“A Tale of Two Plaintiffs” – The Second Circuit’s Dual-Track Standard for Assessing Sincerity of Religious Beliefs at Summary Judgment
(Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 23-7544, 2d Cir. July 2 2025)

1. Introduction

Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the Second Circuit’s first published decision squarely addressing how courts should evaluate sincerity of religious objections to COVID-19 vaccination mandates at the summary-judgment stage. The case arose after the New York Federal Reserve (“FRBNY”) fired two executive assistants—Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz—for refusing to comply with its 2021 mandatory vaccination policy. Both sought religious exemptions; both were denied; both sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause, and Title VII.

The district court granted summary judgment to the FRBNY on all claims and sanctioned the plaintiffs for discovery misconduct. On appeal, the Second Circuit—Judges Lynch (author), Nardini, and Lee—split the baby: it affirmed dismissal of Gardner-Alfred’s claims, revived Diaz’s claims, and upheld the sanctions order.

The decision forges a dual-track framework:

• Track 1 – High-Conflict Record: when a plaintiff’s only evidence is self-serving testimony that is “wholly contradictory, incomplete, and incredible,” summary judgment against the plaintiff is proper.
• Track 2 – Credibility Disputes: when competing evidence could still allow a reasonable juror to credit the plaintiff’s testimony, issues of sincerity and burden belong to the jury, even if the plaintiff also harbored secular motives or misunderstandings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Gardner-Alfred: Summary judgment affirmed. Her testimony about affiliation with the “Temple of the Healing Spirit” was so devoid of detail and riddled with contradictions that “no reasonable jury” could find sincerity.
• Diaz: Summary judgment vacated. Genuine disputes exist over the sincerity of her Catholic-based objection to vaccines tested on fetal cell lines and over whether the FRBNY policy burdened that belief.
• Sanctions: Adverse inference instructions and roughly $54,000 in fees were upheld; plaintiffs’ willful discovery failures warranted them.
• Disposition: Affirmed in part (sanctions; dismissal of Gardner-Alfred), vacated in part (Diaz), remanded.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and their Influence

1. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984) – Established that sincerity is a factual question usually unsuited for summary judgment. The panel used Patrick to revive Diaz’s claims.
2. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) – Bars courts from dissecting religious beliefs or requiring doctrinal consistency. Cited to reject the district court’s reliance on Diaz’s pastor’s refusal and Church hierarchy.
3. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) – Courts cannot test the objective truth of a belief. Invoked to fault the district court for treating Diaz’s “mistaken” science as dispositive.
4. Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) – Allows summary judgment where plaintiff’s testimony is “wholly fanciful.” Applied to Gardner-Alfred.
5. Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, 624 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) – Deferential standard for discovery sanctions. Used to uphold the sanctions order.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Sincerity Inquiry

• • The threshold for plaintiffs is low: a sworn statement can suffice unless no reasonable juror could believe it.
• • For Diaz, secular motives, past conduct, and her pastor’s stance are merely impeachment. They create credibility disputes, not grounds for judgment as a matter of law.
• • For Gardner-Alfred, contradictions were “inescapable and unequivocal.” Her failure to produce a single corroborating email or coherent narrative reduced her claim to a “sham issue of fact.”

b) Burden/Conflict Inquiry

• Court reiterated that the burden element turns on the plaintiff’s own understanding, not scientific accuracy.
• District court erred by narrowing Diaz’s beliefs to vaccines that “contain or are manufactured with” fetal cells, ignoring her broader objection to any involvement of fetal cell lines in testing or development.

c) Discovery Sanctions

• Intentional withholding + prior warnings justified adverse-inference instructions (Rule 37(b),(c)) and fee-shifting (Rules 16(f), 26(g)).
• The panel emphasized deterrence and the district court’s duty to manage its docket.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

• Vaccination & Religious Exemptions: Plaintiffs will likely cite Diaz to survive summary judgment where mixed secular–religious motives exist. Employers will lean on Gardner-Alfred to defeat claims with demonstrably incoherent narratives.
• Summary-Judgment Practice: Clarifies that sincerity rarely warrants summary judgment, except in the “rare Bentley/Jeffreys scenario” of unrebutted internal contradictions.
• Scope of Religious Belief: Courts must avoid parsing theological fine points or substituting scientific fact for conscience, a warning relevant beyond vaccine cases (e.g., gene-therapy, AI ethics).
• Discovery Conduct: Confirms that modest yet meaningful sanctions (adverse inference + fees) are sustainable where parties flout orders, even absent dramatic prejudice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Free Exercise Clause: Part of the First Amendment forbidding government from interfering with individuals’ religious practices.
• RFRA: A statute requiring the federal government to meet “strict scrutiny” (highest legal test) before burdening religious exercise.
• Title VII Religious Accommodation: Employers must reasonably accommodate employees’ religious practices unless doing so causes “undue hardship.”
• Summary Judgment: A pre-trial procedure where the judge decides a case (or part of it) because no real factual disputes exist for a jury.
• Adverse Inference Instruction: A direction to the jury that it may (or must) presume missing evidence would hurt the party who withheld it.
• Sincerity Test: Courts look at actions, consistency, timing, and corroboration to decide if a professed religious belief is genuine.

5. Conclusion

Gardner-Alfred v. FRBNY sets a nuanced precedent: sincerity determinations are usually jury questions, but courts may dismiss where a plaintiff’s story collapses under its own weight. The Second Circuit struck a balance—reviving Diaz’s plausible claims while extinguishing Gardner-Alfred’s untenable ones—and tightened the leash on discovery abuse. Litigants, employers, and trial courts now have a clearer roadmap for navigating the intersection of pandemic-era health mandates, religious liberty, and civil-procedure mechanics.