“All-Claim” Requirement Reaffirmed: Sixth Circuit Limits what Counts as a PLRA Strike and Restricts Post-Notice District Court Revisions

1. Introduction

Davariol Marquavis Taylor, an incarcerated person in Michigan’s Marquette Branch Prison (“MBP”), filed a § 1983 civil-rights action alleging (i) fatal medication errors by prison medical staff and (ii) sexual and physical assault by the prison doctor. Because he could not afford the filing fee, Taylor moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The district court denied IFP status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) “three-strikes” provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), concluding that Taylor had at least three prior qualifying dismissals. It then dismissed the complaint for non-payment of fees. Taylor appealed.

While the appeal was pending, the district court issued a “clarifying” order that replaced the strikes it had originally relied on—raising complex jurisdictional and merits questions about (a) when a strike accrues and (b) a district court’s authority once an appeal is noticed.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Clay, Gilman, and Bloomekatz) held:

Taylor possesses only two PLRA strikes, not three; and
The district court’s post-notice “clarifying” order was void for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Jurisdictional Holding: After a notice of appeal is filed, a district court lacks authority to issue orders that materially alter the merits of the appealed decision; any such order is “null and void.”

2. PLRA Holding: A prior lawsuit counts as a “strike” under § 1915(g) only if all of its claims are dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Dismissals based solely on (a) Eleventh Amendment immunity or (b) a court’s discretionary refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction do not qualify. Mixed dismissals—where at least one claim is dismissed on non-enumerated grounds—also fail to constitute strikes.

Applying these principles, neither Taylor v. Adler (Eleventh Amendment dismissal) nor Taylor v. Stump (mixed grounds) qualifies as a strike. Taylor therefore remains below the three-strike threshold and is entitled to pursue his current action IFP.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Crump v. Blue, 121 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2024) – The cornerstone precedent. Crump established the “all-claim” rule: a dismissal is a strike only if every claim in the action falls within § 1915(g)’s enumerated bases (frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim). Crump also rejected Eleventh Amendment-only and supplemental-jurisdiction dismissals as strikes. The Taylor panel treats Crump as controlling and applies its reasoning directly.
Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2021) – Provides a concise statement of the PLRA three-strike framework, cited for definitional clarity.
Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., 727 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2013) – Cited for the standard of appellate review (de novo) regarding whether a dismissal qualifies as a strike.
Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2007) – An older Sixth Circuit case that had treated some mixed dismissals as strikes. The panel acknowledges potential tension but, following Crump, declines to extend Pointer.
Cases on post-appeal district-court authority – Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 2003); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. DNR, 71 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995). These lay the groundwork for holding the “clarifying” order void.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Jurisdictional Analysis
Upon Taylor’s notice of appeal, the district court was divested of jurisdiction except to handle collateral or housekeeping matters. By substituting one supposed “third strike” (Torok) for the two earlier relied-on cases, the court substantively changed its merits determination. That exceeded its residual authority and rendered the second order void (United States v. Sims, 708 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2013)). Consequently, the court of appeals disregarded the second order altogether.

(B) PLRA “Strike” Calculation
1. Statutory text – § 1915(g) lists only three qualifying grounds; to be a strike the entire “action or appeal” must be dismissed under one of them.
2. Application to Adler – Dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds ≠ frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim. No additional findings; therefore, no strike.
3. Application to Stump – Mixed dismissal (sovereign immunity + mis-labelled habeas claim). Because at least one ground lies outside § 1915(g), the “all-claim” rule bars strike status.
4. Effect of Crump vs. Pointer – Although Pointer once allowed mixed dismissals as strikes, Crump’s later panel read the statute more strictly. The Taylor panel explicitly follows Crump and limits Pointer to its facts, enhancing doctrinal clarity within the circuit.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Strike Inflation Curtailed: District courts in the Sixth Circuit must now apply the “all-claim” rule rigorously. Dismissals based on sovereign immunity, jurisdictional abstention, supplemental-jurisdiction declination, or any mixed rationale no longer automatically push prisoners toward the three-strike bar.
Strategic Litigation Choices: Incarcerated plaintiffs can more confidently pursue claims without fear that partial dismissals will prematurely exhaust their strike allotment.
District-Court Procedure: Judges must resist the temptation to modify merits orders after a notice of appeal. Administrative clarifications are permissible; substantive rewrites are not.
Future Appeals: The panel’s repudiation of post-notice “clarifying” orders will likely deter such practice and reduce jurisdictional confusion.
Pointer’s Erosion: Although not overruled, Pointer’s authority is now narrowly cabined. Future mixed-ground dismissals are unlikely to be deemed strikes unless an en banc court revisits the issue.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA “Strike”: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), each prior case or appeal the prisoner files that is dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim counts as a “strike.” Three strikes bar IFP status unless the prisoner faces imminent danger.
Mixed Dismissal: A case in which some claims are dismissed for reasons listed in § 1915(g) and others on different grounds (e.g., immunity, lack of jurisdiction). Under the “all-claim” rule, such a dismissal does not count as a strike.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity: The constitutional doctrine that states and their agencies (and sometimes officials) cannot be sued in federal court for damages without their consent.
In Forma Pauperis (IFP): A procedural status allowing litigants who cannot afford filing fees to pursue their cases either without payment or via installment plans.
Divestiture of Jurisdiction: Once a party files a notice of appeal, the district court loses authority over matters implicating the merits of the appealed judgment. It retains only the ability to take ancillary or clerical actions.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Taylor v. Stevens (25-1003) does two significant things. First, it guards appellate jurisdiction by nullifying a district court’s post-appeal attempt to rewrite its merits decision. Second, it vigorously re-affirms Crump’s “all-claim” interpretation of § 1915(g), curtailing over-expansive use of the three-strike rule. The ruling promotes fair access to courts for incarcerated litigants, ensures faithful statutory interpretation, and signals to lower courts that creative “clarifications” after a notice of appeal are impermissible. In the broader context, the decision incrementally aligns Sixth Circuit doctrine with the PLRA’s text and purpose, reinforcing principled limits on the three-strikes mechanism.