“Connected-To” Is Pure Fact: Fifth Circuit Bars Judicial Review of Causation Findings in VAWA Cancellation
Commentary on Agwuegbo v. Bondi, No. 24-60388 (5th Cir. June 18 2025)

1. Introduction

In Agwuegbo v. Bondi the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of its own jurisdiction over a Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) cancellation-of-removal decision rendered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). While the underlying immigration dispute involved multiple forms of relief—VAWA cancellation, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)—the opinion breaks new doctrinal ground on a single, deceptively narrow, phrase in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C): whether a criminal conviction is “connected to” the applicant’s experience of battery or extreme cruelty.

The Fifth Circuit held that determining whether such a “connection” exists is a pure question of fact. Consequently, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review that determination. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished cause-in-fact from proximate cause, overrode an unpublished Fifth Circuit panel that had treated the issue as a reviewable mixed question, and relied on Supreme Court guidance in Patel, Guerrero-Lasprilla, and Wilkinson. The opinion therefore reshapes both VAWA cancellation jurisprudence and broader judicial-review doctrine in immigration law.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Disposition: Petition for review dismissed in part (for lack of jurisdiction over the VAWA “connection” finding) and denied in part (withholding and CAT claims).
• Key Holding: The statutory phrase “connected to” in § 1229b(b)(2)(C) entails only a factual, cause-in-fact inquiry; as such, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips the court of jurisdiction to second-guess the BIA’s determination.
• Secondary Holdings:

• The BIA did not violate 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); it assumed the petitioner’s facts as stated and ruled them legally insufficient, which is permissible “issue-resolution,” not impermissible fact-finding.
• No protected liberty interest exists in discretionary VAWA cancellation; therefore, the petitioner’s due-process allegations fail.
• Withholding of removal was properly denied—two-day detention, minor injuries, and deprivation of food/water did not rise to past persecution; future-risk argument was waived.
• CAT relief was properly denied—speculative chain of events and generalized country reports are insufficient to show a likelihood of torture.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) – Interpreted § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) broadly to bar review of “any judgment” relating to discretionary relief, including factual findings. The panel relies on Patel as the jurisdictional anchor.
• Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) and Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) – Recognize a carve-out for “constitutional claims or questions of law,” including some mixed questions. The Fifth Circuit uses these cases to frame—but ultimately exclude—the causation inquiry from the carve-out.
• Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2019) – Earlier Fifth Circuit precedent treating causation language (“on account of”) as factual. The panel treats Pierre-Paul as controlling and more persuasive than the contrary unpublished decision below.
• Santibanez-Sanchez v. Garland, No. 21-60958, 2024 WL 4471737 (5th Cir. Oct. 11 2024) (unpublished) – Had assumed “connection between” was a mixed question. The current panel expressly disavows that assumption, re-establishing circuit consistency.
• Traditional tort decisions (Patton v. Bickford, Lake Shore cases, etc.) – Cited to illustrate the distinction between fact-based cause-in-fact and law-laden proximate cause.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Statutory Text: The word “connected” is broad and devoid of an imbedded legal standard (e.g., foreseeability). The court reasons that Congress’s choice of such a word signals a simple factual relationship; no balancing, policy, or foreseeability analysis is required.
2. Cause-in-fact vs. Proximate Cause: Borrowing from tort law, the court characterizes the “connection” test as equivalent to “but-for” or substantial-factor causation—historically factual—contrasted with proximate cause, which invites normative judgments and therefore mixed questions.
3. Interaction with § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i): Because the “connection” determination is purely factual, it falls squarely within Congress’s bar on reviewing “any judgment” relating to discretionary relief.
4. Rejection of Mixed-Question Treatment: The panel explains that while Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson allow judicial review of some mixed questions, those cases involved legal standards (equitable tolling, diligence tests) that were at least partially normative. No such normative overlay exists here.
5. BIA’s Role and Regulation 1003.1(d)(3)(iv): The court holds that the BIA merely applied law to undisputed allegations—accepting the petitioner’s version of events at face value—and concluded the nexus was insufficient. Hence the BIA stayed within its appellate mandate.
6. Due Process: Because VAWA cancellation is explicitly discretionary (“may cancel removal”), denial cannot constitute deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Thus, any alleged procedural irregularity does not implicate constitutional due process.

3.3 Likely Impact

a) On VAWA Cancellation Litigation
• Applicants within the Fifth Circuit now have little hope of obtaining circuit-court review of an IJ/BIA determination that their convictions are not “connected to” abuse. Fact development and preservation must therefore occur before the IJ.
• Advocates will need to marshal extensive documentary and testimonial evidence at the trial level to cement the nexus because appellate correction is now foreclosed.

b) On Broader Immigration Jurisdiction
• The opinion deepens the fissure between factual versus mixed-question characterization. Expect petitioners to frame issues as involving foreseeability, legal policy, or other normative components to remain within the “questions of law” carve-out.
• Other statutory schemes using “related to,” “connected with,” or similar formulations (e.g., inadmissibility waivers, crime-related bars) may receive similar treatment, tightening the jurisdictional gate.

c) Circuit & Supreme Court Discord
• The Third Circuit’s decision in Da Silva v. Attorney General suggests that “connected to” involves a causal inquiry but does not expressly label it pure fact or mixed question. If other circuits read the phrase differently, a circuit split—and Supreme Court intervention—could emerge.

d) Practice Before the BIA
• The BIA can decide the “connection” question on the existing record without remand, so long as it accepts all testimonial allegations as true. This may streamline certain appeals but also pressures IJs to ensure a fully developed factual record.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• VAWA Cancellation of Removal: A special form of discretionary relief allowing certain non-citizens who were abused by a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse/parent to avoid deportation. The applicant must still show “good moral character”; certain convictions normally destroy that showing unless tied to the abuse.
• “Connected To” (§ 1229b(b)(2)(C)): Statutory language allowing a conviction to be forgiven if it is causally related to the abuse. The Fifth Circuit now says deciding whether the connection exists is a matter of fact, immune from appellate review.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i): A jurisdiction-stripping provision preventing courts from reviewing any judgment concerning discretionary immigration relief, subject to a carve-out for constitutional or legal questions.
• Cause-in-fact vs. Proximate Cause:
  • Cause-in-fact (but-for or substantial factor) is a straightforward factual inquiry: “Did X actually cause Y?”
  • Proximate cause adds policy-laden considerations like foreseeability—often treated as a mixed question of law and fact.
• Withholding of Removal vs. Asylum: Withholding carries a higher burden (“more likely than not” persecution) but is not discretionary; asylum has a lower burden (“well-founded fear”) but can be denied even if the burden is met.
• Convention Against Torture (CAT): U.N.-based protection requiring proof it is “more likely than not” the alien would suffer state-involved torture if removed.

5. Conclusion

Agwuegbo v. Bondi establishes a concrete doctrinal rule: the causation inquiry embodied in “connected to” under VAWA cancellation is a non-reviewable factual determination. By categorizing the inquiry as pure fact, the Fifth Circuit tightens the jurisdictional limits imposed by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and clarifies the boundaries between factual findings and mixed questions of law and fact. Immigrants seeking VAWA cancellation in the Fifth Circuit must now focus their efforts on fact-building at the immigration-judge stage because the federal appellate forum is effectively closed for disputing the nexus between abuse and criminal conduct. Beyond VAWA, the decision signals an increasingly restrictive approach to judicial review of discretionary-relief findings, and it may prompt other circuits or eventually the Supreme Court to resolve whether “connection” inquiries elsewhere in immigration law should likewise be deemed purely factual.