Rehabilitation and the “Very Compelling Circumstances” Test under s.117C(6) NIAA: Commentary on Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1597

Rehabilitation and the “Very Compelling Circumstances” Test under s.117C(6) NIAA: Commentary on Majera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1597

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1597, a deportation case involving a Rwandan national sentenced to imprisonment for public protection (“IPP”) following a series of extremely serious robberies. The case concerns:

  • The correct application of the “very compelling circumstances” test in s.117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”) where the foreign criminal relies heavily on rehabilitation;
  • The adequacy of reasons required from the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) when allowing an appeal under that provision;
  • The scope of the Upper Tribunal’s (“UT”) powers under s.12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“TCEA”), particularly whether there is any entitlement to remittal so that an appellant can benefit from a “two-tier” appeal process; and
  • The role of delay and mental health evidence in the proportionality assessment under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The appeal arose after:

  • An original deportation order in 2012 was upheld on appeal (FtT and UT);
  • The appellant was later released from IPP; and
  • A fresh appeal in 2022 succeeded before the FtT on the basis of rehabilitation and passage of time, but was overturned by the UT, which remade the decision and dismissed the appeal.

Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant challenged the UT on three fronts:

  1. That the UT (Jackson UTJ) was wrong to find that the FtT’s 2022 decision (Judge Young‑Harry) contained a material error of law and to set it aside.
  2. That, if there was an error of law, the UT should have remitted the case to the FtT (or at least preserved some FtT findings), rather than remake the decision itself.
  3. That the UT (Mandalia UTJ), in remaking the decision, misapplied the law in concluding that there were no “very compelling circumstances” to outweigh the public interest in deportation.

Additionally, by Respondent’s Notice, the Secretary of State contended that rehabilitation is, as a matter of law, incapable of amounting to “very compelling circumstances” under s.117C(6), arguing that it bears only on risk of reoffending and not on the wider public interests of deterrence and public concern.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds and declined to accept the Secretary of State’s extreme position on rehabilitation. The decision substantially clarifies:

  • The structural requirements for a lawful and adequately reasoned application of the s.117C(6) test;
  • The limited but real role that rehabilitation may play in that assessment;
  • The operation of s.12 TCEA and the Practice Statement on remittal vs remaking; and
  • The treatment of delay, mental health, and expert evidence in serious-offender deportation appeals.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

The Court of Appeal:

  • Upheld the UT’s decision (Jackson UTJ) to set aside the FtT’s 2022 decision for material errors of law in applying the “very compelling circumstances” test and in failing to give adequate reasons.
  • Confirmed that the UT had been entitled – indeed, in practice expected – to remake the decision itself under s.12(2)(b) TCEA, rather than remitting to the FtT, and that there is no general right to a two-tier appellate process.
  • Approved Mandalia UTJ’s re-made decision dismissing the Article 8 appeal, finding no material legal error in his proportionality assessment including his treatment of rehabilitation, delay, deterrence, and mental health evidence.
  • Rejected the Secretary of State’s submission that rehabilitation is legally incapable of satisfying s.117C(6), though confirming it will “rarely” be of great weight and must be carefully located in the Article 8 proportionality analysis.

2.2 Central Legal Holdings

The main legal conclusions can be distilled as follows:

  1. Structured proportionality and adequacy of reasons under s.117C(6): A FtT decision applying the “very compelling circumstances” test must:
    • Demonstrate awareness of the statutory scheme and leading authorities (especially HA (Iraq));
    • Identify the relevant factors on both sides (public interest vs Article 8 rights) and the facts underpinning them;
    • Explain the relative weight given to these factors, including the seriousness of the offending and the limited general weight of rehabilitation; and
    • Show why the particular circumstances amount to “very compelling circumstances over and above” Exceptions 1 and 2.
    • Rehabilitation’s role in the s.117C(6) test:
      • Rehabilitation is a relevant factor in Article 8 proportionality and may reduce the “public safety” aspect of the public interest in deportation.
      • It “will rarely be of great weight” given that the public interest also rests on general deterrence and other policy considerations.
      • Rehabilitation can, in principle, contribute to “very compelling circumstances”, but only where clearly linked to the Article 8 rights at stake and where its weight is properly reasoned and justified.
      • The Secretary of State’s argument that rehabilitation is legally incapable of satisfying s.117C(6) was not accepted.
    • Remittal vs remaking under s.12 TCEA:
      • The default position, reflected in the Practice Statement, is that the UT will remake the decision rather than remit, even if some further fact-finding is required.
      • Remittal is generally reserved for cases where the FtT hearing was procedurally unfair (Practice Statement 7.2(a)) or where the nature/extent of fact-finding makes remittal appropriate under the overriding objective (7.2(b)).
      • AEB v SSHD does not establish any general right to a two-tier process; its result turned on procedural unfairness in the FtT.
    • Delay and Article 8: The Court articulated four ways in which delay may be relevant, but endorsed the UT’s fact-specific conclusion that, in this case, it reduced but did not eliminate the public interest in deportation and had limited effect on private/family life ties.
    • Mental health and “very significant obstacles”: The UT was entitled to evaluate the psychiatric evidence, not bound by the expert’s predictions of “re-traumatisation”, and to conclude that the statutory threshold of “very significant obstacles” to integration in Rwanda was not met.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Legal Framework for Deportation of Foreign Criminals

3.1.1 Automatic deportation and UK Borders Act 2007

Sections 32–33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (“UKBA”) establish a regime of “automatic” deportation for “foreign criminals”, defined broadly as non‑British/non‑Irish nationals sentenced in the UK to at least 12 months’ imprisonment. The Secretary of State must make a deportation order unless one of the statutory exceptions applies (s.32(5)), and may only revoke a deportation order where an exception applies.

Exception 1 (s.33(2)(a)) is engaged where removal would breach a person’s Convention rights, principally Article 8 ECHR in this context.

3.1.2 Article 8 and Part 5A of the 2002 Act

Article 8 ECHR protects the right to respect for private and family life, subject to justified interference under Article 8(2) where necessary and proportionate for legitimate aims such as public safety, prevention of crime, and protection of the rights of others.

Part 5A of the NIAA (ss.117A–117C), introduced in 2014, codifies the “public interest considerations” that domestic courts and tribunals must apply in Article 8 immigration cases. Section 117C applies specifically to foreign criminals and provides, in summary:

  • Deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest (s.117C(1)).
  • The more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation (s.117C(2)).
  • Where the sentence is less than four years, deportation is required unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies (s.117C(3)–(5)).
  • Where the sentence is at least four years (“serious offenders”), deportation is required unless “there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2” (s.117C(6)).

Exceptions 1 and 2 provide structured tests around:

  • Exception 1 (s.117C(4)): long residence, social and cultural integration in the UK, and “very significant obstacles” to integration in the country of return; and
  • Exception 2 (s.117C(5)): genuine and subsisting relationships with qualifying partners/children, and “unduly harsh” impact of deportation on them.

Section 117C(6) imposes a more stringent threshold for serious offenders: they must show “very compelling circumstances” that go “over and above” the level of harm that would merely satisfy Exceptions 1 and 2. This provision was central to Majera.

3.1.3 HA (Iraq) and the “very compelling circumstances” test

The leading authority on s.117C(6) is the Supreme Court’s decision in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Lord Hamblen, with whom the Court agreed, summarised the test as involving:

  • A full Article 8 proportionality assessment weighing the gravity of interference with private/family life against the strong public interest in deportation.
  • A recognition that s.117C(6) functions as a “safety valve” with a high threshold, reserved for rare cases where the Article 8 claim is “very strong indeed”.
  • A requirement that the circumstances go beyond a “bare case” under Exception 1 or 2; they must be “over and above” those described in the Exceptions, whether by intensity (e.g. “unduly unduly harsh” consequences for a child) or by additional factors outside the strict scope of the Exceptions.
  • An acknowledgment that there is no freestanding “exceptionality” test, but that, practically, such cases will be rare.

The Court in Majera carefully re‑emphasised these principles and used them as the primary benchmark for assessing both tribunals’ decisions.

3.1.4 Rehabilitation in HA (Iraq)

On rehabilitation, Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) drew heavily on Underhill LJ’s summary:

  • Rehabilitation, where evidenced, is a relevant factor in the proportionality balance.
  • If the only evidence is an absence of further offending, it will generally be of “little or no material weight”.
  • Where there is “positive evidence of rehabilitation” demonstrating a reduced risk of reoffending, it “may have some weight” as it relates to one aspect of the public interest (protection of the public).
  • However, it will “rarely be of great weight”, because deportation policy also reflects deterrence and broader public concern, not just future risk.

In Majera, this nuanced position is preserved and applied, but the Court goes further in clarifying how rehabilitation must be analysed when invoked as a purportedly “very compelling” factor.

3.2 The FtT’s 2022 Decision and Its Deficiencies

3.2.1 FtT’s basic reasoning

The FtT judge (Young‑Harry FtTJ) allowed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal to revoke the deportation order, essentially on the basis that:

  • The appellant’s serious offending was historic (some 16 years old);
  • He had shown “impressive” and “exceptional” rehabilitation, including strong behaviour in custody and 7 years in the community without re‑offending;
  • Expert evidence (from psychologist Ms Lackenby) described his rehabilitation as “exceptional and unusual”; and
  • These factors, combined with passage of time, “just tip[ped] the balance” in the appellant’s favour, amounting to “very compelling circumstances” warranting revocation of the deportation order.

By contrast, the judge gave very limited attention to:

  • The specifics and gravity of the underlying offending (ten sadistic street robberies involving weapons and severe harm);
  • The sentence structure (IPP with a 7‑year minimum, based on a notional 18-year determinate term);
  • The statutory requirement that circumstances must go “over and above” Exceptions 1 and 2; and
  • The structured Article 8 approach in HA (Iraq), including the usual limited weight of rehabilitation.

3.2.2 Adequacy of reasons and structured proportionality

The Court of Appeal, endorsing Jackson UTJ’s critique, held that the FtT’s reasoning was inadequate as a matter of law. The Court grounded its analysis in:

  • The Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction on “Reasons for decisions” (4 June 2024), which requires reasons to be “adequate” – i.e. to explain to the parties why they have won or lost and enable an appellate body to understand the decision.
  • The Supreme Court’s insistence in Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS FT [2025] UKSC 15 that Convention rights require a “more structured approach” than a vague balancing metaphor suggests.

The Court identified several structural criteria that a lawful s.117C(6) decision must satisfy:

  1. The decision-maker must have in mind the relevant legal principles, including the statutory scheme and leading case law.
  2. They must identify the relevant factual and legal factors on each side of the Article 8 proportionality equation.
  3. They must indicate the weight they give to those factors, explaining why, including:
    • How the seriousness of offending calibrates the public interest;
    • How any mitigating consideration (e.g. rehabilitation, delay, mental health) affects that weight; and
    • Why, cumulatively, those factors are or are not “very compelling”.
  4. They must carry out a reasoned proportionality assessment reflecting the high threshold of s.117C(6) and the “over and above” requirement.

The FtT decision failed these standards in multiple respects:

  • It did not engage meaningfully with the extreme seriousness of the crime spree and the heavy sentence.
  • It couched the public interest reduction in vague terms (“to some extent”), without anchoring it in any explicit analysis.
  • It did not explain how rehabilitation – usually of modest weight – could nonetheless be decisive in a case at the top end of seriousness.
  • It omitted any analysis of how the circumstances went “over and above” Exceptions 1 and 2, or how they related to the actual Article 8 rights in play (private/family life).

In short, the FtT treated rehabilitation almost as a free‑standing “very compelling” factor “in the abstract”, which the Court held is impermissible: “very compelling circumstances” must be tied tightly to the severity of the Article 8 interference.

3.3 Rehabilitation as a “Very Compelling” Factor

3.3.1 The Secretary of State’s “incapability” argument

Via Respondent’s Notice, the Secretary of State advanced a stark submission: that rehabilitation is, as a matter of law, incapable of satisfying s.117C(6), because:

  • Rehabilitation goes only to risk of reoffending;
  • The public interest in deportation also rests on deterrence and public concern; therefore
  • Rehabilitation can never be sufficiently weighty to displace the public interest in deporting a serious offender.

The Court did not accept such an absolute position. While it firmly reiterated that rehabilitation will usually carry limited weight, it left open the possibility that in genuinely exceptional cases, rehabilitation could contribute to “very compelling circumstances”, particularly when:

  • There is strong, positive evidence of change and social reintegration;
  • That change significantly alters the real-world impact of deportation on the individual’s private life (e.g. where they have rebuilt their life in a pro‑social way in the UK); and
  • Those factors are carefully reasoned in accordance with Article 8 principles.

However, the Court was clear that:

  • Rehabilitation most obviously operates to reduce the public interest in deportation to the extent it mitigates public safety concerns.
  • Any suggestion that rehabilitation also sits on the Article 8 “rights” side of the scales must be carefully justified, not assumed.
  • “Very compelling circumstances” cannot exist in the abstract; they must be grounded in the nature and intensity of the Article 8 rights at stake and the real-world consequences of deportation.

3.3.2 Critique of the FtT’s use of rehabilitation

The Court identified four specific problems with the FtT’s approach to rehabilitation:

  1. The FtT appeared to treat rehabilitation as a factor aggravating the impact of deportation on Article 8 rights, rather than as a factor reducing the public interest in deportation, which is how the authorities conceptualise it.
  2. The decision failed to explain how, concretely, rehabilitation related to the appellant’s private life and the severity of the interference caused by deportation.
  3. The FtT did not engage with the general principle from HA (Iraq) that rehabilitation usually carries little weight, nor did it explain why, in this case, it was given decisive weight “just tipping” the balance.
  4. The judgment did not confront the requirement that circumstances must be “over and above” those in Exceptions 1 and 2, nor explain how rehabilitation met that enhanced threshold.

The Court’s message is clear: tribunals cannot simply invoke rehabilitation rhetorically. They must:

  • Identify its evidential basis;
  • Explain its limited usual role under the case law;
  • Show how, in combination with other factors, it affects both:
    • The weight of the public interest (especially public safety); and
    • The intensity of the Article 8 interference in the individual’s situation.

3.4 The UT’s Powers under s.12 TCEA: Remittal vs Remaking

3.4.1 Statutory and practice framework

Section 12 TCEA provides that, where the UT sets aside an FtT decision for error of law, it must either:

  • Remit the case to the FtT with directions; or
  • Remake the decision itself.

The Practice Direction and Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers give more detailed guidance:

  • Paragraph 3.1: Parties should assume that the UT will normally remake the decision (s.12(2)(b)(ii)) rather than remit, subject to Practice Statement 7.2.
  • Practice Statement 7.2:
    • The UT is likely to remake the decision unless satisfied that:
      1. (7.2(a)) The error of law deprived a party of a fair hearing/opportunity before the FtT (procedural unfairness), or
      2. (7.2(b)) The necessary fact-finding is such that, having regard to the overriding objective, remittal is appropriate.
    • 7.3 reiterates that remaking is the normal approach, even where some further fact-finding is needed.

3.4.2 AEB v SSHD and MR (Bangladesh)

The appellant relied heavily on AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 to argue that the case should have been remitted to the FtT, preserving a “two-tier” appeal structure. The Court of Appeal in Majera carefully distinguished AEB, emphasising:

  • AEB turned on the FtT’s procedural unfairness (wrongful refusal of adjournment), squarely within 7.2(a).
  • In such cases, fairness generally requires remittal to restore a genuinely two-tier process that is fair “throughout”.
  • By contrast, in MR (Bangladesh) (part of JD (Congo)), the Court held that the stricter second appeals test is not a reason in itself to remit; prompt and final decision-making in the tribunals is in the parties’ interests.

In Majera:

  • There was no claim of procedural unfairness in the FtT; the error of law was in reasoning, not process.
  • The appellant did not ask the UT to remit at the time; he only advanced the argument later in the Court of Appeal.
  • The Court rejected the notion of any general entitlement to a two-tier system once the UT has found an error of law. Such a rule would contradict both the Practice Statement and MR (Bangladesh).

3.4.3 Begum and unfairness as a factor

The appellant also cited Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), where the UT treated procedural unfairness as a factor in the remittal/remaking discretion, but nonetheless remade. Far from helping the appellant, Begum underlined:

  • That remaking remains the general rule, even where there has been some unfairness; and
  • That remittal turns on a fact‑sensitive exercise of discretion, not on any rigid right to a two-tier process.

In Majera, where there was no unfairness and minimal disputed fact-finding, the UT’s decision to retain the case and remake was comfortably within the proper exercise of its discretion.

3.4.4 Preservation of FtT findings

The appellant argued that the UT should at least have “preserved” some FtT findings (e.g. on rehabilitation) as a starting point, invoking the principle in AB (Preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC). The Court rejected this argument, noting that:

  • The FtT’s decision was notably light on factual findings, and what findings existed were either uncontroversial (e.g. absence of reoffending) or derivative of the flawed legal analysis.
  • The crucial issues (role and weight of rehabilitation) were primarily evaluative and legal, not credibility‑heavy factual disputes.

This reinforces a practical point: where the problem lies in the legal framework and evaluative reasoning, preservation of factual findings may have little real function.

3.5 Delay, Mental Health, and Private Life

3.5.1 The four ways delay may matter

The Court synthesised prior case law (EB (Kosovo); MN-T (Colombia); HA (Iraq)) and identified four ways in which delay by the Secretary of State may bear on Article 8 proportionality:

  1. Rehabilitation opportunity: The appellant has more time to demonstrate rehabilitation, which may reduce the public interest in deportation (public safety component).
  2. Deterrence “dimming”: Prolonged delay may somewhat reduce the general deterrent effect of deportation, though this point is context-specific and was not decisive here.
  3. Evidence of systemic dysfunction: Where delay reflects a “dysfunctional system” yielding “unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes” (EB (Kosovo)), it may reduce the weight of “firm and fair immigration control”.
  4. Growth of ties: Delay may allow the individual to form deeper private and family life ties in the UK, strengthening the Article 8 side of the balance.

In Majera, the UT – and the Court – accepted that delay had allowed the appellant to demonstrate a period of law‑abiding conduct in the community, which counted in his favour. However:

  • There was insufficient evidence that the appellant had developed significantly deeper private/family life ties during the delay.
  • The delay did not display systemic dysfunction of the kind identified in EB (Kosovo); arguments to that effect were raised too late and, in any event, lacked evidential support.
  • The UT was entitled to view the delay as favourable (in having no prejudicial impact on him) but not transformative of the proportionality assessment.

3.5.2 Mental health and “very significant obstacles”

The appellant relied on expert evidence from Ms Lackenby, who considered that:

  • The appellant had residual PTSD symptoms and possibly depression;
  • Return to Rwanda might worsen his mental health given uncertainties in healthcare access;
  • He would face integration difficulties due to a lack of family support and his unwillingness to return; and
  • He would likely be “re-traumatised” by memories associated with Rwanda.

The UT accepted aspects of this evidence but concluded:

  • That the appellant did not meet the “very significant obstacles to integration” threshold in s.117C(4)(c); and
  • That his circumstances, though involving some hardship, did not reach the high level required either under Exception 1 or as “very compelling circumstances”.

The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that this was irrational or an impermissible substitution of the judge’s view for clinical judgment. The legal principles are:

  • Clinical experts provide opinions, not binding determinations; it is for the tribunal to decide if the legal threshold (e.g. “very significant obstacles”) is met.
  • The tribunal must consider expert evidence as part of a holistic assessment, but is entitled to weigh it against other evidence and the statutory test.
  • The Deevaseelan principle applies: previous FtT findings (including about conditions on return) are a starting point, absent material change.

On the facts, the UT’s evaluation was within the permissible range. The Court saw no error of law in the conclusion that, although there would be some mental health impact, it did not cross the stringent threshold of “very significant obstacles” or amount, cumulatively with other factors, to “very compelling circumstances”.

3.6 The UT’s Re‑made Decision: Application of the Test

Mandalia UTJ’s re-made decision (dismissing the appeal) was upheld in full. The Court regarded it as a careful and “dense and detailed” application of the statutory scheme and HA (Iraq).

3.6.1 Public interest side

The UT:

  • Correctly started with the seriousness of the offending, emphasising:
    • Ten robberies over multiple days, weapons, sadistic violence and prolonged detentions of victims;
    • Severe physical and psychological impact on the victims;
    • The finding of “dangerousness” and imposition of IPP with a long minimum term.
  • Applied s.117C(2): the greater the seriousness, the greater the public interest in deportation.
  • Considered both:
    • Public safety (risk of reoffending – reduced but not extinguished by rehabilitation); and
    • Deterrence and public concern, in line with HA (Iraq) and RU (Bangladesh).

3.6.2 Article 8 (rights) side and rehabilitation

On the appellant’s side of the scales, the UT found:

  • Exception 1 not met: although the appellant had now lived most of his life in the UK and was socially/culturally integrated since release, he would not face “very significant obstacles” to integration in Rwanda.
  • Exception 2 did not apply: there was no qualifying partner or qualifying child.
  • Rehabilitation: the appellant’s risk of reoffending was assessed as low but not negligible, and his non‑offending since release was creditworthy. This reduced the public safety aspect of the public interest.
  • Delay: this favoured the appellant to the extent that it enabled him to demonstrate rehabilitation, but otherwise had limited impact on his ties or the legitimacy of immigration control.
  • Mental health and return conditions: these involved hardship and some risk of re‑traumatisation, but did not amount to “very significant obstacles” or an Article 3-type risk, nor did they generate “very compelling” Article 8 circumstances.

Balancing these factors, the UT concluded that, even “giving credit” for rehabilitation and the favourable aspects, the public interest remained too strong to be outweighed: the appellant’s Article 8 claim fell short of the very high threshold.

The Court endorsed this reasoning. The criticism that the UT’s final sentence conflated public interest “weakening” with the absence of “very compelling circumstances” was dismissed as over‑semantic. Read as a whole, the judgment correctly:

  • Identified and calibrated the public interest;
  • Evaluated the mitigating factors (rehabilitation, delay, mental health) within the HA (Iraq) framework; and
  • Applied the “over and above” requirement for serious offenders under s.117C(6).

3.7 Link to IA (Gaza) and Broader Proportionality Principles

The Court briefly referred to its later decision in IA (Gaza) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ (under the Immigration Rules test of “very compelling or exceptional circumstances”), noting that:

  • That case reinforces the need to give appropriate weight to immigration policy and to focus on the terms of the rights protected by Article 8.
  • It emphasises the demand for analytical rigour in proportionality assessments.

Although IA (Gaza) concerned a different legal context, its underlying message echoes the approach in Majera: tribunals must avoid unstructured or impressionistic “balancing” and instead proceed by a carefully reasoned analysis rooted in the statutory scheme and the nature of Article 8 rights.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Foreign criminal” and automatic deportation

A “foreign criminal” is a non‑British/non‑Irish person who has been convicted in the UK and sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment. Under the UKBA, the Home Secretary must normally make a deportation order against such a person, unless deportation would breach their human rights (for example, Article 8).

4.2 The “very compelling circumstances” test (s.117C(6))

For serious offenders (sentenced to at least four years), the law presumes that deportation is in the public interest. To avoid deportation on Article 8 grounds, they must show:

  • Very compelling circumstances – factors that make their case “very strong indeed”, and
  • Those circumstances must go over and above what would be needed to satisfy one of the two statutory Exceptions (long residence + obstacles; or family life with “unduly harsh” impact).

This is a high bar. It is not enough to show that deportation would be difficult or harsh. Only in rare cases will the combination of private/family life factors be strong enough to outweigh the grave public interest in deporting serious offenders.

4.3 Exceptions 1 and 2

  • Exception 1 (mainly about private life) applies to some offenders with shorter sentences and requires:
    • Most of their life spent lawfully in the UK;
    • Social and cultural integration here; and
    • Very significant obstacles to integrating in the country of return (very high threshold).
  • Exception 2 (family life) applies where:
    • The person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child; and
    • The effect of deportation on that partner/child would be “unduly harsh” – harsher than the usual severe distress of family separation.

For serious offenders like the appellant, Even more is required than these already demanding tests.

4.4 IPP sentences

An IPP (imprisonment for public protection) sentence is an indeterminate sentence given to offenders deemed “dangerous”. The court sets a minimum term, after which the offender can only be released by the Parole Board if it is safe to do so. The fact that IPP was imposed in Majera underscores the gravity of the offending and the assessment that the appellant posed a serious risk at the time.

4.5 s.12 TCEA and the “two-tier” system

Immigration appeals normally involve:

  1. First-tier Tribunal (FtT) – fact-finding and initial decision; then
  2. Upper Tribunal (UT) – reviewing for legal errors and, if needed, correcting them.

Under s.12 TCEA, if the UT finds an error of law in the FtT’s decision, it must either:

  • Send the case back to the FtT (remittal), or
  • Make a new decision itself (remaking).

The Practice Statement makes clear that remaking is the norm. There is no general right to have the FtT decide the case twice, or to an automatic “two-tier” process once an error is found. Remittal is mainly reserved for cases where the first hearing was unfair or where extensive new fact‑finding is needed.

4.6 Deevaseelan “starting point” principle

Where there has been a previous FtT decision on an earlier appeal involving the same individual, the later tribunal should treat that earlier decision as a starting point for its fact-finding, unless new evidence or changed circumstances justify departing from it. This avoids re‑litigating the same facts without good reason.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 For tribunals and judges

The decision sends a clear signal that:

  • Decisions on serious offender deportations must be analytically rigorous and explicitly structured around:
    • The statutory wording of s.117C;
    • The gravity of the offence and sentence; and
    • The linking of “very compelling circumstances” to concrete Article 8 rights.
  • It is not enough simply to list factors and announce an overall impression that “the balance just tips” one way.
  • Rehabilitation must be placed in its proper doctrinal location (mainly on the public interest side, mitigating public protection concerns) and its usual limited weight must be acknowledged and justified if treated as particularly significant.

5.2 For practitioners representing appellants

The case offers both a warning and a limited opportunity:

  • Warning: relying on rehabilitation alone – even impressive rehabilitation – will rarely suffice to meet the very high threshold of s.117C(6). Advocates must:
    • Marry rehabilitation evidence to demonstrable private/family life impacts;
    • Address deterrence and public concern explicitly; and
    • Show why, even against extremely serious offending, the particular constellation of factors is “very compelling” and goes beyond Exceptions 1 and 2.
  • Opportunity: the Court did not close the door on rehabilitation being part of a “very compelling” package. In rare, well‑evidenced cases where rehabilitation is transformative and linked to a deeply rooted new life in the UK, it may meaningfully contribute to the Article 8 side of the scales.

The case also emphasises the importance of:

  • Raising arguments about remittal and procedural fairness at the UT stage, not for the first time on appeal; and
  • Providing specific evidence on how delay has deepened private/family life ties, if that is to be relied upon.

5.3 For the Home Office and presenting officers

The decision supports much of the Secretary of State’s approach but sets boundaries:

  • It confirms the continued force of deterrence and public concern as components of the public interest in deportation.
  • It affirms that rehabilitation will usually play a secondary role and rarely be determinative in serious offender cases.
  • However, presenting officers cannot credibly argue that rehabilitation is legally irrelevant or incapable of ever satisfying s.117C(6); arguments must instead focus on the weight and context.

5.4 Systemic implications

More broadly, Majera:

  • Aligns with the trend in HA (Iraq), IA (Gaza), and Abbasi towards structured, principle‑driven proportionality analysis rather than impressionistic balancing.
  • Reaffirms the institutional design of the tribunal system: the UT is expected to be a final and efficient appellate body, not merely a remittal conveyor belt.
  • Clarifies the legal architecture around delay and rehabilitation, reducing space for free‑floating equity arguments unmoored from statutory text and structured precedent.

6. Conclusion

Majera v SSHD is an important clarification of how the “very compelling circumstances” test in s.117C(6) NIAA must be applied in serious-offender deportation cases, especially where rehabilitation is the central plank of the appellant’s case.

The Court of Appeal:

  • Reaffirmed that serious offending attracts a very strong public interest in deportation, which will only rarely be displaced;
  • Confirmed that rehabilitation is a relevant but usually limited factor, mainly operating to reduce public safety concerns, and cannot be invoked in the abstract as a free‑standing “very compelling circumstance”;
  • Insisted that tribunals give adequate, structured reasons explicitly linking the facts to the statutory tests and to the gravity of the Article 8 interference;
  • Clarified that there is no general right to a two-tier appeal process once the UT finds an error of law: remaking rather than remittal is the norm, subject mainly to procedural unfairness or exceptional fact-finding needs; and
  • Upheld a careful UT decision applying these principles to dismiss the appeal, despite long delay and significant rehabilitation.

In the broader legal landscape, Majera reinforces the message that Article 8 challenges to deportation orders for serious offenders must be argued and decided within a tight statutory and jurisprudential framework. Rehabilitation, delay, and hardship remain important ingredients, but they must be analysed with precision, clearly tied to Article 8 rights, and shown – cumulatively and concretely – to reach the stringent threshold of “very compelling circumstances over and above” Exceptions 1 and 2. In this case, they did not.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

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