“Biological Sex” as the Sole Protected Characteristic in MHRA Public-Accommodation Claims –
A Commentary on R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District, Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc (10 June 2025)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Missouri’s 2025 decision in R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District marks the Court’s first definitive construction of the term “sex” in the public-accommodation section of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), §213.065.1. The Court—by a 5-2 vote—held that “sex” means biological sex only, thereby excluding claims predicated on gender identity. The ruling reinstated the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the school district and nullified a $4.175 million jury verdict that had favored a transgender male student who was denied access to boys’ restrooms and locker rooms.

The decision settles a question left open by R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV School District, 568 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. banc 2019) (“R.M.A. I”), where the Court allowed the same plaintiff’s petition to survive dismissal without construing “sex.” Now, six years later, the Court provides that construction, setting a binding precedent for public-accommodation discrimination cases throughout Missouri.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The plaintiff (R.M.A.), a transgender male student, prevailed at a 2021 jury trial and was awarded $175,000 compensatory and $4 million punitive damages.
• The circuit court granted the District’s post-trial JNOV, finding plaintiff failed to make a submissible case because the only evidence showed exclusion “because of female genitalia,” not “because of male sex.”
• The Supreme Court affirmed:
  • “Sex” in §213.065 means biological classification as male or female.
  • Legislative inaction on proposals to add gender identity underscores that intent.
  • Evidence showed the District acted due to plaintiff’s biological characteristics associated with the female sex, so plaintiff did not prove discrimination based on his pleaded male sex.
• The Court therefore upheld the JNOV, mooted the conditional new-trial order, and denied appellate attorney fees.
• Two dissenting opinions (Powell, J.; Wilson, J.) argued that the majority misapplied the standard for JNOV, ignored contrary evidence, and misread Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents & Authorities Cited

• R.M.A. I (2019) – allowed cause of action to proceed but left meaning of “sex” undecided.
• Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) – Title VII employment decision holding discrimination against transgender people inherently involves sex discrimination. Majority distinguishes it as employment-specific and expressly not about restrooms.
• Missouri authorities on statutory interpretation: Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772 (2011); Johnson (2017); Milazzo (2025).
• Rules 78.06 & 74.01 on timing and finality of judgments – addressed in footnotes re: JNOV timing.
• Unsuccessful bills: SB 172 (2019), SB 945 (2020), HB 984 (2021), SB 711 (2022), SB 60 (2023), SB 787 (2024) – used as evidence of legislative intent.
• Federal & state cases on restroom separation and sex classification (e.g., Adams v. St. Johns Cty. School Board, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022)).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual inquiry. MHRA does not define “sex,” so the Court applied its “plain and ordinary meaning,” referencing multiple editions of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. That meaning anchors sex in biology: morphology, physiology, chromosomes.
2. Legislative history / acquiescence. Continuous failure to amend MHRA to add “gender identity” signaled legislative intent to keep protection limited to biological sex.
3. Role of Bostock. Majority declared Bostock inapposite because (a) it is an employment case (Title VII), (b) Missouri courts follow federal cases only when “consistent with Missouri law,” and (c) Bostock itself disclaimed application to bathrooms and locker rooms.
4. Application to evidence.
   • Plaintiff pled discrimination “on the basis of male sex” (not on gender identity).
   • All proof showed District considered genitalia typically associated with females; thus, denial was because of plaintiff’s female sex under the Court’s definition.
   • Because plaintiff did not prove discrimination on the ground he pled (male sex), no submissible case existed; JNOV proper.
5. Jury-instruction challenge. Plaintiff’s argument that instructions should have referred only to “sex” failed; Court said that would conflict with its holding in R.M.A. I that plaintiff must prove denial “because of his male sex.”

3.3 Likely Impact

• Immediate precedential force. Trial courts statewide must apply “biological sex” when evaluating MHRA public-accommodation claims. Transgender plaintiffs must plead and prove discrimination based on their biological sex classification, not gender identity.
• Divergence from federal trajectory. The decision creates a clear departure from Bostock-influenced jurisprudence in employment law and from decisions of some federal circuits protective of transgender restroom access. This may spur forum-shopping into federal court under Title IX and §1983 theories.
• Legislative reaction. The explicit reliance on legislative inaction may galvanize future bills either codifying the majority’s view or extending protections to gender identity. The opinion invites lawmakers, not courts, to revise §213.065.
• Restroom & locker-room policies. Missouri schools and other public-accommodation operators obtain clearer authority to separate facilities by biological sex without risk of MHRA liability (though still subject to federal law).
• Litigation strategy. Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination will likely pivot to federal claims (Title IX, Equal Protection) or to MHRA employment provisions where Lampley & sex-stereotyping remain potent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Biological vs. Legal Sex

“Biological sex” refers to physical attributes (chromosomes, reproductive anatomy). The Court rejects the notion of a separate “legal sex” that could be changed by documentation alone.

Submissible Case

A threshold of evidence necessary for a claim to be presented to (or sustained by) a jury. If any essential element lacks substantial supporting evidence, the judge may remove the issue via JNOV.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)

Post-trial ruling overturning a jury verdict when no reasonable jury could have reached that verdict on the evidence. Considered “drastic” because it supplants the jury’s fact-finding.

Sex Stereotyping

A form of discrimination where a decision-maker penalizes a person for not conforming to expected gender norms. Under Missouri law (see Lampley), sex stereotyping can prove employment discrimination; the majority here says it was not proved.

Legislative Acquiescence

A canon that courts presume legislative approval of the existing judicial construction of a statute when the legislature repeatedly declines to amend it.

5. Conclusion

R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District closes the interpretive gap left by R.M.A. I by declaring that, for public accommodations, “sex” under the MHRA is exclusively biological. The ruling forecloses state-law restroom-access claims by transgender individuals unless they allege discrimination relative to their biological designation. While the majority frames its holding as faithful textualism and deference to legislative prerogative, the vigorous dissents warn that the decision recasts facts, ignores Supreme Court logic in Bostock, and risks undermining jury authority. The practical outcome is a sharper bifurcation between state and federal protections, ensuring that forthcoming Missouri civil-rights litigation—and legislative debate—will pivot on the very definition of sex itself.