Substance over Form in POCA Committals and Assessment of Benefit in Planning Enforcement Sentencing:
Commentary on R v Salem & Robinson‑Dadoun [2025] EWCA Crim 1602

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Salem & Robinson‑Dadoun [2025] EWCA Crim 1602, a significant decision at the intersection of criminal planning enforcement, confiscation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”), and the sentencing powers of the Crown Court following committal from the magistrates’ court.

The case arises from persistent and deliberate non-compliance with a planning enforcement notice issued by the London Borough of Camden (“the Council”) under section 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“TCPA 1990”). The appellants, Salem and Robinson‑Dadoun, converted a property authorized for four flats into seven flats, let them out for many years in defiance of the enforcement notice, and continued to re-let even after criminal proceedings had begun.

The Crown Court imposed:

A confiscation order of £1 against Salem and £16,696 against Robinson‑Dadoun under s.6 POCA.
A fine of £262,500 on Salem and £70,000 on Robinson‑Dadoun.
Substantial prosecution costs: £185,258.73 (Salem) and £61,752.91 (Robinson‑Dadoun).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal was primarily concerned with:

Whether the Crown Court’s sentencing powers were in law limited to the magistrates’ maximum fine (then £20,000) for part of the offending period, given the way the case was committed under POCA (Ground 1).
Whether the very substantial costs orders (including those arising out of confiscation proceedings) were justified, both as a matter of principle and in light of the appellants’ alleged means (Ground 4).
A series of auxiliary challenges (Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6), focused on the level of fine, the interaction between confiscation findings and sentencing, the drawing of inferences about the appellants’ means, and the treatment of corporate assets.

Leave to appeal had been granted by the single judge on Ground 1 and later, at the hearing, by the full court on Ground 4. Leave on Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 was refused and those refusals were expressly endorsed by the Court of Appeal.

The judgment has enduring importance in several respects:

It clarifies that the Crown Court’s sentencing powers on a POCA committal are not curtailed by imperfections or silence in the committal certificate where the case was in substance committed for sentence and all parties proceeded on that basis.
It reaffirms that “financial benefit” for sentencing under s.179(9) TCPA 1990 is the gross rental income from the unlawful use, regardless of how offenders subsequently apply that income (e.g. to pay mortgages).
It emphasises that sentencing and costs decisions are not rigidly constrained by earlier confiscation findings, particularly where the defendants have obscured their true financial position.
It confirms a robust approach to costs orders where defendants’ non-compliance and obfuscation have rendered confiscation proceedings unusually burdensome and expensive.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Background

Salem (61) and Robinson‑Dadoun (53) were convicted in 2020 at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court (before DJ Allison) of failing to comply with an enforcement notice, contrary to s.179(2) and (8) TCPA 1990. The Council, as local planning authority, also prosecuted.

The enforcement notice (served in October 2010) required compliance by May 2011. The appellants ignored this and continued letting seven flats (despite permission only for four), even entering into fresh tenancies after summonses were issued in October 2018 and after their first Magistrates’ appearance in late 2018. They continued receiving rent until the property’s sale in April 2021.

The magistrates committed the case to the Crown Court under POCA for confiscation and (as the Crown Court ultimately held) for sentence. Confiscation proceedings concluded in September 2023; sentencing for the s.179 offences (fine and costs) occurred in February 2024.

2.2 Sentences in the Crown Court

Confiscation (September 2023):
Salem: nominal confiscation order of £1 (deemed served).
Robinson‑Dadoun: confiscation order of £16,696, payable within 3 months or 12 months’ imprisonment in default.
Fine and costs (February 2024):
Salem: fine of £262,500 (9 months to pay; 3 years’ default imprisonment) and £185,258.73 towards the Council’s costs.
Robinson‑Dadoun: fine of £70,000 (9 months to pay; 18 months’ default imprisonment) and £61,752.91 towards the Council’s costs.

The sentencing judge (HHJ Aaronberg KC) made severe findings as to culpability, deliberate and prolonged non-compliance, the exploitation of vulnerable tenants in unsatisfactory conditions, and the deliberate structuring of mortgage and corporate arrangements to reduce apparent assets and frustrate confiscation.

2.3 Grounds of Appeal

The appellants’ grounds (as summarised) were:

Ground 1 – Sentencing Powers: The Crown Court’s power to fine was, they argued, limited to the magistrates’ maximum (£20,000) for part of the offending period.
Ground 2 – Starting Point: The sentencing judge allegedly adopted an excessive starting point for the fine, by wrongly treating gross rental income as “benefit”.
Ground 3 – Confiscation Findings: The judge was said to be bound, in sentencing, by his earlier confiscation findings that Salem had no available assets and that Robinson‑Dadoun’s available assets were only £16,696.
Ground 4 – Costs: The judge erred in awarding the Council its full prosecution and confiscation costs, and in concluding that the appellants had the means to pay.
Ground 5 – Wrong Inferences: The judge allegedly erred in concluding that breaches of the Financial Circumstances Order justified inference of substantial undisclosed means.
Ground 6 – Company Assets: The judge failed properly to distinguish between assets of companies and assets of the appellants personally.

Leave was granted on Ground 1 (by the single judge) and on Ground 4 (by the full court). Leave on Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 was refused as unarguable, and the Court of Appeal adopted the single judge’s reasons.

2.4 Outcome

Ground 1 (sentencing powers): dismissed.
Ground 4 (costs): dismissed.
Grounds 2, 3, 5, 6: leave to appeal refused.

The fines and costs orders therefore stand in full; the appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

3. Legal and Factual Context

3.1 Statutory Framework: s.179 TCPA 1990

The offence was failing to comply with a planning enforcement notice under s.179 TCPA 1990. Key features:

The owner of land who is in breach of an enforcement notice commits an offence (s.179(2)).
It is a defence to show that the defendant did everything they could reasonably be expected to do to secure compliance (s.179(3)).
Before 15 March 2015, the maximum fine on summary conviction was £20,000 (s.179(8)(a) old version), with an unlimited fine on indictment (s.179(8)(b)).
After 15 March 2015, following the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Fines on Summary Conviction) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/664) (“the LASPO Regulations”), the maximum was removed: on summary conviction or on indictment, the offender is simply “liable … to a fine” (s.179(8) new version), i.e. an unlimited fine in both courts.
In determining the amount of any fine, the court “shall in particular have regard to any financial benefit which has accrued or appears likely to accrue to [the offender] in consequence of the offence” (s.179(9)).

The offending in this case spanned both regimes: from 19 May 2011 to 6 June 2018.

3.2 Committal under POCA and the Sentencing Code

The committal from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court took place under:

POCA ss.70–71: allowing committal where the prosecutor seeks confiscation. Where the magistrates’ court could itself commit for sentence under s.14(2) of the Sentencing Code (e.g. where its sentencing powers are insufficient), it must state whether it would have done so. If it would have, the Crown Court has the same sentencing powers as if the offender had been convicted on indictment (s.71(2)); if not, its powers are limited to those of the magistrates’ court (s.71(3)).
Sentencing Code s.14(2): empowers the magistrates to commit an offender to the Crown Court for sentence where their powers are insufficient.

The appellants relied on perceived deficiencies in the committal paperwork to argue that, at least for pre‑15 March 2015 offending, the Crown Court’s sentencing powers were capped at the magistrates’ former statutory maximum of £20,000.

3.3 Financial Circumstances Orders & Disclosure Failures

The sentencing judge had made a Financial Circumstances Order requiring disclosure of the appellants’ financial position. The appellants failed to comply fully, omitting material such as full bank statements for Imperial House Ltd and concealing a shareholding in that company by Robinson‑Dadoun. The Court of Appeal noted that:

The appellants accepted in their Perfected Grounds that they had not complied fully with the Financial Circumstances Order.
This non‑compliance underpinned the sentencing judge’s adverse inferences about their true wealth and capacity to pay fines and costs.

These disclosure failures were central to the appeal on costs and to the attempted reliance on earlier confiscation findings of limited means.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 R v Roderick Bloor [2020] EWCA Crim 402

In Bloor, the Court of Appeal confirmed that, following the LASPO Regulations, magistrates have power to impose unlimited fines for certain offences where the previous statutory maxima were removed. In the context of s.179 TCPA 1990, the effect was to align magistrates’ and Crown Court sentencing powers, making both capable of imposing unlimited fines.

Haddon‑Cave LJ described the sentencing powers as a “broad sentencing canvass”, emphasising that courts must of course be guided by the statutory purposes of sentencing but are not artificially constrained by former monetary limits once removed.

In Salem, this authority is used to:

Confirm that for post‑15 March 2015 offending, magistrates had unlimited fining power.
Underscore that the Crown Court’s powers were similarly unrestricted, so any technical argument that its powers were limited to £20,000 for the whole period was conceptually unsound.

4.2 Hussain v R (London Borough of Brent) [2014] EWCA Crim 2344

Hussain concerned similar planning enforcement offences. There, the magistrates retained jurisdiction over sentencing and committed the case to the Crown Court only because the prosecution sought confiscation. The committal expressly specified that the reason was confiscation alone.

In Salem, the Court of Appeal distinguishes Hussain on its facts, using it as a contrast:

In Hussain, the magistrates’ intention not to commit for sentence was clear.
In Salem, by contrast, contemporaneous records, later email confirmation from the court’s legal adviser, and the conduct of both parties showed that the magistrates had committed for sentence, even though the standard form wording was not as clear as it might have been.

4.3 R v Butt [2023] EWHC Crim 1131

Butt involved serious procedural defects in sending or committing a case from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court. It provides a structured approach (at [64]) to analysing such issues:

What power was exercised by the magistrates’ court when sending or committing the case?
Was that power exercised erroneously?
If so, what are the consequences of the procedural error?
What steps can or should be taken to correct the error?

In Salem, the Court adopts that analytical framework but concludes:

The relevant power was under POCA ss.70–71 (committal for confiscation and, in fact, for sentence).
The power was properly exercised; there was no real procedural error. The references to “committal for sentence/to be dealt with” were sufficient, in context, to show that s.14(2) Sentencing Code was engaged.
Even if there had been an error, it would have had no practical consequence because everyone – prosecution, defence, and sentencing judge – understood and proceeded on the basis that the Crown Court had the full sentencing powers.

4.4 R v Rance [2013] 1 Cr App R (S) 123

In Rance, the Court of Appeal reduced a costs order on the basis that a substantial proportion of the prosecution’s costs related to confiscation proceedings which were “fruitless” and did not ultimately advance the case.

The appellants in Salem sought to rely on Rance to argue that the Council’s confiscation work had been similarly fruitless and that they should not bear those costs.

The Court of Appeal in Salem distinguished Rance on two main grounds:

The confiscation proceedings here were not inherently fruitless; they were rendered protracted and unrewarding because of the appellants’ own conduct in failing to disclose and in obscuring their financial affairs.
By the time of sentencing, it was clear (on far more complete evidence) that the appellants were of significant means; the limited confiscation orders did not reflect a lack of assets so much as the state of knowledge at the confiscation stage.

4.5 R v Wiseman [2023] EWCA Crim 1363

In Wiseman, the Court of Appeal addressed the approach to defendants’ means when making costs orders. It held that:

The court is not required to make precise, accountant‑level findings of a defendant’s means before ordering costs.
The proper test is whether the judge is satisfied that the defendant has, or will have within a reasonable time, the means to pay the costs proposed.

In Salem, the Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the sentencing judge’s reliance on Wiseman and his conclusion that precise quantification was unnecessary: it was enough that he was satisfied that both appellants had substantial undisclosed means sufficient to meet the costs orders.

4.6 Other Authorities Mentioned

The Court briefly referred to s.142 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (power to correct mistakes) and Criminal Procedure Rule 5.4 (duty to make and correct court records), noting that amendments in 2022 made the recording duty mandatory. Those provisions were ultimately academic here because no material recording error was found.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Ground 1: Sentencing Powers and POCA Committals

5.1.1 The Appellants’ Case

The appellants argued that:

Before 15 March 2015, the magistrates’ court could impose a maximum fine of £20,000 for s.179 offences; the Crown Court’s power was unlimited on indictment.
Where a matter is committed to the Crown Court under POCA ss.70–71, the Crown Court’s sentencing powers depend on whether the magistrates would have committed for sentence under s.14(2) Sentencing Code.
The committal certificate did not expressly state that the magistrates would have committed for sentence because their sentencing powers were insufficient. It spoke of committal “for sentence or to be dealt with”.
Accordingly, the Crown Court’s powers for pre‑15 March 2015 offending should be treated as capped at £20,000, either as a matter of law or at least as a matter of fairness in setting the fine.

5.1.2 The Statutory Scheme

Sections 70–71 POCA create two routes:

Committal for confiscation only: If the magistrates do not or would not exercise s.14(2) Sentencing Code, the Crown Court’s power to sentence is limited to the magistrates’ own sentencing powers (s.71(3)).
Committal for confiscation and sentence: If the magistrates state that they would have committed for sentence (because their powers are insufficient), then the Crown Court’s powers mirror those it would possess on conviction on indictment (s.71(2)).

The key question was therefore factual and procedural: did the magistrates in this case in fact commit the appellants to the Crown Court for sentence as well as for confiscation?

5.1.3 The Evidence of Committal for Sentence

The Court looked at:

The committal record sheet stating “Committal for sentence/to be dealt with”.
The Crown Court “CCDDES” register extract stating: “Defendant committed for Wood Green Crown Court – sentence or to be dealt with”.
An email from the magistrates’ court legal adviser (Richard Goss) dated 28 May 2021, confirming: “On that date the defendants were committed to Wood Green Crown Court for sentence and for consideration of a Confiscation Order.”
The prosecution’s written submissions at sentence, which unequivocally stated that there was no statutory maximum fine in the Crown Court and referred to unlawful rental income of around £700,000.
Critically, the defence’s own written submissions, which expressly accepted that “the Crown Court’s powers are set out in section 179(8) TCPA, it can impose an unlimited fine”.

The Court placed particular weight on the appellants’ own acceptance (extending to their written submissions) that the Crown Court had unlimited fining powers. This was wholly inconsistent with their later attempt to argue that the Crown Court was in fact restricted to £20,000.

5.1.4 Application of Butt and the “Procedural Error” Analysis

Applying the Butt questions:

What power was exercised?
POCA ss.70–71: the magistrates committed the appellants for confiscation and, on the Court’s findings, for sentence under s.14(2) Sentencing Code.
Was it exercised erroneously?
No. The Court held that, despite the somewhat inelegant standard wording (“for sentence or to be dealt with”), the substance and contemporaneous record (including the legal adviser’s email and the parties’ subsequent conduct) showed that the magistrates intended and did commit for sentence.
If there was an error, what were the consequences?
Even if one assumed an error in record‑keeping, there were no adverse consequences for the appellants. All parties understood that the Crown Court had full sentencing powers, and the defence never suggested a £20,000 cap during the Crown Court hearings – a point which, if valid, would have been central to their submissions.
What steps to correct?
Not necessary, given the Court’s conclusion that no material error occurred and that any defect would be harmless.

5.1.5 Rejection of the “Fairness” Sub‑Argument

The appellants advanced an alternative, more modest contention: even if the Crown Court was not legally bound by a £20,000 maximum, it ought to have factored in, as a matter of fairness, that some of the offending pre‑dated the change in the magistrates’ powers.

The Court rejected this. The relevant question under s.179(9) was the financial benefit from the whole period of offending, assessed in the modern sentencing environment where unlimited fines are available. The seriousness of the offending – prolonged defiance, substantial gain, exploitation of vulnerable tenants, and deception – justified the fines imposed.

Accordingly, Ground 1 failed both as a matter of procedural law and as a matter of substantive fairness.

5.2 Ground 2: Benefit, Mortgages, and the “Starting Point”

Although leave was refused, the Court took the opportunity to clarify an important point of principle in paragraph 23 of the judgment: the relationship between “benefit” and how offenders apply the proceeds.

The appellants argued that the gross rental income received from the unlawful flats should not be treated as “benefit” for sentencing purposes because much of it was used to service mortgages, sometimes to other companies in their corporate network.

The Court decisively rejected this argument:

The “financial benefit” from the offence is the receipt of the rental income resulting from the unlawful use of the property.
What the offender chooses to do with that income – pay off mortgages, buy jewellery, donate to charity, or gamble it away – does not change its character as benefit.
This applies whether mortgagees are connected companies or independent banks: using proceeds of crime to discharge liabilities does not negate the benefit.

This aligns the sentencing calculation under s.179(9) with the established approach in confiscation law, where “benefit” is generally gross benefit, subject only to narrow statutory and case‑law qualifications.

The Court also endorsed the single judge’s view that the sentencing judge had been “perhaps generous” in reducing the calculated benefit from £487,966.16 to £300,000 as a working figure for sentencing. The attack on the starting point was therefore unarguable.

5.3 Ground 3: Confiscation Findings and Sentencing

The appellants argued that the sentencing judge was bound by his earlier confiscation findings that Salem had no available assets and that Robinson‑Dadoun had available assets of only £16,696, and that he could not later conclude that both had significant means sufficient to pay high fines and costs.

The Court emphatically rejected this:

Confiscation and sentencing serve different purposes and can be informed by different evidential pictures at different times.
It would be impossible in principle to say that the court is forever bound by an earlier confiscation assessment of assets, especially where the defendant has subsequently been found to have misled the court or to have concealed assets.
Here, far more detailed and extensive financial evidence emerged (or became intelligible) by the time of sentencing. It was entirely proper for the judge to make fuller, more adverse findings at that stage.
To hold otherwise would reward defendants who successfully obscure their true means during confiscation, then seek to rely on that obscured picture to shield themselves from appropriate fines and costs.

Accordingly, the Court held that the sentencing judge was not legally constrained by his earlier confiscation findings when determining fines or costs.

5.4 Grounds 5 and 6: Inferences and Corporate Structures

Grounds 5 and 6 challenged the judge’s adverse inferences about the appellants’ means and his treatment of corporate assets as indicative of personal wealth. The Court upheld the single judge’s reasons for refusing leave:

The sentencing judge had conducted extended evidential hearings, cross‑examined the appellants, and painstakingly analysed multiple lever arch files of financial documents.
He found Salem’s evidence to be a “dishonest miasma” and concluded that Salem was “a wealthy individual who has contrived, over many years, to produce an elaborate and impenetrable network of shareholdings, directorships and property assets … to conceal his true wealth from the court”.
He concluded that “he has the ability to meet any order as to fine and costs which I make” and that Robinson‑Dadoun likewise had undisclosed assets.
It is not the role of the Court of Appeal to re‑try factual findings based on credibility and intensive document analysis, absent clear error or unreasonableness. The appellants did not come close to that high threshold.
Ground 6 added nothing material: the judge was entitled to treat complex corporate dealings – including very large sums passing through a company like Imperial House Ltd – as part of the evidential picture when assessing personal means, particularly where the appellants had not clearly demonstrated that these assets were genuinely beyond their control.

5.5 Ground 4: Costs Orders

5.5.1 The Appellants’ Case

Ground 4 had two limbs:

As a matter of principle, the appellants argued that they should not pay the Council’s costs in the confiscation proceedings, on the basis that those proceedings were largely determined in line with their early assertion that they had little or no available assets. They relied on Rance to argue that the confiscation work was “fruitless”.
In any event, they argued that, given the modest confiscation orders (£1 and £16,696), it was wrong for the judge to make large costs orders against them: the confiscation findings allegedly showed that they lacked the means to pay.

5.5.2 The Court’s Response

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s approach in full:

The confiscation proceedings (June 2021–September 2023) were “unusually protracted”, involving multiple delays, challenges and extensive financial investigation work, which the Court accepted were largely caused by the appellants.
As the sentencing judge recorded at [88], by the time of sentencing he had found that “both defendants are in a position to make very substantial payments and, had their true financial status been declared in the confiscation proceedings, much if not all of the fruitless work would have been avoided.”
In other words, the reason the confiscation proceedings appeared “fruitless” was not any overreach or misjudgment by the Council, but the appellants’ concealment and delay.
Relying on Wiseman, the judge correctly directed himself that he did not need precise accounting of means to order costs; he merely had to be satisfied that each defendant had the means to pay. He expressly stated that he was so satisfied.
He rejected the contention that the Council had incurred “unnecessary” costs, accepting instead the prosecution’s submission that it could not abandon allegations such as “sham mortgages” until late‑served material (7 September 2023) clarified matters.
The judge concluded – and the Court of Appeal endorsed – that “the very significant costs … have arisen as a direct result of the defendants’ conduct which has vastly increased the costs which would otherwise have been incurred” and that “it would be wholly wrong for the Council’s taxpayers to meet the Council’s costs in these proceedings.”

Thus, both limbs of Ground 4 failed:

As a matter of principle, there was nothing wrong in ordering the appellants to pay the prosecution’s full costs where their own conduct had driven those costs.
As a matter of means, the judge was entitled to find that they could pay, notwithstanding earlier confiscation orders which had been made on an incomplete (because misleading) evidential basis.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Enforcement Notice and s.179 TCPA Offence

A planning enforcement notice is issued by a local planning authority when development has occurred without permission or in breach of conditions. The notice specifies:

What is alleged to be unlawful (here: use of the property as seven flats).
What steps must be taken (e.g. stop the unlawful use, reduce to four flats).
A compliance period.

If, after the compliance period ends, the owner does not comply – by taking the required steps or stopping the prohibited use – the owner commits a criminal offence under s.179 TCPA 1990.

6.2 Magistrates’ Court vs Crown Court and “Committal for Sentence”

The magistrates’ court is the usual starting point for lower‑level offences, with limited sentencing powers.
The Crown Court deals with more serious cases and has greater sentencing powers, including unlimited fines for many offences.
If the magistrates consider that their sentencing powers are insufficient for the gravity of the case, they may commit the offender to the Crown Court for sentence under s.14(2) of the Sentencing Code.

In a POCA case, the magistrates may also commit for confiscation. If they do so and indicate that they “would have” committed for sentence anyway (because their powers were insufficient), then the Crown Court can sentence as if the case had been tried there, with full powers.

6.3 POCA Confiscation vs Fine

It is important to distinguish:

A confiscation order aims to remove the financial benefit the offender has obtained from their criminal conduct. It is calculated by reference to “benefit” and “available amount” under POCA.
A fine is a punishment for the offence itself, set by considering seriousness, culpability, harm, and the offender’s means, guided by statutory purposes of sentencing (punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.).

The two are related but distinct. A small confiscation order can coexist with a large fine, particularly where:

Assets have been dissipated or concealed by the time of confiscation, but
There is evidence that the offender remains of substantial means or has ongoing earning capacity relevant to sentencing and costs.

6.4 “Financial Benefit” vs “Profit”

“Financial benefit” in s.179(9) does not mean “profit after expenses”; it is closer to:

All money received because of the offence – here, the gross rent from unlawfully let flats – regardless of what is later done with it.

Deducting mortgage payments, loan servicing, or other expenses is not permitted in this context. Allowing that would create an easy avenue for offenders to launder benefit into apparent legitimate outgoings, or to claim poverty after voluntarily using criminal proceeds to pay down debts.

6.5 Costs Orders and “Means”

A criminal court may order a convicted person to pay the prosecution’s costs. When doing so:

The court considers whether it is just and reasonable that the defendant pay, in whole or in part.
It considers ability to pay, but – per Wiseman – need not calculate this with mathematical precision. The judge must simply be satisfied that the defendant can pay the level of costs proposed, now or within a reasonable time.

Where the defendant has deliberately hidden or obscured their finances, courts may draw adverse inferences: they will not permit a defendant to benefit from their own non‑disclosure.

6.6 Corporate Structures and Personal Means

Defendants sometimes hold assets through companies or complex structures. The court asks:

Who really controls or benefits from the company’s assets?
Are the companies arms‑length, or effectively alter egos of the defendant?

If a defendant uses a “web” of companies to generate and receive income, and fails to provide clear evidence that these assets are genuinely outside their control, courts are entitled to treat those corporate dealings as part of the evidence of personal wealth. The more opaque and deliberate the structure, the more likely the court is to infer concealment rather than genuine separation.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Planning Enforcement and Sentencing Policy

This judgment reinforces a robust approach to sentencing for planning enforcement offences:

Substantial fines – in six figures – are legitimate and will be upheld where there has been prolonged, deliberate non‑compliance, substantial financial gain, and exploitation of vulnerable tenants.
The removal of the statutory maximum fine for s.179 offences on summary conviction, and the alignment of magistrates’ and Crown Court powers, is not a mere technicality: it supports a deterrent policy against landlords who treat enforcement notices as optional.
The Court’s clear statement that “benefit” means gross rental income prevents offenders from reducing their apparent benefit by channeling proceeds into mortgages or other financial arrangements.

7.2 POCA Committals: Substance Over Form

On POCA committals, the judgment promotes a practical, substance‑based approach:

Courts will look beyond imperfections in the committal certificate to the real nature of what was done in the magistrates’ court and what all parties understood.
Where the record, contemporaneous documents, and parties’ own conduct show that the case was in fact committed for sentence, the Crown Court will be treated as having full sentencing powers under s.71(2) POCA.
Defendants cannot wait until after sentence to exploit technical ambiguities in standard forms, particularly if their own counsel told the sentencing judge that the Crown Court had unlimited fining power.

7.3 Confiscation vs Sentencing and Costs: No “One‑Way” Constraint

The judgment makes clear that:

Earlier confiscation findings do not “freeze” the court’s understanding of a defendant’s means for all future purposes.
Where better or more complete evidence later emerges – or where the court finds that it was previously misled – the sentencing and costs decisions can rightly be based on that fuller picture.
Defendants who successfully minimise or conceal assets at the confiscation stage cannot then complain if, when their true financial strength emerges, they are subjected to large fines and costs orders.

7.4 Costs and Public Funding of Enforcement

The decision has practical significance for local authorities:

It endorses the principle that the wrongdoer, not the public purse, should bear the costs of complex enforcement and confiscation proceedings, particularly where those proceedings were lengthened by the defendant’s non‑cooperation.
The Court’s explicit concern that Council taxpayers should not pay for costs inflated by defendants’ evasive behaviour will support robust costs applications in future planning enforcement cases.

7.5 Message to Defendants Using Complex Financial Structures

Finally, the case sends a clear message:

Using elaborate corporate or mortgage arrangements to obscure wealth is unlikely to protect defendants from severe financial penalties.
Failure to comply with financial disclosure orders (such as Financial Circumstances Orders) will lead courts to draw adverse inferences rather than give defendants the benefit of any doubt.
Attempts to “game” the interaction between confiscation and sentencing – for example, by arguing that a nominal confiscation order proves lack of means – will not succeed where the court later finds evidence of substantial wealth.

8. Conclusion

R v Salem & Robinson‑Dadoun is a significant planning enforcement and sentencing decision that does three main things:

It confirms that, in the context of POCA committals, substance prevails over form: where a case has in fact been committed for sentence as well as confiscation, and all parties have proceeded on that basis, the Crown Court’s full sentencing powers are engaged, despite imperfections in the committal paperwork.
It firmly establishes that, for s.179 TCPA 1990 sentencing, the “financial benefit” to which the court must have regard is the gross rental income derived from unlawful occupation, irrespective of how the money is later spent or applied.
It underlines that confiscation findings do not rigidly bind later sentencing and costs decisions, especially where defendants have obscured their financial affairs; courts are entitled to take a more adverse view once fuller evidence of wealth emerges.

In practical terms, the judgment strengthens the hand of local authorities in tackling serious, profit‑driven breaches of planning control and sends a strong deterrent message to landlords who might otherwise view enforcement notices as a mere commercial risk. At the same time, it provides authoritative guidance on the interaction between POCA committals, sentencing powers, and costs orders, ensuring that technical defects in paperwork cannot be turned into a shield against substantial and deserved financial penalties.

Substance over Form in POCA Committals and Assessment of Benefit in Planning Enforcement Sentencing: Commentary on R v Salem & Robinson‑Dadoun [2025] EWCA Crim 1602