“A Limited-Time Offer”: Sixth Circuit Holds APA Claims Moot Once Statutory Spending Windows Close – Commentary on W6 Restaurant Group, Ltd. v. Kelly Loeffler

I. Introduction

In W6 Restaurant Group, Ltd. v. Loeffler, No. 24-3483 (6th Cir. 2025), fifteen Ohio and Florida restaurants sought judicial redress for the Small Business Administration’s handling of the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (“RRF”), a $28.6-billion COVID-19 grant program created by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. Initially framed as an equal-protection challenge after Vitolo v. Guzman, the lawsuit evolved into an Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) action alleging (1) unlawful departure from the statutory “first-come, first-served” mandate and (2) failure to claw back improperly paid grants. By the time the case reached the Sixth Circuit, however, two critical developments had occurred: (a) the statutory “covered period” for using RRF monies (Feb. 15 2020 – Mar. 11 2023) had expired, and (b) Congress, through the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, rescinded the program’s unobligated balances. The Court concluded that, regardless of the merits, “it is now too late to grant any effectual relief,” and affirmed dismissal for mootness.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court treated the government’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a facial jurisdictional attack because no facts outside the pleadings were required.
• Mootness, not standing, was dispositive: once the RRF’s covered period ended on 11 March 2023, grantees were statutorily barred from spending funds and required to return any unexpended amounts to the Treasury (15 U.S.C. §9009c(c)(5)–(6)).
• Because any judicial order granting or reallocating RRF funds would be futile, the controversy no longer presented a live case or controversy under Article III.
• No mootness exception (e.g., “capable of repetition yet evading review”) was invoked or applied.
• The district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery was upheld because only legal questions remained.
• Judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) – Congress’s failure to re-pass an expired bill rendered challenges moot (“dead letter”).
   Influence: Provided the primary analogy for statutory sunset rendering litigation non-justiciable.
2. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) – A case is moot if no “effectual relief whatever” can be given.
   Influence: Articulated the functional test applied to RRF relief.
3. Mwasaru v. Napolitano, 619 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2010) – Diversity-visa eligibility expires at fiscal year’s end, mooting pending suits.
   Influence: Served as the Sixth Circuit’s own precedent for “limited-time offer” programs.
4. Vitolo v. Guzman, 999 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2021) – Earlier panel found RRF priority scheme likely unconstitutional.
   Influence: While foundational to plaintiffs’ original claims, it became tangential once mootness was determinative.
5. Other citations (Patton v. Fitzhugh, Ohio v. EPA, Fialka-Feldman) collectively framed the standing–mootness continuum.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Construction: The plain text of §9009c(c)(5) (“may be used only during the covered period”) and (c)(6) (mandatory return of unspent funds) created a bright-line temporal cut-off. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ narrower reading that the return requirement applied only to entities already funded.
2. Mootness Doctrine: Applying Scientology, the Court held that post-March 11 2023 no “effectual relief” remained; even if the SBA awarded grants, plaintiffs would have to remit them immediately.
3. Facial vs. Factual Attack: The appellate panel clarified that because no extrinsic evidence was material, the jurisdictional challenge was facial, subject to de novo review.
4. Separation of Powers Considerations: By rescinding unobligated balances, Congress foreclosed executive (and judicial) discretion to revive the fund. Any contrary order would trench upon the legislative power of the purse.

C. Impact on Future Litigation and Administrative Law

• Time-Bound Benefit Programs: The decision cements a rule that once a spending window written into a statute closes, APA litigants cannot keep controversies alive merely by attacking process. Plaintiffs must obtain preliminary relief before the statutory deadline or face mootness.
• Strategic Litigation Planning: Entities eyeing relief under temporary federal grant schemes must pursue expedited remedies—TROs, preliminary injunctions, escrow orders—early in litigation.
• Agency Incentives: Agencies administering sunset programs gain stronger defenses against late-stage suits, potentially reducing pressure to maintain residual processing capacities after statutory expiration.
• Congressional Drafting: Legislators can control the litigation exposure of emergency programs via explicit sunset and forfeiture clauses, knowing courts may treat them as jurisdictional endpoints.
• Jurisdictional Discovery: The opinion signals that where mootness turns solely on statutory text, district courts may, without abuse of discretion, deny discovery directed at agency conduct.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness

A doctrine requiring a “live” dispute at every stage of federal litigation. If intervening events make the court’s decision incapable of changing the parties’ legal rights, the case is dismissed.

Standing vs. Mootness

Standing is measured at filing; mootness is measured throughout the case. One asks “Was there an injury?”; the other asks “Is the injury still remediable?”

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) §706

Allows courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.

Facial vs. Factual Jurisdictional Attack

A facial attack challenges jurisdiction based on the pleadings alone; a factual attack relies on evidence outside the pleadings.

Covered Period (15 U.S.C. §9009c(a)(3))

The statutorily defined window (Feb 15 2020 – Mar 11 2023) during which RRF grant funds could be used.

V. Conclusion

W6 Restaurant Group v. Loeffler provides a crisp illustration of Article III’s mootness brake on federal judicial power. The Sixth Circuit held that once Congress draws a firm temporal boundary on the use of federal grant funds—and that boundary passes—courts cannot fashion meaningful relief, and APA process-based challenges wither. The ruling reinforces the “limited-time offer” concept first articulated in Mwasaru, extends it to pandemic-era relief programs, and guides litigants and agencies alike on the jurisdictional consequences of statutory sunsets. Ultimately, the case underscores a practical lesson: in emergency-aid litigation, time is not merely money—it is jurisdiction itself.