“Cover-Up” Is Not a “New Injury”: The Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Statute-of-Limitations, Standing, and Tax-Injunction Principles

Introduction

Brian Rice, a Birmingham property owner, became convinced that a 2019 appraisal valuing his land and proposed improvements at $0 was fraudulent. Over four years later he filed a sweeping pro se lawsuit in federal court alleging a conspiracy between private parties (the bank and the appraisal firm) and public actors (two Alabama regulatory agencies and the Jefferson County Board of Equalization). The suit asserted constitutional violations, civil RICO, state-law fraud, and violations of multiple federal statutes.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed every claim, denied Rice’s motion to recuse the trial judge, and rejected his request to amend. The Eleventh Circuit—publishing its decision on a non-argument calendar—affirmed in full. Although unpublished, the opinion is notable for its crisp reaffirmation of three recurring procedural doctrines:

1. Statute of limitations in civil RICO and fraud cases is not tolled by a later “cover-up.”
2. Regulators’ inaction cannot supply Article III standing if the plaintiff’s injury was already complete.
3. The Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) bars federal interference—even in suits for damages—where state tax assessment procedures are at issue and state remedies are “plain, speedy, and efficient.”

Summary of the Judgment

• RICO and state-law fraud (Synovus Bank & CBRE). Claims filed in 2024 were time-barred because Rice discovered the alleged injury in 2019. Subsequent regulatory “cover-up” did not restart the limitations clock. (Four-year period for RICO; two-year period for Alabama fraud.)
• Section 1983/1981 and constitutional claims (AREAB & ADEPA). Dismissed for lack of standing: regulators’ failure to discipline others did not cause Rice’s lost property value.
• Claims against Jefferson County Board of Equalization. Barred by the TIA because the relief sought would interfere with a state tax assessment, and Alabama provides adequate judicial review (appeal to Alabama Tax Tribunal or state circuit court).
• Recusal motion. Denial affirmed; the judge’s previous unrelated representation of Synovus and the State of Alabama did not require recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
• Leave to amend. Denial affirmed; amendment would be futile where the time-bar is incurable.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) – The backbone for the limitations discussion. The court reiterates that civil RICO’s four-year period runs from discovery of the injury, and later acts that merely “continue” the original injury do not reset the clock.
• Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2001); Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997); Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1997) – Read together with Lehman to reject Rice’s attempt at “bootstrapping” later conduct into a new limitations period.
• Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817 (11th Cir. 2003); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642 (11th Cir. 2023) – Foundation for the three-part standing test and “traceability” requirement.
• Turner v. Jordan, 117 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024); Smith v. Travis County Education District, 968 F.2d 453 (11th Cir. 1992); A Bonding Co. v. Sunnuck, 629 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) – TIA/comity line of cases barring federal jurisdiction over state tax matters.
• Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) – Standard of review for recusal motions.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statute of Limitations.
   Key holding: “A plaintiff cannot use an independent, new predicate act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by earlier acts outside the limitations period.” (Lehman citation).
   Rice knew of the alleged fraudulent appraisal in September 2019; his RICO (4-year) and fraud (2-year) windows closed no later than September 2023. Alleged concealment by state regulators was deemed a continuation—not a new injury—thus no tolling.
2. Standing. regulators’ lack of enforcement did not cause Rice’s property-value injury; that harm was complete once the appraisal was issued and the bank denied the loan. Without traceability, Article III jurisdiction fails.
3. Tax Injunction Act. Any order compelling the JCBOE to reassess—or pay damages for failing to reassess—would “restrain” or “suspend” Alabama’s tax assessment. Alabama’s dual review mechanisms (Tax Tribunal or circuit court) are “plain, speedy, and efficient,” satisfying the statutory test. Federal courts therefore lack subject-matter jurisdiction.
4. Recusal. Prior, unrelated representation of Synovus by Judge Axon before her 2018 judicial appointment, without financial interest or involvement in the “matter in controversy,” is insufficient to create an appearance of partiality under § 455.
5. Leave to Amend. Because no amendment can revive claims that are facially time-barred, the district court legitimately denied further leave.

3. Practical Impact

• Civil RICO Tolling Narrowed. The court reinforces that post-injury concealment—even by third parties—does not toll RICO limitations unless the concealment itself causes a distinct injury.
• Suits Against Passive Regulators. Plaintiffs displeased with agency inaction must allege independent injury traceable to that inaction; disappointment that regulators failed to punish another actor will not suffice.
• Damage Claims and the Tax Injunction Act. Rice is another reminder that the TIA blocks not only injunctions but also monetary claims intertwined with state tax assessments, so long as adequate state remedies exist.
• Recusal—Prior Representation. A multi-year cooling-off period plus the absence of a direct relationship to the pending matter makes recusal unlikely, offering guidance to litigants contemplating § 455 motions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act)

A federal statute allowing treble damages when a “pattern of racketeering activity” injures business or property. Four-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers the injury, not when the pattern is fully known.

Statute of Limitations

A legal deadline to file suit. If missed, the claim is “time-barred” unless an exception (tolling) applies.

Tolling

Pausing or extending the limitations clock. Common doctrines include fraudulent concealment (when a defendant hides facts preventing discovery) and continuing violation (ongoing separate violations). Rice failed to meet either.

Article III Standing

The constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show (1) concrete injury, (2) causation (traceability), and (3) redressability (a court order can fix it).

Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341)

A federal statute depriving district courts of jurisdiction to “enjoin, suspend or restrain” state tax assessment, levy, or collection if the state offers adequate remedies.

Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455

Requires a judge to step aside if impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” or if the judge previously served as a lawyer in the same matter. Prior, unrelated representation is generally not enough.

Conclusion

While technically “DO NOT PUBLISH,” Rice v. Chief Examiner provides a concise and instructive primer on several procedural landmines that frequently derail complex, multi-party litigation:

• Timeliness is paramount. Once the initial injury is known, subsequent concealment or regulatory delay will not restart the limitations period—especially under civil RICO.
• Standing hinges on causation. Plaintiffs cannot piggyback on government inaction when the injury predates that inaction.
• Federal courts remain wary of state-tax entanglements. Whether the plaintiff seeks injunctions or damages, the TIA and comity doctrine push most tax-assessment disputes back into state forums.
• Recusal motions require real, case-specific conflicts, not historical or attenuated links.

Going forward, litigants should carefully evaluate statutes of limitations, traceability, and TIA implications before filing federal suits that challenge appraisals, tax assessments, or regulatory inaction. Rice affirms that procedural rigor is often the decisive barrier to relief, regardless of the merits alleged.