Woods‑Springer: Calibrating the Upper Bound of Extended Sentences in Multi‑Victim Child Sexual Offences and Reaffirming the Bar on Concurrent “Offender of Particular Concern” Sentences

Citation: R v Woods‑Springer [2025] EWCA Crim 1239

Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales

Date: 16 September 2025

Judge delivering judgment: Lord Justice Singh

Introduction

This appeal arose from the sentence imposed on a foster carer for a prolonged, grave campaign of sexual abuse against multiple very young children (C1, C2, C3), with additional admitted offending against two further children (C4, C5) and oral rape of a sixth (C6). The sentencing judge at York Crown Court imposed a lead extended determinate sentence of 36 years (30 years’ custody plus a 6‑year extended licence) for rape of a child under 13, with a raft of concurrent sentences across two indictments, including several “special custodial sentences” for offenders of particular concern under section 278 of the Sentencing Code.

On appeal, two central issues arose:

Whether the structure of the sentence was lawful—specifically, whether the court could combine an extended sentence with concurrent special custodial sentences under section 278 on associated counts; and
Whether the custodial term of 30 years on the lead count (implying a notional post‑trial sentence of at least 45 years) was manifestly excessive in light of appellate guidance on the outer limits of extended sentences in serious sexual offending.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, corrected the unlawful aspects of the sentence structure, and substantially reduced the total custodial term by calibrating it to the principled upper boundary for extended sentences in multi‑offence sexual cases.

Note on reporting restrictions: The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applies; victims must not be identified. This commentary preserves anonymity and follows the judgment’s use of C1–C6.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held as follows:

Unlawful structure corrected: Where an extended sentence is imposed, concurrent “special custodial sentences” for offenders of particular concern under section 278 of the Sentencing Code cannot be imposed on associated counts. Following R v Powell and R v F, the Court substituted determinate sentences on those counts, removing the erroneous additional licence elements (paragraphs 14–16).
Manifest excess redressed by recalibration: The notional post‑trial custodial term of about 45 years adopted by the sentencing judge was manifestly excessive even for this extraordinarily serious multi‑victim offending (paragraphs 20–21). Applying the guidance in R v Ayo, the Court accepted that exceptionally grave cases can exceed about 30 years after trial, but set the proper notional sentence here at 33 years, leading—after full plea credit—to a custodial term of 22 years on the lead count, with the extended licence of 6 years unchanged (total extended sentence: 28 years). The Court emphasised the need for a total sentence that is just and proportionate, even in cases of extreme seriousness (paragraphs 20–21).
Final orders: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the lead count became an extended sentence of 28 years (22 years’ custody + 6 years’ extension). The previously unlawful section 278 sentences were replaced with concurrent determinate terms (10 years on the relevant rape counts; 7 years on assault by penetration counts) (paragraph 22).

Background and Procedural Context

Distilled facts

The appellant, a foster carer, sexually abused three foster children, C1–C3 (ages 3–5 at the time), including multiple acts of oral rape, digital penetration, and other sexual assaults. He recorded images and videos of the abuse. Extremely serious aggravating features included abuse of toddlers, recording of the acts, abuse occurring in the presence of other children, and gross breach of trust.
On arrest, devices yielded hundreds of indecent images, including many category A images, and images of his offences against C1–C3. In later interviews the appellant made frank admissions, adding details beyond the children’s disclosures, and admitted further offending against C4 (voyeurism), C5 (sexual assault and images) and C6 (oral rape).

Sentencing at first instance

On 28 June 2024, the Crown Court at York imposed a lead extended determinate sentence of 36 years (30 years’ custody + 6‑year extension) for rape of a child under 13, with multiple concurrent sentences for other counts, including several purported special custodial sentences under section 278 (offenders of particular concern).
The judge explained, on a relisted clarification hearing (12 July 2024), that if the rapes across multiple victims were sentenced consecutively, they would total about 40 years. He therefore used the lead count as the vehicle to reflect overall criminality, making other sentences concurrent and applying totality, credit for plea, and prison‑conditions adjustments.

The appeal

The Registrar raised concerns about the legality of combining an extended sentence with section 278 sentences on other counts. The parties agreed those sentences were unlawful and required correction (paragraphs 14–16).
The appellant argued that: the starting point was too high (implying a notional post‑trial term of at least 45 years); insufficient credit was given for pleas and confessions (which went beyond the police’s knowledge); and the extended sentence imposed was, in practical effect, akin to or harsher than life (paragraph 17).
The Crown contended there was a persuasive case for life imprisonment, but accepted that absent life the judge could step outside guideline ranges given the exceptionally grave nature of the offending (paragraph 18).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Powell [2018] EWCA Crim 1074; [2018] 2 Cr App R (S) 34

Powell confirms that when a court imposes an extended sentence for certain sexual offences, it is precluded from also imposing, on associated counts, a special custodial sentence for offenders of particular concern (the current section 278 Sentencing Code, successor to section 236A Criminal Justice Act 2003). The regimes are structurally incompatible when applied in tandem to associated offences within the same sentencing exercise.
Applied here, the Crown Court’s concurrent section 278 sentences—alongside the lead extended sentence—were unlawful. The Court of Appeal remedied this by substituting determinate sentences on those counts, excising the additional licence elements the judge had wrongly imposed (paragraphs 14–16).

R v F [2016] EWCA Crim 561

Powell builds on F. Together they establish that section 278 sentences cannot sit alongside an extended sentence for associated counts within the same case. The Court explicitly cited F through Powell (paragraph 14), underscoring the longevity and clarity of the principle.

R v Ayo [2022] EWCA Crim 1271; [2023] 1 Cr App R (S) 24

Ayo provides vital calibration on the outer limits of custodial terms in extended sentences for multiple sexual offences. It states that it will be comparatively rare for the total custodial term of an extended sentence in multi‑count sexual cases to exceed about 30 years after trial, with longer sentences reserved for particularly serious offending (paragraph 19).
Here, the Court acknowledged that the offending was indeed exceptionally serious, justifying movement above that 30‑year marker. Nevertheless, a notional post‑trial term of 45 years was deemed manifestly excessive. The Court set the right notional level at 33 years, reflecting the gravity yet preserving proportionality (paragraphs 20–21).

Legal Reasoning

1) Unlawful sentence structure

Once the sentencing judge chose an extended sentence for the lead count (section 279 Sentencing Code), section 278 offender of particular concern sentences on associated counts were not available. The Court, following Powell and F, corrected this by substituting determinate concurrent sentences of the custodial lengths the judge clearly intended, but without the section 278 additional licence elements (paragraphs 15–16, 22).

2) Totality and proportionality in extreme multi‑offence sex cases

The judge’s approach to totality—using a lead count to reflect overall criminality and making other sentences concurrent—was not criticised in principle. Indeed, the judge’s reasoning that consecutive terms for the rapes alone could have amounted to 40 years was carefully recorded (paragraph 13).
However, the Court emphasised that even in the most serious cases, the total must remain “just and proportionate” (paragraph 20). The notional post‑trial figure of about 45 years overshot the principled outer boundary, even accounting for the harrowing facts. The Court applied Ayo to calibrate the notional post‑trial term to 33 years (paragraph 21).

3) Pleas, confessions, and mitigation

The appellant made frank admissions extending beyond the children’s recollections and pleaded guilty across the board. The Court proceeded on the basis that full credit for pleas was given (paragraphs 12, 17, 21). Translating the notional post‑trial sentence of 33 years into a custodial term yields 22 years after full credit.
While the appellant’s confessions carried mitigating weight, the extreme seriousness of the offences—multiple victims aged 3–5, abuse recorded, gross breach of trust, harm evidenced by vomiting during an assault—meant that the sentence still properly fell in the outer reaches of extended determinate sentencing. The confessions did not justify the exceptionally high 45‑year notional starting point, but they were reflected in the full reduction.

4) Life sentence vs extended sentence

The Crown suggested there was a “very persuasive case” for life imprisonment (paragraph 18). The sentencing judge considered life but “stepped back,” in part due to the unusual breadth of the admissions and pleas (paragraph 12). The Court of Appeal did not impose life; rather, it corrected the extended sentence to a just and proportionate level. The decision illustrates that, absent life, the upper outer band for a total custodial term in an extended sentence must be closely policed to maintain proportionality.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Significance

1) A calibrated upper boundary for extended sentences in multi‑count sexual cases

Woods‑Springer operationalises Ayo by demonstrating that, even for grievous, multi‑victim child sexual offending by a foster carer with recording and multiple rapes, a notional post‑trial custodial term should ordinarily be in the low 30s rather than the mid‑40s. This provides a practical marker for future cases: if the facts demand going beyond 30 years after trial, the step up should be modest and reasoned, not a leap to the mid‑40s.

2) Structural purity: no mixing of extended sentences and section 278 on associated counts

The judgment reaffirms, with a concrete remedial template, that when a lead extended sentence is passed, other counts should attract determinate terms rather than section 278 sentences. If error occurs, the Court will excise the additional licence parts and substitute determinate terms reflecting the intended custodial lengths.

3) Practical sentencing method in multiple‑count cases

The case endorses clarity in method: identify a lead count to represent overall criminality; explain what the consecutive structure might have produced; then adjust for totality, plea, and other relevant mitigation. But the overall figure must remain proportionate in light of Ayo’s guidance. A transparent record—of the notional post‑trial sentence and the credit applied—assists appellate scrutiny and public understanding.

4) Pleas and confessions in sexual offending

Full credit can, and should, be given where appropriate—even when admissions reveal additional unknown offending. Woods‑Springer confirms that such mitigation does not displace the need to anchor the sentence within principled outer bounds.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extended determinate sentence (EDS) (section 279 Sentencing Code): Used where the offender is “dangerous” and convicted of specified offences. It has two parts: a custodial term (reflecting punishment) and an extended licence period (for public protection after release). The offender serves the custodial term (subject to release provisions) and is then supervised on licence for the extended period.
Special custodial sentence for certain offenders of particular concern (section 278): A special regime (successor to section 236A CJA 2003) for certain sexual/terrorist offences. It includes a custodial term and a mandatory additional licence period. Critically, where an EDS is imposed for associated offences, section 278 sentences cannot be imposed alongside it.
Notional sentence after trial: The sentence a judge would have imposed if the offender had been convicted after a trial. This figure is essential because credit for a guilty plea is applied by reducing from the notional post‑trial term.
Credit for guilty plea: Ordinarily up to one‑third reduction if a plea is indicated at the first reasonable opportunity. In Woods‑Springer, the Court proceeded on the basis that “full credit” was applied in converting a 33‑year post‑trial notional sentence to 22 years’ custody.
Totality principle: When there are multiple offences, the aggregate sentence must be just and proportionate to the overall offending. Courts may adopt a lead count reflecting overall criminality and make other terms concurrent, or impose some consecutive terms, always ensuring the total is not crushing.
Concurrent vs consecutive sentences: Concurrent sentences are served at the same time; consecutive sentences are served one after the other. For multiple victims and distinct episodes, consecutive terms are often justified, subject to totality.
Life sentence vs extended sentence: A life sentence may be imposed for very serious sexual offences when justified by seriousness and risk; the offender will then serve a minimum term before potential release, remaining on licence for life. An extended sentence has a fixed custodial term plus a fixed extended licence period.
Indecent images categories: Category A denotes the most serious (e.g., penetrative abuse), followed by Categories B and C. The presence of category A images significantly aggravates seriousness.

Practical Guidance Extracted from the Judgment

When imposing an extended sentence on any count within a multi‑count sexual case, do not impose section 278 sentences on associated counts. Use determinate terms; make concurrency or consecutivity decisions according to totality.
Explicitly identify the notional post‑trial custodial term and the level of plea credit applied. This transparency assists proportionality checks and appellate review.
In multi‑victim child sexual offences, even where breach of trust, recording of abuse, and multiple rapes are present, carefully test any movement beyond about 30 years after trial against Ayo. Reserve sentences far exceeding 30 years for the rarest and most extreme scenarios; a calibrated addition into the low 30s may suffice to mark the gravity.
Use a lead‑count approach to reflect overall criminality if helpful, but ensure the final total is just and proportionate, and capable of being explained by reference to guideline structures and appellate guidance.
Where unlawful section 278 sentences have been passed alongside an EDS, the appellate remedy is to substitute determinate terms that reflect the judge’s intended custodial lengths and to remove the additional licence elements.

Conclusion

Woods‑Springer is an important sentencing decision at the confluence of two principles: structural purity and proportional calibration. First, it reaffirms that extended sentences and section 278 “offender of particular concern” sentences are incompatible when applied to associated counts in the same sentencing exercise. The Court provides a clean remedial route by substituting determinate sentences without the extra licence components.

Second, it refines the upper boundary for extended sentences in multi‑count sexual cases. Building on Ayo, it confirms that while extraordinary gravity can justify movement beyond about 30 years after trial, a notional term of 45 years is manifestly excessive. Even in a case of profound depravity involving multiple very young victims and recorded rapes, the proper notional figure was in the low 30s (here, 33 years), leading—after full plea credit—to a 22‑year custodial term with a 6‑year extension on licence.

The decision thus offers a clear, structured template for future cases: maintain legal coherence in sentencing architecture; explicitly identify and justify the notional post‑trial term; and keep the total sentence firmly within the bounds of justice and proportionality, even when the facts compel some upward movement from the Ayo benchmark.

Disposal Recap

Lead count (rape of a child under 13): extended sentence of 28 years (custodial term 22 years + extended licence 6 years).
Unlawful section 278 sentences on associated counts replaced with determinate terms:
- Rape counts: 10 years’ imprisonment, concurrent.
- Assault by penetration counts: 7 years’ imprisonment, concurrent.
Other orders (surcharge, SHPO, forfeiture/destruction, notification requirements) remain as imposed and unaffected by the appeal.