“Dancing on Thin Ice” – The Sixth Circuit’s Clarification of Sua Sponte Rule 11 and § 1927 Sanctions in Pandemic-Related Litigation

(Commentary on Erica Bojicic v. Richard Michael DeWine, 25a0199p.06, 6th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic generated a wave of constitutional challenges to state health measures. One such challenge was brought by Ohio dance-studio owners who claimed that business-closure orders violated their constitutional rights. After the merits suit collapsed in 2022, the litigation took an unexpected turn when the district court sanctioned the plaintiffs’ attorneys—Thomas B. Renz and Robert J. Gargasz—for what it labelled “hapless” pleading and “frivolous” arguments. The present appellate opinion—Bojicic v. DeWine (2025)—does not revisit the pandemic orders. Instead, it addresses whether the district court correctly invoked:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (sua sponte), and
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings)

to impose fees and costs on counsel. The Sixth Circuit unanimously AFFIRMED, thereby establishing a clear, citable roadmap for lower courts confronting comparable attorney misconduct—especially in hot-button, rapidly evolving contexts such as pandemic litigation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a panel that included Judges Boggs, Moore, and Griffin, Judge Boggs held:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte after providing a detailed show-cause order and a full evidentiary hearing;
Sanctions under § 1927 were likewise proper because counsel “reasonably should have known” their claims were frivolous and persisted nonetheless;
The corresponding award of attorneys’ fees and costs was appropriately tailored to the excess work caused by counsel’s conduct.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

King v. Whitmer, 71 F.4th 511 (6th Cir. 2023) – Reiterated that failure to follow Rule 11’s “safe harbor” bars party-initiated sanctions, but does not limit the court’s own sua sponte power.
League of Independent Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 814 F. App’x 125 (6th Cir. 2020) – An unpublished yet pivotal decision upholding shutdown orders under rational-basis review. The panel faulted counsel for ignoring this near-identical precedent.
Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997) – Supplies the § 1927 standard: an attorney “knows or reasonably should know” a claim is frivolous.
Hall v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 595 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 2010) – Articulates “abuse of discretion” review for sanctions.
Foundational Supreme Court authorities: Penn Central (takings), Heller v. Doe (rational basis), and Rule 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1983) which emphasize pre-filing inquiry.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Sua Sponte Rule 11 Mechanics
• The district court’s March 7, 2022 order sufficiently “described the specific conduct” and gave counsel a hearing, satisfying Rule 11(c)(3).
• The “safe-harbor” defect in defendants’ own motions was irrelevant to court-initiated sanctions.
• The opinion recites counsel’s failure to identify defendants’ conduct, conflate standards, and rely on conspiracy-tinged speculation, concluding there was no objectively reasonable basis for the pleadings.
§ 1927 Standard Applied
• Objective test: would a competent attorney know the claims were untenable?
• Counsel ignored direct Sixth Circuit precedent (League of Independent Fitness), mis-stated constitutional doctrine, and persisted for four years.
• The opinion stresses that civil-rights cases do not provide “free rein” for frivolity; zealous advocacy requires minimal legal research.
Fees & Costs Calculation
• The panel accepts modest district-court reductions and ties recoverable fees to the incremental burden caused by counsel’s conduct (not to litigation as a whole).

3.3 Likely Impact

Clear Blueprint for Sua Sponte Sanctions – Trial courts now have a published, appellate-approved checklist: give notice, specify conduct, hold a hearing; safe-harbor is immaterial.
Heightened Duty in Rapid-Evolving Fields – Attorneys filing in emerging areas (e.g., pandemic response, AI regulation) must rigorously update research. Reliance on stale or state-level authority contrary to controlling federal precedent risks sanctions.
Deterrent to “Copy-and-Paste” Litigation – The court highlighted a “consistent pattern” of similar pleadings in other COVID cases, signaling intolerance of recycled, unsupported complaints.
Guidance on § 1927 Objective Standard – By decoupling sanctions from subjective bad faith, the decision fortifies the circuit’s precedent that sheer incompetence or recklessness is sanctionable.
Circuit Split Potential – Other circuits (e.g., 2d & 9th) interpret sua sponte Rule 11 power more narrowly. Bojicic II could widen divergence, inviting Supreme Court scrutiny.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 Sanctions: Federal rule requiring attorneys to ensure factual and legal legitimacy of every filing. Violation = monetary or other penalties.
Sua Sponte: Latin for “of its own accord.” The court acts without a party’s motion.
28 U.S.C. § 1927: Statute allowing fees against lawyers who “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings—think of it as a penalty for needlessly dragging out a case.
Rational-Basis Review: The most deferential constitutional test: a law stands if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose.
Penn Central Test: Three-factor balancing used to decide when regulations become “takings” requiring compensation.
Standing—Traceability Prong: Plaintiff must link injury to defendant’s conduct; lumping different officials together generally fails this requirement.

5. Conclusion

Bojicic v. DeWine (2025) is not merely another pandemic-era skirmish; it is a robust statement on attorney accountability. By affirming both sua sponte Rule 11 and § 1927 sanctions, the Sixth Circuit:

Reaffirmed that courts may act proactively to police the integrity of their dockets;
Clarified that the objective unreasonableness—not subjective bad faith—triggers § 1927 liability;
Warned practitioners that ignoring on-point precedent and conflating doctrines invites personal financial consequences.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision strengthens judicial tools against frivolous pleading, especially in high-profile, emotionally charged contexts where the temptation to bypass rigorous research looms large. Future litigants—and their counsel—should heed the court’s admonition: zeal must be married to competence, and advocacy to candor.

“Dancing on Thin Ice” – The Sixth Circuit’s Clarification of Sua Sponte Rule 11 and § 1927 Sanctions in Pandemic-Related Litigation (Bojicic v. DeWine II, 2025)