“Additional Elements of Dependency”, Not Mere Support: IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516

1. Introduction

IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 is a major Court of Appeal decision on the scope of “family life” under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the limits of Article 8 as a vehicle for humanitarian protection in entry clearance cases from war zones.

The case arises from an emotionally compelling factual matrix: a Palestinian family of six trapped in Gaza during the 2023–25 conflict, seeking to join a British citizen sponsor (the father’s younger brother) in the United Kingdom. It presents, in acute form, the tension between:

the humanitarian imperative to protect civilians – including children – caught in a war zone; and
the structural limits of Article 8 and the constitutional deference owed to immigration control and ministerial policy.

Three core legal questions were before the Court of Appeal:

Family life threshold (Article 8(1)) – What is the correct test for the existence of “family life” between adult siblings? Did the sponsor in the UK and his brother’s family in Gaza fall within Article 8(1)?
Whose Article 8 rights are engaged (extra‑territoriality and “unitary” family life) – If such family life existed, to what extent do the Article 8 rights of the family members outside the UK count in the proportionality assessment under Article 8(2)?
Proportionality and exceptional circumstances – Assuming Article 8(1) was engaged, was it disproportionate for the Secretary of State to refuse entry clearance, in light of the family’s life‑threatening circumstances and the children’s best interests?

The First‑tier Tribunal (FTT) had found that family life existed and upheld the refusal as proportionate. The Upper Tribunal (UT) upheld the finding of family life but held the refusal disproportionate, essentially treating the case as involving “very compelling or exceptional circumstances” under Article 8(2). The Secretary of State appealed.

The Court of Appeal:

allowed the appeal on Grounds 1 and 3, and in part on Ground 2 (para [9]);
held that no Article 8 “family life” existed between the sponsor and his brother’s family under the proper test (paras [130]–[136], [177]); and
held that, even if family life had existed, the UT’s proportionality analysis was wrong and that Article 8(2) would not have been infringed (paras [169]–[175], [178]).

Due to a prior undertaking by the Secretary of State to admit the family regardless of the outcome (para [179]), the decision does not alter their individual fate. Its significance lies entirely in the precedential re‑alignment of UK Article 8 jurisprudence with Strasbourg authority.

Two central legal messages emerge:

The threshold for “family life” between adults is that of “additional elements of dependence, involving more than normal emotional ties”, not merely “real, committed or effective support”.
In Article 8(2) balancing, especially in entry‑clearance cases from war zones, immigration control and the Rules carry very considerable weight, and even grave risks and children’s best interests do not readily amount to “very exceptional or compelling circumstances” justifying departure from that policy.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Facts

The respondents (“the family”) are a father, mother and four children who have lived in Gaza since 1994 (para [15]). The sponsor, the father’s younger brother, has lived and worked in the UK since 2007 and is now a British citizen. Before he left Gaza, he had a close relationship with his brother, his brother’s wife (a cousin he had known since childhood), and the older children (para [15]).

After the outbreak of the Gaza conflict following the 7 October 2023 attacks, the family’s home was destroyed and they were displaced (para [15]). They later lived in the al‑Mawasi humanitarian zone, and at the time of the UT hearing in the Nuseirat refugee camp in a damaged summer tent (para [17]). The humanitarian situation was described as “dire”, with a breakdown of law and order and daily risk of death or serious injury (paras [17], [134]).

The family has an anti‑Hamas profile arising from past affiliation with or work for Fatah/the Palestinian Authority; two uncles were arrested by Hamas and one killed (para [18]). The father’s ties to the Palestinian Authority prevented him from obtaining work in Gaza (para [18]).

The sponsor in the UK:

earns around £3,700 net per month;
sends money to the family “when possible”; and
suffers from PTSD triggered by fears for their safety, with a risk of deterioration if they come to harm (paras [19]–[20]).

The family applied for entry clearance on 25 January 2024 using a Ukraine Family Scheme form as a procedural vehicle, while acknowledging they did not qualify under that or any Immigration Rules route (para [16]). They sought leave “outside the Rules” on compelling compassionate grounds.

Entry clearance was refused on 30 May 2024 on the basis that there were no “compelling compassionate circumstances” warranting leave outside the Rules, that there was no resettlement route for Palestinians, and that refusal was not disproportionate (para [16]). The FTT later held that a human rights claim had in fact been determined, giving rise to a right of appeal (para [16]).

2.2 Tribunal decisions

FTT

Accepted that there is no presumption of family life between adult siblings but applied the Kugathas “real, committed or effective support” test and
explicitly treated that as a lower threshold than “dependency” (paras [21]–[22]).

It found that:

the sponsor had provided “genuine, effective and committed support” since the conflict began (para [22]);
the family were not dependent on him, but dependency was not necessary to establish family life (para [22]); and
family life had existed between the sponsor and the father and the rest of the family since the start of the Gaza conflict (paras [22], [138]).

On proportionality, the FTT weighed:

Against the family: non‑compliance with the Rules; no resettlement route; that the new family life was not the natural progression of a normal sibling relationship (para [25]); and
In favour: extreme danger and humanitarian crisis; high risk of death; the best interests of the children to escape Gaza (though not necessarily to come to the UK) (paras [26]).

It concluded that the public interest in immigration control, including the policy choice not to create a Gaza resettlement scheme, outweighed the interference (para [27]).

UT

The UT held:

the FTT had not erred in law in finding family life existed, reading the decision as applying the “exacting” dependency test (paras [28], [127]);
but the FTT’s proportionality assessment was vitiated by multiple errors (including failure to consider the anti‑Hamas profile and mis‑handling of accommodation/maintenance, mental health, and the resettlement policy) (para [29]).

The UT therefore re‑made the proportionality assessment, treating the case as one involving:

a “very strong claim indeed” and
“very compelling or exceptional circumstances” (para [30]).

It gave:

Very significant weight to the best interests of the minor children, who faced a daily high risk of death and lived in “extreme and unjustifiably harsh” conditions (para [32], [153]).
Significant weight to the family’s “extreme and life‑threatening” circumstances, even while acknowledging the case was not framed under Articles 2 or 3 (para [33]).
Substantial weight to the existing and future development of family life with the sponsor (para [34]).
Some weight to the anti‑Hamas profile and to the sponsor’s mental health (paras [35]–[36]).

It discounted as minor or speculative the absence of a resettlement scheme and the “floodgates” argument (paras [31], [162]). It ultimately held that the refusals of entry clearance violated Article 8.

2.3 Court of Appeal outcome

The Court of Appeal:

Held that the correct test for family life between adults is the “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties” test articulated by the ECtHR and adopted in Beoku‑Betts, and that “real, committed or effective support” is not the legal test (paras [10], [41], [60], [116]–[125]).
Found that both the FTT and UT misapplied the test: the FTT expressly applied a lower threshold, and the UT wrongly treated that as an “exacting” test (paras [21]–[22], [126]–[129]).
Re‑made the decision on Article 8(1) itself and concluded that no family life existed between the sponsor and his adult brother or between the sponsor and the wider family for the purposes of Article 8(1) (paras [130]–[136], [177]).
On Ground 2, clarified the proper treatment of the rights of family members abroad: “family life” is unitary, but in entry clearance cases the main focus of the Article 8(2) analysis remains the rights of the person within the jurisdiction (the sponsor), not freestanding Article 8 rights of those abroad (paras [141]–[143]).
On Ground 3, held that even if family life had existed, the UT:
- gave excessive weight to the best interests of the children and the risks of death in Gaza, effectively treating them as a trump card; and
- failed to attach the “considerable weight” mandated by Agyarko to immigration control and the Rules in the proportionality exercise (paras [157]–[160], [166]–[169]).
Stated that, had family life existed, it would have itself re‑made the Article 8(2) decision and held that refusal of entry clearance was not disproportionate, because no “very exceptional or compelling circumstances” were made out (paras [169]–[175], [178]).

The appeal was allowed, but due to a prior concession, the family’s admission to the UK and costs position remain unaffected (para [179]).

3. Precedents and Doctrinal Lineage

3.1 ECtHR on “family life” between adult relatives

(a) S v United Kingdom (1984) – Origin of the dependency test

In S v UK (10375/83, 10 December 1984), the European Commission held that:

Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8 involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their dependent, minor children … Relationships between adults … would not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 … without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, emotional ties.

This text is the foundational formulation of the “additional elements of dependency” requirement, emphasising:

the baseline: cohabiting dependents in the “core family”; and
that adult relationships require further elements of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.

The Court of Appeal rightly identifies this as the lodestar of subsequent Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence (paras [42], [60], [116]).

(b) A.W. Khan v United Kingdom (2010)

In A.W. Khan (47486/06), the ECtHR accepted that the applicant’s relationship with his girlfriend and baby constituted de facto family ties, but rejected his claim of family life with his mother and brothers, despite cohabitation and their health problems (paras [44]–[45] of this judgment).

The ECtHR held that:

the fact that the applicant was living with his mother and brothers, or the fact that the entire family suffered from different health complaints, constitutes [not] a sufficient degree of dependence to result in the existence of family life.

This is an early, clear application of the principle that mere cohabitation and non‑incapacitating illness do not suffice to show the enhanced dependency required between adults.

(c) Savran v Denmark (Grand Chamber, 2021)

In Savran (57467/15), the applicant, an adult with paranoid schizophrenia, claimed family life with his mother and siblings in Denmark. The Grand Chamber held that:

the applicant’s mental illness, albeit serious, [could not] in itself be regarded as sufficient evidence of his dependence on his family members to bring the relationship … within the sphere of “family life” … It has not been demonstrated that the applicant’s health condition incapacitated him to the extent that he was compelled to rely on their care and support in his daily life…

This reinforces that even serious mental illness does not automatically generate the requisite dependency; the condition must incapacitate to the point that daily life cannot be managed without the family’s care (para [46]).

(d) Bierski v Poland (2023)

Bierski (46342/19) concerned a father seeking access to his adult son with Down syndrome. The ECtHR reiterated that family life between parents and adult children requires “additional factors of dependence” beyond normal emotional ties (paras [47]–[48] of this judgment).

On the facts, the son was fully incapacitated and could not communicate with strangers; the father was one of the very few with whom he could communicate. These features were held to amount to the necessary additional elements of dependence.

(e) Kumari v Netherlands (2024) – The definitive synthesis

Kumari (44051/20, 10 December 2024) is the pivotal authority. The case involved an elderly widow in India and her adult son in the Netherlands. The ECtHR distilled decades of case law at paras [34]–[43], and this Court of Appeal judgment reproduces and adopts those principles (paras [49]–[51]).

Key points from Kumari:

Family life is “normally limited to the core family” (para [35]).
Between parents and adult children or adult siblings, there is no family life unless there are “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties” (para [35]).
“Dependency” may arise from:
- serious physical or mental disability requiring constant care and support (para [38]);
- serious but not necessarily incapacitating health issues, if coupled with other facts, though several examples show when it is not sufficient: diabetes, heart conditions, COPD, asthma, etc. (para [39]);
- financial dependence, but this alone is never sufficient (para [41]); and
- other factors, such as being the only surviving relative, or lack of viable alternatives in the country of origin (para [42]).
The assessment must be individualised and fact‑sensitive, often resulting from a combination of elements (paras [37], [43]).

On the facts, the ECtHR held that neither the mother nor the son was incapacitated or in need of constant care from the other; financial support could be and was provided at a distance. Accordingly, no Article 8 family life existed (para [51]).

(f) Alvarado v Netherlands (2024)

Alvarado (4470/21) involved a Peruvian adult with the cognitive level of an 8‑year‑old, living with and cared for by his sisters in the Netherlands. The ECtHR again restated the Kumari principles (paras [52]–[53]) and found that there were “additional elements of dependency other than normal emotional ties” between the applicant and his sisters (paras [54], [57]).

Of particular importance is para [49], where the ECtHR rejected the domestic Dutch notion that only “exclusive dependency” can ever suffice. The Court of Appeal reads this correctly: exclusive or total dependency is not required (paras [55]–[56], [120], [125]). What is required is substantial dependency, which may co‑exist with some support from others.

(g) Demirci v Hungary (2025)

In Demirci (48302/21), the ECtHR, applying the Kumari–Alvarado principles (para [58]), found no family life between an adult daughter and her father or between adult spouses living apart. It reaffirmed that adult family relationships require additional elements of dependence, and that cohabitation alone is not enough (paras [58], [71]–[73]).

3.2 Domestic case law on adult family life

(a) Kugathas v SSHD (2003)

Kugathas [2003] EWCA Civ 31 is the starting point for domestic law. Sedley LJ described the approach in S v UK as “the proper approach” (para [63]) and noted that there is no presumption of family life even with immediate family.

His controversial statement (para [17]) was that, reading “dependency” down as “support”:

if one adds … “real” or “committed” or “effective” to the word “support”, then it represents … the irreducible minimum of what family life implies.

Arden LJ, by contrast, expressed the test in more orthodox terms, requiring “something more” than normal emotional ties and indicating that “such ties might exist if the appellant were dependent on his family or vice versa” (para [66]).

The current Court of Appeal judgment treats Sedley LJ’s dicta as, at most, obiter and holds that the “real, committed or effective support” formulation should not be regarded as the legal test itself (paras [68], [122]–[123]).

(b) Beoku‑Betts v SSHD (HL, 2008)

Beoku‑Betts [2008] UKHL 39 is crucial in two respects:

It endorsed the ECtHR statement in Mokrani v France that “relationships between adults do not necessarily benefit from protection under article 8 … unless the existence of additional elements of dependence, other than normal emotional ties, can be proven” (para [69]).
It recognised the “unitary” nature of family life for Article 8 purposes: in assessing the Article 8 rights of an individual facing removal, all members of the family whose rights are engaged must be considered (paras [87], [96]).

The Court of Appeal correctly treats Beoku‑Betts as domestic confirmation of the “additional elements of dependency” test (paras [10], [69], [116]).

(c) Later Court of Appeal authorities – the drift towards a lower threshold

The judgment surveys a line of domestic cases which, while purporting to apply Strasbourg law, often substituted Sedley LJ’s “real, committed or effective support” test for the dependency test, or blurred the distinction (paras [71]–[84], [77]–[79]). These include:

PT (Sri Lanka) [2016] EWCA Civ 612 – emphasising a fact‑sensitive approach but treating Kugathas as effectively defining the test.
Rai [2017] EWCA Civ 320 – rejecting any requirement for “extraordinary or exceptional” circumstances and regarding “real, committed or effective support” as sufficient (paras [75]–[77]).
Uddin [2020] EWCA Civ 338 – stating that the “test … is one of effective, real or committed support” with “no requirement to prove exceptional dependency” (para [78]).
Saliu [2021] EWCA Civ 1847 – treating “real, committed or effective support” as “the irreducible minimum” (para [83]).

By contrast, Mobeen [2021] EWCA Civ 886 is seen as more faithful to Strasbourg, referring to “further elements of emotional and/or financial dependency” as well as effective support (paras [80]–[81]).

The Court of Appeal in IA concludes that these later cases had, in varying degrees, “lost sight” of the core ECtHR requirement of additional dependency (paras [77], [79], [84]). This judgment therefore operates as a corrective.

3.3 Extra‑territoriality and “unitary” family life

(a) Beoku‑Betts and AS (Somalia)

Beoku‑Betts concerned a family all in the UK; it stands for the proposition that in assessing whether one person’s Article 8 rights are infringed, the impact on the entire family unit must be considered (paras [87]–[88]).

AS (Somalia) [2009] 1 WLR 1385 recognised, obiter, that entry clearance decisions can engage the Article 8 rights of those abroad where they form part of the family life of a person within the UK (paras [89]–[90]).

(b) Al‑Skeini and MN v Belgium

Al‑Skeini (2011) 53 EHRR 18 set out the general principles on extra‑territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. The key idea is that a state’s obligations may extend beyond its territory when it exercises “control and authority” over individuals abroad, and that Convention rights can be “divided and tailored” to the individual’s situation (paras [91]–[93]).

MN v Belgium (3599/18, 5 May 2020) is especially important. The Grand Chamber explained that in many Article 8 family/private life cases concerning individuals outside the territory, the jurisdictional link arises from a pre‑existing family life with a person within the contracting state, which the state has a duty to respect (para [99]).

(c) Abbas and Khan – the “unitary family” clarified

In Abbas [2018] 1 WLR 533, Burnett LJ (as he then was) observed that Strasbourg jurisprudence supports the proposition that persons abroad can, in limited circumstances, rely on the family life aspect of Article 8 to seek entry, because one family member already in the contracting state is being prevented from enjoying family life with them (paras [95]–[97]).

Khan v UK (2014) 58 EHRR SE15 emphasised that the positive obligation to enable family reunification rests “in large part” on the presence of a family member already in the contracting state whose family life is restricted by the non‑admission of relatives abroad (para [97]).

The Court of Appeal in IA distils these authorities into a coherent principle: where a person in the UK enjoys Article 8 family life with relatives abroad, the UK may have a positive obligation to facilitate that family life, but:

the Article 8 right is primarily that of the person within the jurisdiction (here, the sponsor), and
family life is “unitary” in the sense that interference with the family life of one affects all, but does not create independent substantive Convention rights for every extended family member abroad (paras [100]–[103], [141]–[143]).

3.4 Proportionality, immigration control and children’s best interests

(a) Jeunesse v Netherlands and El Ghatet v Switzerland

Jeunesse (GC, 2014) is a leading authority on proportionality in immigration/family life cases. The ECtHR held that:

where family life is created when immigration status is precarious, it will only be exceptional that removal or non‑admission breaches Article 8(2) (para [103]);
the best interests of the child are a “paramount” consideration but cannot alone be decisive or operate as a “trump card” (paras [103]–[104]).

El Ghatet (56971/10, 2016) further clarified the balancing factors in family reunification cases, focusing on whether parents had effectively abandoned the idea of future reunification, and whether there were “insurmountable obstacles” or major impediments to the parents returning to the country of origin (paras [105]–[106]).

(b) Agyarko – weight of the Immigration Rules and “exceptional circumstances”

In R (Agyarko) [2017] 1 WLR 823, a seven‑judge Supreme Court emphasised that:

the Immigration Rules are policy statements approved by Parliament, setting out how Article 8 rights are to be balanced against public interests; courts must attach “considerable weight” to them (paras [109]–[110]);
the requirement that grants of leave outside the Rules are limited to “exceptional circumstances” is not inconsistent with Strasbourg jurisprudence (paras [111]–[112]).

In IA, the Court of Appeal builds on this, stressing that in entry‑clearance cases outside the Rules, the threshold is “very exceptional or compelling circumstances” (paras [12], [146], [169], [173]).

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Ground 1 – The correct test for “family life” between adult siblings

(a) Identifying the test

The Court unequivocally endorses the Kumari/Beoku‑Betts test: to establish family life under Article 8(1) between adult siblings (or parents and adult children), one must demonstrate:

“additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties” (paras [10], [41], [60], [113], [116]).

The Court emphasises several points (paras [116]–[125]):

Domestic courts have consistently intended to follow ECtHR jurisprudence; any divergence has been inadvertent.
The same test applies to adult siblings and adult parent‑child relationships; no case has suggested different thresholds (para [118]).
The assessment is fact‑specific and multi‑factorial, potentially involving health, finances, cohabitation, availability of alternative carers, etc. (para [119], [132]).
Exclusive or total dependency is not required (paras [120], [125], [55]–[56]).

(b) Distinguishing “dependency” from “real, committed or effective support”

The Court decisively addresses the conceptual drift in domestic case law:

“Dependency” and “support” are related but not interchangeable concepts; one can have real or effective support without being dependent in the Article 8 sense (paras [39], [122]–[123]).
“Real support”, in particular, might be a very low hurdle and thus is not sufficient as the legal test (para [68], [123]).
At most, evidence of “real, committed or effective support” is one way of evidencing the necessary dependency, but it is not the test itself (para [123]).

The Court stresses that the ECtHR uses “dependence” to evoke “cohabiting dependents” as its primary paradigm (para [123]), signalling a relationship of substantial reliance: physical, psychological and/or financial, of a kind that goes beyond ordinary adult ties.

(c) Application to the FTT and UT

The FTT explicitly stated that:

it was applying the “real, committed or effective support” test (para [21]); and
that test was “lower than dependency”, and dependency was “not necessary” (para [22]).

The Court of Appeal treats this as a clear legal error: the FTT consciously applied a less exacting standard than the correct dependency test (paras [126]–[128]).

The UT, meanwhile, properly recited the Kumari / Alvarado principles but then incorrectly concluded that there was “nothing on the face” of the FTT decision to show that it had applied anything other than the exacting adult‑dependency test (para [128]). In fact, the FTT had expressly disavowed any need for dependency. The UT therefore erred in upholding the FTT’s finding of family life (paras [127]–[129]).

(d) Re‑making the Article 8(1) decision

The Court chooses not to remit. It notes that:

there are extensive and clear findings of primary fact by both tribunals;
it is deeply familiar with the legal framework; and
once the correct test is applied, the answer is not finely balanced (para [130]).

On the facts (paras [132]–[136]):

The brothers had not seen each other for 17 years and had not been in genuinely frequent contact until the war began (para [133]).
Since the conflict, there were regular calls and the sponsor had become deeply concerned, contributing to his PTSD; he sends money when he can and has made plans to house the family in the UK (paras [133]–[135]).
The family’s situation in Gaza is “extremely dangerous” with a “dire humanitarian situation” and high risk of death or injury; the father faces extreme anxiety (paras [17], [134]).

However:

The family had lived in Gaza for 17 years without long‑term support from the sponsor (para [135]).
They do not totally depend on him now; the father receives a stipend from the Palestinian Authority and has some other forms of support (paras [18], [51]).
While there is emotional support and some financial support, this does not reach the level of dependency seen in Bierski, Alvarado, or Emonet (para [135]).

The Court therefore holds that:

none of this amounts to the level of dependence needed to establish family life between adult siblings under article 8(1) … no sufficient family life exists between either the sponsor and the brother or between the sponsor and the family. (para [136])

This is the central doctrinal holding: the Gaza conflict and the sponsor’s intensive concern and support, while highly relevant on a human level, do not convert an ordinary adult sibling or uncle‑family relationship into an Article 8 “family life”.

4.2 Ground 2 – Whose Article 8 rights are in play in entry‑clearance cases?

Ground 2 concerns whether the UT was legally entitled to:

treat the family’s own Article 8 rights (as persons abroad) as directly engaged, and
give them independent weight in the balancing exercise.

The UT had relied on its own decision in Al‑Hassan and held that, once family life between a UK‑based sponsor and individuals abroad is established, a judge should consider that family life on a unitary basis and not focus exclusively on the sponsor’s rights (para [139]).

The Court of Appeal draws a nuanced distinction (paras [141]–[143]):

Article 8 rights are territorially limited by Article 1 ECHR, but Strasbourg recognises that decisions taken by a contracting state in its own territory (e.g. on entry clearance) may affect family life enjoyed partly abroad.
In such cases, “family life” is indeed unitary: interference with the sponsor’s family life necessarily affects the relatives abroad (paras [141]–[142]).
However, the primary focus of the Article 8(2) analysis is the right to respect for the family life of the person within the jurisdiction (here, the sponsor), not freestanding Article 8 rights of the overseas relatives (para [142]).
The UK is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family; any positive obligation can only extend to those who, in law, have “family life” with the sponsor (para [143], citing paras [100]).

The Court concludes that the UT placed weight on the family’s supposed own Article 8 rights in a way that went beyond this structure, and that this was an error, at least in part (paras [141]–[144]). That error fed into the UT’s treatment of the children’s best interests and the weight given to the family’s circumstances.

4.3 Ground 3 – Proportionality, war‑zone risk and the weight of immigration control

Although Ground 3 is formally academic (since no family life was established), the Court considers it because it raises issues of general importance and indicates how similar cases should be approached (para [145]).

(a) Nature and fragility of the claimed family life

The Court considers that, even if family life had existed, the UT gave excessive weight to it, failing to account properly for:

its recent and contingent nature;
the absence of cohabitation for 17 years;
the fact that the core family unit in Gaza (parents and their children) would remain intact regardless of the UK decision (para [151]); and
the fact that the renewed closeness was formed “in the knowledge that the family had no right to enter the UK” (para [151]).

Strasbourg has emphasised that family life formed when immigration status is precarious will rarely justify non‑removal or admission (Jeunesse, para [103]). The Court considers that the UT failed to reflect this in its weighing.

(b) Best interests of the children and risk of death in Gaza

The UT found that:

It is difficult to conceive of a situation more contrary to [the children’s] best interests than the one they are currently experiencing … [it is] self‑evidently and overwhelmingly in [their] best interests to be in a safe (or safer) environment, together with their parents and siblings. (paras [153], quoting UT)

The Court of Appeal does not dispute the factual finding but holds that the UT’s approach was legally flawed:

The best interests of the children are a primary consideration, but not paramount in this context (paras [104], [157]). The UT, in practice, treated them as a trump card (para [157]).
The risks to the family’s life and safety in Gaza (while acutely real) are not risks caused by the UK; the UK has no general duty to protect all children in war zones simply because they have relatives in the UK (paras [155]–[157]).
Focusing heavily on the war’s effects “distorted the balance” required by Article 8(2) (para [157]).

The Court ties this back to the text of Article 8(2), which justifies interferences that are “necessary in a democratic society” in, among other things, the interests of “the economic well‑being of the country” and “the rights and freedoms of others” (paras [8], [158]). It is within this frame that the state’s immigration policies must be respected.

(c) Weight of immigration control and the Rules

Drawing on Agyarko, the Court emphasises that:

Immigration control is an “intensely political issue” and the Secretary of State and Parliament determine policy within the state’s margin of appreciation (para [109]).
Ccourts must attach “considerable weight” to the Secretary of State’s policies as reflected in the Rules (paras [110]–[111], [158]–[160], [166]–[167]).
Grants of entry or leave outside the Rules are properly confined to very exceptional or compelling circumstances (paras [12], [146], [169], [173]).

The UT purported to give “considerable weight” to the Rules but, in the Court of Appeal’s assessment, effectively allowed the humanitarian situation and the children’s best interests to override them in circumstances which did not meet that threshold (paras [162]–[169]).

The Court is explicit:

There were, to put the matter starkly, no exceptional or compelling circumstances here. (para [173])

And:

This is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process, and for the SSHD's decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. (paras [159], [167], [173])

The Court underscores that the absence of a Gaza resettlement scheme is a policy choice within the remit of the executive and legislature. Tribunals should not create a de facto resettlement route via Article 8 (paras [159]–[161], [175]).

(d) How the Court would have struck the balance

For completeness, the Court sets out how it would have decided the proportionality question had family life been found (paras [171]–[174]):

It would have given some, but “not great”, weight to the short‑lived and non‑cohabiting family life between sponsor and family (para [172]).
It would have attached weight – but again not paramount weight – to the children’s best interests and to the family’s serious risk and hardship in Gaza (para [172]).
It would have attached some weight to the father’s anti‑Hamas profile and to the sponsor’s PTSD (para [172]).
Balanced against that, it would have attached considerable weight to the Immigration Rules and the absence of a policy permitting such admissions (paras [173], [169]).

The resulting overall balance “would have come down heavily in favour of refusing entry clearance” (para [174]).

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 What is “family life” under Article 8?

Article 8(1) of the ECHR guarantees everyone the right to respect for their “private and family life, home and correspondence”. Strasbourg case law has developed the concept of “family life” as:

typically referring to the core family unit: parents and their minor, dependent children living together;
extending, exceptionally, to adult relationships (adult children, siblings, even other relatives) only where there are “additional elements of dependence” beyond normal emotional ties.

In simple terms: love, affection and ordinary adult concern are not enough. There must be a special dependence of one on another, such as:

a serious disability requiring constant care from a relative;
a situation where a relative cannot manage daily life without the other’s physical or emotional support; or
a very particular constellation of factors (health, finances, lack of other carers) creating substantial reliance.

5.2 “Dependency” vs. “support”

Everyone in a family may give and receive support – emotional, practical, financial. But “dependency” for Article 8 is a stronger and narrower concept. It asks:

Is A so reliant on B that, without B’s presence or support, A could not manage their daily life in any meaningful way, at least without severe hardship?

You can support someone (sending money, regular calls, providing reassurance) without them being dependent upon you in this heightened sense. The Court in IA insists that the law focuses on this dependency, not just on whether the support is real or heartfelt.

5.3 What does “unitary” family life mean?

“Unitary family life” means that:

when the state interferes with the family life of one person (for example, by removing or refusing to admit them),
it necessarily affects the whole family unit, because family life is something shared between its members.

But this does not mean that every extended relative abroad automatically gains a separate legal right to be admitted. The primary right belongs to the person within the UK (or otherwise within the UK’s jurisdiction). The relatives abroad are relevant because excluding them affects that person’s family life – not because they possess identical, independent Convention rights enforceable against the UK.

5.4 Article 8(2) – Interference and justification

Even when family life exists, not every interference is unlawful. Article 8(2) allows interferences that are:

“in accordance with the law” (e.g. based on clear legal rules and procedures); and
“necessary in a democratic society” for specific reasons:
- national security,
- public safety,
- economic well‑being of the country,
- prevention of disorder or crime,
- protection of health or morals, or
- protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

In immigration cases, “economic well‑being” and “rights and freedoms of others” relate to immigration control, social cohesion and resource allocation. Courts must balance:

the individual’s interests in maintaining family life; against
the community’s interest in effective immigration control.

The Supreme Court in Agyarko and this Court of Appeal judgment underline that very exceptional or compelling circumstances are required to justify granting entry or leave outside the Immigration Rules.

5.5 Best interests of the child

In all decisions affecting children, their best interests must be a primary consideration – meaning they must be given serious weight and carefully assessed. But they are not always “paramount” in immigration cases (unlike, for example, in domestic child welfare proceedings).

The ECtHR has repeatedly held (e.g. in Jeunesse, IAA v UK, El Ghatet) that children’s best interests:

must be considered thoroughly and given great weight;
cannot automatically override other legitimate considerations such as immigration control.

5.6 Extra‑territorial effect and positive obligations

The ECHR is generally territorial: states are obliged to secure rights to people “within their jurisdiction”. However, the ECtHR recognises exceptions, including:

where state agents exercise control over individuals abroad (e.g. military operations);
where decisions made within the state (e.g. on visas) affect the ability of people outside the state to enjoy family life with someone inside it.

In the latter category, the state may be under a positive obligation to take reasonable steps (such as admitting relatives) to enable family life, but always within the boundaries of what is “necessary in a democratic society” and subject to the margin of appreciation accorded to national authorities.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Re‑centring Strasbourg’s “dependency” test in UK law

The most immediate doctrinal impact of IA is the clear restatement that:

for adult relatives, the legal test is “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”, not “real, committed or effective support” as such;
domestic authorities that treated “real, committed or effective support” as the irreducible minimum or the test itself were mistaken (paras [68], [77], [79], [84], [122]–[123]).

In practical terms, future tribunal and court decisions on adult family life will be expected to:

anchor their reasoning in Kumari, Alvarado, Bierski, etc.;
treat evidence of support as one factor pointing to dependency but not as conclusive; and
explicitly analyse whether the adult abroad cannot manage life in any reasonable sense without the support of the family member in the UK.

This will likely narrow the class of adult relatives able to invoke Article 8(1) successfully, especially in entry‑clearance cases involving parents abroad, adult children, siblings, and extended family members.

6.2 Article 8 and humanitarian crises: reaffirming limits

IA sends a strong signal that Article 8 is not a general humanitarian protection instrument, particularly where the risk arises from conditions abroad (e.g. war zones) and not from actions of the UK.

Key messages:

Even extreme danger and dire humanitarian conditions do not of themselves create Article 8 family life between adults.
Even where family life exists, such conditions and the presence of children in those conditions:
- must be weighed; but
- will not normally override immigration control policies in the absence of a legislative or policy route, unless truly exceptional or compelling circumstances are shown.
The appropriate mechanism for large‑scale humanitarian admissions is policy‑making (e.g. resettlement schemes), not incremental expansion of Article 8 in litigation (paras [159]–[161], [167]–[175]).

In light of this, individuals in war zones seeking to join distant relatives in the UK will face a very high hurdle if relying solely on Article 8, especially where:

they are adults with some residual support structures in their own region; and
the UK relative is an extended family member rather than a spouse or minor child.

6.3 Clarifying the role of children’s best interests

While the judgment is careful not to minimise the gravity of the children’s situation, it squarely rejects the notion that children’s best interests in escaping a war zone can function as a trump card in Article 8 entry‑clearance cases. This aligns domestic practice with Strasbourg’s insistence that best interests are primary, but not decisive in all circumstances.

Tribunals will need to:

conduct a structured best‑interests assessment (as the UT did); but
explicitly explain how those interests are balanced against immigration control and policy, rather than simply concluding that best interests “overwhelmingly” support admission and allowing that to dominate the outcome.

6.4 Extra‑territorial Article 8 litigation going forward

On the treatment of family members abroad, IA:

reaffirms that “unitary” family life does not mean equal and independent Convention rights for each relative; and
clarifies that the legal anchor point remains the person within the UK whose family life is affected.

This will influence:

the way entry‑clearance appeals are framed (expect more emphasis on the sponsor’s Article 8 rights);
the development of internal Tribunal jurisprudence (e.g. reconsideration of UT authorities like KF (Syria) and Al‑Hassan in light of this judgment); and
arguments about the scope of any positive obligation to admit relatives from outside the ECHR territory.

6.5 Constitutional and institutional implications

Finally, IA is a robust affirmation of:

the separation of powers in immigration control: Parliament and the executive set the policy; courts enforce Convention‑compliant application of that policy but do not themselves design resettlement schemes;
the margin of appreciation in immigration, as recognised in Agyarko and Strasbourg case law; and
the requirement that domestic courts “go no further than they can be fully confident that the ECtHR would go” in expanding Convention rights (para [40]).

In humanitarian crises with strong public attention (such as Gaza, Syria, Ukraine), the judgment underscores that political action, not judicial creativity with Article 8, is the constitutionally appropriate route to broader admissions.

7. Conclusion

IA & Ors v SSHD is a significant recalibration of UK Article 8 jurisprudence in three core respects.

Threshold for adult “family life”
The Court definitively restores the ECtHR’s “additional elements of dependence” test as the governing standard for family life between adults. “Real, committed or effective support” is relevant evidence but is not the legal test. This will tighten the availability of Article 8(1) for adult relatives, particularly in entry‑clearance cases.
Scope of Article 8 for relatives abroad
The judgment clarifies that in entry‑clearance cases, the principal Article 8 right is that of the UK‑based sponsor. Family life is unitary, but this does not convert every overseas relative into an independent Article 8 rights‑holder vis‑à‑vis the UK. The UK may, in some circumstances, have a positive obligation to facilitate family reunification, but that obligation is bounded by immigration policy and the public interest.
Proportionality, war zones, and immigration control
Even in the face of harrowing facts – children in a war zone, extreme humanitarian crisis, risk of death – Article 8 is not a general mechanism for humanitarian admission. Immigration control and the Immigration Rules carry considerable weight, and only “very exceptional or compelling circumstances” justify departure. Children’s best interests are primary but not paramount; they cannot operate as an automatic trump card.

On the facts, the Court held that the sponsor and his brother’s family did not enjoy Article 8 “family life” and that, even if they had, refusal of entry clearance would not have been disproportionate. The family’s ultimate admission to the UK results from a policy concession, not from the legal outcome.

In the broader legal landscape, IA will stand as a leading authority on:

the definition of “family life” between adults under Article 8(1);
the structure of Article 8(2) balancing in entry‑clearance cases from conflict zones; and
the constitutional limits of judicial intervention in immigration policy in the name of human rights.

It thus marks an important precedent for future litigation concerning extended families, conflict‑driven displacement, and the intersection of humanitarian crises with the European Convention on Human Rights.