R v Sartip‑Zadeh & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1250: Regulatory Warnings as Aggravating Factors and Fair Trial Despite Encrypted Digital Evidence

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision in R v Sartip‑Zadeh & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1250, a case arising from a large‑scale online fraud involving the sale of “assistance” in obtaining European Health Insurance Cards (EHICs) which were in fact available free of charge from the NHS.

The judgment concerns renewed applications for:

extensions of time, and
leave to appeal against conviction and/or sentence

by three members of the Sartip‑Zadeh family:

Damien – convicted of fraudulent trading (two counts), aggressive commercial practice, and money laundering;
Dale – convicted of fraudulent trading (two counts) and money laundering;
Diane – convicted of money laundering.

Their co‑accused father, Mahmud, had also been convicted of one count of fraudulent trading but did not renew his appeal. The applications arose after the single judge had refused leave to appeal and, in some cases, refused extensions of time. The Court (Lord Justice Coulson and a Lady Justice, who gave the main reasons) heard all three renewed applications together and dismissed them all.

Though procedurally straightforward, the case raises important points about:

how the courts deal with lost or inaccessible digital evidence (an encrypted server, “KM/1”);
whether a co‑defendant’s trial decisions (sacking counsel, not giving evidence) can undermine another defendant’s fair trial;
the status of regulatory warnings and alleged failures by Trading Standards in sentencing for fraud;
the threshold for appointing an intermediary and for alleging judicial bias in a long, complex trial; and
the Court of Appeal’s approach to litigants in person and to renewed applications for leave to appeal.

Taken together, the judgment reaffirms that:

personal responsibility for criminal conduct cannot be displaced by pointing to regulatory failings; and
where lost or encrypted digital material may have been relevant, a fair trial can still be achieved through appropriate directions and case management, and this will not normally render convictions unsafe.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The offending conduct

Between 2013 and 2016, Damien and Dale operated a website which:

offered to arrange European Health Insurance Cards (EHICs),
charged customers for doing so,
even though EHICs were freely available from the NHS.

When Trading Standards intervened, warning letters were sent and the website was shut down. After a pause between 2016 and 2018 (while Camden investigated the first business), the brothers set up a second, essentially identical website, which they operated between 2018 and 2019.

The indictment reflected this pattern:

Count 1: fraudulent trading in relation to the first website;
Count 2: fraudulent trading in relation to the second website;
Count 3: engaging in aggressive commercial practice (threats of legal action and costs to deter chargebacks and complaints);
Count 4: concealing, converting, and transferring criminal property (money laundering) through the bank accounts of Damien, Dale, and Diane.

The total loss to customers was substantial:

£1,446,538 on count 1;
£1,217,726 on count 2;
Total: £2,664,264.

2.2 Convictions and sentences at first instance

On 5 April 2023, at Leeds Crown Court before HHJ Belcher and a jury:

Damien was convicted on counts 1–4;
Dale was convicted on counts 1, 2, and 4 (he was acquitted on count 3 on a directed verdict);
Diane was convicted on count 4 (money laundering).

On 15 May 2023, sentences were imposed:

Damien:
- 8 years 6 months on counts 1 and 2 (concurrent);
- 6 months on count 3, concurrent;
- 12 months consecutive on count 4;
- Total: 9 years 6 months’ imprisonment.
- 10‑year director disqualification.
Dale:
- 7 years on counts 1 and 2 (concurrent);
- 12 months consecutive on count 4;
- Total: 8 years’ imprisonment.
- 10‑year director disqualification.
Diane:
- 2 years’ imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, with requirements.

2.3 The appeals

All three applicants appeared as litigants in person before the Court of Appeal. They sought:

extensions of time, and
leave to appeal against conviction and/or sentence,

after the single judge had refused their applications. The Court treated the requested extensions as short and, out of fairness to litigants in person, examined the substantive merits of the grounds first, indicating that if any ground had real merit it would also grant the extension.

The Court stressed that it could not consider new complaints that had not been included in the original grounds of appeal filed in the Criminal Appeal Office. This excluded, for example:

Damien’s extensive allegations of “judicial bullying” (not raised in his formal grounds);
new lines of criticism based on a confidential email from leading counsel (Miss Breen‑Lawton KC) about Dale’s trial counsel which were not within the settled grounds.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal:

Refused all extensions of time and all applications for leave to appeal (for Damien, Dale and Diane);
Did so essentially for the reasons already given by the single judge, which the Court “could not improve upon”;
Held that:
- the convictions were “entirely safe”; and
- the sentences were neither “manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.”

In relation to the key grounds:

Encrypted server KM/1: the trial judge had correctly concluded that a fair trial remained possible despite the loss of data caused by encryption; the prejudice could be dealt with through the trial process and jury directions. The Court endorsed that view.
Co‑defendant’s conduct (Dale’s trial choices): it was Dale’s decision to dismiss counsel and not to give evidence; Damien and Diane could not convert disagreement about those choices into a ground of appeal without concrete prejudice. None was shown.
Counsel misconduct allegations (Dale): after privilege was waived, trial counsel provided detailed responses. The Court accepted these and rejected the criticisms as unarguable.
Intermediary and case‑management (Diane): expert evidence had found her fit to stand trial. The recommendation for an intermediary was based on a misunderstanding of the intermediary’s role. The judge had given adequate breaks and explanations. Complaints of bias and unfairness lacked particulars.
Sentencing (Damien and Dale): the judge had correctly:
- treated culpability as high;
- used the fraud by false representation guideline by analogy for fraudulent trading;
- recognised that the second website, set up after warnings, was a serious aggravating factor;
- treated any failings by Trading Standards as aggravating, not mitigating;
- applied the totality principle, imposing concurrent terms on counts 1 and 2 and a reduced, but consecutive, term on the money‑laundering count.

The Court therefore dismissed all renewed applications.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents and doctrinal context

The judgment, at least in the extract provided, does not expressly cite named authorities. Instead, it applies well‑established principles in several areas:

Appeals against conviction: The Criminal Appeal Act 1968 governs the test—whether a conviction is “unsafe”. The Court affirms that none of the alleged irregularities rendered the convictions unsafe.
Loss or destruction of evidence: Where evidence is lost (here, digital data on an encrypted server), the key questions are:
- Whether the loss makes a fair trial impossible, in which case a stay for abuse of process may be ordered; or
- Whether any prejudice can be accommodated by the trial process through disclosure, cross‑examination, and judicial directions.
The Court follows the latter course, emphasising both the trial judge’s ruling and her careful jury directions.
Case management and bias: English criminal procedure recognises a trial judge’s wide case‑management discretion, particularly in long fraud trials, provided fairness is maintained. Repeatedly refusing unmeritorious applications, or deciding some without calling for prosecution submissions, is not in itself evidence of bias.
Intermediaries: The Criminal Practice Directions and case law make clear that an intermediary is not a general support worker but a specialist communication aid for defendants or witnesses with demonstrable communication difficulties. The Court applies that standard, noting the absence of evidence that Diane needed help with communication.
Sentencing principles:
- The Court relies on the Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Guideline, using the offence of fraud by false representation as an analogous guideline for fraudulent trading.
- It applies the totality principle, which requires that when multiple offences are sentenced together, the overall sentence must reflect the total criminality but not be crushing or disproportionate.
- It reiterates that failure by regulators or Trading Standards to stop offending cannot mitigate sentence; rather, continuing offending after warnings is aggravating.

Thus, while no fresh authority is announced, the judgment reaffirms and sharpens the application of these established principles in the context of modern, internet‑based fraud.

4.2 Damien’s appeal

4.2.1 The encrypted server KM/1 and alleged prejudice

Damien’s principal complaint was that the trial was unfair because potentially exculpatory material on a server (KM/1) was irretrievably lost when the server was encrypted by a police examiner. The brothers contended that:

the required 100‑character password existed only on the server itself;
once lost, it rendered the contents permanently inaccessible.

The single judge had already rejected this ground, and the full Court agreed. Several points underpin this:

Inherent implausibility of the defence account
IT experts agreed that the practice of storing a 100‑character password only on the server and nowhere else “made no sense” and would have put the business at substantial risk (for example, in any power outage). This made Damien’s account inherently unlikely.
Fair trial still possible
In her ruling of 31 January 2023, the trial judge had carefully considered the prejudice arising from the loss of the data but concluded that:
- a fair trial remained possible; and
- the defence could explore the circumstances of the seizure and encryption before the jury.
The Court of Appeal endorsed that conclusion.
Impeccable and fair jury directions
The judge gave structured directions to the jury:
If the jury were sure that the defendants had deliberately withheld the password, they might properly conclude that any prejudice was their own responsibility and should not be counted in their favour.
Conversely, if the jury were not sure that the defendants had deliberately withheld the password, they should take the possible prejudice into account in the defendants’ favour.
The Court described these directions as “impeccable and fair”.

Legally, this illustrates a key principle: loss of evidence does not automatically render a trial unfair. The crucial question is whether:

the loss was deliberate or culpable, and
whether the resulting prejudice can be managed by directions and by allowing the defence to “make capital” out of the loss before the jury.

Here, the Court clearly thought that the jury was put in a good position to assess the consequences of the missing data and to give Damien whatever benefit of the doubt was appropriate.

4.2.2 Prejudice from Dale’s conduct and trial strategy

Damien also argued that he was prejudiced by:

Dale’s dismissal of his leading counsel, which led to junior counsel’s withdrawal; and
Dale’s decision not to give evidence.

The Court accepted the single judge’s answer: these were Dale’s own decisions, taken with advice, and they did not undermine the fairness of Damien’s own trial. In particular:

It was not for Damien to dictate Dale’s defence strategy.
The fact that Dale’s case was not run as Damien would have liked does not create an arguable ground of appeal.
No specific, concrete way in which Damien’s ability to present his own defence was impaired was identified.

The case thus reinforces the principle that:

In a multi‑handed trial, each defendant’s representation and tactical choices are personal to them; and
A co‑defendant cannot generally overturn their conviction simply because they would have preferred the co‑accused’s case to be conducted differently, absent clear and demonstrable prejudice.

4.2.3 Sentencing: high culpability, regulatory warnings, and totality

Damien contended that his sentence of 9½ years was manifestly excessive, arguing that:

his mitigation (including personal circumstances and delay) was under‑valued;
the authorities should have “nipped his criminality in the bud” earlier;
relatively few customers complained compared with the total number who paid; and
sentences should have been wholly concurrent, with greater attention to totality.

The Court, endorsing the single judge, rejected each of these points:

Guideline starting point
For each offence of fraudulent trading, the judge used the fraud by false representation guideline as an analogous measure, identifying:
- a starting point of 7 years’ imprisonment for each fraud; and
- a category range of 5–8 years.
Damien’s own acceptance that he was the “driving force” and that his culpability was high aligned with this categorisation.
Regulatory warnings as aggravating, not mitigating
A central feature of the sentencing reasoning was that:
“You seek to blame Trading Standards for not ‘nipping your criminality in the bud’; but you alone were responsible for your actions and the earlier investigations and warnings are aggravating and not mitigating features of your case.”
In other words, once the defendants had been investigated and warned, the decision to set up a second fraudulent website was particularly culpable.
Totality and concurrency
While concurrent sentences on counts 1 and 2 were imposed to respect totality, the judge treated:
- the aggressive commercial practice (count 3) as a further aggravating feature (though its own 6‑month term was concurrent); and
- the money‑laundering offence (count 4) as warranting a consecutive 12‑month term, reduced substantially below the 3–6 year guideline range in order to respect totality.
The overall sentence therefore reflected the total criminality across both frauds and the laundering.
Delay and personal mitigation accounted for
The Court explicitly accepted that the sentencing judge had properly taken into account:
- the delay in bringing the case to trial; and
- the available personal mitigation.
It found no error in the balancing exercise.

Accordingly, the sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

4.3 Dale’s appeal

4.3.1 Criticisms of counsel and decision not to give evidence

Dale’s conviction appeal rested heavily on alleged misconduct by his trial counsel (Mr Furlong and junior, Ms Birch), including:

making an offer to the prosecution without consent;
failing to present evidence or cross‑examine witnesses as instructed;
lateness to court, limiting opportunities to take instructions;
wrongly presenting a blurred image of Damien’s house to the jury; and
announcing that Dale would not give evidence before a final decision had been made.

He also alleged that:

junior counsel resigned abruptly whilst pregnant and unwell, leaving him under‑represented; and
he was denied time to instruct replacement counsel.

Dale was asked to, and did, waive privilege. Counsel provided detailed written responses, and the prosecution also responded. The Court accepted these responses and relied on the single judge’s assessment:

It was Dale’s decision to dismiss counsel. Given Ms Birch’s pregnancy, ill‑health, and the overrunning nature of the trial, it “must have been obvious” that she might not be able to step in as lead.
It was Dale’s considered decision, against advice, not to give evidence. He had substantial time to consider this. He could not later ask the Court to “speculate” about what might have happened if he had testified.
The complaints about counsel’s conduct were effectively answered by the joint response from Mr Furlong and Ms Birch and by the Crown.

From a doctrinal perspective, this underscores several points:

A defendant who, against advice, decides not to give evidence is highly unlikely to be permitted to treat that tactical choice as a ground of appeal.
Dismissal of counsel mid‑trial, especially in complex fraud cases, is fraught with risk; that risk falls primarily on the defendant who chooses to take it.
The Court requires objective support for allegations of serious professional misconduct and will give significant weight to counsel’s written explanations after privilege is waived.

4.3.2 Directions on counts 1 and 2

Dale also challenged the judge’s directions to the jury on counts 1 and 2. The single judge described this ground as unarguable, and the Court agreed:

the direction was neither wrong in law nor unfair; and
it properly related to the elements of fraudulent trading as charged.

In the absence of any detailed critique of a specific misdirection or omitting a necessary element, the Court was not persuaded there was any realistic prospect of success.

4.3.3 Sentence

Dale’s sentencing appeal mirrored Damien’s in several respects. He argued:

the judge failed to give due weight to his previous good character and other mitigation;
his role was not “high culpability” but only “medium” under the guideline;
sentences should have been concurrent, not consecutive; and
delay and limited complaints from customers were under‑valued.

The Court found:

Dale had himself accepted before the judge (and in his initial grounds) that his culpability was high; his later attempt to recast it as medium was inconsistent and unpersuasive.
The same aggravating features applied as in Damien’s case: continuing after warning by Trading Standards, over a prolonged period, involving substantial sums.
The judge had properly distinguished between Damien and Dale:
- Damien as the “driving force” justified his longer sentence (8½ years on the frauds);
- Dale’s 7‑year term on counts 1 and 2 reflected a somewhat lesser role.
The 12‑month consecutive term for the money‑laundering offence was again a heavily reduced sentence applying totality to avoid double‑counting the fraud loss.

The Court reiterated the same core point: regulatory inaction is no mitigation. The earlier warnings and investigations aggravated rather than mitigated the offending. The overall sentence of 8 years was therefore upheld.

4.4 Diane’s appeal

4.4.1 Intermediary, fitness, and communication needs

Diane’s grounds of appeal against conviction, described by the single judge as “lengthy and rather confusing,” included:

a complaint that no intermediary had been appointed to assist her;
claims that insufficient measures were taken to help her during a long trial, leading to adverse health impacts; and
assertions that the judge wrongly refused applications for adjournments, severance, special measures, and exclusion of her police interview.

The Court summarised and endorsed the single judge’s emphatic rejection of the “intermediary ground” as “hopeless”:

Expert evidence was that Diane was fit to stand trial.
The recommendation for an intermediary was based on a flawed understanding of the intermediary’s role. There was no evidence that she had communication difficulties requiring such assistance.
The real needs were:
- proper breaks; and
- clear explanations of the charges,
which the judge provided and which were properly within counsel’s remit.
No specific intermediary had been identified; no report from an intermediary setting out any communication problems had been produced.

The judgment thus reaffirms an important distinction:

Intermediaries are for communication difficulties, not for general support, stress management, or cognitive strain in long trials.
Being tired, anxious, or unwell does not by itself justify an intermediary; such factors are usually addressed through case management (breaks, pacing, clear language) rather than through appointment of an intermediary.

4.4.2 Adequacy of breaks and case management

Diane complained that the judge did not allow enough breaks and that some applications were decided without full argument or without inviting a prosecution response, which she characterised as unfair.

The Court, echoing the single judge, held that:

the grounds failed to:
- identify specific instances where breaks were requested and wrongly refused; or
- explain how any such refusal prevented her from receiving a fair trial;
the criticism that the judge did not hear “the whole application” went nowhere without:
- identifying which applications were decided summarily;
- what arguments the judge allegedly failed to hear; and
- how the outcome would have been different and how this would render the conviction unsafe.
it is “absolutely entitled” for a judge to dismiss a plainly bad application without calling on the other side, particularly when a jury is waiting; this can be good case‑management.

Put simply, assertions of unfairness must be specific and supported by evidence; general dissatisfaction with robust case management is insufficient.

4.4.3 Alleged bias

Diane argued that the judge demonstrated bias, largely inferred from disagreeing with defence applications. The single judge—and the full Court—rejected this in strong terms:

rejection of applications, even repeatedly, “goes nowhere near” establishing bias;
allegations of bias are serious and must be based on a proper foundation and fully explained; mere insinuation is “wholly improper.”

This reiterates that:

trial judges are under a duty to manage proceedings;
vigorous or adverse rulings are not, without more, indicative of partiality; and
appellants must clearly plead and particularise any bias claim, identifying the facts said to give rise to an appearance of bias.

4.4.4 “No case to answer” and sufficiency of evidence

Diane also claimed that her “no case to answer” submission should have been upheld, citing insufficient evidence of money laundering. The single judge originally did not have the ruling, but the full Court did, and reviewed it.

Having considered the ruling transcript, the Court confirmed:

there was no merit in the suggestion that the judge’s refusal of the submission gave rise to an arguable appeal;
the evidence was sufficient to leave the money‑laundering count properly to the jury.

This implicitly confirms that the judge had applied the usual “no case” test (whether there was evidence on which a properly directed jury could convict), and the prosecution case against Diane met that threshold.

4.4.5 Alleged prejudice from Dale’s defence and delay

Diane, like Damien, claimed that she was prejudiced by events in Dale’s defence. The Court found:

she provided no evidence of any specific way in which Dale’s conduct prevented her from participating effectively in the trial;
generalised assertions of atmosphere or confusion were insufficient.

She also made a brief reference to delay. The Court noted that:

she had not advanced an abuse of process argument based on delay at trial (her sons had, unsuccessfully); and
in any event, the sentencing judge had taken delay into account in mitigation.

The extension of time and leave to appeal were both refused.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Lost or encrypted digital evidence

The treatment of the KM/1 server illustrates how courts are likely to approach missing digital evidence:

There is no automatic bar to trial or appeal where digital material is inaccessible.
The key is whether the defence can:
- explore the circumstances of the loss before the jury; and
- obtain an appropriate, balanced judicial direction.
Where the defence may itself be responsible for the loss (e.g. by withholding a password), that may significantly blunt any fairness complaint.

Future defendants seeking to rely on lost digital evidence will have to show:

that the lost material was realistically likely to be exculpatory; and
that the trial judge’s directions and procedural safeguards were insufficient to neutralise the prejudice.

5.2 Regulatory inaction and repeated fraud

A notable theme is the Court’s insistence that:

Regulators’ failures to act swiftly do not mitigate offending;
where offenders continue or resume their criminal conduct after regulatory investigation and warning, that is an aggravating factor.

This is especially significant in the context of:

online business models exploiting consumer confusion;
fraud schemes that rely on perceived “grey areas” or regulatory lag.

Would‑be appellants in fraud cases will find it difficult to argue that they should be treated more leniently because Trading Standards, the FCA, or other bodies did not intervene sooner. Instead, the very fact of earlier scrutiny and warning will likely worsen the sentencing position if offending continues.

5.3 Co‑defendant strategy and “shared prejudice”

The case underscores that:

Each defendant’s trial decisions (whether to give evidence, whether to dismiss counsel) are personal and made with advice.
The existence of conflict or strategic divergence between co‑defendants does not, without more, make a trial unfair.
Appeals premised on a co‑defendant’s allegedly poor choices must show specific, demonstrable prejudice to the appellant’s own ability to present a defence.

This will be particularly relevant in long, multi‑handed fraud trials where the dynamics between defendants can be tense and where mid‑trial changes of representation are not uncommon.

5.4 Intermediaries, vulnerability, and case management

The judgment also contributes to the growing body of case law on vulnerable defendants and trial adaptations:

Intermediaries are not a general safeguard for any defendant who finds the process stressful or complex; they are targeted tools for specific communication impairments.
Judges retain broad powers to manage trials with breaks, clear language and tailored directions. These measures, if adequately provided, will usually be sufficient to preserve fairness without an intermediary.
Unparticularised assertions of bias or inadequate breaks will not pass the threshold for an arguable appeal.

5.5 Sentencing for online consumer fraud

Finally, the case signals the Court of Appeal’s stance on sentencing for large‑scale online fraud against consumers:

Fraudulent trading by selling services that exploit public ignorance of free public provision (such as NHS EHICs) will be treated very seriously.
Where losses exceed £1 million and offending continues after warnings, long custodial sentences (7–9+ years) are plainly within, and near the top of, guideline ranges.
Money‑laundering counts involving substantial sums can justify significant sentences in their own right, albeit adjusted for totality when sentencing alongside the underlying fraud.

The judgment therefore offers clear sentencing guidance for similar schemes that monetise access to public services or official documents available free of charge.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Extension of time and leave to appeal

Leave to appeal: Most criminal appeals require permission (leave). A single judge usually considers the application first on the papers.
Extension of time: There is a strict deadline for filing appeal notices. If missed, an appellant must ask the Court to extend time, explaining the delay.
Renewed application: If the single judge refuses leave, the appellant can renew the application before a full court (as happened here).

6.2 Unsafe conviction and manifestly excessive sentence

Unsafe conviction: The Court will quash a conviction if it considers it unsafe—for example, because of serious procedural error, unfairness, or evidential problems.
Manifestly excessive sentence: A sentence is not altered simply because another judge might have passed a lower one. It must be so high as to be “manifestly excessive” or otherwise “wrong in principle,” e.g. by:
- misapplying guidelines;
- failing to consider totality; or
- ignoring relevant mitigation or aggravation.

6.3 Totality

The totality principle ensures that when an offender is sentenced for multiple offences at once:

the overall sentence reflects the total seriousness of the offending; but
the result should not be disproportionate or “crushing.”

Judges often:

make similar counts run concurrently (at the same time); but
may impose consecutive sentences for distinct types of criminality (e.g. fraud and separate laundering), sometimes reducing individual terms to avoid excessive totals.

6.4 Intermediary

A trial intermediary is:

a specialist communication professional;
appointed where a defendant or witness has real difficulty:
- understanding questions, or
- expressing themselves clearly;
who helps ensure that they can participate effectively in the trial.

They are not:

a general supporter or advocate; or
a solution for stress, anxiety, or the ordinary challenges of a lengthy trial.

6.5 No case to answer

A submission of “no case to answer” is made at the close of the prosecution case, arguing that:

there is insufficient evidence on one or more counts for a reasonable jury, properly directed, to convict;
therefore, the judge should stop the case on those counts and direct verdicts of not guilty.

If the judge rejects the submission, the defence may still call evidence and the case proceeds to the jury.

7. Conclusion

R v Sartip‑Zadeh & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1250 is not a landmark in the sense of announcing a new rule of law, but it is an important and practical judgment in several respects.

First, it confirms that:

even where digital evidence has been lost or encrypted, a fair trial remains possible if the defence can explore the issue and the judge gives clear, balanced directions to the jury about potential prejudice.

Secondly, it sends a strong message that:

offenders cannot shift blame onto regulators or Trading Standards for failing to intervene earlier; and
continuing to offend after formal investigation or warning will be treated as a serious aggravating factor at sentence.

Thirdly, it clarifies that:

co‑defendants’ tactical errors, including dismissal of counsel or electing not to give evidence, do not ordinarily provide a basis to overturn another defendant’s conviction;
allegations of judicial bias, or of the need for intermediaries, must be evidence‑based and specific, not generalised complaints about robust case management.

Finally, the case exemplifies the Court of Appeal’s approach to:

litigants in person in complex fraud appeals—reading materials sympathetically, but confining itself to properly framed grounds; and
sentencing for large‑scale consumer fraud involving online deception—endorsing substantial custodial terms anchored in the Sentencing Council guidelines and the totality principle.

In sum, the decision underscores personal responsibility in both offending and trial strategy, and it offers clear guidance for future fraud prosecutions involving online misrepresentation of access to public services, lost digital evidence, and claims about trial fairness.