Webb & Somerset‑How v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1491: Personal Autonomy, Servitude and the Single Offence of “Holding in Slavery” under the Modern Slavery Act 2015

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision is a leading authority on the meaning of “slavery” and “servitude” in section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (“MSA 2015”), particularly in a domestic, non‑labour context involving a severely disabled adult.

The appellants, George Ashley Webb and Sarah Somerset‑How, were convicted after trial of:

• Count 1: holding Thomas Somerset‑How (“TSH”) in slavery or servitude, contrary to s 1(1)(a) MSA 2015;
• a series of counts of ill‑treatment by a care worker (Webb) and aiding and abetting that ill‑treatment (Somerset‑How), contrary to s 20 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015;
• a single count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Webb) contrary to s 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

On count 1 both appellants received 11 years’ imprisonment, concurrent with an overall 9‑year total for the other offences. They appealed against conviction on count 1 and sought leave to appeal sentence. The central questions were:

• What does it mean to hold a person in “slavery” or “servitude” when the victim performs no work or services for the perpetrators?
• Does s 1(1)(a) MSA 2015 create one offence or two (slavery and servitude) for the purposes of duplicity?
• Were the jury properly directed on the law, and was there a case to answer on “slavery”?
• Should the sentences for ill‑treatment be reduced once the slavery conviction fell away?
• Should there be a retrial on count 1 under s 7 Criminal Appeal Act 1968?

The Court (Vice‑President presiding) allowed the appeals against conviction on count 1, upheld the 9‑year sentences for ill‑treatment, and refused to order a retrial. In so doing it laid down significant guidance on:

• the conceptual distinction between slavery and servitude under the MSA 2015;
• the centrality of personal autonomy to the notion of slavery in domestic criminal law;
• the structure of s 1(1)(a) as creating a single offence which may be committed via slavery or servitude;
• the proper (limited) role of Brown directions and the approach to duplicity in such cases;
• the criteria for ordering a retrial where misdirections have occurred in a novel area of law.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

• The convictions for holding a person in slavery or servitude (count 1) were held unsafe and quashed.
• The Court held there was insufficient legal basis for a conviction on servitude (no work/services provided), and misdirections on both slavery and servitude.
• The convictions for ill‑treatment by a care worker (and aiding/abetting) and for ABH remained unaffected.
• The resulting 9‑year total sentences for each appellant were held not manifestly excessive.
• The Court refused the Crown’s application for a retrial on count 1.

2.2 Core Legal Holdings

1. Servitude requires work or services.
   The Court held that “servitude”, as incorporated into s 1(1)(a), must involve the provision of work or services under coercion, together with the additional features described in Siliadin v France and R v K. Because TSH performed no work or services for the appellants, the case should never have been left to the jury on the basis of servitude ([73]–[77]).
2. Section 1(1)(a) creates a single offence.
   “Holding a person in slavery or servitude” under s 1(1)(a) MSA 2015 describes one offence, not two separate crimes. Slavery and servitude are distinct but closely related concepts and often coexist; they are different ways in which the same offence can be committed ([79]–[81], [102]).
3. Definition of slavery for domestic criminal law.
   The Court moved beyond the strict “right of ownership” language from the 1927 Slavery Convention and Siliadin, and held that, in the context of s 1:

   “the essence of slavery is the domination of another person's life so that they are deprived of any real personal autonomy” ([92]).

   Slavery is a change in the victim’s status from being able to exercise choice to being “subject in all important matters to the will of another” ([98]).
4. Model jury directions on slavery.
   The Court proposed model questions for juries, for example:

   “Are you sure that the defendant made V his slave, that is, stopped him being a person in his own right by exercising coercive power over him, treating him as if he owned him?” ([96]).

   Directions should be tailored to the facts, focusing on the effect on the victim’s autonomy rather than abstract analogies with “animals or objects” ([95]–[98]).
5. Brown directions are rarely appropriate here.
   Given that s 1(1)(a) creates one offence and that slavery and servitude are often indistinguishable in practice, a Brown direction (requiring jury unanimity on the specific alternative basis) was unnecessary and inappropriate in this case ([79]–[82]).
6. Misdirections rendered the conviction unsafe.
   The judge:
   • misdirected the jury that servitude could exist without work or services, partly by misusing the “benefits” concept in s 3 MSA 2015 ([73]–[78]); and
   • failed to give a sufficiently clear, autonomy‑focused direction on the definition of slavery ([90]–[98]).
   There was evidence capable of proving slavery, but it was not so overwhelming that the conviction could be upheld despite the misdirections ([99]–[100]).
7. Sentences of 9 years for ill‑treatment upheld.
   The 9‑year total sentences (after count 1 was removed) were held to properly reflect the gravity, duration and cruelty of the ill‑treatment; they were not manifestly excessive ([106]–[113]).
8. No retrial in the interests of justice.
   Although slavery is in principle more serious than ill‑treatment, a retrial was refused because:
   • count 1 added little to the real sentencing picture in this case ([106]–[107], [115]–[118]);
   • the main difference would be in early‑release policy, not sentencing principle ([116]–[119]);
   • the evidence on slavery, while sufficient for a case to answer, was not overwhelming ([99], [120]); and
   • the Crown had already had a full opportunity to present its case and had contributed to the misdirections ([121]–[122]).

3. Factual Background

3.1 The Relationship and Care Arrangements

TSH, who has cerebral palsy and severe physical limitations, married the appellant Sarah Somerset‑How in 2012. The marriage was agreed to have been happy until his health began to deteriorate from 2013 onwards, with progressive mobility and visual impairment ([15], [18]).

In early 2016 the appellant George Webb became his carer, initially on weekdays and not living in the property. What began as satisfactory care deteriorated sharply: Webb became late or absent; TSH was frequently left in bed for days, unwashed, with minimal assistance for toileting, and increasingly isolated ([19]–[23]).

3.2 Alleged Abuse and Control

The prosecution case was that the appellants coerced and controlled TSH in order to:

• ensure Webb retained his carer’s income despite gross failings;
• enable both appellants to live in TSH’s home and use his money to fund their lifestyle;
• conceal their affair, which they conducted in TSH’s home while he was effectively bed‑bound.

Key factual elements included:

• TSH being left in bed for up to 12 hours with a urine bottle and Tupperware, often not showered for long periods ([22]–[23]).
• Verbal abuse and humiliation, such as Webb calling him “horrible”, “disgusting” and “scummy” when he needed cleaning after a bowel accident ([23]).
• Growing isolation from family, engineered by controlling access, intercepting or discouraging visits, and monitoring communications ([25]–[32]).
• Living conditions described by his sister as “squalid”, with TSH found thin, unwashed, smelling of urine, in a dark, filthy environment ([27]).
• Text messages in which the appellants jointly disparaged TSH and his family, referred to “rules” about visits, and described a “five‑year plan” to save money from this arrangement to fund a music business before leaving TSH ([31]–[33]).
• An assault (Count 12) where Webb threw an object (said by TSH to be a football boot) splitting his lip, with Somerset‑How minimising the incident ([26], [32]).

TSH’s own messages show desperation:

“I want out of here… This isn’t fair. You keep saying it'll get better, but it won't… You and him, have your plans and I barely feature except as an inconvenient chore to be dealt with… Why do you think I asked you to kill me, for fun? It's the only way I get out.” ([32])

3.3 The Prosecution’s Characterisation: “Slavery Without Labour”

Uniquely, this was a case where the alleged slavery did not involve TSH performing work or services. Instead, the Crown argued that:

• TSH was “effectively imprisoned” for about 2½ years, confined to bed and stripped of autonomy;
• his only “decision” was to limit food and drink intake to minimise soiling, in the hope someone would eventually assist him;
• by enslaving him in this way, the appellants were able to continue enjoying free accommodation, Webb’s income, and use of TSH’s funds ([34]).

This created the central legal problem: can a person be held in “slavery or servitude” where they perform no work or services? If so, how is the offence properly characterised and proved?

4. Precedents and Authorities Considered

4.1 Statutory Framework: Modern Slavery Act 2015 and Article 4 ECHR

Section 1(1) MSA 2015 provides (in material part):

(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person holds another person in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is held in slavery or servitude…

Section 1(2) mandates that “slavery” and “servitude” are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 1(3)–(5) allow the court to consider “all the circumstances”, including vulnerability and any “work or services provided” in circumstances amounting to exploitation under s 3 ([9]–[11], [61]–[62]).

Article 4 ECHR provides:

(1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
(2) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

Sections 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 require domestic courts to:

• take into account Strasbourg case‑law when determining questions arising in connection with Convention rights (s 2); and
• read and give effect to legislation, so far as possible, in a way which is compatible with those rights (s 3) ([49]–[51]).

4.2 Siliadin v France and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia

The leading Strasbourg case on Article 4 considered was Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16. The ECtHR defined:

• Slavery as:

  “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (1927 Slavery Convention, adopted at [122]).

• Servitude as:

  “an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion” ([124]),
  associated with a “particularly serious form of denial of freedom” and, historically, an obligation to live on another’s property and inability to change status ([123]).

In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] ECHR 22 the ECtHR reiterated these definitions and emphasised that:

• slavery requires the exercise of a genuine right of ownership, reducing the person to an “object” ([53], quoting Rantsev at [276]);
• servitude involves an obligation to provide services under coercion, linked to slavery;
• forced or compulsory labour requires physical or mental constraint and overriding of the person’s will ([53]).

4.3 R v K [2011] EWCA Crim 1691

In R v K, the Court of Appeal was directly construing Article 4 via s 4 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, which used the concept of exploitation contravening Article 4. K adopted the Siliadin definitions:

“Slavery is the status of a person over whom powers attached to the right of ownership are exercised. Servitude is an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion. Forced or compulsory labour is work performed involuntarily and under the threat of a penalty.” ([52], citing K at [19])

Importantly, K described the three concepts as a hierarchy of denial of personal autonomy ([55], [56], citing K at [24], [39]):

• slavery (most serious);
• servitude (intermediate);
• forced or compulsory labour (least serious).

K also gave a widely‑cited “essence” formulation which the trial judge in Webb adopted:

“The essence of the concept of ‘slavery’ is treating someone as belonging to oneself, by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or an object.”
“The essence of the concept of ‘servitude’ is one person's obligation to provide services to another, an obligation imposed by the use of coercion.” ([56], quoting K at [39])

4.4 Rooney and Others [2019] EWCA Crim 681

In R v Rooney the Court of Appeal dealt mainly with “forced or compulsory labour” under s 71 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (predecessor to s 1 MSA 2015). The Court in Webb noted Rooney to confirm that the structural change in the 2015 Act (inserting ss 1(3)–(5) and s 3) was intended to clarify, not radically change, the substantive law ([43], [75]).

4.5 DPP v Merriman, R v Grout and R v Chilvers: Duplicity and Brown Directions

On the procedural side, the Court engaged with the rule against duplicity and the use of Brown directions:

• DPP v Merriman [1973] AC 584 endorsed a practical approach to whether differing acts form one “transaction” and may properly be charged in a single count ([65]).
• R v Grout [2011] EWCA Crim 299 criticised an indictment that lumped together multiple distinct offences under s 8 Sexual Offences Act 2003 within a single count, making the conviction unsafe because the jury may have convicted on an impermissible basis ([66]–[67]).
• R v Brown (Kevin) (1983) 79 Cr App R 115 gave rise to the so‑called Brown direction: in some limited circumstances a jury must be directed that they must unanimously agree on which of several alternative factual bases they rely on to convict.
• R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311 concerned the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour (s 76 Serious Crime Act 2015). The Court there emphasised that Brown directions are “comparatively rare” and set out three limited categories where they may be appropriate ([69]–[70]).

Webb uses Chilvers both as an analogy (one offence, potentially committed via different but conceptually similar behaviours) and as authority for restricting the use of Brown directions.

5. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

5.1 Servitude: Work or Services Are Essential

(a) The judge’s approach at trial

The trial judge directed the jury that “servitude” involves:

• “one person's obligation to provide services to another, an obligation that is imposed by the use of coercion” ([21]);
• plus two further requirements:
  1. loss of the ability to decide where to live; and
  2. no prospect of changing their condition ([22]).

Recognising that TSH did not provide any obvious ‘services’, the judge attempted to broaden “services” by reference to s 1(4)(b) and s 3(5)–(6) MSA 2015. He reasoned that coercing TSH to:

• keep Webb employed,
• provide a home for both appellants, and
• allow the use of his money to fund their lifestyle

could themselves count as “services” or “benefits” within the meaning of servitude ([37], [25]–[28]).

(b) The Court of Appeal’s rejection of that approach

The Court firmly rejected this expansion. Starting from the Siliadin/K definition, it held:

• Servitude “must involve the provision of work or services under coercion” ([73]).
• The “benefits” language in s 3(5)–(6) is strictly limited to the context of “work or services” for the purpose of defining exploitation under s 2 and, via s 1(4)(b), to situations where work or services are actually being provided ([75]).
• Section 1(3) allowing regard to “all the circumstances” cannot be used to rewrite the core definition so that servitude applies even where no work or services are done ([75]).

The decisive passage is at [74]–[76]:

“The difficulty with this approach in this case is that TSH never did provide any services or do any work for either appellant. Therefore, paragraph 26 of the judge's directions was a misdirection. There was no basis, on this definition, on which the case could be left to the jury on the basis that it was open to them to find that TSH had been held in servitude.” ([74])

and:

“Section 3(3)–(6) are carried into the interpretation of section 1 by section 1(4)(b) which only applies them to the provision of work or services… That is the only respect in which section 3, including the references to benefits, is applied… [Allowing s 1(3) to override that] would make no sense… This is a penal statute… there should be no doubt about what conduct is penalised and what is not. That is a further reason for rejecting the approach of the judge.” ([75]–[76])

Consequently, it was wrong in law to invite the jury to convict on the basis of servitude, and the directions were also unclear in explaining the relationship between “services” and “benefits” ([77]–[78]).

(c) Implications

This aspect of Webb establishes that under s 1(1)(a) MSA 2015:

• servitude remains anchored to its labour/service‑based roots in Article 4 jurisprudence;
• cases involving purely domestic domination, where the victim performs no work or services, cannot be characterised as “servitude” (though they may be slavery, or other offences);
• prosecutors must be careful not to treat any coerced “benefit” (e.g. providing accommodation or access to funds) as a substitute for “services” unless it is integral to a work/services relationship and falls within s 3(5)–(6) via s 1(4)(b).

5.2 Slavery: From “Ownership” to Domination of Personal Autonomy

(a) Problems with the “ownership” paradigm

The Court acknowledged the “classic” definition of slavery in the 1927 Slavery Convention and Siliadin:

“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” ([46], [85], [88]).

But it pointed out a stark difficulty when this definition is imported into a modern domestic penal statute:

• In the UK (as in all Convention states) there is no lawful “right of ownership” over a person; the legal status of chattel slavery no longer exists ([85], [89]).
• Siliadin had distinguished between “slavery in the proper sense” and severe exploitation/servitude partly on this basis, which does not map neatly onto domestic criminal liability under MSA 2015.

The Court noted that the same term “slavery” appears in s 45 MSA 2015 (defence for victims of slavery or exploitation who offend under compulsion) and plainly cannot be limited to individuals who are technically the objects of “powers attaching to a right of ownership” ([86]).

(b) Refining the definition for s 1 MSA 2015

Webb does not discard the international definition, but adapts it to the domestic context. The Court emphasised that:

• we are not here interpreting Article 4 directly, but a statute that must be applied “in accordance with” Article 4 and “compatible with” it ([51], [90]);
• this justifies a more concrete, autonomy‑focused explanation to a jury, rather than abstract notions of ownership or analogies with animals/objects ([90]–[91], [97]–[98]).

The Court’s key move is to redefine the essence of slavery for the purposes of s 1:

“We consider that the essence of slavery is the domination of another person's life so that they are deprived of any real personal autonomy. They are deprived of important freedoms by the coercion and controlling behaviour of another person.” ([92])

Slavery is therefore characterised as a status or condition in which:

• the victim is no longer a “person in his own right” able to make important life choices;
• such choices have effectively been usurped by the perpetrator’s coercive power ([96], [98]).

The Court gave examples of freedoms often removed in cases of slavery:

• freedom of movement, including freedom to leave the property;
• choice of where and with whom to live;
• control over bodily integrity, including forced work or sexual exploitation;
• control over intimate matters such as toileting, hygiene, and contact with others ([92]–[93]).

(c) Duration and severity

The Court stressed that both slavery and servitude are statuses, not transient incidents:

“Slavery is a status and not a condition which lasts only for a short time. The same is true of servitude… these are serious charges and are not intended to cover a one‑off event or a condition that only lasts for a period of a few days or weeks.” ([93], [40]–[41])

The jury must determine, as a matter of fact:

• the period during which the victim was held in that condition; and
• whether that period is long enough to amount to being “held” in slavery, bearing in mind the gravity of the offence ([93], [40]–[41]).

(d) Overlap with servitude

The Court suggested that the two additional features identified in the servitude case‑law—that the victim:

1. has lost the ability to decide where they live; and
2. perceives no prospect of changing their condition

will “in most cases” also be present in slavery ([94]). This reinforces the close conceptual proximity of slavery and servitude, while preserving slavery as a more comprehensive deprivation of autonomy.

(e) Critique of the trial judge’s direction

The judge had directed the jury using the K formulation:

“Treating someone as belonging to oneself by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or object.” ([39]–[20])

The Court considered this inadequate and potentially confusing:

• it focused attention on how one treats animals or objects, rather than on the effect on the victim’s autonomy and status ([97]);
• the earlier reference to the Slavery Convention’s “powers attaching to the right of ownership” did not assist in a modern UK context, where no such legal right can exist ([85]–[90], [97]–[98]).

In short, the jury were given a legally orthodox but conceptually unhelpful definition that did not clearly explain what they had to decide about TSH’s condition and autonomy. That lack of clarity was one of the reasons the conviction was unsafe, independent of the servitude error ([90], [97]–[100]).

5.3 One Offence or Two? Slavery, Servitude and Duplicity

(a) Structure of s 1(1)(a)

Section 1(1)(a) criminalises holding a person “in slavery or servitude”. The question arose whether this creates:

• two distinct offences (slavery; servitude), which if charged together in a single count would risk duplicity; or
• a single offence, committed if the victim is held in either (or both) conditions.

(b) The Court’s answer: a single offence with two closely related modes

The Court held that s 1(1)(a) creates one offence ([79]–[81], [102]):

• Slavery and servitude do not necessarily overlap in every case, but their conditions are so similar that “in many cases both words will be apt to describe the condition to which the victim was reduced” ([79]).
• It would serve no useful purpose to say the statute creates two separate offences where the distinction between ingredients is fine and in most serious cases both elements are present ([79]).
• The Court compared this to “controlling or coercive behaviour” under s 76 Serious Crime Act 2015, where no one suggests that “controlling” and “coercive” create two distinct offences; rather, they are two closely related ways of committing a single offence ([79], [69]–[70]).

Accordingly:

• a count alleging “slavery or servitude” is not duplicitous simply because it uses both terms ([80], [102]);
• the decision in Grout (where a single count truly contained multiple distinct offences) should not be read across to s 1 MSA 2015 ([80]).

(c) Brown direction not needed

Because there is only one offence, the Court held that a Brown direction was not required. The jury needed only to be sure that:

• the factual conduct occurred; and
• that conduct amounted in law to the victim being held in slavery or servitude.

They did not have to be unanimous as to which word applied, provided they were unanimously sure that the overall condition met the statutory standard ([79]–[82]).

However, on the specific facts of Webb:

• there was no evidence capable of supporting servitude; and
• the judge had given a Brown direction which explicitly allowed the possibility that some jurors might convict on slavery and others on servitude ([35]–[39], [81]–[82]).

Given the misdirection on servitude, this created the real possibility that:

“the jury may have been unsure that there was slavery… but sure that there was servitude and convicted on that basis. This renders the conviction unsafe because there was no evidence of servitude here.” ([82])

Thus, although duplicity as such did not require quashing the conviction, the misuse of slavery/servitude alternatives and the Brown direction did ([82], [102]–[103]).

5.4 Applying the Law to the Facts: Was There Evidence of Slavery?

The Court accepted that there was a case to answer on slavery ([99], [120]). Analysing the facts through the lens of autonomy, it observed that:

• TSH had been deprived of fundamental choices:
  • who would provide intimate personal care;
  • when he could leave his bed, go to the lavatory, or go outside;
  • whether and when he could see his family ([92]);
• there was evidence of coercion and control by both appellants, including threats, manipulation, and monitoring of communications ([31]–[32]);
• TSH’s messages suggesting that death was his only escape indicated a profound loss of autonomy and hope ([32], [92]);
• the deprivation continued over years, not days or weeks ([22], [40]–[41], [93]).

On this evidence, a properly directed jury could have found that TSH had been “held in slavery”. But the Court concluded the evidence was not so overwhelming that the conviction could be saved under the proviso despite the misdirections:

“We do consider that there was evidence on which a jury properly directed could have concluded that TSH was held in slavery… but we do not think that it was so overwhelming that the conviction is safe notwithstanding the problem which arose…” ([99]).

Combined with the flawed directions on the definition of slavery itself, this made the convictions on count 1 unsafe ([99]–[101]).

5.5 Sentencing: Ill‑Treatment vs Slavery

Once count 1 fell away, each appellant was left with:

• Webb: three consecutive 3‑year terms for ill‑treatment by a care worker (s 20 CJCA 2015) and a concurrent 12‑month ABH (s 47 OAPA), totalling 9 years ([5], [105]).
• Somerset‑How: three consecutive 3‑year terms for aiding and abetting ill‑treatment, totalling 9 years ([5], [105]).

The Court emphasised that the factual basis of the slavery count and the ill‑treatment counts was the same ([106]). The ill‑treatment counts already captured:

• the prolonged cruelty, neglect and abuse;
• the exploitation of TSH’s vulnerability;
• the isolation and degradation he suffered.

The Court endorsed the trial judge’s use of consecutive sentences to reflect the totality and seriousness of the criminality ([106]–[108]). It described the offending as:

• “cruel and neglectful behaviour of a powerless and defenceless man in his own home” ([108]);
• a jointly cynical plan to exploit TSH and his resources over a five‑year period ([108], [33]);
• causing “life altering physical and psychological damage” ([111]).

Although 9 years is a substantial sentence for offenders of previous good character, the Court held it was not manifestly excessive ([107], [112]–[113]).

5.6 Retrial on Count 1

(a) The statutory test

Under s 7 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the Court may order a retrial where it allows an appeal against conviction and “it appears to the Court that the interests of justice so require” ([114]).

(b) Factors considered

The Crown argued that a retrial was justified because:

• count 1 in principle reflected a distinct and more serious wrong (depriving TSH of autonomy to the point of slavery), warranting a higher maximum sentence and stricter release regime ([116]–[117]);
• a conviction on count 1 would significantly extend the actual time in custody (two‑thirds of 11 years vs 40% of 9 years: 88 months vs 42 months) ([116]).

The Court accepted that, in principle, slavery is more serious than ill‑treatment: it requires proof of an additional consequence for the victim—loss of personal autonomy or freedom to the point of being a slave ([116]). However, the Court then emphasised:

• in this particular case, the gravity of the consequences for TSH was already fully reflected in the 9‑year ill‑treatment sentences ([117]);
• the difference in release point owed much to legislative policy responses to prison capacity rather than a deeper sentencing principle ([118]–[119]);
• this was not a dangerousness case; there was no public protection rationale for extending custody ([119]);
• the evidence of slavery, though sufficient for a case to answer, was not overwhelming and different juries might reasonably differ ([99], [120]);
• the prosecution had already had a full trial and had contributed to the misdirections by resisting clarification and encouraging the flawed approach to servitude ([121]).

(c) Conclusion on retrial

Taking these factors together, the Court held that the interests of justice did not require a retrial ([122]). The appellants would serve a substantial term for very serious offending, and the marginal difference from an additional slavery conviction did not justify a second trial.

6. Impact and Future Significance

6.1 Clarifying the Scope of “Servitude” under the MSA 2015

Webb makes clear that:

• servitude under s 1(1)(a) is labour/service focused—it cannot exist in the complete absence of work or services; and
• the “benefits” language in s 3 cannot be used to stretch servitude to cover any coercive extraction of advantage unconnected to work/services.

For prosecutors, this means:

• in cases of domestic control over vulnerable adults where no work or services are performed (e.g., abuse of a disabled spouse), the appropriate modern slavery limb is slavery, not servitude;
• where there is a work or care relationship (e.g., domestic workers, live‑in carers), both slavery and servitude may be in play, but the evidential focus must include the service element for servitude;
• indictments and case theories should be carefully framed to avoid relying on “servitude” unless the facts clearly involve coerced provision of work or services.

6.2 Re‑centring “Slavery” on Personal Autonomy

The Court’s rearticulation of slavery as a comprehensive deprivation of personal autonomy is the most far‑reaching doctrinal development in this case. It:

• moves domestic criminal law away from a rigid focus on non‑existent “rights of ownership” towards the practical reality of domination in modern exploitative relationships;
• provides a framework for prosecuting forms of enslavement that do not fit the classic chattel‑slavery paradigm, including:
  • extreme domestic coercion of disabled adults;
  • situations where the primary benefit to the perpetrator is control over the victim’s life, not their labour;
  • cases where sexual, psychological or caregiving dynamics are central.
• offers workable jury directions that focus on the effect on the victim’s autonomy, which can be adapted across a wide range of fact patterns.

This is likely to influence:

• future charging decisions under s 1 MSA 2015;
• interpretation of “slavery” in other parts of the Act, including the s 45 defence;
• judicial training and the Crown Court Compendium, which the Court expressly invited to consider its suggested formulations ([95]–[96]).

6.3 Duplicity and Jury Directions in Modern Slavery Cases

Webb gives practical guidance on indicting and directing in s 1 cases:

• One count for “slavery or servitude” will generally be appropriate; no need to split into separate counts unless there is a genuinely distinct factual basis.
• Brown directions should be reserved for the limited categories identified in Chilvers and similar authorities, not routinely used whenever a statute offers alternative wordings.
• Where the case is purely about slavery (e.g., no work/services), the judge should consider:
  • removing “servitude” from the count; or
  • directing the jury explicitly that “servitude” is not in play on the facts.

This should reduce the risk of juries convicting on unsustainable alternative bases, as almost certainly happened (or at least might have happened) in Webb.

6.4 Relationship with Care‑based Offences and Coercive Control

The Court made an important policy‑oriented observation: all of the appellants’ wrongdoing could be (and was) captured by ill‑treatment by a care worker and, potentially, the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour ([69], [106]).

The message is twofold:

• Prosecutors should not overreach for a slavery charge where more straightforward offences adequately reflect the criminality and permit appropriate sentencing.
• However, in cases where the abuse truly crosses the line into effective enslavement, s 1 remains available, with a life maximum and stricter early‑release regime, provided the autonomy‑based test is properly applied.

6.5 Interests of Justice and Retrials in Novel Legal Contexts

The retrial analysis has broader resonance beyond modern slavery:

• When the Crown presses a novel or complex legal theory, it bears a significant responsibility to assist the trial judge with accurate directions.
• If misdirections occur largely because of the Crown’s chosen approach, the Court of Appeal will not assume a second bite at the cherry is warranted.
• The fact that a retrial might adjust actual time in custody because of changes in early‑release policy (driven by prison capacity) is of limited weight in the “interests of justice” calculus ([118]–[119]).

This is a noteworthy application of restraint in ordering retrials where the main marginal effect would be on administrative release rules rather than on the substantive reflection of culpability and harm in the sentence.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 Slavery, Servitude and Forced or Compulsory Labour

• Slavery (under s 1 MSA 2015, per Webb):
  • A status or condition where the victim is deprived of real personal autonomy in all important aspects of life.
  • The perpetrator exercises coercive power so that the victim can no longer meaningfully choose where to live, who to see, when to leave, or how to manage basic bodily needs.
  • It may or may not involve work; the core is domination of the person.
• Servitude:
  • An obligation to provide services to another, imposed by coercion.
  • Typically includes being required to live on the perpetrator’s premises and having no real ability to change the situation.
  • Work or services are essential; without them, there is no servitude.
• Forced or compulsory labour:
  • Work done involuntarily under the threat of a penalty.
  • Involves physical or mental constraint and overriding the person’s will ([53]).
  • Generally seen as less severe than servitude or slavery.

7.2 Duplicity in an Indictment

The rule against duplicity requires that:

• each count in an indictment should allege only one offence;
• a count that truly contains multiple, distinct offences can be unfair because the jury’s verdict may be unclear or internally inconsistent.

However, where a statutory offence can be committed in two closely related ways (e.g. “slavery or servitude”, “controlling or coercive behaviour”), it is usually legitimate to charge both forms in the same count because they are simply alternative labels for the same crime. Webb confirms that this is the position under s 1(1)(a) MSA 2015 ([79]–[81], [102]).

7.3 What is a Brown Direction?

A Brown direction (from R v Brown (Kevin)) is a specific jury instruction required in narrow circumstances where:

• a single count alleges that the offence may have been committed in different factual ways, each of which would itself constitute the complete offence; and
• there is a real risk that some jurors may be sure the defendant committed one version, while others are sure of a different version, so that they are not unanimous on any one factual basis.

In those situations, the judge must instruct the jury that they must all agree on at least one specific alternative in order to convict. Webb, applying Chilvers, stresses that such directions are “comparatively rare” and were unnecessary here because s 1(1)(a) creates a single offence and this was not a case of multiple discrete incidents ([69]–[71], [81]).

7.4 Personal Autonomy

“Personal autonomy” in this judgment means a person’s practical ability to:

• make and implement decisions about important aspects of their life (movement, residence, bodily integrity, relationships);
• act on those decisions without being overridden by another’s coercive power.

Slavery, on the Webb definition, exists where that autonomy is effectively extinguished by another’s domination, such that the person no longer lives as a “person in his own right” but as someone whose significant life choices are dictated by the perpetrator ([92], [96], [98]).

8. Conclusion: The Significance of Webb & Somerset‑How

Webb & Somerset‑How is a foundational authority on how English criminal law understands and applies “slavery” and “servitude” under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Its main contributions can be summarised as follows:

• It confirms and sharpens the classic Strasbourg‑based definition of servitude as involving coerced work or services, closing off attempts to stretch that concept to non‑labour scenarios via the “benefits” provisions of s 3 MSA 2015.
• It re‑conceptualises “slavery” for domestic criminal purposes as the domination of a person’s life to the point of loss of real personal autonomy, rather than as a status rooted in now‑non‑existent rights of ownership.
• It holds that s 1(1)(a) creates a single offence of holding a person in “slavery or servitude”, and that slavery and servitude are closely related and often overlapping modes of committing that offence.
• It provides practical jury directions that focus on the change in the victim’s status and the deprivation of autonomy, which will guide future trials and the Crown Court Compendium.
• It illustrates the Court’s willingness to quash convictions, even in highly emotive cases, where substantial misdirections on novel legal issues may have affected the verdict.
• It demonstrates a balanced approach to retrials, refusing to order one where the Crown has already had a full opportunity, the evidence is not overwhelming, and the main marginal effect of a further conviction would be on administrative release rules rather than substantive justice.

In the broader landscape of modern slavery jurisprudence, Webb marks an important evolution: it aligns domestic criminal law with the realities of contemporary exploitation—including domestic, non‑labour situations—while respecting the architecture of Article 4 ECHR and maintaining clear boundaries between slavery, servitude, and forced labour. For practitioners, judges and policymakers, it is now a key point of reference on how to define, charge and try the most serious forms of domination of one human being by another under English law.