Supreme Court Clarifies the Adverse Possession “Boundary Condition” Under the Land Registration Act 2002

Supreme Court Clarifies the Adverse Possession “Boundary Condition” Under the Land Registration Act 2002

1. Introduction

In Brown v Ridley & Anor (Rev1) ([2025] UKSC 7), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was asked to decide on a pivotal point of statutory interpretation within the Land Registration Act 2002. This case arose from a so-called “leapfrog appeal” from the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), with the central issue revolving around the construction of paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 to the Act (“the boundary condition”), which sets out the requirements to establish title to registered land through adverse possession.

The parties—Mr. Brown (the Respondent) and Mr. & Mrs. Ridley (the Appellants)—disputed ownership over a strip of land adjoining their respective properties. The Ridleys had occupied the disputed land for many years under the belief that it belonged to them, until evidence obtained during a planning application suggested otherwise. At stake was whether Schedule 6’s requirement that a person “reasonably believed” in their ownership of the disputed land for at least ten years demands that this belief persist up to the date of application for registration (Construction A), or whether the belief need only have existed for any continuous ten-year segment within the applicant’s overall period of adverse possession that immediately precedes the application (Construction B).

The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Appellants, confirming that the necessary “reasonable belief” does not have to continue right up to the date of the application, provided the belief lasted for at least ten years within the broader adverse possession period. This ruling stands to reshape the approach to boundary disputes under the Land Registration Act 2002 and significantly affects how future boundary-related adverse possession actions are handled.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Delivering the unanimous judgment, Lord Briggs, with whom Lords Hamblen, Stephens, Lady Rose, and Lady Simler agreed, held that the correct interpretation of paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 is that a long-term occupant of registered land may satisfy the “reasonable belief” requirement at any point over a continuous ten-year period of adverse possession, rather than needing that belief to persist through to the exact date of the application.

The Court noted that strictly requiring the “reasonable belief” to remain extant on the day of submission (Construction A) would render the “boundary condition” nearly impossible to meet in many routine scenarios. Once a landowner’s neighboring titleholder disputes the boundary, the occupant’s belief that the land belongs to them is often immediately called into question—yet preparing an application for registration necessarily takes longer than a single day. Therefore, adhering to Construction A would, in practice, defeat Parliament’s objective of providing a workable avenue for resolving boundary disputes under the new adverse possession framework.

Consequently, the judgment restored the earlier decision of the First-tier Tribunal, overruling the respondent’s narrower interpretation and enabling the Ridleys to be registered as proprietors of the disputed strip of land.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

While the Supreme Court’s decision ultimately hinged on the language and background policy of the Land Registration Act 2002, several previous cases played a background role:

  • Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306: The Court of Appeal had assumed, without explicit argument on the statutory construction point, that Construction A (requiring continuing belief up to the date of application) was the correct interpretation. In Brown v Ridley, however, the Supreme Court clarified that Zarb’s references to this issue were assumed and not reasoned judgments on the question. The Court expressly declined to treat them as binding.
  • Dowse v Bradford MBC [2020] UKUT 202 (LC): Although primarily concerned with the scope of “adjacent land,” this decision sheds light on how courts have approached boundary disputes under the 2002 Act.
  • JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2007) 46 EHRR 45: In this notable European Court of Human Rights ruling, the Grand Chamber upheld the older (pre-2002) adverse possession regime against human rights challenges. Though focused on the broader question of expropriation, it underscored the wide margin of appreciation granted to member states in structuring land title laws.

Collectively, these precedents illustrate both the evolution of thought around adverse possession and how Brown v Ridley emerges as a critical point of clarification for the “boundary condition” in registered land contexts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The crux of the dispute was a matter of statutory construction, specifically the meaning of the words “for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application” in paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6. Two potential interpretations arose:

  • Construction A: The occupant’s belief that the land belongs to them must remain reasonable up to and including the date of the application for registration.
  • Construction B: The occupant must have held a reasonable belief in their ownership for at least a continuous ten-year period at any time within the occupant’s overall period of adverse possession that extends to the date of application (but not necessarily up to that last day).

Lord Briggs emphasized that ordinary grammar naturally points to Construction B:

  • The phrase “ending on the date of the application” attaches to the full adverse possession requirement, not necessarily to the occupant’s state of mind.
  • A purely literal reading that demands continued belief up to the application date would, in most boundary disputes, be “illusory,” because once the occupant suspects they are trespassing, they cannot meet the day-of requirement yet also cannot prepare an application instantly.

Further, the Court found that a de minimis principle could not rescue Construction A by allowing a few days or months between discovery of the true boundary and the application date. A window of one or two months is not “de minimis,” but rather a substantial (and necessary) period for gathering surveys, documentation, and legal advice. Parliament, if it wished to prescribe such a grace period, would have expressly done so as it did for other scenarios (e.g., the six-month window in cases of eviction).

3.3 Impact

Brown v Ridley confirms that the “reasonable belief” requirement does not have to continue unabated until the morning of the application. Instead, an occupant who once held a genuine and objectively reasonable belief for at least ten consecutive years during the broader time in adverse possession can meet the threshold, paving the way for a successful application if other sub-paragraphs of the boundary condition (e.g., land adjacency, undetermined boundary) are likewise satisfied.

This ruling may have multiple practical consequences:

  • Enhanced Clarity for Boundary Disputes: Landowners may now be more inclined to bring applications under the “boundary condition” after discovering they are not the paper title owner but have possessed the land in good faith for many years.
  • Shift in Neighbor Negotiations: Realizing that losing a “reasonable belief” on day one does not destroy an adverse possession claim, opposing landowners might approach disputes with less reliance on the occupant’s newly discovered awareness. This could encourage earlier negotiations before the occupant finalizes an application.
  • Reduced Litigation Risks: While litigation may still occur, the more accessible standard could reduce unproductive procedural wrangling over the occupant’s state of mind at a specific date.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse possession refers to the occupation of land, without the owner’s permission, in a way that can eventually ripen into ownership if particular conditions are satisfied. Under the Land Registration Act 2002, the occupant must apply to HM Land Registry to become the registered proprietor, proving:

  1. They have possessed the land exclusively and without permission for ten years up to the date of the application (or until eviction with an application soon thereafter).
  2. They meet one of three conditions set forth in paragraph 5 of Schedule 6.

The “boundary condition” is the third of those conditions. It applies when:

  • The disputed land is adjacent to the occupant’s own land.
  • The exact boundary line has not been determined under land registry rules.
  • The occupant (or predecessor) had a “reasonable belief” for at least ten years that the land was theirs.
  • The land in question was registered for at least one year before the occupant’s application.

In Brown v Ridley, the Supreme Court clarified that the “ten-year reasonable belief” period need not extend right up to the day of application. This interpretation avoids penalizing an occupant who only learns of a boundary dispute (thus disabusing them of their belief) shortly before filing.

5. Conclusion

Brown v Ridley & Anor ([2025] UKSC 7) stands as a significant clarification of Parliament’s intentions in designing the new adverse possession regime under the Land Registration Act 2002. The Supreme Court’s endorsement of “Construction B” resolves the inherent tension between the words of paragraph 5(4)(c) and real-world boundary disputes, ensuring the “boundary condition” remains an effective tool for occupants who long believed themselves to be lawful owners.

By removing the requirement for an occupant’s reasonable belief to persist until the literal day the registration application is filed, the Court preserves Parliament’s broader objective of reducing frivolous claims without destroying the remedial aspect of adverse possession for genuine boundary mistakes. In the broader legal context, Brown v Ridley confirms that while the Land Registration Act 2002 sharply limited the scope of adverse possession against registered titles, it did not render it impossible, especially in typical boundary scenarios. This decision is expected to influence future tribunal and court determinations on adverse possession, providing practical guidance for both landowners and occupants embroiled in boundary disputes.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: United Kingdom Supreme Court

Comments