“Doing Business” in Dirty Money: The Sixth Circuit’s Clarification of the § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) Enhancement and Loss-Attribution Rules in United States v. Pacheco & Cabrera

“Doing Business” in Dirty Money: The Sixth Circuit’s Clarification of the § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) Enhancement and Loss-Attribution Rules in United States v. Pacheco & Cabrera

Introduction

The consolidated appeal in United States v. Ruvi Beaney Pacheco & Claudio Everardo Cabrera, Jr., No. 23-5762/5819 (6th Cir. July 23 2025) required the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to consider four challenges arising from a money-laundering scheme that piggy-backed on a multi-state narcotics conspiracy centered in Lexington, Kentucky. The romantic partners-turned-couriers, Ruvi Pacheco and Claudio Cabrera, were indicted and ultimately convicted of (1) conspiracy to commit money laundering and (2) promotional money laundering, following a pattern of “money pickups” executed in multiple states between December 2020 and August 2022.

On appeal, the defendants attacked (i) a supplemental jury instruction confirming the use of a drug dog, (ii) the amounts of drug proceeds attributed to them, (iii) the four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for being “in the business of laundering funds,” and (iv) Cabrera’s entitlement to a minor-participant reduction. The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished but nonetheless instructive opinion by Judge Boggs, rejected each contention and affirmed the 110-month sentences. While not precedential under Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(b), the opinion sheds useful light on two recurring sentencing issues: (1) how far loss attribution may reach within a jointly-undertaken money-laundering venture and (2) what constellation of facts is sufficient to deem a defendant “in the business of laundering funds” for purposes of § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C).

Summary of the Judgment

  • Supplemental Jury Instruction: The district court’s brief factual answer to the jury—confirming that a K-9 unit alerted during the airport search—fell squarely within permissible practice under United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2011). No abuse of discretion occurred.
  • Loss Attribution: The district court permissibly held Pacheco responsible for $276,870 and Cabrera for $376,870 by (a) directly counting money seized from them and (b) treating two earlier deliveries as foreseeable, in-scope conduct of the joint conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit approved both the legal framework (relevant-conduct analysis) and the factual findings under clear-error review.
  • § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) Enhancement: Reaffirming that the six enumerated factors in Application Note 4(B) are independent, non-exhaustive indicators, the Court endorsed the four-level increase where defendants repeatedly couriered bulk cash, did so over many months and in numerous states, and worked with multiple narcotics brokers, even without direct proof of the exact fees they earned.
  • Minor-Participant Reduction: Cabrera forfeited the issue by mentioning it only in the issues-presented list; even had it been preserved, the record did not support it.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2011) – Provided the template for handling juror requests for testimony. The panel analogized the district court’s short answer to Harvey’s approved practice of reading back discrete record portions with a cautionary instruction.
  • United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) – Long-standing standard for reviewing supplemental instructions (abuse of discretion).
  • United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2018) – Governs how to attribute loss in fraud/money-laundering conspiracies. The Court borrowed Donadeo’s two-step test: (i) define the scope of jointly undertaken activity; (ii) decide whether co-conspirators’ conduct was in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable within, that scope.
  • United States v. Salem, 657 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2011) – Adopted in Donadeo for the six “scope” factors (single scheme, similarities in modus operandi, etc.).
  • Other Sixth Circuit cases on procedural reasonableness and forfeiture (Coppenger, Clark) supplied the review framework.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Supplemental Jury Instruction

The district court confirmed a discrete, uncontested fact: Agent Hart testified that a drug dog was used. The Sixth Circuit held that merely restating an uncontested portion of testimony, coupled with a reminder to consider all the evidence, avoided the twin dangers of (i) undue emphasis and (ii) loss of context. The Court emphasized that the parties had agreed the testimony existed; thus the instruction was not a judicial comment on credibility but a neutral factual reference, fully consistent with Harvey.

b. Attributable Loss

  1. Step 1 – Scope of Joint Criminal Activity: The panel meticulously walked through the Salem/Donadeo factors. Identical travel patterns, the same hotel, the same false cover story (“visiting family”), and even the same California address supplied at check-in demonstrated a unified modus operandi linking Pacheco, Cabrera, and Pacheco’s brother. Therefore Nemetz’s December 7 drop to the brother fell within appellants’ agreed scope.
  2. Step 2 – In Furtherance & Reasonable Foreseeability: Because Nemetz had already delivered to appellants in the same fashion, further drops to another family member were naturally foreseeable. The Court stressed that foreseeability does not require advance knowledge of each delivery’s details, only that such deliveries be reasonably predictable events within the conspiracy’s operation.
  3. Fact-Finding & Reasonable Estimates: Following the Guidelines’ instruction that courts “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,” the panel upheld the district court’s figure of $100,000 for the December 20 delivery. Surveillance video, typical load sizes, and agent testimony together supported the estimate.

c. “In the Business of Laundering Funds” Enhancement

Application Note 4(B)’s six factors are conjunctive-disjunctive signposts, not cumulative elements. The district court found four of them: repeated conduct, extended duration, multiple sources, and inculpatory statements to undercover agents. The Sixth Circuit rejected the defendants’ effort to graft an additional “professional-fence” requirement. Regular, sustained laundering across numerous states was enough; proof of huge profits or prior convictions was unnecessary. This reasoning aligns with circuits that apply the enhancement when laundering is recurrent and organized, even if the defendant is a courier rather than a high-level financier.

d. Minor-Participant Claim

Cabrera’s perfunctory mention, unaccompanied by argument or citation, amounted to forfeiture. The panel reiterated that issues not “developed” are waived. Substantively, the record—showing Cabrera coordinated trips, took possession of six-figure sums, and interacted with multiple brokers—would have defeated the reduction in any event.

3. Impact of the Judgment

  • Sentencing Consistency in Money-Laundering Cases: District courts now have fresh, appellate-blessed guidance that the “business of laundering funds” enhancement applies to itinerant couriers who repeatedly move bulk cash, even absent bank-account layering or elaborate fee structures.
  • Loss Attribution for Couriers: The opinion underscores that couriers cannot confine their relevant conduct to cash actually seized from them; foreseeable drops to similarly-situated confederates will count. This will likely increase exposure in multi-courier conspiracies.
  • Practical courtroom management: Trial judges may confidently give short factual responses to juror questions where testimony is undisputed, provided they pair the answer with a cautionary instruction.
  • Unpublished yet Persuasive: Although labelled “Not Recommended for Publication,” the decision will influence plea negotiations and presentence litigation within the Sixth Circuit because it synthesizes and applies existing precedent in a concrete factual setting.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Promotional Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)): Using illicit proceeds to further or “promote” the underlying criminal activity (here, drug trafficking). Example: paying couriers to move cash so more drugs can be bought.
  • Relevant Conduct: Sentencing doctrine that holds a defendant responsible not only for what he personally did but also for foreseeable acts of his co-conspirators within the agreed-upon scheme.
  • § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) Enhancement: Adds 4 offense-levels where the defendant is effectively a “professional” launderer. The Guidelines list six factors—frequency, duration, multiple sources, revenue, past convictions, and incriminating statements—to guide courts.
  • Minor-Participant Reduction (§ 3B1.2): Up to 4-level decrease if the defendant is substantially less culpable than the average participant. Simply being a courier does not automatically qualify; the court looks to role, knowledge, and discretion.
  • Abuse of Discretion vs. Clear Error: “Abuse of discretion” reviews the legal wisdom of a court’s choice; “clear error” scrutinizes factual findings and is overturned only when the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake was made.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Pacheco & Cabrera reinforces a pragmatic, fact-intensive approach to both jury-management issues and federal sentencing in money-laundering cases. First, it affirms that trial judges may clarify undisputed testimony for jurors without fear of reversible error. Second, it expands the practical reach of loss attribution by confirming that identical modus operandi and close familial or logistical ties suffice to render co-conspirators’ activity foreseeable. Third, it clarifies that routine, multi-state courier operations meet the “business of laundering funds” standard, even absent direct evidence of hefty profits. Together, these holdings provide prosecutors and defense counsel alike with sharper contours for plea bargaining, evidentiary presentation, and sentencing advocacy in future laundering prosecutions.

Key takeaway: Where cash couriers criss-cross the country on one-way tickets, staying in the same hotels and following an established pick-up routine, courts may justifiably treat them as professional launderers and hold them accountable for the broader, foreseeable flows of illicit funds coursing through the conspiracy.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Comments