“A Claim by a Participant” Only: The New York Court of Appeals Narrows the World Trade Center Filing Extension in Matter of Garcia v. WTC Volunteer

I. Introduction

In Matter of Garcia v. WTC Volunteer, 2025 NY Slip Op 06360 (Nov. 20, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the special filing extensions enacted for those who participated in World Trade Center (WTC) rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The core holding is precise and consequential: the additional filing period created by Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) § 168 in Article 8‑A applies only to claims brought by the statutorily defined “participant” in WTC operations, and does not extend the limitations period for death benefit claims brought by survivors. As a result, the widow’s claim—filed more than two years after the volunteer’s death—was barred by the general two-year statute of limitations in WCL § 28.

Notably, the Court deliberately leaves unresolved the broader question of whether Article 8‑A authorizes any death benefits for WTC volunteers. It affirms solely on timeliness grounds, holding that even if such death claims are otherwise available under Article 8‑A, this specific claim is untimely.

This decision clarifies, and significantly narrows, the reach of Article 8‑A’s remedial filing extensions, and has important implications for future World Trade Center–related death claims by dependents of both employees and volunteers.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Decedent and His Lifetime WTC Benefits

• The decedent volunteered with the American Red Cross in the WTC recovery efforts in the aftermath of 9/11.
• He was exposed to toxins at a designated WTC site.
• As a result, he developed multiple medical conditions deemed causally related to his volunteer work.
• He had an established claim for lifetime benefits under Article 8‑A—meaning the Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) had already recognized his conditions as compensable WTC-related injuries.
• The decedent died in July 2016.

B. The Widow’s Death Benefit Claim

• In February 2020—more than three and a half years after the decedent’s death—the claimant, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits with the WCB.
• A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially granted a death benefit award in claimant’s favor.
• The Uninsured Employers’ Fund (UEF)—which functions as the employer for WTC volunteers under WCL § 167—sought administrative review.

C. The Workers’ Compensation Board’s Decision

On administrative review, the WCB:

• Disallowed the death benefits award.
• Held the claim was “untimely on its face” under WCL § 28 because it was filed more than two years after decedent’s death.
• Concluded that:
  • WCL § 28 (two-year statute of limitations) applied to the death claim; and
  • Article 8‑A and its extensions, including § 168, did not save the claim.
• Rejected claimant’s contention that WCL § 28 does not apply to Article 8‑A claims or that disallowance was premature.

D. The Appellate Division’s Ruling

The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the WCB’s disallowance (211 AD3d 1264 [3d Dept 2022]):

• The majority held that the extended filing period in WCL § 168 applies only to a “participant” in WTC operations as defined in Article 8‑A.
• On that definition, the decedent, not the widow, was the “participant.”
• The widow’s death claim was a separate and distinct legal proceeding, accruing at the time of death, and she could not “piggyback” on the decedent’s § 168 rights.
• Because she filed more than two years after death, the claim was barred by WCL § 28.

One judge dissented. The dissent argued that:

• WCL § 163—which governs “notice” for “injury or death resulting from a qualifying condition for a participant”—contains language that could be read to give dependents more time.
• The case should be remitted to the Board to decide when the claimant “knew or should have known” that decedent’s death resulted from a qualifying WTC condition, and whether the claim was timely if measured from that knowledge.

The Court of Appeals granted leave (42 NY3d 905 [2024]) and has now affirmed the Appellate Division’s majority.

III. Statutory Framework

A. General Workers’ Compensation Structure

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law generally:

• WCL § 10(1) obligates employers to provide compensation for employees for injuries “arising out of and in the course of” employment.
• WCL § 15 establishes a schedule of benefits “during the continuance” of disability—i.e., lifetime wage-replacement and medical benefits for injured workers.
• WCL § 16 provides for death benefits to surviving dependents “[i]f the injury causes death.”
• WCL § 18 requires notice of injury within 30 days to the employer; it expressly allows notice to be given by:
  • the employee;
  • someone on the employee’s behalf; or
  • “in case of death, by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person, on their behalf.”
• WCL § 28, titled “Limitation of right to compensation,” sets the two-year statute of limitations:
  • Two years after the accident or disablement, and
  • If death results therefrom, two years after such death.
  • For certain occupational diseases, the period runs from when the claimant knew or should have known that the disease was due to the nature of the employment.

B. Article 8‑A: World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations

Article 8‑A was enacted in 2006 (L 2006, ch 446) as a special remedial scheme tailored to the unique circumstances and latency of conditions arising from WTC rescue, recovery, and cleanup efforts.

Legislative materials emphasized three core problems:

1. Latency of disease: Many illnesses from toxic exposure would not manifest until years after 9/11.
2. Civilian volunteers: Many responders were not traditional “employees” and therefore fell outside the existing Workers’ Compensation framework.
3. Procedural barriers: Strict notice and limitation periods in the WCL risked barring compensation for WTC-related conditions discovered long after the events.

1. Definition of “Participant”

To bring both employees and volunteers into the compensation system, Article 8‑A defines a “participant” as:

• Any employee who, in the course of employment, or
• Any volunteer, upon presenting satisfactory evidence to the Board,

who took part in rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at specified WTC-related sites during a defined period after 9/11.

2. Registration Requirement (WCL § 162)

To benefit from Article 8‑A, a participant must:

• File a written, sworn statement with the WCB,
• Indicating dates and locations of participation, and
• Identifying the participant’s employer during participation, if any.

This registration operates as a gateway to later WTC-related benefits.

3. Notice for WTC Qualifying Conditions (WCL § 163)

Section 163 addresses notice for “injury or death resulting from a qualifying condition for a participant.” It provides:

• The notice rules are those in WCL § 18 (30-day notice),
• Except that the notice may be given within two years after the disablement of the participant or two years after the participant knew or should have known that the qualifying condition was causally related to WTC service.

The focus is on extending the time to give notice for WTC-related injuries and qualifying conditions, adjusting for latency.

4. Employer for Volunteers (WCL § 167)

Because many WTC responders were volunteers with no traditional employer:

• For Article 8‑A volunteers, the Uninsured Employers’ Fund is deemed the “employer” for purposes of administering and paying WTC-related workers’ compensation benefits.

5. Additional Period for Filing Certain Claims (WCL § 168)

Section 168—central to this case—was added in 2008 (L 2008, ch 489, § 20) and has since been repeatedly extended. It is titled:

“Additional period for filing certain claims.”

In substance, it provides:

• “A claim by a participant” whose disablement occurred within specified time frames “shall not be disallowed as barred by” WCL § 18 (notice) or WCL § 28 (limitations),
• So long as the claim is filed by certain extended deadlines keyed to the date of disablement.

The legislature has lengthened and expanded these time frames multiple times, most recently allowing claims by participants whose disablement “occurred between September 11, 2017 and September 11, 2021” to be filed up to September 11, 2026.

6. Additional Provisions (Including WCL § 169)

Article 8‑A has been frequently amended in response to evolving understanding of WTC-related health effects:

• 2008 and 2013 amendments extended registration deadlines and refined covered conditions.
• A 2013 amendment limited coverage to specifically enumerated conditions.
• A 2022 amendment added WCL § 169, requiring the WCB to accept certain federal certifications as presumptive evidence of causation for qualifying illnesses or deaths.

These amendments consistently aim to make it easier for WTC participants to link their conditions to their service and to surmount technical procedural hurdles.

IV. Summary of the Court of Appeals’ Opinion

The Court of Appeals, per Judge Garcia, affirms the Appellate Division’s order, holding:

1. WCL § 168’s filing extension applies only to a “claim by a participant.” Survivors’ claims—such as a widow’s death benefits claim—are not “claims by a participant” and therefore do not benefit from § 168’s extended deadlines.
2. WCL § 163 extends time for notice only, not for filing a claim. It incorporates and modifies WCL § 18 (notice), but does not affect the two-year filing limitation in WCL § 28.
3. Because the widow’s claim was filed more than two years after decedent’s death, it is barred by WCL § 28.
4. The Court therefore does not reach the question whether Article 8‑A authorizes death benefit claims for WTC volunteers at all. Even assuming such claims are allowed, this particular claim is untimely.

The Court grounds its analysis in:

• The plain text of §§ 18, 28, 163, and 168,
• The statutory definition of “participant,”
• Legislative history emphasizing latency and the need to extend participants’ filing periods, and
• Separation-of-powers concerns—any further expansion of benefits must come from the legislature, not judicial reinterpretation.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. The Core Interpretive Question: Who May Use § 168’s Extension?

The central legal issue is deceptively simple: when WCL § 168 states that “[a] claim by a participant” shall not be barred by §§ 18 or 28 if filed within certain extended periods, does that phrase also encompass a dependent’s death benefits claim related to that participant?

The claimant argued that:

• Her husband’s disablement occurred in 2016 (the year of his death).
• Section 168 allowed “claims” arising from such disablements to be filed by extended dates (she pointed to the 2022 deadline).
• Her death claim, filed in 2020, was therefore timely as a WTC-related claim falling under § 168.

The Court rejects this argument. It reads “a claim by a participant” literally and narrowly: only the person who meets the statutory definition of “participant” can invoke § 168’s filing extension. Dependents are not participants; they are beneficiaries asserting separate causes of action that accrue at death.

B. Textual Analysis: Comparing §§ 18, 28, 163, and 168

1. The Language of WCL § 168

Section 168:

• Expressly refers to “[a] claim by a participant”,
• Refers again to “any such participant” when directing the Board to reconsider certain previously denied claims, and
• Cross-references both WCL §§ 18 and 28, thus excusing compliance with both notice and limitation provisions for qualifying participant claims.

The Court concludes that this repeated and focused reference to “a participant” is exclusive: only the direct participant’s own claim is covered; survivors’ claims are not.

2. Contrast with WCL § 18 (Notice Provisions)

The Court underscores that WCL § 18, by contrast, uses much broader wording:

• Notice may be given by “any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or some one in his behalf.”
• Notice may be signed by the employee or a person on the employee’s behalf.
• “In case of death, [notice may be given] by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person, on their behalf.”

Similarly, WCL § 28 refers to “the claimant” and references payments “to an employee or his dependents in case of death.”

These sections show that when the legislature wants to include dependents and survivors within the scope of a provision, it knows how to do so explicitly. The conspicuous absence of such inclusive language in § 168 is taken as intentional.

3. WCL § 163 – Notice Extension Only

The dissenting Appellate Division judge had relied heavily on WCL § 163, which covers “notice” for “injury or death resulting from a qualifying condition for a participant,” and allows notice to be given within two years after disablement or after the participant knew or should have known of the causal relation.

The Court of Appeals clarifies:

• Section 163 is limited to notice requirements.
• It expressly cross-references only WCL § 18 (notice),
• It does not cross-reference WCL § 28 (statute of limitations).

Therefore, § 163 cannot be used, as the dissent suggested, to extend the time to file a claim. At most, it extends the time within which notice of injury or death must be given. The widow’s problem here is not notice, but the time to file the claim itself.

C. The Nature of a Death Benefits Claim: Separate and Distinct

The Appellate Division characterized the widow’s death claim as a “separate and distinct legal proceeding” from the decedent’s original disability claim, and the Court of Appeals implicitly adopts that framing.

This reflects a foundational principle of workers’ compensation law:

• An injured worker’s claim for disability benefits is one cause of action, accruing upon injury or disablement.
• A dependent’s claim for death benefits is a separate cause of action that accrues at the worker’s death—even if both claims arise from the same underlying exposure or accident.

In this case:

• The decedent’s lifetime claim was timely and properly established under Article 8‑A.
• The widow’s death claim accrued upon his death in July 2016 and had to be brought within two years under WCL § 28 unless some valid extension applied.
• Because § 168 applies only to “a claim by a participant,” it does not extend the widow’s filing period.

D. Legislative Purpose and Latency: Why Extend Participants’ Time, But Not Survivors’?

The Court bolsters its textual analysis with policy considerations drawn from legislative history:

• Lawmakers were gravely concerned that WTC responders would develop latent illnesses—cancers, respiratory diseases, etc.—many years after the statutory deadlines.
• Such responders risked being time-barred from relief under the ordinary WCL framework.
• Therefore, Article 8‑A and its amendments were designed to:
  • Extend registration deadlines,
  • Relax and lengthen notice requirements, and
  • Extend (via § 168) claim-filing deadlines for the participants themselves.

By contrast, the Court reasons that:

• For survivors’ death benefit claims, the latency concern is less acute. The “manifestation” of the condition is death itself, and:
  • The cause of death and its relation to the decedent’s WTC-related condition should be, in many cases, more apparent at or shortly after death.

Whether one agrees with this policy assessment or not, the Court uses it as a secondary justification: the legislature’s evident focus was on ensuring that participants could overcome latency-related barriers to their own claims; it did not extend the same special solicitude to dependent death claims.

E. Separation of Powers and Institutional Role

The Court closes by emphasizing institutional limits. Citing Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept., 44 NY3d 45, 56 n 6 (2025), it notes:

• The remedy that exists is the one the legislature has created.
• If that remedy is perceived as inadequate—e.g., because it omits survivors from the § 168 extension—it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to revise the statute.

Thus, while expressing evident respect for the contributions of WTC volunteers and employees, the Court refuses to “rewrite” § 168 to cover claims the text does not mention. The WCB “may only award the recovery of benefits in a manner authorized by the statute,” and the Court must interpret the statute according to its plain language.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Discussed

A. Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept.

The Court references Matter of Schulze primarily for the proposition that:

“The challenged statutory provision is the remedy the legislature has created and it is for the legislature to determine whether it is adequate.”

Schulze is used to reinforce:

• The judiciary’s limited role in expanding statutory entitlements.
• The idea that perceived inequities in the scope of benefits (such as the absence of extended time for survivors’ death claims) must be addressed legislatively.

While the Court does not otherwise elaborate on Schulze, its invocation here underscores the Court’s commitment to a textualist approach in benefits statutes: courts do not “fix” gaps; they apply the law as written.

B. Legislative History and Agency Support as Persuasive Authority

The Court also relies heavily on legislative history documents and agency views, including:

• Senate Introducer’s Memorandum in Support of the original 2006 Article 8‑A legislation (Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 446).
• Budget Report backing the 2006 bill, noting its unprecedented expansion of compensation to volunteers.
• A supporting letter from the president of the New York State AFL–CIO (Mario Cilento) for 2018 amendments, highlighting that many symptoms were still emerging.
• The WCB’s own prior statements supporting Article 8‑A’s adoption, emphasizing its importance in recognizing volunteers’ contributions.

These materials are not binding precedent but are used to:

• Clarify the law’s overarching purpose—addressing latency and including volunteers.
• Confirm that § 168 was aimed at participants themselves.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Participant” vs. “Dependent”

• Participant: Under Article 8‑A, a participant is the person who did the actual rescue, recovery, or cleanup work at designated WTC sites—either an employee or a volunteer. Only this person can:
  • Register under § 162 as a participant, and
  • Invoke the special filing extension in § 168.
• Dependent: A surviving spouse, child, or other family member seeking death benefits after the participant dies. Dependents:
  • Are eligible for benefits under § 16 (if the “injury causes death”),
  • But under Garcia, they cannot use § 168’s extended filing period, because their claims are not “by a participant.”

B. “Notice” vs. “Filing a Claim”

Two distinct procedural requirements often get conflated:

• Notice of injury or death (WCL § 18; modified by § 163 for WTC cases):
  • Alerting the employer (or WCB) that an injury occurred and may be work-related.
  • Normally due within 30 days; for WTC participants’ qualifying conditions, up to 2 years under § 163.
• Filing a claim for compensation (WCL § 28):
  • Formally applying for benefits—starting the legal proceeding before the WCB.
  • Must be done within two years of the accident/disablement or, if death results, two years of death, unless a special statute (like § 168) extends that time.

Garcia makes clear:

• § 163 only extends time for notice, not for filing the claim.
• § 168 extends time for both notice and claim-filing, but only for claims by participants.

C. “Disablement” vs. “Death”

• Disablement: The point at which a worker becomes unable to work or suffers a compensable loss due to work-related illness or injury. In WTC cases, this may occur years after 9/11 as conditions emerge.
• Death: The worker’s death caused by the work-related injury or illness, giving rise to a new claim for death benefits by dependents.

Under WCL § 28:

• A claim for disability benefits must be filed within two years after the accident or disablement.
• If death results from that injury, a separate death benefits claim must be filed within two years of death.

D. Article 8‑A’s Special Extensions

• Because WTC illnesses may be latent, Article 8‑A:
  • Extends notice periods (via § 163); and
  • Extends claim-filing periods (via § 168) for participants whose disablement occurs within specified ranges.
• However, under Garcia, death benefit claims remain subject to the ordinary § 28 two-year statute of limitations, unless and until the legislature changes the law.

VIII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Practical Consequences for WTC Survivors and Practitioners

The immediate and concrete effect of Garcia is:

• Survivors of WTC participants must file death benefit claims within two years of the participant’s death, regardless of when disablement occurred or what § 168 deadlines might otherwise apply to the participant’s own claims.

This has several downstream implications:

• Heightened urgency for legal advice: Families of deceased WTC participants must seek counsel promptly; waiting to understand or prove the causal link between WTC exposure and death may risk forfeiting claims.
• No “piggybacking” on participant’s extended rights: Even if the participant could, under § 168, file or reopen claims years after disablement, that does not extend any corresponding right for survivors to bring death claims.
• Clearer planning for ongoing WTC cases: Attorneys handling lifetime WTC claims must separately calendar and monitor potential death benefit deadlines.

B. Litigation Strategy and Unresolved Questions

The Court expressly does not decide whether Article 8‑A authorizes death benefits for volunteers at all. That question remains open and ripe for future litigation:

• On one view, because Article 8‑A folds participants (including volunteers) into the broader Workers’ Compensation system, and because § 16 generally applies when injury “causes death,” death benefits could be available if timely filed.
• On another view, some textual features of Article 8‑A may be argued to limit or reshape death benefits for volunteers in particular ways.

Future cases may test:

• Whether and how § 16’s death benefits provisions interact with the Article 8‑A framework for volunteers.
• Whether any other Article 8‑A provisions can be invoked by dependents (e.g., presumptions under § 169) once the basic timeliness and coverage questions are resolved in their favor.

Crucially, Garcia ensures that the first gate any such case must pass through is timeliness under WCL § 28; survivors cannot rely on § 168 for an extended filing window.

C. Doctrinal Clarification of Textual Interpretation

Garcia reinforces a broader doctrinal trend in New York statutory interpretation:

• Courts give significant weight to the plain meaning of the statutory text, especially in detailed, multi-section schemes like the Workers’ Compensation Law.
• Where the legislature has used broader language in some sections (e.g., including dependents) and narrower language in others (e.g., referencing only “participants”), courts infer meaningful legislative choices.
• Beneficial or remedial purposes—even in compassionate contexts like WTC relief—do not justify judicial expansion beyond clear statutory language.

This case will likely be cited in future for the proposition that benefits statutes with carefully delineated beneficiaries and categories should be read as written, not generously reimagined, even when sympathetic claimants are involved.

D. Legislative Policy Options

The Court effectively invites legislative reconsideration if policymakers wish survivors to enjoy the same extended filing protections as WTC participants. Among the possible legislative responses:

• Amending § 168 to read “a claim by or on behalf of a participant, including claims for death benefits by dependents,” or similar inclusive language.
• Adding a new section within Article 8‑A specifically addressing limitations periods for death benefit claims arising from qualifying conditions.
• Clarifying that, for WTC-related deaths, the limitations period runs from when survivors reasonably knew or should have known that the death resulted from a qualifying WTC condition.

Absent such amendments, Garcia cements a relatively strict two-year filing period for WTC death claims, even as participants continue to benefit from broader Article 8‑A extensions for their own disabilities.

IX. Conclusion

Matter of Garcia v. WTC Volunteer establishes a clear and important rule in New York workers’ compensation law:

The extended filing deadlines in Workers’ Compensation Law § 168 are available only for claims brought by the statutory “participant” in World Trade Center rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations and do not extend the deadline for survivors’ death benefit claims, which remain governed by the two-year limitation in § 28.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court:

• Relied on the plain language and structure of the Workers’ Compensation Law, particularly the targeted reference to “a claim by a participant” in § 168.
• Distinguished between extensions for notice (under § 163) and extensions for claim filing (under § 168).
• Clarified that survivors’ death benefit claims are separate causes of action, accruing at death, which must independently satisfy § 28.
• Grounded its interpretation in the legislature’s demonstrated focus on participants’ latent illnesses and underscored that any broader remedial expansion must come from legislative amendment, not judicial reinterpretation.

For practitioners and claimants in WTC cases, the message is stark: while Article 8‑A remains a robust remedial scheme for participants, providing extended time and favorable evidentiary rules, survivors must still file death benefit claims within two years of the participant’s death unless and until the legislature affirmatively changes the law.

Garcia therefore stands as a significant precedent, both for its specific holding on WTC-related claims and for its broader affirmation of textualist statutory interpretation in the complex field of workers’ compensation benefits.