R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1656:
Perception‑Response Time Evidence, Counsel’s Tactical Choices and Sentencing for Vehicle‑as‑Weapon Murders

1. Introduction

The decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1656 arises from a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence following a domestic homicide in which a motor vehicle was used as the killing instrument.

Alice Wood, aged 22 at the time of the incident, was convicted in the Crown Court at Chester of the murder of her fiancé, Ryan Watson, by twice striking him with a Ford Fiesta and then dragging him for over 150 metres underneath the vehicle. She was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 18 years (later clarified as 16 years and 114 days after crediting time on remand).

On renewal before the full Court of Appeal, represented pro bono by Mr D’Souza, Ms Wood advanced three core complaints about her conviction and one about sentence:

Ground 1 – Expert evidence and re‑examination: The trial judge was said to have erred in permitting re‑examination of the prosecution collision expert, PC Thompson, on the applicability of “Perception Response Time” (“PRT”), thereby allowing inadmissible and misleading opinion evidence which usurped the jury’s function.
Ground 2 – No case to answer: It was argued that the judge wrongly rejected a submission of no case to answer on the murder charge in circumstances where the evidence of intent was circumstantial and allegedly equivocal as between murder and accident.
Ground 3 – Fresh evidence and counsel’s tactical decisions: The applicant sought to add a new ground of appeal based on trial counsel’s decision not to adduce evidence of the deceased’s historic mental ill‑health and prior incidents of self‑harm, including an occasion where he allegedly tried to kill himself in front of a car.
Sentence appeal: The applicant contended that the 18‑year minimum term was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive, in particular because the judge (i) found an intention to kill; (ii) treated the car as a “weapon equivalent”; and (iii) over‑emphasised aggravation while under‑valuing mitigation.

The Court of Appeal refused leave on all grounds, but in doing so provided a structured and instructive judgment which:

clarifies the proper use and limits of expert collision evidence on PRT in a criminal trial;
reaffirms the Galbraith test for “no case to answer” in the context of extensive CCTV evidence;
restates the stringent approach to fresh grounds advanced by new counsel, and to appellate critique of trial counsel’s tactical decisions (applying James and McCook); and
confirms orthodox sentencing practice under Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020 when a vehicle is used as a weapon in a murder, including where the intent to kill is short‑lived and formed in the heat of the moment.

The decision is therefore an important reference point in cases involving fatal vehicle use, contested expert reconstruction evidence, and attempts to re‑open tactical defence decisions on appeal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Disposition

The Court granted a short extension of time (49 days) to renew the application, recognising the gravity of the case and that the delay was not the applicant’s fault.
However, it found no arguable ground of appeal against conviction and refused leave.
It also found no arguable ground of appeal against sentence, holding that the 18‑year minimum term was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
The Court did, however, direct that the sentence be formally recorded as life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days, reflecting the deduction of 616 days’ remand time from the 18‑year minimum term, in accordance with existing guidance.

2.2 Key holdings

In outline, the Court held:

On expert evidence (Ground 1): The judge properly allowed re‑examination of the prosecution collision expert on PRT. The questions were confined to matters arising out of cross‑examination, were consistent with the expert’s reports, fell within his expertise, and did not usurp the jury’s fact‑finding function. Any conflict between experts was for the jury to resolve.
On no case to answer (Ground 2): Applying R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, the judge was plainly right to leave the murder count to the jury. The combination of clear CCTV footage, the applicant’s own admission to having driven at the deceased to scare and intimidate him, her comments on arrest, her “no comment” interviews and the nature of the fatal injuries easily satisfied the Galbraith test.
On fresh evidence and counsel’s tactics (Ground 3): The historic mental‑health records of the deceased were capable of belief but of limited probative value to the events of May 2022. Trial counsel’s decision not to deploy them – to avoid opening the door to highly damaging bad character evidence about the applicant – was an entirely legitimate tactical choice. The proposed new ground fell far short of the “particularly cogent” threshold set in R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285, and there was no basis for concluding that the conviction was unsafe.
On sentence: The judge’s findings that the applicant intended to kill at the second strike, and that the car was properly treated as a highly dangerous “weapon equivalent”, were plainly open to him. His structured application of Schedule 21, his identification of aggravating and mitigating factors, and an uplift from a 15‑year to an 18‑year starting point were all orthodox and within a reasonable range.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The incident

On 6 May 2022 the applicant and the deceased attended a work‑related party. Both consumed alcohol. Witnesses described the deceased as gregarious; the applicant’s demeanour was more variable, with some describing her as “cold” or “sullen” while other footage showed her laughing and dancing.

The couple returned home to 12 Oak Street, Rode Heath, shortly after 11 pm in the deceased’s Fiat Punto. The physical setting – a tight parking area near a Chinese takeaway on Sandbach Road – became crucial for the subsequent CCTV analysis of the movements of both people and vehicles.

An argument ensued, apparently fuelled by the deceased’s jealousy and accusations of flirting. The applicant claimed she discovered she had lost her phone, was assaulted inside the house by the deceased, and then got into her own Ford Fiesta intending to return to the party and then go to her mother’s home. The FCA (Fiat) blocked in the Fiesta, so she moved the Fiat by releasing the handbrake.

On CCTV, the deceased can be seen moving around the vehicles, receiving calls and texts, and at times approaching the applicant’s car. The applicant’s attempts to manoeuvre the Fiesta were described by a neighbour as like a “game of chicken” – with revving engines and collisions with a bin and a bollard.

Two key vehicle–pedestrian impacts followed:

Strike 1: The applicant swerved left off the carriageway onto the pavement, colliding with the deceased and causing him to fall onto the bonnet and windscreen before falling off. He regained his footing and was apparently uninjured.
Strike 2 (fatal): After reversing in an arc for 3.7 seconds and straightening the car, with the deceased illuminated in her headlights, the applicant drove directly at him, knocking him down and driving over his body. He screamed and was then carried under the vehicle for 158.8 metres along Sandbach Road, while the car emitted smoke and appeared to manoeuvre to dislodge an obstruction.

The applicant eventually stopped in a cul‑de‑sac, got out, made ineffectual attempts to lift the car and went to nearby houses saying “I’ve run over my boyfriend”. At the scene and on arrest she made self‑incriminating comments such as “I deserve it” and “You should just shoot me in the head”. At interview she answered “no comment” to substantive questions.

Toxicology showed a blood alcohol level of 136mg/100ml (the legal driving limit is 80mg/100ml).

3.2 The trial and the competing narratives

The prosecution alleged that the applicant murdered Ryan Watson: that she used the car deliberately, in drink and anger, as a weapon, intending at least to cause really serious bodily harm (if not to kill).

The defence case was that the death was a tragic accident arising from chaotic, panic‑driven driving in poor visibility while intoxicated. The applicant accepted that she had deliberately driven towards the deceased at strike 1 to “scare and intimidate” him, hoping to brake before contact; but maintained that strike 2 was an unintended collision: she claimed she had been looking over her shoulder at traffic when she pulled forward, did not see the deceased in front of her car, did not hear his scream because the radio was on, and felt no impact as he went under the vehicle.

To support this, the defence called an expert collision investigator, Mr Barry Seaward, who emphasised:

the concept of Perception Response Time (PRT) – the time needed for a driver to perceive and react to a new or unexpected hazard; and
the short period of 3.7 seconds between strikes 1 and 2, during which the applicant reversed for 1.6 seconds, paused for 0.9 seconds and then moved forward for only 1.2 seconds before the fatal impact.

He argued that if the applicant’s eyes had been away from the front view during that interval, then, scientifically, the second collision could have been unavoidable within normal human reaction limits.

The prosecution’s expert, PC Michael Thompson, disagreed about the relevance of PRT to strike 2, given that:

the deceased had just been on the bonnet in strike 1;
he remained broadly in front of the car between strikes, as shown by CCTV; and
the applicant necessarily knew of his presence in that zone.

In his view, the deceased’s presence at strike 2 was not an “unexpected hazard”, so the formal PRT analysis did not apply in the manner suggested by the defence.

3.3 The conviction and sentence

The jury convicted the applicant of murder. On sentence, the judge:

selected the 15‑year starting point under paragraph 5 of Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (no weapon brought to the scene for the purpose of murder), rather than the 25‑year starting point for certain weapon cases;
treated the Ford Fiesta as a “highly dangerous weapon or weapon equivalent” in the factual analysis;
found that by strike 2 the applicant had formed a short‑lived but firm intention to kill after seeing the deceased regain his feet; and
identified multiple aggravating factors – intoxication, the deceased’s vulnerability as a pedestrian, repeated hostile driving including two strikes, and the physical/mental suffering caused by dragging – which justified an uplift to a minimum term of 18 years.

4. Detailed Analysis of the Judgment

4.1 Ground 1 – Expert Evidence, PRT and Re‑examination

4.1.1 The complaint

The principal and most legally nuanced ground focused on the re‑examination of PC Thompson. The defence contended that:

his evidence on PRT in re‑examination improperly conveyed a personal belief about the ultimate issue – whether the collision was avoidable and therefore whether the applicant had driven deliberately at the deceased;
this evidence was not truly expert opinion but an inadmissible comment on a factual matter for the jury; and
the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to rehabilitate or bolster the expert’s evidence in re‑examination after concessions in cross‑examination, thereby unfairly undermining the defence expert’s position.

4.1.2 The legal framework: expert evidence and re‑examination

The Court began by restating the orthodox common law and statutory framework:

Admissibility of expert evidence: governed by common law principles and subject to the exclusionary discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Expert evidence is admissible if:
- it concerns a recognised and sufficiently reliable body of knowledge or expertise beyond the experience of lay jurors; and
- it will assist the jury in understanding evidence or determining an issue.
Scope of re‑examination: as a matter of principle, re‑examination must be confined to matters arising from cross‑examination. Its proper function is to explain, restore or clarify answers that may have been left incomplete, ambiguous or misleading by cross‑examination.
The “ultimate issue” and jury function: while outdated formulations suggested experts must not address any “ultimate issue”, contemporary law accepts that an expert may express views that bear directly on central issues provided:
- they do not purport to decide guilt or innocence; and
- the judge makes clear that the jury remain the ultimate arbiters of fact and are free to accept or reject expert opinion.

The Court emphasised that the trial judge has a discretion – informed by fairness under section 78 PACE – to admit or exclude expert opinion, including in re‑examination, and that appellate interference will be rare where the principles are properly applied.

4.1.3 What actually happened at trial

In evidence‑in‑chief, consistent with his written report and the joint experts’ statement, PC Thompson stated that PRT did not apply to strike 2 because:

the deceased was not an “unexpected hazard” at that stage, having just been thrown onto the bonnet; and
the CCTV showed he remained in front of the car between strikes.

In cross‑examination, he accepted that:

the deceased’s position had changed slightly between the strikes;
if the applicant had turned away from looking forwards – even for a second – then on one view PRT could be “relevant”, because the brain would have to process a slightly new spatial configuration.

In re‑examination, the Crown sought to restore the full context by asking whether the fact and timing of the first impact affected the PRT analysis for the second impact. After defence objection and a short legal discussion (including the judge questioning whether the line of questioning touched the “ultimate issue”), the judge permitted the question.

PC Thompson then re‑affirmed his opinion:

“PRT … is all about the unexpected, the unforeseen hazard and … after the first collision, [the deceased’s] presence in the second is not unexpected.”

Meanwhile, the defence expert, Mr Seaward, maintained that:

if the applicant had looked away (e.g. to check behind for traffic), the deceased’s position at the moment of strike 2 could function, in practice, as a new hazard;
1.2 seconds of forward motion might then be insufficient for perception and reaction; and
the overall pattern could be consistent with chaotic and intimidatory driving rather than homicidal intent.

The jury were thus presented with a clear technical disagreement between experts, squarely placed for them to resolve in light of the CCTV and the applicant’s own admissions.

4.1.4 Why the Court rejected Ground 1

The Court concluded that Ground 1 was “unarguable” and that:

The question asked in re‑examination plainly arose from cross‑examination, which had explored whether changes in the deceased’s position made PRT relevant.
The re‑examination did no more than invite the expert to restate and explain his longstanding position: that once the applicant had already struck the deceased, his continued presence in front of the car could not be categorised as an “unexpected hazard” in PRT terms.
This was squarely within his area of expertise as a collision investigator and did not cross the line into determining the applicant’s actual mental state or guilt.
There was no breach of the rule on re‑examination; the questioning was properly confined to matters raised in cross‑examination.
The judge’s directions on expert evidence were orthodox and fair. The jury were told that:
- experts assist but do not decide the case;
- they could accept or reject any part of an expert’s evidence; and
- they had to decide, on the entirety of the evidence (including the CCTV and the applicant’s own words), whether the driving at strike 2 was deliberate.
There was no rational basis for saying that the jury were bound to accept the prosecution expert or that they could not properly prefer his analysis over that of the defence expert.

Another important aspect is what the Court did not find: it did not accept that the expert had “usurped” the jury’s role. Crucially:

The critical factual question – where the applicant was looking when she drove forward (forwards or over her shoulder) – was left entirely to the jury.
The expert evidence merely described, in technical terms, what the implications would be under each hypothesis.

In short, the Court reaffirmed that:

where a technical issue (like PRT) is in dispute, both sides are entitled to call expert evidence and seek clarification in re‑examination; and
disagreement between experts is a classic issue for the jury, not a basis for appellate interference, provided procedural fairness and proper directions are maintained.

4.1.5 Significance for future cases

The treatment of PRT evidence in Wood carries practical lessons:

PRT is not a magic shield. It applies to unexpected hazards. If the driver is or should be aware of the presence of a person in front of the vehicle, it will be harder to rely on PRT to support an accident narrative.
Experts can be asked plainly whether a hazard was “unexpected”. That does not, without more, trespass on the ultimate issue, particularly where:
- the question is rooted in technical collision analysis; and
- the factual premise (what the driver knew, what they saw) remains for the jury.
Re‑examination is a live forensic tool. Defence counsel should be cautious in extracting concessions, as it may legitimately prompt rehabilitative re‑examination by the prosecution.

4.2 Ground 2 – The Galbraith Submission of No Case to Answer

4.2.1 The Galbraith test

The governing authority, R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, sets out when a trial judge must withdraw a case from the jury:

If there is no evidence on which a jury could properly convict, the judge must stop the case.
If there is some evidence but it is so weak or tenuous that no reasonable jury properly directed could convict, the judge also has a duty to stop the case.
However, where the evidence is such that its strength depends on the view the jury takes of a witness’s reliability, or of competing inferences, the judge should ordinarily leave it to the jury to decide – these are “jury points”.

4.2.2 The defence argument

The defence submitted that:

the case on intent was entirely circumstantial and equivocal;
each piece of CCTV footage was said to be equally consistent with murder or accident; and
unless the jury could exclude every realistic possibility of accident, proof beyond reasonable doubt could not be achieved, so the case on murder should not have been left to them.

4.2.3 The trial judge’s ruling

The judge rejected the submission without hearing from the prosecution, noting that:

the case was not purely circumstantial in the classic sense; there was extensive CCTV from multiple angles providing a near‑continuous visual account;
the issue was what inferences should be drawn from what the jury could see and hear, alongside other evidence; and
these were “jury points”, not matters for judicial withdrawal under Galbraith.

4.2.4 The Court of Appeal’s reasoning

The Court fully endorsed the trial judge. When the prosecution evidence was taken “at its highest”, as Galbraith requires, it included:

multi‑angle CCTV footage showing:
- deliberate swerving off the carriageway and onto the pavement at strike 1;
- the deceased appearing on the bonnet, then regaining his feet;
- the applicant reversing in an arc and then driving forwards at him at strike 2; and
- the prolonged dragging of the deceased under the car.
the applicant’s own admission during cross‑examination that she had driven deliberately towards the deceased at strike 1 to “scare and intimidate him”.
her post‑incident comments (“I deserve it”, “You should just shoot me in the head”).
her multiple “no comment” interviews, potentially permitting adverse inferences (depending on judicial directions) as to why her detailed accident account only emerged later.
forensic and expert evidence confirming death by traumatic compressive asphyxia consistent with being run over and dragged beneath the car.

The Court held that this was ample material on which a reasonable jury could convict of murder. Any argument that the footage was “equivocal” was precisely the sort of evaluation that belongs to the jury’s fact‑finding role. The judge was therefore correct:

to treat the assessment of intent as a classic jury question; and
to conclude that there was a case to answer under the Galbraith test.

4.2.5 Implications

The decision underlines that:

Extensive CCTV footage can move a case away from the paradigm of “weak circumstantial evidence” towards one where a direct visual record exists – but still often requiring nuanced inference about intent and state of mind.
Where such evidence is available, judges will be slow to uphold a submission of no case to answer simply because defence counsel can articulate an alternative innocent explanation. If the inference of guilt is a realistic option for a properly directed jury, the case should be left to them.

4.3 Ground 3 – Fresh Evidence, the Deceased’s Mental Health and Counsel’s Tactical Decisions

4.3.1 The proposed new ground

The applicant sought to add a fresh ground of appeal contending that trial counsel erred by not deploying evidence of the deceased’s prior mental ill‑health and documented incidents of self‑harm, including:

attempted suicide;
an incident in August 2019 when he allegedly tried to kill himself by stepping in front of a car; and
a September 2019 assessment noting risk of impulsive behaviour and jumping in front of traffic.

The argument was that this material could have supported a theory that the deceased might have moved into the path of the car at strike 2, thereby contributing to his own death, and that failure to adduce it rendered the trial unfair.

4.3.2 Statutory and case‑law framework

Two strands of authority were central:

Section 23, Criminal Appeal Act 1968 – fresh evidence: The Court must consider whether:
- the evidence is capable of belief;
- it may afford a ground for allowing the appeal;
- there is a reasonable explanation for its non‑production at trial; and
- overall, whether admitting it is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.
Section 31, Criminal Appeal Act 1968 – leave filter and fresh counsel: In R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749, the Court stressed that fresh grounds advanced by new counsel after a single judge has refused leave must be “particularly cogent”. The appellate process is not designed to encourage second‑guessing of trial strategy by new lawyers, absent powerful reasons.

Additionally, the Court invoked McCook (a leading authority on appellate scrutiny of counsel’s conduct) for the principle that:

the Court will be slow to criticise decisions of experienced trial counsel; and
only where a decision falls outside the range of reasonable professional judgment will it begin to impugn trial fairness on this basis.

4.3.3 The bad character “trade‑off”

Crucial to the Court’s assessment was trial counsel’s McCook response. Ms Young KC explained that:

she was fully aware of the deceased’s mental‑health records and their “striking” features;
however, the prosecution had served:
- one bad character application to adduce evidence that in 2021 the applicant had herself used her car aggressively towards the deceased; and
- a second application concerning an alleged prior stabbing of the deceased by the applicant, supported by photographic evidence.
if the defence sought to portray the deceased as suicidal and impulsive around traffic, this would almost inevitably invite the prosecution to press for admission of these bad character incidents to rebut that portrayal and to suggest a pattern of the applicant using her car as a weapon.
counsel therefore made a considered, strategic decision – discussed with and agreed by the applicant – to keep historical relationship dynamics and mutual mental‑health histories out of the trial and to focus squarely on the events captured by CCTV.

The prosecution similarly indicated that they would agree to that focused approach, avoiding a collateral trial on the couple’s wider relationship.

4.3.4 The Court’s evaluation of the fresh evidence

The Court accepted that:

the medical records were genuine and capable of belief;
they might, in a very general way, support an argument that the deceased had a history of impulsive self‑harming behaviour near traffic.

However, it held that they were of limited probative value in the specific context of May 2022 because:

they were historic (from 2019);
there was no evidence that the deceased was suffering suicidal ideation or mental crisis at the time of the incident; and
the jury had before them very strong, direct evidence of the applicant’s deliberate driving – including two swerves towards the deceased and the extensive dragging – which was far more probative than remote background material.

The Court emphasised that under section 23 CAA 1968 and repeated appellate guidance:

fresh evidence must not only be credible; it must be such that it would probably have affected the outcome or the safety of the conviction.
in this case, against the overwhelming evidential matrix (CCTV, admissions, expert views), it was “difficult to see” how the mental‑health records could have made a material difference.

4.3.5 Counsel’s tactical decision and McCook

Applying McCook, the Court concluded that:

Ms Young’s decision was made in good faith, on the basis of a rational assessment of risk;
the applicant was an intelligent defendant, properly advised, who agreed with the tactical choice;
while hindsight might prompt reflection, the decision was well within the band of reasonable professional judgment and could not be characterised as negligent or incompetent;
indeed, given the potential damage of admitting evidence that the applicant had previously used a car and a knife against the deceased, many experienced counsel would reasonably have made the same choice.

Accordingly:

there was no failure of representation in any legally culpable sense; and
the fresh ground did not approach the “particularly cogent” threshold for expanding grounds of appeal after refusal by the single judge, as per James.

The application to add Ground 3 and to rely on the fresh evidence was therefore refused.

4.3.6 Wider impact

This part of the judgment has important signalling effects:

It reinforces that appeals based on alleged errors in trial strategy – especially where new counsel simply disagree with prior choices – will face a very high hurdle.
Where there is a clear tactical trade‑off (e.g. between helpful evidence and the risk of devastating bad character material), the Court will almost invariably defer to trial counsel’s judgment, provided it was reasoned and client‑approved.
Attempts to weaponise a deceased’s historical mental‑health difficulties in support of accident or partial responsibility arguments will be carefully scrutinised, particularly if:
- the material is temporally remote;
- there is no contemporaneous evidence of mental crisis; and
- admitting it risks unfairly lengthening and complicating the trial.

5. Sentencing Analysis: Vehicles as Weapon Equivalents and Short‑Lived Intent to Kill

5.1 The statutory structure – Schedule 21 Sentencing Act 2020

Schedule 21 provides the statutory framework for setting minimum terms in mandatory life sentences for murder. The court must:

identify the appropriate starting point (e.g., 15 years, 25 years or 30 years) based on the category of murder;
adjust up or down for aggravating and mitigating factors; and
arrive at a just minimum term reflecting the seriousness of the particular offence.

For adult offenders:

Paragraph 5 (15‑year starting point) generally covers murders without high statutory aggravation, such as where no weapon is brought to the scene.
Paragraph 4(2) (25‑year starting point) applies where the offender took a knife or other weapon to the scene intending to use it to commit an offence or have it available as a weapon.

In Wood the judge, and the Court of Appeal, made clear that:

this was not a paragraph 4(2) “weapon brought to the scene” case; the applicant did not bring the car as a pre‑conceived killing instrument;
but the car could still properly be treated as a “highly dangerous weapon or weapon equivalent” when assessing aggravation within the 15‑year category.

5.2 Findings of fact – the two strikes and intention

The Court endorsed the trial judge’s careful factual analysis:

Strike 1:
- The car left the carriageway and mounted the pavement to hit the deceased.
- The judge rejected the applicant’s claim that she intended only to frighten him and brake short; he found she intended to cause some harm by this first swerve.
Strike 2:
- Occurred just 3.7 seconds after strike 1.
- The applicant reversed in an arc, re‑positioned, and then drove straight at the deceased, who was visible in her headlights.
- The vehicle lifted as it passed over him; she then continued to drive for 158.8 metres while he was trapped underneath, with the car’s altered handling showing resistance.

From these facts the judge concluded that:

there was a short‑lived but real intention to kill formed after strike 1, once the deceased had regained his feet and was standing in front of the car; and
strike 2 was not an accident but a deliberate lethal drive at a vulnerable pedestrian.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that these were plainly findings available on the evidence and not arguably perverse.

5.3 Aggravating factors

The judge identified, and the Court approved, several key aggravating factors (carefully avoiding double‑counting):

Use of a vehicle as a weapon equivalent: The Fiesta was used as a highly dangerous weapon. While not a “weapon taken to the scene” in the Schedule 21 sense, as a factual aggravator its use to run over and drag a pedestrian was properly treated as a weapon‑like deployment.
Vulnerability of the victim: The deceased was:
- on the pavement;
- intoxicated;
- using his phone; and
- with limited ability to avoid a rapidly developing vehicular assault.
Intoxication of the offender: The applicant was around 1.7 times the legal driving limit. Voluntary intoxication is an aggravating feature in sentencing (even though it is not a defence to murder in law).
Repeated hostile driving and escalation: The death was not caused by a single snap movement but by a sequence of aggressive manoeuvres:
- collisions with a bin and bollard;
- strike 1 (deliberate swerve onto the pavement); and
- strike 2 (repositioning and driving directly into the deceased, followed by dragging).
Physical and mental suffering of the victim: The judge found:
- the deceased screamed when first dragged under the car;
- multiple abrasions showed sustained trauma during the 21‑second drag;
- the applicant realised he was under the car (from the vehicle lift and altered handling) yet continued driving along Sandbach Road.

The Court rejected any suggestion that suffering must be “significant” before it can be treated as aggravation under Schedule 21; the statute imposes no such threshold.

5.4 Mitigating factors

The judge also fairly recognised mitigating features:

the applicant’s age (22 at the time of the offence, 24 at sentence);
her previous good character and academic promise;
supportive personal references;
her immediate attempts to lift the car and seek help after realising what had happened.

However, he found:

that these factors, while real, carried limited weight in the context of deliberate lethal driving; and
that there was no genuine remorse sufficient to mitigate seriousness – expressions of distress at the scene did not outweigh the earlier deliberate acts.

The Court endorsed this calibrated approach, emphasising that mitigation such as youth and good character cannot seriously dilute sentence in a case of intentional killing by vehicle, particularly where the driving was prolonged and aggressive.

5.5 The final minimum term and its justification

Starting at 15 years, the judge uplifted to 18 years in light of:

proved intention to kill at strike 2;
use of the car as a weapon equivalent against a pedestrian;
the applicant’s intoxication;
the repeated and escalating pattern of hostile driving; and
the degree of physical and mental suffering before death.

The Court described the 3‑year uplift as “modest” given the seriousness and noted that comparable authorities recognise substantial uplifts where vehicles are used as weapons in murders.

It concluded that:

the judge’s approach to Schedule 21 was “orthodox, structured and reasoned”;
the factual findings on intention and conduct were solidly grounded in the trial evidence; and
the final minimum term was within a reasonable range and could not be said to be wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

For ease of reference, the principal legal concepts in Wood can be summarised as follows:

Perception Response Time (PRT): The time it takes a person (here, a driver) to notice a hazard, process what it means, and begin a physical response (e.g. braking or steering). In road traffic science, PRT is most relevant where a hazard is unexpected. It is less useful where the hazard is known and continuously present.
Expert evidence: Testimony from a witness with specialised knowledge (e.g. collision investigation) which is beyond lay experience and helps the jury understand evidence or issues. It is admissible subject to fairness (section 78 PACE) and must not usurp the jury’s role in determining guilt.
Re‑examination: After cross‑examination, the party who called the witness may ask further questions only on matters raised in cross‑examination. The aim is to clarify or restore context where answers may otherwise mislead.
No case to answer / Galbraith submission: A submission made at the close of the prosecution case that, even taking the evidence “at its highest”, a reasonable jury could not convict. If the judge agrees, the defendant is acquitted without having to call evidence. The test comes from R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039.
Bad character evidence: Evidence of a person’s previous misconduct (e.g. prior violence, similar acts) which can sometimes be admitted to show propensity, rebut a false impression, or provide background, but which may also be highly prejudicial. Counsel often make tactical decisions to avoid opening the door to such evidence.
Fresh evidence on appeal (s23 CAA 1968): Evidence not called at trial but which the appellant seeks to rely on in the Court of Appeal. It is admitted only if it is credible, potentially material to safety of the conviction, and there is a reasonable explanation for it not being used at trial.
McCook principle: The Court of Appeal will be slow to condemn trial counsel’s tactical choices unless they fall outside the range of reasonable professional judgment. Disagreement by new counsel is not, by itself, a ground to impugn a conviction.
Weapon equivalent: An object not traditionally classed as a weapon (like a car) can operate as a weapon equivalent when intentionally used to cause serious harm or death. This is highly aggravating in sentencing for murder, even if the object was not taken to the scene for that purpose.
Manifestly excessive sentence: A sentence that, even if lawful in principle, is so out of proportion to the seriousness of the offence and comparable cases that an appellate court must reduce it. The threshold is high; an appellate court will not interfere merely because it might have imposed a different sentence.

7. Broader Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Collision experts and PRT defences

Wood sends a clear message to practitioners and experts that:

PRT analysis must be closely tied to actual hazard perception: if the driver knows a person is in front of the vehicle, claiming that that person was an “unexpected hazard” will be difficult.
Courts will permit prosecution experts to push back against over‑extension of PRT concepts, including in re‑examination.
Defence strategies built on PRT should be careful not to ignore or underplay powerful visual evidence such as CCTV that demonstrates continuous awareness of a pedestrian’s presence.

7.2 The limits of appellate re‑engineering of trial strategy

By applying James and McCook, the Court reinforces a strong policy stance:

The appeal process is not a laboratory for re‑running trials with different strategic emphases chosen by fresh counsel.
Where there was a rational tactical reason to forgo potentially helpful evidence (here, to avoid damaging bad character), new counsel cannot readily assert that the original decision was wrong or unfair.
Victim mental‑health histories, especially when historic, will be cautiously treated: they will rarely suffice to undermine a conviction in the face of strong direct evidence of the defendant’s conduct.

7.3 Sentencing in vehicle‑as‑weapon murders

In sentencing terms, Wood confirms and sharpens several points:

Where a car is used deliberately to run over a pedestrian, courts are entitled to treat it as a weapon equivalent and to increase the minimum term accordingly, even within the 15‑year starting‑point category.
A short‑lived, situational intention to kill, formed in moments after an initial non‑lethal use of the car, can still justify substantial uplift in sentence. Pre‑planning is not a prerequisite for a very serious minimum term.
Youth, good character and educational promise will have limited mitigating impact where the offender has intentionally driven a vehicle into a victim and persisted in driving while the victim is trapped underneath.

7.4 Managing “relationship evidence” and trial focus

The Court’s approval of the parties’ mutual decision to focus on the night in question, and to avoid a wide‑ranging trial over historic relationship difficulties, is also notable. It suggests:

a judicial preference for focused trials where possible, avoiding satellite disputes about long‑term relationship dynamics and mutual allegations unless genuinely central to liability; and
a pragmatic recognition that, in domestic homicide cases, careful management of bad character and mental‑health evidence on both sides is essential to maintain fairness and clarity for the jury.

8. Conclusion

R v Wood is not a radical departure from existing law, but a detailed and careful application of settled principles to a tragic and factually stark case. Its significance lies in the way it:

clarifies how courts will approach expert collision evidence, especially the use of PRT, and reinforces that such evidence must not be allowed to obscure clear visual and circumstantial indicators of deliberate conduct;
reaffirms that submissions of no case to answer will rarely succeed where there is rich CCTV and supporting evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer intent;
strengthens the appellate message that trial tactics are for trial counsel, not for later re‑engineering by fresh teams, unless decisions fall outside the bounds of reasonable professional judgment; and
provides a structured and fact‑sensitive example of sentencing where a vehicle is used as a weapon equivalent in murder, confirming that even short‑lived intent to kill can properly attract a substantial uplift from the 15‑year starting point.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that:

the conviction was safe: the jury had been properly directed, and none of the evidential rulings or strategic decisions rendered the trial unfair; and
the sentence was within the appropriate range for a murder involving deliberate lethal driving, intoxication, repeated aggressive manoeuvres, and prolonged suffering.

Wood will thus stand as a key authority in cases at the intersection of homicide, vehicular use as a weapon, expert accident reconstruction and the appellate treatment of defence strategy and fresh evidence.

R v Wood [2025] EWCA Crim 1656: Perception‑Response Time Evidence, Counsel’s Tactical Choices and Sentencing for Vehicle‑as‑Weapon Murders