“Bringing Brokers Within the Safety Fold” – Sixth Circuit Declares Negligent-Hiring Claims Against Freight Brokers Survive FAAAA Pre-emption

“Bringing Brokers Within the Safety Fold” – Sixth Circuit Declares Negligent-Hiring Claims Against Freight Brokers Survive FAAAA Pre-emption

1. Introduction

In Robert Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., No. 24-3599 (6th Cir. July 8 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit tackled a question that has divided the federal judiciary: Are state-law negligent-hiring claims against freight brokers pre-empted by § 14501(c) of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”)? Resolving the issue for the first time in this circuit, Judge Jane B. Stranch, writing for a unanimous panel, held that such claims fall within the statute’s “safety exception,” § 14501(c)(2)(A). Consequently, the panel reversed a district-court dismissal that had barred Robert Cox’s Ohio negligence action against broker Total Quality Logistics (“TQL”) after a fatal tractor-trailer crash killed Cox’s wife, Greta.

The ruling aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Ninth Circuit (Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.) and squarely conflicts with recent decisions from the Seventh (Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.) and Eleventh Circuits (Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.). Its practical significance is immediate for personal-injury litigants, the $1-trillion logistics industry, and state regulators alike.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The district court had dismissed Cox’s negligent-hiring suit, concluding that (i) the claim “related to” a broker’s services and was therefore expressly pre-empted by § 14501(c)(1), and (ii) the FAAAA’s “safety exception” was inapplicable because it does not cover claims against brokers. On de novo review, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the first proposition but rejected the second. The panel held:

  • Common-law negligent-hiring rules constitute “safety regulatory authority of a State.”
  • Because the gravamen of Cox’s claim concerns the safe operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway, the claim is “with respect to motor vehicles.”
  • Accordingly, § 14501(c)(2)(A) exempts the claim from pre-emption and the suit may proceed.

The case was therefore remanded to the Southern District of Ohio for merits litigation.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) – Defined “related to” broadly in the ADA context; used as the template for reading § 14501(c)(1).
  • Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013) – Interpreted “with respect to” as “concern”; provided the conceptual hook for determining the scope of both the pre-emption clause and the safety exception.
  • City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002) – Emphasized that Congress enacted the safety exception to preserve traditional state police power over highway safety.
  • Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) – First circuit decision holding negligent-hiring claims against brokers survive pre-emption; relied on heavily for textual and policy arguments.
  • Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) & Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) – Represented the contrary view; the Sixth Circuit explicitly explained why it “respectfully diverges.”
  • Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014) – Confirmed that “other provisions having the force and effect of law” embrace common-law rules.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Sixth Circuit

  1. Step One – Pre-emption Clause Applies.
    • Because negligent-hiring rules “have a connection with” broker services and affect the cost structure and operational choices of brokers, they are “related to” services under § 14501(c)(1).
    • Cox conceded this point; the panel nevertheless independently affirmed it to set the groundwork.
  2. Step Two – Safety Exception Analysis.
    1. “Safety regulatory authority” includes common law. Drawing on Kurns and Riegel, the court reiterated that common-law duties are a potent form of state regulation and therefore qualify.
    2. “With respect to motor vehicles.” The court read “with respect to” as “concerning” and rejected the stricter “direct-connection” gloss adopted by Aspen/Ye. It emphasized that the negligent act alleged—selecting an unsafe carrier to operate a semi-truck—unavoidably involves motor vehicles and highway safety.
    3. Statutory harmony. Eliminating common-law claims from the exception would create arbitrary distinctions between codified and uncodified state safety rules, undercutting Congress’s stated desire to preserve safety authority.
  3. Step Three – Application to Facts. Cox’s claim is quintessentially about highway crash risk; therefore, it satisfies both prongs of the exception and survives pre-emption.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

  • Circuit split deepens. The Sixth Circuit becomes the second appellate court (after the Ninth) to uphold such negligent-hiring suits, making Supreme Court review more probable.
  • Litigation strategy shifts. Plaintiffs in accidents involving brokered loads now have a clear path to sue brokers in Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, and Tennessee. Brokers doing business in these states face increased liability exposure.
  • Operational repercussions for brokers. Expect heightened vetting protocols, more robust carrier-qualification software, and potentially higher brokerage fees to internalize added risk.
  • State regulatory space reaffirmed. The ruling underscores that states retain significant authority to police highway safety—even indirectly through common-law tort suits—despite federal deregulatory schemes.
  • Insurance market effects. Broker errors-and-omissions (E&O) policies may see premium hikes; insurers will scrutinize underwriting guidelines for carrier-selection procedures.
  • Legislative attention. Congress could step in either to codify the safety-exception interpretation or to clarify the FAAAA’s reach, especially if the Supreme Court stays silent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • FAAAA Pre-emption (49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1))
    A federal rule preventing states from passing or enforcing laws that significantly affect trucking or broker prices, routes, or services—part of a broader deregulatory agenda begun in the 1980s.
  • Safety Exception (§ 14501(c)(2)(A))
    A carve-out preserving state authority over highway safety, including rules about how motor vehicles operate, their routes, size/weight, and insurance.
  • Freight Broker
    A middleman who arranges for licensed motor carriers to haul cargo; does not itself own the trucks but coordinates the shipment for a fee.
  • Negligent Hiring
    A tort claim alleging that a defendant failed to use reasonable care in selecting a competent contractor, thereby causing injury.
  • “Related To” vs. “With Respect To”
    “Related to” is interpreted very broadly (“any connection”). “With respect to” means “concerning” but, per this case, does not necessarily require a direct or ownership-based link.

5. Conclusion

Cox v. Total Quality Logistics firmly situates the Sixth Circuit on the side of expansive state authority to protect motorists from unsafe trucking practices, even when those practices arise at the brokerage layer of the supply chain. By holding that negligent-hiring claims against brokers are preserved under the FAAAA’s safety exception, the court:

  1. Affirms that common-law tort duties are a legitimate component of “safety regulatory authority.”
  2. Interprets “with respect to motor vehicles” in a functional, substance-oriented manner.
  3. Sets a liability landscape in which brokers must internalize safety diligence once thought applicable only to carriers.

Whether the Supreme Court will intervene to resolve the now-entrenched three-way circuit split remains to be seen. Until then, the Sixth Circuit’s decision stands as a powerful precedent ensuring that, in the heartland of America’s trucking corridors, safety obligations follow the freight all the way up the contractual chain.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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