Totality in Consecutive Sentencing for Linked Firearms and Class A Drug Conspiracies: Commentary on R v Speed & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1582

1. Introduction

R v Speed & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1582 is a significant Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision arising out of an EncroChat-based prosecution involving high-level Class A drug supply and firearms conspiracies. The case engages two important areas of criminal law and practice:

• the safety of a conviction where a jury is directed to accept an “Agreed Fact” that appears to conflict with video evidence; and
• the correct application of the totality principle when imposing consecutive sentences for serious, but distinct, drug and firearms offending.

Three defendants were involved:

• Thomas Speed – Liverpool-based, linked by the prosecution to EncroChat handle “Simplecreek”, convicted after trial.
• Scott Roseau – London-based, said to be EncroChat user “Mystickangaroo”, largely based around a flat at Lawson Close; convicted after a majority verdict.
• James Salkeld – using EncroChat handle “Bestgolfer”, who pleaded guilty on a basis.

All three were convicted of offences involving kilogram-level Class A drug supply (heroin and cocaine) and firearms/ammunition conspiracies. At first instance, they received extremely long sentences: Speed 28 years, Roseau 22 years, and Salkeld 15 years 4 months.

On appeal:

• Roseau sought to appeal his conviction, arguing that the trial judge’s direction to the jury regarding electricity at the Lawson Close flat was factually wrong and unfairly undermined his defence.
• All three appealed their sentences (with limited leave), contending that the sentencing judge did not sufficiently apply the totality principle when making the firearms and drug sentences consecutive.

The Court of Appeal refused the conviction appeal but allowed all three sentence appeals in part, reducing the global sentences modestly on totality grounds. The case is particularly important for:

• how it treats minor inaccuracies in Agreed Facts and jury directions when assessing the safety of a conviction; and
• its clear articulation that, where substantial consecutive sentences are imposed for distinct drug and firearms conspiracies, there should ordinarily be a discernible reduction for totality, even if modest, and that the absence of such an adjustment can render the overall sentence manifestly excessive.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Conviction appeal (Mr Scott Roseau)

Roseau argued that his conviction was unsafe because:

• An Agreed Fact (49(b)) stated that the power to 26 Lawson Close “had been switched off at the mains”, so that household appliances including the fridge were “not in normal use”.
• The jury, scrutinising the body-worn-video of the search, saw lights on a Wi‑Fi router and (possibly) a thermostat, and queried how this squared with the Agreed Fact.
• The trial judge told the jury they could accept the Agreed Facts “as accurate” regarding the condition of the flat when police arrived and should not speculate.
• Defence counsel on appeal argued this may have caused the jury to reject Roseau’s defence that he had rented the flat to “Ray” and that someone else was using it for drug storage, on the (false) premise that the flat had no electricity and was therefore not realistically rentable.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and refused the extension of time:

• Agreed Fact 49(b) did not say the flat was disconnected from mains electricity as a utility; it merely said the supply had been switched off at the mains when police arrived.
• Whether some power was switched on during the search, or some circuits were live, was marginal and peripheral to the real issues.
• The fact that the flat may have been unoccupied and partly unusable at the time of the August 2020 search did not bear materially on who was using it during the critical EncroChat period (April–May 2020).
• The evidence linking Roseau to the handle “Mystickangaroo”, the Mercedes KE15 JZX, and the Lawson Close address was compelling and multi-stranded.

Accordingly, the conviction was held to be safe and the extension of time for the conviction appeal was refused as futile.

2.2 Sentence appeals (all three appellants)

Each appellant argued, with leave, that the Judge had not made sufficient reduction on account of totality when imposing consecutive sentences for drug and firearms conspiracies.

The Court of Appeal:

• Confirmed that consecutive sentences for the drug and firearms conspiracies were appropriate because they represented distinct criminality, despite being linked in practice.
• Accepted that the component sentences were properly categorised under the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines for drugs and firearms.
• Held that, although the judge referred repeatedly to totality, she did not make any clear or discernible downward adjustment for totality, and that the resulting global sentences were manifestly excessive.

The Court recalibrated the sentences by applying modest but concrete totality reductions:

• Speed: components reduced by 1 year each on the principal counts:
  • Firearms conspiracy (count 1): from 12 years to 11 years.
  • Class A conspiracies (counts 6 & 7): from 16 years to 15 years (concurrent with each other, consecutive to count 1).
  • New total: 26 years’ imprisonment (down from 28).
• Roseau:
  • Firearms conspiracies (counts 2 & 3): from 7 years to 6 years.
  • Class A conspiracies (counts 8 & 9): from 15 years to 14 years (concurrent with each other, consecutive to firearms).
  • New total: 20 years’ imprisonment (down from 22).
• Salkeld:
  • Notional sentence before plea (firearms): from 7 years to 6.
  • Notional sentence before plea (Class A conspiracies): from 16 years to 15.
  • Applying plea discount, firearms reduced to 4 years, drugs to 10 years, consecutive; other terms concurrent.
  • New total: 14 years’ imprisonment (down from 15 years 4 months).

The core principle emerging is that where consecutive sentences are imposed for distinct but related serious offences (here, large-scale drug supply and firearms conspiracies), the sentencer should normally:

• make a clear assessment of totality; and
• apply at least a modest downward adjustment to the aggregate to ensure it is just and proportionate, especially when the individual sentences are already at or near the top of guideline ranges.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The offences and EncroChat context

The case arose from the extensive law-enforcement operation using data from EncroChat devices. The prosecution case was that:

• Speed and Roseau were engaged in large-scale Class A drug supply (primarily heroin and cocaine), dealing at the kilogram level.
• They were also involved in the possession, acquisition, and trading of firearms and associated ammunition.
• EncroChat messages, exchanged between March and May 2020, featured:
  • Photographs of kilogram blocks of drugs and discussions of prices.
  • Images and references to bundles of cash.
  • Discussion of firearms and ammunition, including:
    • slang such as “guns”, “shooters”, “38s”, “9mm”, “sweets” (bullets);
    • references to well-known brands such as Luger, Glock, and Walther; and
    • photographs of particular firearms.

The prosecution attributed the relevant EncroChat accounts as follows:

• “Simplecreek” – Speed (Liverpool).
• “Mystickangaroo” – Roseau (London).
• “Bestgolfer” – Salkeld.

Speed and Roseau denied being the users of these handles. Salkeld pleaded guilty, thus implicitly affirming, at least as against himself, the realities of the conspiracies.

3.2 Attribution evidence

The attribution case, particularly regarding Roseau, was extensive and multi-layered:

• Other EncroChat users saved “Mystickangaroo” under names like “Scott”, “SO” and “ST”.
• Messages indicated that “Mystickangaroo” was a black male from London.
• Items at Lawson Close and at another address to which Roseau had access tied him personally to those premises (passport, driving licence, correspondence, V5 for the Mercedes KE15 JZX).
• Expert evidence (Mr Duncan Brown) showed a correlation between:
  • ANPR records of the Mercedes KE15 JZX;
  • cell-site data relating to Roseau’s conventional mobile phone; and
  • location patterns inferred from EncroChat communications.
  Over a 45‑day period in April–May 2020, there was no clear separation between the mobile and EncroChat device movements, and both aligned with the movements of the Mercedes used by and insured to Roseau.

3.3 The Lawson Close search

On 19 August 2020, Roseau was arrested. That same morning police searched 26 Lawson Close, a flat held by his uncle but used by Roseau. The flat:

• Was cluttered, undergoing apparent renovation, and in disrepair.
• Had power “switched off at the mains” when the police arrived, so appliances were not in normal use.
• Contained:
  • Over £126,000 in cash in bags in the kitchen.
  • Scales with traces of cocaine and diamorphine.
  • Multiple mobile telephones.
  • Significant quantities of cocaine and diamorphine (including high purity cocaine and 59% pure heroin mixed with caffeine).
  • A cash counting machine.
  • Six gas-powered pistols (one bearing Roseau’s fingerprint).
  • Eight realistic imitation starter pistols.

3.4 The defence cases

Key defence positions included:

• Attribution: both Speed and Roseau denied using the EncroChat handles attributed to them, challenging the reliability and completeness of the EncroChat data and the attribution evidence.
• Lawson Close and “Ray”:
  • Roseau accepted he had access to Lawson Close and that the imitation firearms (props) were his, for use in music videos.
  • He said he had rented the flat to a man called “Ray”, who must have been responsible for the drugs and cash found there.
  • He denied involvement in drug supply or firearms trading.
• Interview and evidence:
  • Both Speed and Roseau gave “no comment” interviews.
  • Speed did not give evidence at trial.

3.5 The EncroChat admissibility challenge

At the outset, Speed applied under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude EncroChat material on the basis that it was incomplete, unreliable, and inaccurate. The judge refused:

• EncroChat evidence is “not unusual” in such cases.
• Any disputes over reliability were matters for the jury, not a basis for blanket exclusion.

3.6 The Agreed Facts and the jury’s note

The body-worn-video of the Lawson Close search was shown to the jury. Agreed Fact 49 described the flat’s condition, including:

“(b) The power to the property had been switched off at the mains, as such the electric household appliances (including the fridge) were not in normal use…”

During deliberations, the jury sent a note pointing out they could see a blue light on the Wi‑Fi router and a light they suspected was on a thermostat, which “contradicts the agreed facts”, and sought directions.

The judge, after discussion with counsel, instructed:

“Well, you have those agreed facts and you can accept them as accurate. That was the condition of the flat when the police arrived. We don’t know what then happened to the electric supply once the police went in to conduct the search. What we do know is that when the police went into 26 Lawson Close there was no electricity on because it had been switched off at the mains. So, you can accept that the material in the agreed facts is accurate and reliable. Please do not speculate about other evidence there may have been…”

The jury later returned majority verdicts convicting Roseau.

4. The Conviction Appeal: Agreed Facts, Jury Directions and Safety of Verdict

4.1 The issue raised on appeal

On appeal, Roseau’s new ground (advanced by different counsel) was narrowly focused:

• The jury might have found an inconsistency between the video (lights on devices) and Agreed Fact 49(b) (power “switched off at the mains”).
• By directing the jury to accept the Agreed Fact as “accurate and reliable”, the judge may have compelled them to proceed on a factually erroneous basis.
• This was said to undermine the plausibility of Roseau’s claim that he had rented the flat to “Ray” and that it was being used by another person, because (the argument went) a flat without working electricity or utilities would be unlikely to be rented or used in the way he claimed.

Thus, it was argued, the judge’s direction risked the jury reaching adverse conclusions against Roseau on an erroneous factual premise, rendering his conviction unsafe.

4.2 The Court of Appeal’s response

The Court undertook a careful analysis of the wording and context of Agreed Fact 49(b), the jury note and the direction:

1. No assertion of permanent disconnection:
   • Agreed Fact 49(b) merely said the power had been “switched off at the mains” when police arrived.
   • It did not suggest the flat had no mains electricity as a supplied utility for some extended period.
   • This undercut the appeal’s premise that the jury were being told there was no “active electricity connection” at all.
2. Ambiguity marginal at best:
   • The judge explicitly distinguished the state of the power when police arrived from what might have happened after they began the search (e.g. police switching on power).
   • Even if some circuits or devices were powered later, that did not contradict the agreed snapshot of the flat’s initial condition.
3. Peripheral to the real issues:
   • The appeal attempted to elevate a minor factual nuance into a central issue.
   • The Court rejected the suggestion that this point was “critical” or “central” to the jury’s verdict, describing that contention as speculative.
   • Other evidence—attribution of the EncroChat handle, movement data, physical evidence at Lawson Close—was far more probative.
4. Temporal mismatch:
   • The disputed fact concerned the condition of the flat in August 2020.
   • The critical period for the EncroChat conspiracies was April–May 2020.
   • Whether the power was switched off (or on) in August did not materially assist in deciding who used the flat in April–May.
5. Defence’s own use of Agreed Fact:
   • The Agreed Fact had been introduced, with defence agreement, to show that the flat was unoccupied, cluttered, in disrepair, and that someone merely “passing through” (as Roseau claimed) might easily miss drugs and cash.
   • It therefore served Roseau’s own narrative that the flat was not suitable as normal living accommodation.
   • Complaining on appeal about a fact previously agreed and strategically deployed by the defence is a high hurdle.
6. Robust attribution and evidential context:
   • The ANPR, cell-site, vehicle, and personal-document evidence formed a compelling picture tying Roseau to the drugs and arms conspiracies.
   • Against that background, a minor point about whether some lights were on during the search could not realistically have tipped the balance.

The Court concluded that:

• Even if there had been an error or ambiguity in Agreed Fact 49(b), it was “peripheral and trivial” and could not have affected the safety of the conviction.
• The conviction was safe; therefore, an extension of time to pursue this ground would be futile and was refused.

4.3 Principles illustrated

While the Court did not state a new legal rule, the judgment illustrates several important principles:

• Agreed Facts are binding unless genuinely material error is shown:
  • Where facts are expressly agreed by both sides, the jury is entitled to treat them as accurate.
  • An appellant later challenging an agreed fact must show that any error was material and prejudicial, not merely incidental or tactical.
• Jury notes and further evidence:
  • Once deliberations are underway, the jury cannot be given new evidence; the judge can clarify existing evidence and warn against speculation.
  • Here, the judge properly reinforced the agreed factual framework and cautioned the jury to avoid hypothesising about additional evidence.
• Safety of conviction and marginal discrepancies:
  • The appellate question is not whether every detail was flawless but whether any misdirection or factual inaccuracy rendered the conviction unsafe.
  • A peripheral inconsistency, especially on an issue temporally and causally remote from the core allegations, will rarely suffice to undermine a conviction supported by strong, independent evidence.

5. The Sentencing Appeals: The Totality Principle in Serious Drug and Firearms Conspiracies

5.1 Sentencing frameworks applied at first instance

The sentencing judge applied the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines:

• Class A drug supply (conspiracy):
  • All three defendants were assessed as having a leading role in category 1 offending (very high quantities – around 10–15kg of Class A drugs per person).
  • For category 1 leading role, the guideline starting point is 14 years with a range of 12–16 years.
• Firearms offences:
  • For Speed, the guideline was that for transfer of firearms for sale or otherwise, assessed at “upper end of category B” for culpability and category 2 for harm (no evidence of actual use in offending). Starting point: 10 years; range 8–14 years.
  • For Roseau and Salkeld, the guideline for possession of firearms was engaged, with at least category B culpability and category 2 harm. Starting point: 6 years; range 5–7 years.

The judge treated the firearms conspiracies and the Class A conspiracies as distinct offences and imposed:

• substantial terms under each guideline; and
• made the firearms and drug sentences consecutive, whilst keeping drugs sentences concurrent with each other.

She expressly stated she had “reminded herself of the relevant authorities” and of the totality principle, and that separate consecutive sentences were necessary to “properly reflect the scale and totality” of the offending.

5.2 The Court of Appeal’s approach to totality and consecutive sentences

The Court accepted that:

• drugs and firearms conspiracies involve different types of harm and criminality, even when linked; and
• therefore, consecutive sentences are generally appropriate to reflect that distinct criminality.

However, under the totality principle (as reflected in Sentencing Council guidance and longstanding appellate authority):

• The court must look at the overall, aggregate sentence and ask whether it is just and proportionate to the totality of the offending.
• This may require a downward adjustment to the individual component sentences (or to the aggregate) when they are ordered consecutively, so that the combined term is not simply the sum of the parts.
• The more overlap there is in the underlying criminality, the greater the potential for totality reduction. Where the criminality is genuinely distinct (as here), the reduction will often be modest.

In this case, although the judge referenced totality multiple times, the Court of Appeal observed:

• There was no explicit identification of:
  • what sentences would have been passed on each count “but for” totality; or
  • the degree of reduction applied to reflect totality.
• The component sentences imposed were at or near the top of the applicable guideline ranges, strongly suggesting that no meaningful totality reduction had in fact been made.

Accordingly, the Court revisited the sentences to apply an appropriate, explicit, and modest totality allowance.

5.3 Application to each appellant

(a) Mr Thomas Speed

For Speed, the judge had imposed:

• Firearms conspiracy (count 1): 12 years’ imprisonment.
  • This is in the upper half of the B2 range (8–14 years).
  • Given the categorisation (“upper end of category B” culpability; category 2 harm and no evidence of actual use), the Court observed that any higher sentence (13–14 years) would approach or enter the B1/category 1 territory, for which the specific harm factors were not present.
• Class A drugs conspiracies (counts 6 & 7): 16 years (concurrent).
  • 16 years is at the very top of the category 1 leading role range (12–16 years).
  • Again, there was no sign of downward totality adjustment in this figure.

The Court concluded that there was:

• minimal overlap between the firearms and drugs criminality; but
• no proper totality reduction despite extremely high terms on each component.

A modest reduction was therefore warranted. The Court:

• Reduced the firearms sentence from 12 to 11 years.
• Reduced the drug terms from 16 to 15 years each (concurrent).
• Maintained the consecutive structure, yielding a new total of 26 years.

(b) Mr Scott Roseau

The judge had sentenced Roseau to:

• Firearms conspiracies (counts 2 & 3): 7 years (concurrent).
• Class A conspiracies (counts 8 & 9): 15 years (concurrent), consecutive to firearms.

Again:

• The 7-year firearms term was at the very top of the B2 range (5–7 years);
• The 15-year drug term was near the top of the 12–16 year range.

The Court reasoned that:

• Any higher firearms term (e.g. 8 years) would essentially push into the next guideline category, which would not be justified on the facts (no evidence of actual use of firearms in offending).
• This strongly suggested that no or no significant totality allowance had been made on either component.

As with Speed, a modest reduction was deemed appropriate:

• Firearms conspiracies reduced from 7 to 6 years.
• Class A conspiracies reduced from 15 to 14 years (concurrent).
• Drug terms remained consecutive to firearms, giving a new total of 20 years.

(c) Mr James Salkeld

Salkeld’s case required a more structured analysis because of his early guilty pleas. The judge had imposed:

• Firearms conspiracy (count 2): 4 years 8 months (after plea).
• Class A conspiracies (counts 5 & 6): 10 years 8 months each (concurrent, after plea), consecutive to count 2.
• Total: 15 years 4 months, which the Court identified as representing a notional overall sentence of 23 years before plea discount.

The Court:

• Agreed that, prior to any totality adjustment, the notional terms of 7 years (firearms) and 16 years (drugs) followed the same pattern as for Roseau.
• Observed, as in Roseau’s case, that no meaningful totality reduction appeared to have been applied to those notional figures.

The Court therefore:

• Reduced the notional firearms term from 7 to 6 years.
• Reduced the notional drug terms from 16 to 15 years (concurrent).
• This produced a new notional total of 21 years before plea.
• Applying the same plea reductions yielded:
  • Firearms count: 4 years.
  • Each Class A count: 10 years (concurrent).
  • New total: 14 years’ imprisonment.

5.4 Clarified expectations for sentencing judges

Although the Court did not purport to issue a formal guideline judgment, its reasoning emphasises:

• Where substantial consecutive sentences are imposed for distinct but related serious offences (like wholesale Class A supply and firearms conspiracies), the judge should:
  • Consciously and explicitly apply the totality principle; and
  • Ideally indicate what, if any, reduction is being made from the guideline starting points or ranges to achieve a just overall sentence.
• If the individual sentences are at or near the top of their guideline ranges and then made consecutive without apparent moderation, the Court of Appeal may infer that totality has not been meaningfully applied, even if it is mentioned in the remarks.
• Where the overlap in criminality is limited, only a modest totality adjustment is required; in this case, the Court considered a reduction of about one year per principal group of offences to be sufficient.

This case therefore functions as a practical illustration of how appellate courts will scrutinise totality in the context of long consecutive terms in serious organised crime cases.

6. Precedential Significance and Impact

6.1 Impact on EncroChat and attribution-based prosecutions

The case reinforces several themes emerging from the wave of EncroChat prosecutions:

• Attribution can rest on cumulative circumstantial evidence:
  • Handle naming conventions (“Scott”, “SO”, “ST”),
  • self-referential messages (descriptions of a black male from London),
  • co-location of devices with vehicles and home addresses, and
  • physical finds (drugs, cash, firearms) at linked premises,
  are all capable of creating a powerful web of attribution.
  • Minor factual anomalies will not usually upset such attribution:
    • The Court was unimpressed by an attempt to focus appellate attention on an ambiguity about electricity status on the day of the search.
    • Where the attribution evidence is robust and multi-faceted, peripheral factual disputes will rarely affect the safety of the conviction.
  • Caution against re‑characterising tactical choices as miscarriages:
    • The Agreed Facts were jointly crafted and served aspects of the defence case.
    • Appellants will struggle to turn such tactical decisions into grounds of appeal absent a genuine and material unfairness.

  6.2 Agreed Facts and jury management

  The decision underscores:

  • Responsibility when agreeing facts:
    • Both sides must carefully consider the accuracy and implications of Agreed Facts, as they will be treated by the jury as authoritative.
    • Defence counsel should anticipate that agreed descriptions of a scene (e.g. disrepair, lack of normal utilities use) may later be used to undermine alternative theories (such as third-party occupancy).
  • Handling juror concerns about perceived inconsistencies:
    • When jurors perceive a mismatch between video and written facts, judges must respond without reopening the evidential record mid‑deliberation.
    • The judge’s approach here—affirming the accuracy of the Agreed Facts as to the condition on arrival, while declining to speculate about later changes—is a model of keeping the jury within the evidential boundaries.
  • Threshold for unsafe conviction:
    • The Court emphasised that the presence of an arguable discrepancy is not enough; the question is whether the direction “to the detriment of the defendant” could realistically have affected the verdict.
    • Here, the answer was clearly no, given the limited significance of the electricity point and the strength of the remaining evidence.

  6.3 Sentencing in serious organised crime: drugs and firearms

  On sentencing, the case:

  • Affirms the propriety of consecutive terms for linked yet distinct arms and drugs conspiracies, recognising:
    • Drug supply and firearm trafficking generate different forms of societal harm,
    • justify separate penal censure, and
    • cannot simply be “rolled up” into a single term without loss of proportionality and public protection.
  • Enforces the ceiling effect of guideline ranges:
    • Where a component sentence is already at the guideline maximum (or close to it), adding another such term consecutively without any totality moderation risks over-punishment.
    • Appellate courts are likely to query whether such stacking of top-end sentences truly reflects an individual’s role and culpability.
  • Demonstrates modest totality reductions in practice:
    • The Court did not radically revise the structure of the sentences; it trimmed around one year from each group of principal offences.
    • This left the appellants still serving extremely long sentences (26, 20 and 14 years respectively), but with better calibration between their roles, the guideline ranges, and the totality of their criminality.

  6.4 Appellate scrutiny of totality and “manifestly excessive” sentences

  The case clarifies the Court’s approach to claims that a sentence is “manifestly excessive” by reason of totality:

  • Reference to guidelines is necessary but not sufficient:
    • Even where each individual component term is within its guideline range, the combined effect may be excessive.
    • Totality is about the holistic impression, not simply tick‑box compliance with guidelines on each count.
  • Need for transparent reasoning:
    • Sentencers who say they are applying totality should ideally:
      • state what they would have imposed on each count if sentenced in isolation; and
      • then explain briefly how they have moderated those figures for totality.
    • Absent such clarity, appellate courts may infer, as here, that totality has not in fact been given effect.
  • Manifest excessiveness in this context:
    • “Manifestly excessive” does not mean the appellate court would simply have chosen a slightly different figure; there must be a recognisable miscalibration.
    • Here, the miscalibration lay in combining guideline‑maximum (or near‑maximum) sentences consecutively without effective reduction for totality.

  7. Complex Concepts Simplified

  7.1 Conspiracy

  A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a criminal offence. In this case, the defendants were accused of agreeing with others to:

  • possess, purchase or acquire prohibited weapons;
  • possess ammunition; and
  • supply Class A and Class B drugs.

  The crime is the agreement itself, not the completion of the drugs deals or firearms transfers.

  7.2 EncroChat and attribution

  EncroChat was an encrypted communication platform used widely by organised criminals. When its data were obtained, messages appeared under anonymous “handles” such as “Simplecreek” or “Mystickangaroo”. The prosecution must prove which real person used each handle. This can be done through:

  • self-references (name, location, occupation) in the chats;
  • timing and location of messages, matched with defendant’s movements;
  • co‑location of the device with a particular vehicle or address; and
  • linking content of messages to physical evidence (drugs or firearms found).

  7.3 Agreed Facts

  Agreed Facts are statements of fact that both prosecution and defence accept and formally place before the jury. The jury is told it may treat such facts as proven and need not debate them. Because they are agreed, they cannot lightly be challenged on appeal unless it is shown that:

  • they were materially wrong; and
  • the error caused real unfairness in the trial or affected the safety of the verdict.

  7.4 The totality principle

  The totality principle in sentencing requires that when a court imposes sentences for multiple offences (especially when some are consecutive), it must ensure that the overall sentence:

  • is just and proportionate to all the offending taken together; and
  • is not simply an arithmetic sum of individual sentences without considering the overall impact.

  Common ways to implement totality include:

  • making some sentences concurrent rather than consecutive;
  • reducing the length of some component sentences to avoid an excessive aggregate; or
  • a combination of both.

  7.5 Sentencing guidelines: categories, roles, and ranges

  The Sentencing Council issues guidelines that structure sentencing decisions. Key concepts include:

  • Harm categories (e.g. 1, 2, 3): relate to the seriousness or scale of harm. For drugs, category 1 involves very high quantities; for firearms, category 2 might mean there is a high risk but no proven use.
  • Culpability levels (e.g. A, B, C; low, medium, high): reflect the offender’s role and mental state. A “leading role” indicates someone high in the chain (organiser or large-scale supplier).
  • Starting point: the sentence the guideline suggests for a typical case in the relevant category.
  • Category range: the spectrum within which the sentencer can move up or down having regard to aggravating and mitigating factors.

  7.6 Concurrent and consecutive sentences

  • Concurrent sentences run at the same time. If someone is given 10 years and 8 years concurrently, the effective sentence is 10 years.
  • Consecutive sentences run one after another. If they are given 10 years and 8 years consecutively, the effective sentence is 18 years.

  Courts often make sentences concurrent where offences are part of the same incident, and consecutive where they are truly separate, or where additional punishment is required to reflect distinct harm—as in separate firearms and drug conspiracies.

  7.7 “Manifestly excessive”

  An appellate court does not change a sentence simply because it might have chosen a different figure. A sentence is “manifestly excessive” if:

  • it is outside the range of sentences reasonably open to the judge, given the facts and guidelines; or
  • there is a clear error of principle (for example, failing to apply totality), leading to a noticeably disproportionate result.

  7.8 Single Judge and extension of time

  In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division):

  • A single judge first considers applications for leave to appeal. If leave is refused, the applicant can seek to “renew” the application before the full court.
  • Appeals must normally be lodged within a set time after sentence or conviction (e.g. 28 days). If late, the appellant must ask for an extension of time and show good reason for the delay and arguable merit in the appeal.

  In this case, the Court refused an extension of time for Roseau’s conviction appeal because, on the merits, the argument had no realistic prospect of success; the extension would therefore be futile.

  8. Conclusion

  R v Speed & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1582 is an important appellate judgment in the modern landscape of EncroChat prosecutions and high-end organised crime sentencing.

  On the conviction side, the Court robustly dismissed a narrowly framed challenge based on an alleged inconsistency between an Agreed Fact and video evidence about the electricity status at a flat. By emphasising the marginality of the point, its temporal remoteness from the conspiracy period and the strength of the attribution and physical evidence, the Court reaffirmed that minor factual ambiguities, particularly in Agreed Facts originally deployed tactically by the defence, will rarely render a conviction unsafe.

  On sentencing, the judgment provides a clear and practical application of the totality principle in a context where large consecutive terms are imposed for distinct but related serious offences. While endorsing consecutive sentencing for separate firearms and drug conspiracies and accepting the guideline categorisations, the Court identified that the component sentences—set at or near the top of guideline ranges—had not been meaningfully moderated to account for totality. By modestly reducing the principal terms for each appellant and leaving the overall structure intact, the Court signalled that:

  • totality must be applied in a tangible way, not just referenced in passing; and
  • sentencers should, where possible, make clear on the record how totality has influenced the final figures, particularly in long, serious cases.

  Going forward, the case will be a useful reference for:

  • trial judges managing jury questions about Agreed Facts and evidential anomalies;
  • lawyers drafting and agreeing factual frameworks in complex EncroChat prosecutions; and
  • sentencers and appellate courts ensuring that very long sentences for multiple serious conspiracies remain calibrated, transparent and proportionate under the totality principle.