Supreme Court Confirms Statutory Right to Wild-Camp on Dartmoor:
Darwall & Anor v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20

1. Introduction

The United Kingdom Supreme Court has delivered a landmark ruling in Darwall & Anor v Dartmoor National Park Authority, resolving a long-running dispute over whether the public right of access to Dartmoor Commons under s 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”) includes the freedom to pitch a tent and stay overnight—a practice popularly known as “wild camping”. Mr and Mrs Darwall, farmers and landowners at Blachford Manor, sought a declaration that no such statutory entitlement exists. They succeeded in the High Court but lost in the Court of Appeal, and have now seen their appeal dismissed by a five-justice panel (Lords Sales & Stephens delivering the only judgment, with Lord Reed PSC, Lady Rose and Lady Simler concurring).

At stake was the balance between private property rights and public recreational freedoms in England’s only national park to contain extensive privately-owned commons. The decision re-calibrates that balance, firmly embedding wild camping within the concept of “open-air recreation” for which Parliament granted a positive right of access in 1985. The ruling inevitably reverberates across access, conservation and property law, and significantly restates principles of statutory interpretation, the “principle of legality” and procedural rules for declarations affecting public rights.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Outcome: Appeal dismissed; Court of Appeal’s order restored. The public enjoys a statutory right to wild-camp on Dartmoor Commons provided they gain access on foot or on horseback and comply with applicable byelaws.
• Key Holding: The phrase “right of access … on foot and on horseback for the purpose of open-air recreation” in s 10(1) naturally encompasses camping. “On foot and on horseback” describes the means of access, not the scope of activities once on the land.
• Interpretive Method: Ordinary meaning, contextual reading with the National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (“the 1949 Act”), statutory history (Law of Property Act 1925 s 193), and modern purposive construction. No ambiguity arose, so Pepper v Hart material and the principle of legality were inapplicable.
• Procedural Guidance: Where litigants seek declarations limiting public rights, the Attorney-General (representing the public) must ordinarily be joined; the omission here was criticised though ultimately moot.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents & Authorities Cited

1. Foundational Statutes
   • National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act 1949 — ss 5, 59-60, 90 & Sch 2.
   • Law of Property Act 1925 — s 193 (public “air and exercise” on commons).
   • Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 — focus on s 10 and connected provisions.
2. Interpretation Cases
   • R (N3) v SSHD [2025] UKSC 6 — reiterated purposive approach.
   • Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens [2022] UKSC 3 — context-based reading.
   • Black-Clawson [1975] AC 591 & Spath Holme [2001] 2 AC 349 — meaning derived from statutory context.
   • Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 — limited admissibility of Hansard.
   • Wilson v First County Trust [2004] 1 AC 816; PACCAR [2023] UKSC 28 — use of external aids.
3. Constitutional Principles
   • R v SSHD, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 — principle of legality.
   • Gouriet v UPW [1978] AC 435; London Passenger Transport Board v Moscrop [1942] AC 332 — joinder of the Attorney-General for public rights.

Each authority informed the Court’s approach: historic statutes evidenced Parliament’s linguistic choices regarding outdoor recreation; interpretive cases supplied methodology; constitutional decisions framed the limitations of property rights and the procedural necessity of representing the broader public interest.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis of s 10(1)
   • “Right of access … on foot and on horseback” = how one must enter the commons.
   • “For the purpose of open-air recreation” = why one is there. Camping, like picnicking or bird-watching, is plainly within ordinary language.
   • The clause after the semicolon immunises those “on the commons for that purpose” from trespass liability, underscoring that lawful presence continues while stationary.
2. Context within the 1985 Act
   • Cross-references (s 10(3)) import the 1949 Act model, including Sch 2 restrictions rather than private trespass claims as regulatory tools.
   • Adjacent sections (ss 10(4), 10(11), 11, 14) use “recreation” unqualified, showing Parliament contemplated a broad spectrum of activities and provided mechanisms (byelaws, wardens) to manage their impact.
3. Broader Legislative History
   • The 1925 Act’s explicit exclusion of “camp[ing]” showed that, absent such carve-out, camping naturally counts as outdoor recreation.
   • The 1949 Act’s open and generous wording on “open-air recreation” echoes in the 1985 Act, affirming continuity.
4. Rejection of Contrary Arguments
   • Pepper v Hart: no ambiguity, so ministerial statements inadmissible.
   • Principle of Legality: restriction on trespass actions is express, balancing advantages conferred (public regulation, byelaws, wardens).
   • Byelaws: although supportive, they post-date the Act and can’t alter its meaning.
5. Procedural Observations
   A declaration affecting “the public” ought not be granted absent representation by the Attorney-General, echoing the Gouriet principle. The Court refrained from disturbing the procedural irregularity given its substantive dismissal of the appeal.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Dartmoor Practice: Restores de facto freedom to wild-camp (subject to byelaws) across ~37% of the National Park, providing certainty for visitors, landowners and DNPA.
• Statutory Interpretation: Reinforces that activity descriptors (“open-air recreation”) are read broadly unless Parliament expressly curtails them. Future litigation over access rights—under the Countryside & Rights of Way Act 2000 or local acts—will cite this judgment.
• Property Rights vs Public Rights: Clarifies the extent to which private owners of registered commons must yield to statutory recreation rights, potentially tempering reliance on trespass litigation in other commons or “right to roam” contexts.
• Procedural Precedent: Signals to practitioners and courts that declarations impacting the general public demand joinder (or at least notice) of the Attorney-General, promoting procedural propriety in public-rights disputes.
• Legislative Drafting: Highlights the sufficiency of existing byelaw-making powers to manage specific nuisances (fires, litter, overuse) rather than blanket statutory exclusions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Open-Air Recreation

A catch-all phrase Parliament has used since 1949 to describe leisure activities conducted outdoors on open land. Unless expressly narrowed, it includes walking, picnicking, camping, climbing, bird-watching, kite-flying, etc.

Means of Access vs Activity

Statutes often specify how the public may enter land (e.g., “on foot or on horseback”) but separately state what they may do once there. Confusing these can wrongly shrink public rights.

Principle of Legality

Courts presume Parliament does not intend to curtail fundamental rights (e.g., property, liberty) without clear words. Here, the Court held that s 10(1) is sufficiently clear in limiting landowners’ trespass rights.

Pepper v Hart Rule

Hansard may be consulted only when statutory wording is ambiguous or leads to absurdity, and ministerial statements are clear. No ambiguity existed, so Hansard was off-limits.

In Pari Materia

Latin for “on the same subject”. When two statutes address related matters, courts may read them consistently. The Court treated the 1949 and 1925 Acts as in pari materia with the 1985 Act.

Attorney-General’s Role

The A-G represents the public interest in court. Declarations restraining or defining public rights generally require the A-G to be a party so the public is bound.

5. Conclusion

Darwall decisively confirms that wild camping is a lawful facet of the public’s statutory right of “open-air recreation” on Dartmoor Commons. By reading s 10(1) according to its ordinary meaning and legislative context, the Supreme Court prioritised coherent statutory design over a narrow, property-centric construction. The ruling strengthens public recreational liberties, underscores the adequacy of regulatory tools such as byelaws to address specific harms, and offers a modern exemplar of purposive statutory interpretation. Going forward, legislators, landowners, national park authorities and outdoor enthusiasts will all look to this judgment as the definitive statement on the coexistence of private ownership and public enjoyment of England’s celebrated open landscapes.