Winsor v Pattinson: Self‑induced lack of representation is no ground to adjourn committal; permission still required to appeal non‑committal contempt findings

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Winsor v Pattinson [2025] EWCA Civ 344 (26 March 2025), delivered by Edis LJ with whom Arnold LJ and Singh LJ agreed. The appeal arose from a suspended committal order made by Linden J on 4 November 2024 after Mr Winsor was found (in a liability hearing on 11 September 2024) to have committed 17 breaches of an injunction granted by Steyn J on 16 February 2024. The injunction restrained harassment and prohibited the publication and dissemination of serious allegations against the claimant, District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) Pattinson, including accusations of fraud and money laundering purportedly linked to historic bankruptcy events and probate proceedings involving the defendant’s late mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as totally without merit. Two threads dominate the judgment:

• First, in contempt proceedings, the court will not adjourn (or set aside outcomes) merely because a defendant remains unrepresented where the absence of representation is self‑induced or the defendant refuses to cooperate with reasonable, focused representation. Article 6 does not compel the court to do so. The High Court’s handling of representation issues was described as “impeccable”.
• Second, the decision consolidates the procedural law governing appeals in contempt matters: permission is required to challenge a finding of contempt which is not itself a “committal order”, whereas an appeal against the committal order is as of right. Attempts to relitigate a refused permission challenge to the finding are abusive, consistent with Nambiar v Solitaire Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1135.

Summary of the Judgment

Edis LJ upheld the suspended committal order imposed for 17 proven breaches of the Steyn injunction, each evidenced by timed and dated emails sent by the defendant to courts, judicial officers, HMCTS officials, and others, repeating serious allegations about the claimant.

Key holdings:

• The injunction was binding and had to be obeyed until set aside; its validity was later vindicated by a final injunction granted by Eardley KC on 24 July 2024 after finding persistent harassment.
• Bean LJ had already refused permission to appeal the liability finding (1 November 2024); that refusal was a final order disposing of the challenge to the finding of contempt. Only the sanction (the committal order) remained open to appeal as of right.
• Article 6 rights in contempt proceedings were respected: the High Court repeatedly told the appellant about his entitlement to legal aid (a non‑means tested representation order in this appeal), gave a “final chance” adjournment between liability and sanction to obtain lawyers, and explored remote participation given health issues. The appellant’s inability to secure representation was self‑induced by insisting that counsel pursue irrelevant “underlying” allegations.
• On sanction, a suspended sentence of four months (concurrent on each breach) for two years—carefully tailored with carve‑outs for litigation and regulatory communications—was within the proper range. Immediate custody would also have been within range, but the judge exercised mercy given age and health, and in the hope of achieving compliance.
• The appeal was dismissed and certified totally without merit, with directions for written submissions on permission to appeal, any further civil restraint order (CRO) and costs.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and authorities cited and their influence

• Nambiar v Solitaire Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1135: The Court applied the distinction between a finding of contempt (which is not a “committal order” and generally requires permission to appeal) and a committal order (appealable as of right). Following Bean LJ’s refusal of permission to appeal the finding on 1 November 2024, any attempt to re‑argue liability in the appeal against sentence was abusive, in line with Nambiar. This settled point underpinned the Court’s procedural analysis (paras 20–21, 61).
• Hammerton v United Kingdom [2016] 63 EHRR 23 (and CA decision [2007] EWCA Civ 248): Relied on by the appellant to contend that the state had to provide him with representation. The Court clarified that Article 6(3)(c) entails a right to free legal assistance where the interests of justice so require, particularly when liberty is at stake, but it does not oblige adjournment where lack of representation is self‑induced or the litigant refuses to cooperate with reasonable assistance (paras 45–46, 57–58). The Court contrasted the facts from Hammerton (legal aid withdrawn pending review, no culpable refusal) with this case (self‑imposed conditions that made representation impossible).
• Benham v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 293, Re K (Contact: Committal Order) [2003] 1 FLR 277, Re G (Contempt: Committal) [2003] 2 FLR 58: Cited in Hammerton and reaffirmed here for the proposition that committal engages Article 6 and often calls for representation; however, limits exist where the defendant unreasonably refuses to cooperate (para 45).

Other materials invoked by the appellant (e.g., Gilham v MoJ [2019] UKSC 44; the Ocado v McKeeve line of authorities) were found irrelevant to the issues on appeal (paras 36–37, 44).

2) Core legal reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rests on five connected principles:

1. Obey now, challenge later: An injunction must be obeyed until set aside. The Steyn injunction, personally served on the appellant, was binding. Its substance was later endorsed by Eardley KC’s final injunction after a finding of persistent harassment (paras 1, 7–9). Truth or public interest assertions do not defend contempt; they are matters for appropriate proceedings to vary or set aside the order.
2. Appellate routes in contempt: The Court consolidated the scheme:
   • Findings of contempt (liability) are not “committal orders” and need permission to appeal (CPR 52.5; s.54(4) AJA 1999). Bean LJ’s refusal on paper was final as to liability (paras 19–21).
   • Committal orders (sentence) are appealable as of right. The only question open on this appeal was whether the suspended sentence was wrong in principle or plainly excessive (paras 20–21, 60–64).
3. Article 6 and representation in committal: The courts took every reasonable step to ensure fairness:
   • The appellant was repeatedly informed of entitlement to legal aid, including a representation order in the appeal (paras 48–53, 55–56).
   • Linden J staged the process—finding first, then adjournment to sentence—to give the appellant a “final chance” to instruct lawyers on the limited issue of sanction (para 51).
   • Adjournment was refused where it would not realistically result in representation because the appellant insisted counsel address irrelevant “underlying issues,” a self‑induced bar to representation (paras 23, 53–54, 57–58).
   • Remote participation addressed health concerns, which did not preclude a fair hearing (paras 10–11, 24, 40(i)–(ii)).
   The Court held this satisfied Article 6; Hammerton did not entitle the appellant to indefinite adjournment or compel lawyers to act (paras 45–46, 57–58).
4. Sanction discretion and proportionality:
   • High culpability: deliberate, persistent non‑compliance (17 breaches), targeted to cause maximum embarrassment and distress, even after pre‑action explanation of harassment (para 8, 28).
   • Harm: the judge candidly noted the likely limited reputational damage among rational recipients but recognised real distress to the claimant from constant, baseless allegations circulated to professional colleagues and leadership judges (paras 8, 28).
   • Outcome: A four‑month sentence (concurrent) suspended for two years with carefully drawn carve‑outs for:
     • Appeal communications
     • Regulatory complaints (SRA/BSB)
     • Responses to express requests from public authorities
     • Appeal and applications related to the Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO)
     This bespoke tailoring preserved legitimate channels while deterring further harassment (para 22(3)(a)–(d)).
   • The Court added that immediate custody would also have been within range; the suspended sentence was “merciful” given age and health but still aimed at securing compliance (paras 29–30, 64–65).
5. Case management for litigants in person (LiPs): The Court endorsed robust case management in the face of prolix, irrelevant, and incomprehensible filings, including certification of applications as totally without merit and the potential for civil restraint orders (paras 15–16, 19, 22(1), 59, 66–68).

3) How the Court dealt with the appellant’s arguments

• “Truth/public interest”: Not a defence to contempt. If the order restrains publication, obedience is required unless and until it is set aside (paras 9, 16–17, 63).
• Lack of representation: The High Court and Court of Appeal facilitated representation, advised on legal aid, contacted pro bono routes, and permitted remote hearing. The appellant’s refusal to permit counsel to focus on the true issues made representation impossible; this did not warrant adjournment (paras 47–58).
• Miscellaneous authorities and allegations: The Court found the appellant’s reliance on Gilham, the Ocado cases, and ECHR authority like Ibrahim misplaced or irrelevant (paras 36–37, 42–45).

4) Impact and significance

Although Edis LJ stated that “there are no wider lessons or points of principle” (para 59), the judgment is practically significant in four respects:

• Procedural clarity in contempt appeals: The case is a clear restatement—aligned with Nambiar—of the permission regime and abuse‑of‑process controls where litigants try to re‑argue liability via an appeal against sentence.
• Article 6 in practice: Courts will actively facilitate representation in committal proceedings, but where the lack of representation is self‑induced (e.g., by insisting on collateral issues), adjournments will likely be refused. This serves as guidance for judges facing similar contentions in contempt and other liberty‑engaging civil processes.
• Tailored suspended committal orders: The judgment showcases best practice in crafting suspension conditions with carve‑outs protecting legitimate litigation, regulatory, and public‑authority communications while preserving the order’s efficacy.
• Harassment injunctions against publication: The case underscores that repeated, baseless accusations circulated to professional networks can be harassment. Compliance with interim orders is mandatory even where the restrained speech purports to expose wrongdoing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Injunction: A court order requiring a person to do or refrain from doing something. It is binding once served and must be obeyed unless set aside or varied by the court.
• Penal notice: A warning attached to an order stating that breach may lead to committal (imprisonment).
• Contempt of court: Disobedience of a court order or other conduct undermining the administration of justice. In civil contempt (like breaching an injunction), the court can impose imprisonment or a fine.
• Committal order: The sanction decision imposing imprisonment (immediate or suspended) for contempt. Appeals against committal orders are generally as of right.
• Finding of contempt (liability): The court’s decision that the contemnor breached the order. This is not, by itself, a “committal order”. Appeals against such findings require permission.
• Suspended committal: The custodial term is not immediately served but will be activated if specified conditions are breached within a defined period. Conditions can include continuing compliance with a final injunction.
• Representation order (legal aid): In committal appeals, legal aid may be available without a means test, authorising payment for lawyers to act, subject to the litigant actually instructing them.
• Article 6 ECHR: The right to a fair trial. In committal (a “criminal charge” for Article 6 purposes), the interests of justice often require legal representation. However, the right is not absolute; a defendant’s unreasonable refusal to cooperate can justify proceeding without adjournment.
• Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO): A court order restraining a litigant from issuing further applications or claims without permission where they have persistently made totally without merit applications.
• “Totally Without Merit” (TWM): A certification that an application is bound to fail, triggering potential civil restraint measures.

Practice Notes and Lessons for Future Cases

• For respondents to harassment: Where persistent, baseless allegations are circulated to professional contacts, a measured but firm harassment injunction remains an effective remedy. Subsequent contempt may be addressed swiftly with committal applications supported by clear documentary evidence (e.g., timestamps, recipients).
• For alleged contemnors:
  • Obey the order pending challenge. “Truth” or “public interest” is not a defence to contempt.
  • If you want to appeal, keep communications within legitimate channels (as the suspension conditions permissibly carve out).
  • Cooperate with legal representatives and let them focus on the issues the court must decide; self‑imposed constraints may forfeit adjournment requests.
• For judges: The judgment endorses:
  • Explaining legal aid and the availability of representation orders in committal appeals.
  • Phasing hearings (liability then sanction) to offer a genuine opportunity to obtain counsel.
  • Refusing adjournments when representation is unlikely due to a party’s unreasonable stance.
  • Crafting suspension conditions with carve‑outs that preserve legitimate rights, help compliance, and avoid overbreadth.
• For appellate practitioners: Be precise about the appeal route:
  • Findings of contempt (non‑committal) require permission; failed paper applications are final unless renewed within the rules. Attempts to relitigate via sentence appeals risk being struck out as abusive.
  • Appeals against committal orders proceed as of right but are confined to sentence and principle.

Conclusion

Winsor v Pattinson is a strong reaffirmation of foundational principles in civil contempt:

• Interim and final injunctions must be obeyed unless and until they are set aside; the courtroom, not mass email circulation, is the forum for challenges.
• Article 6 safeguards in committal are real and practical, but not a licence for delay where the litigant’s own conduct makes representation impossible.
• Appellate routes are tightly policed. Nambiar remains the touchstone separating permission‑only challenges to liability from appeals as of right against sentence.
• Sanction must secure compliance. Here, a merciful suspension—with precise carve‑outs—was unimpeachable, though immediate custody would also have been within range.

The decision provides clear, pragmatic guidance for managing contempt arising from harassment injunctions, especially where litigants in person seek to relitigate collateral grievances. It will be cited for its consolidation of representation principles in committal, its careful sanction analysis, and its forthright application of the “obey now, appeal later” rule.