The Price & Clarke Principle: A Pragmatic Remedy for Duplicitous Section 3ZB Counts and Youth-Based Sentence Reduction in Death-by-Dangerous-Driving Cases

Introduction

Price & Anor, R v ([2025] EWCA Crim 871) concerns two 19-year-old co-defendants—Emma Louise Price and Jago Jo Clarke—who, while racing on public roads, caused one death and serious injuries to others. Tried and sentenced at Swansea Crown Court in January 2024, they received 10-year custodial sentences for causing death by dangerous driving (Count 1) and concurrent terms for causing serious injury by dangerous driving (Count 4) and for causing death while unlicensed and uninsured (Counts 2 & 3).

Before the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) the applicants sought:

Extensions of time and leave to appeal their convictions (arguing the Section 3ZB counts were duplicitous); and
Extensions of time and leave to appeal their sentences (arguing excessive starting points and inadequate credit for youth, pregnancy, immaturity and partial admissions).

Lord Justice Edis (sitting with two other Lord/Lady Justices) refused both conviction- and sentence-based applications, but in doing so formulated practical guidance on (i) how appellate courts may dispose of appeals where technically duplicitous counts have caused no injustice, and (ii) how youth, immaturity and multiple harms should be calibrated under the current “Causing Death by Dangerous Driving” sentencing guideline when the statutory maximum (here, 14 years) caps the headline figure.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Conviction appeals: Counts 2 & 3 (Section 3ZB) were accepted by all parties as “bad for duplicity” because they combined two distinct offences—being unlicensed and being uninsured—in a single count. Nevertheless, applying R v Levantes, the Court held there had been no injustice or prejudice; hence the convictions were not unsafe. Rather than engage in the more elaborate exercise of substituting lawfully-framed counts, the Court adopted “the procedurally simplest” option: refusing the time-extension applications, thereby disposing of the conviction challenges summarily.

2. Sentence appeals: The Court found the trial judge had:

Correctly placed the case in Culpability A (starting point 12 years) under the 2023 Sentencing Guideline;
Properly uplifted the provisional sentence to reflect (a) a prolonged, high-speed race, and (b) additional serious harm caused under Count 4;
Applied a “substantial” downward adjustment—at least four years—to reflect the applicants’ youth, immaturity, injuries and (for Price) pregnancy/childcare factors;
Was not obliged to give Clarke a discount for pleading to the lesser alternative of “causing death by careless driving”.

Consequently the Court concluded the proposed grounds were “not arguable”, refused leave to appeal sentence, and (because it could not increase the overall severity under Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s.11(3)) left untouched the technically too-short driving-disqualification extension period.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Levantes [1999] 1 Cr App R 465 – Duplicity does not necessarily render a conviction unsafe if no unfairness arises. Provided the blueprint for the Court’s refusal to entertain the conviction appeals despite acknowledged drafting defects.
R v Barnes [2024] EWCA Crim 1548 – Clarified that offenders sentenced to determinate terms for serious driving allegations must serve two-thirds of their sentence (rather than one-half). In Price & Clarke, this affected both (a) the judge’s mistaken calculation of the disqualification extension, and (b) the Court’s inability to correct that mistake absent an allowed appeal.
R v Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605 and R v Morgan Clarke & Ors [2018] EWCA Crim 185 – Key authorities on adolescent brain development. They underpin the now well-established principle that chronological age alone is an incomplete indicator; courts must gauge neuro-psychological maturity when sentencing young adults.

Beyond case law, two statutory texts played pivotal roles:

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.86(2) – Raised the maximum for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life imprisonment (for offences after 28 June 2022). Because the fatal crash occurred in June 2021, the sentencing judge here remained capped at 14 years.
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, ss.35A-35B – Oblige courts to extend driving bans so they are not served entirely while the offender is incarcerated. The miscalculation of this “extension period” became moot once leave to appeal sentence was refused.

Legal Reasoning Explained

Duplicitous counts & appellate economy – Where a count improperly merges two offences, the orthodox cures are (a) quash and allow retrial, or (b) amend/substitute counts. Lord Justice Edis emphasised that appellate courts have a third, pragmatic choice when no injustice ensues: declining to extend time, thereby avoiding unnecessary complexity.
Sentencing architecture – The Court endorsed the Crown Court’s two-stage process:
- Step 1: Apply the 2023 Guideline to arrive at a provisional sentence for Count 1 alone (12 years starting point, adjusted upward for prolonged racing).
- Step 2: Further uplift to reflect the additional harm (grave injuries under Count 4) while mindful that the statutory cap (14 years maximum) intervenes only at the very end, so the judge may notionally calculate a higher figure before mitigation.
- Step 3: Apply mitigation (age, immaturity, pregnancy, personal injuries). The Court inferred the judge knocked off “at least four years.”
Youth and immaturity – Reaffirming Peters and Morgan Clarke, the Court held a qualitative assessment of each defendant’s maturity is required. Clarke’s traumatic brain injury and emotional immaturity warranted the same ultimate custodial term as Price, whose differing mitigation lay in childcare responsibilities.
No quasi-credit for partial admissions – A defendant who tenders an alternative plea (e.g., careless rather than dangerous driving) is not entitled to “discount” where the jury ultimately convicts of the more serious charge. This forecloses attempts to slice time off by styling such tactics as “realistic acceptance”.

Potential Impact on Future Litigation

The judgment’s twin contributions are likely to resonate well beyond motoring cases:

The “Price & Clarke procedure” for duplicitous counts – Appellate courts may decline to rectify technical defects where (i) all parties agree no injustice ensued, and (ii) substitution would be a purely formal exercise. Expect greater emphasis on practical harmless‐error analysis, potentially reducing satellite appeals.
Sentencing where guideline ranges meet statutory caps – The Court clarified that judges may theoretically compute a higher sentence than the statutory maximum before then applying the cap and deducting mitigation. This offers transparent mapping of how youth or other factors produced the final figure, aiding comparability and appellate scrutiny.
Confirmation of two-thirds release for serious driving offences – Though derivative of Barnes, the present case spreads awareness; future judges must align driving-ban extension periods with two-thirds, not halfway, release provisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duplicity – An indictment is “duplex” where a single count alleges two distinct offences. This contravenes the rule that each count must charge only one criminal act or omission. Normally cured by amending counts, but only serious if it impedes a fair trial.
Extension of time – Appeals must be lodged within strict deadlines. When a defendant seeks to appeal late, they must first obtain an “extension of time.” If the substantive grounds are plainly unmeritorious, courts can refuse the extension summarily.
Sentencing Guideline starting point vs. range – The Guideline supplies a starting point (the median sentence for a typical case) and a range (lower to upper bounds) for each culpability category. Judges adjust for aggravating/mitigating factors and then apply statutory caps.
Two-thirds release rule – Prisoners sentenced to certain serious offences after 1 December 2020 must serve at least two-thirds of their determinate sentence before being eligible for release on licence, compared with the traditional one-half.
Telematics “black box” – An insurer-installed device recording speed, location and driving behaviour. Increasingly relied upon as objective evidence in dangerous driving prosecutions.

Conclusion

Price & Clarke furnishes a two-pronged precedent. First, it crystallises a practical appellate response to duplicitous counts: where no miscarriage of justice is perceived, the Court of Appeal may simply refuse a time extension, leaving convictions intact. Second, it elucidates how sentencers should reconcile the 2023 driving Guideline with youth-centred mitigation and statutory maxima, explicitly permitting judges to build the sentence upwards before scaling back. The decision also cements the post-Barnes landscape in which serious motoring offenders serve two-thirds of their determinate terms and alerts courts to adjust driving-ban extensions accordingly.

Practitioners should note that partial admissions to lesser alternatives will not cushion eventual sentences, and that careful, evidence-based submissions on neuro-maturity remain pivotal for young adult defendants. Ultimately, the Court’s reasoning underscores a balance between public protection, proportional punishment, and nuanced recognition of developmental science—principles likely to reverberate in future dangerous-driving and wider criminal appeals.