sentencing court properly considered the standby-prepared mitigation report because (a) the court has a non-delegable responsibility to evaluate mitigation in the record, (b) the memorandum had originally been solicited and authorised by Lorenzo, and (c) any arguable error was harmless given the overwhelming aggravation and the weight the court actually assigned to the challenged materials. Finally, the Court independently reviewed the guilty plea and found it knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) – Established the constitutional right of self-representation. The trial court’s rigorous Faretta colloquy and repeated renewal of the offer of counsel satisfied Faretta.
• Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) – Provided the competency standard (“Dusky” standard) applicable both to standing trial and waiving counsel; cited to show Lorenzo had rational and factual understanding.
• Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 2019) & Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 – Emphasised that once waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry ends.
• Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 2022); Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464 (Fla. 2015); Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001)
• Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015)

Bell, Marquardt, and Muhammad collectively require sentencing courts to develop a complete mitigation record when a capital defendant declines to present mitigating evidence. Lorenzo extends this line by holding that a sentencing judge may (and must) consider mitigation already in the record even if the now self-represented defendant objects to that very evidence.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Self-Representation
The Court treated Lorenzo’s self-representation claim as an unpreserved challenge subject to fundamental-error review. Detailing the repeated Faretta inquiries and expert assessment, the Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and hence no fundamental error. Importantly, the Court dismissed Lorenzo’s “sovereign citizen” rhetoric as a strategic delay tactic, not evidence of incompetence, endorsing Dr. Gamache’s conclusions.

b. Consideration of Standby Counsel’s Mitigation Report

1. Although Lorenzo objected in 2022, the report had been created “on his behalf and at his request” in 2020.
2. The Court emphasised the trial judge’s continuing duty under Muhammad/​Marquardt to ensure a reliable penalty phase record. That duty is paramount to – and not trumped by – a defendant’s strategic decision to limit mitigation. The judge is not aiding the prosecution; rather he is safeguarding the integrity of the sentencing process.
3. Because the trial court relied on multiple sources (PSI, Lorenzo’s own 2023 mitigation notice, federal sentencing transcript) and assigned little weight to the disputed items, any supposed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

The ruling produces a concrete doctrinal clarification: Even an autonomous Faretta defendant cannot veto consideration of mitigating material already embodied in the court file, particularly where that material was earlier authorised by the defendant or prepared at the court’s direction. Trial judges now possess clear authority to:

• Order, receive, and weigh a PSI and any other record-based mitigation regardless of a defendant’s wishes.
• Retain and use mitigation memoranda developed by prior or standby counsel, despite subsequent disavowal.
• Comply simultaneously with Faretta autonomy and the heightened reliability required in capital sentencing.

Future self-represented capital defendants therefore have reduced leverage to obstruct or truncate mitigation in hopes of expediting execution or appealing on record-deficiency grounds. Moreover, post-conviction counsel will have a richer record from which to argue ineffectiveness or residual doubt, furthering reliability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Faretta Inquiry – A judge-conducted Q&A session to be sure a defendant knows the pitfalls of proceeding without a lawyer.
• Standby Counsel – Lawyers appointed to assist or step in if a self-represented defendant requests help or disrupts court proceedings.
• Mitigation – Evidence about the defendant’s background or circumstances that may warrant a lesser sentence.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) – A document compiled by probation authorities summarising a defendant’s history, used to inform sentencing.
• Spencer Hearing – Post-penalty-phase hearing where both sides can present additional evidence or argument before the judge imposes sentence.
• Harmless Error – A legal doctrine where an appellate court upholds a conviction/sentence despite an error because the outcome would not have changed.
• Aggravators/Mitigators – Factors that respectively make the crime more or less blameworthy under Florida’s death-penalty statute.

Conclusion

Lorenzo does not break new ground on the facts of guilt or aggravation; those elements were overwhelming. Its enduring significance lies in reconciling two potentially conflicting constitutional imperatives: the defendant’s Sixth-Amendment right to self-representation and the Eighth-Amendment-driven duty of heightened reliability in capital sentencing. The Court’s message is succinct:

Even when a defendant is the captain of his own defence, the trial judge remains guardian of the sentencing record and must weigh all mitigation found therein. Autonomy cannot eclipse accuracy.

By cementing the trial court’s authority – indeed, obligation – to consider standby counsel’s mitigation report despite the defendant’s subsequent objection, the Florida Supreme Court reinforces the principle that society’s interest in a fair and reliable capital verdict transcends a defendant’s unilateral strategic preferences. Practitioners should heed the decision: once mitigation enters the record, it is part of the case, and it will travel with the file to both the sentencing bench and the appellate court, no matter whose hands placed it there.