R v Raja & Idrak – The “Immaterial Misdirection” Principle and Post-Offence Sentencing Guidelines Endorsed

Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Raja & Anor, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 948) addresses two distinct but inter-related appellate issues arising from a fatal road-traffic incident on 7 June 2019 in West London:

Raja – an appeal against conviction for causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving after a jury trial.
Idrak – an appeal against sentence following guilty pleas to the same offences.

Beyond the tragic facts—Mr Surrinder Gupta lost his life and Mrs Raj Gupta was gravely injured—the judgment is noteworthy for the clarification it provides on (a) the correct jury direction where a defendant’s police interview contains both inculpatory and exculpatory material (“mixed statements”), (b) how appellate courts treat harmless or immaterial misdirections, (c) the management of jury notes and alternative counts during deliberations, and (d) application of the 2023 Sentencing Guideline on causing death by dangerous driving to pre-guideline offending.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Raja’s conviction upheld: Although the trial judge incorrectly labelled Raja’s police interview as “not evidence of the facts stated”, the Court held that the misdirection was immaterial because compelling CCTV evidence rendered the verdict safe. A second ground—complaining that the jury continued deliberating while the Crown considered adding an alternative count—was also rejected.

2. Idrak’s sentence upheld: A total sentence of 9 years 9 months (after 25 % credit) and a 12-year disqualification with extended retest were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. Delay between plea (2022) and sentence (2024) did not justify a larger discount and the judge was correct to apply the new sentencing guideline, notwithstanding that the offence pre-dated it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. R v Greenhalgh [2014] EWCA Crim 2084

Greenhalgh is the leading authority on “mixed statements”. It dictates that where an interview contains both incriminating and exculpatory passages, the jury must be told to treat all of it as evidence, albeit untested. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the trial judge technically departed from Greenhalgh but emphasised that the error was corrected, in substance, by later oral directions and was ultimately harmless.

2. Additional Authorities (implicitly relied upon)

R v Makanjuola & R v Easton [1995] 1 WLR 1348 – on discretionary warnings and direction style (relevant to how the judge reminded the jury of the mixed statement).
R v Lane and subsequent majority-direction authorities – underpinning the propriety of encouraging, yet not pressuring, a jury to reach a verdict.
R v Spence [2012] EWCA Crim 2747 – reinforces that not every misdirection renders a conviction unsafe; the appellate test is whether the verdict is unsafe, not whether the summing-up was perfect.

Legal Reasoning

Immaterial misdirection doctrine strengthened.
The court accepted a technical misdirection but applied the long-standing principle that an appeal will only succeed where such misdirection renders the conviction unsafe (Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 2). The existence of overwhelming CCTV evidence, expert consensus, and Raja’s admitted speeding meant the jury must inevitably have convicted even with a perfect direction. This pragmatic approach underscores appellate reluctance to overturn fact-driven verdicts for merely formal errors.
Handling of jury notes and alternative counts.
The judge’s decision to allow deliberations to continue while the Crown pondered adding a dangerous-driving alternative was upheld. Key factors: no pressure on the jury, clear acknowledgment of their concerns, and subsequent majority verdicts reached without coercion. The Court signalled that procedural fluidity is permissible provided jurors are not intimidated or misled.
Sentencing under new guidelines.
The judgment re-affirms that courts must apply the guideline in force at the date of sentence (s. 59 Sentencing Code), not that at the date of offence—a point occasionally contested in delay cases. The Court resisted arguments for an “old guideline discount”, stressing that (a) guidelines are not retroactive legislation and (b) the seriousness of offending, not guideline changes, drove the length of sentence.
Totality and concurrent sentences.
By imposing concurrent terms and folding the serious-injury count into an uplift on the death count, the judge adhered to totality principles, balancing consecutive punishment with overall justice.

Impact

Trial judges are reminded to give Greenhalgh-compliant mixed-statement directions, but appellate courts will not lightly quash convictions where the underlying evidence is overwhelming.
The decision emboldens judges to continue jury deliberations amid procedural uncertainty (e.g., pending amendment of the indictment) as long as juror autonomy is respected.
For sentencing practitioners, the ruling confirms that post-offence guideline changes normally apply and that delay arguments must demonstrate genuine prejudice, not merely the advent of a harsher tariff.
Road-traffic homicide cases can expect robust sentences post-2023 guideline; attempts to rely on the pre-2023 landscape will likely fail.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mixed Statement: A police interview (or other out-of-court statement) containing both admissions (e.g., “I was speeding”) and denials/exculpatory remarks (e.g., “I wasn’t racing”). The jury may treat the entire statement as evidence but should remember it was not given on oath or tested in court.
Misdirection: An error in the judge’s directions to the jury. A conviction is only quashed if the misdirection makes the verdict “unsafe”. A “harmless” or “immaterial” misdirection—one that could not realistically have affected the outcome—does not suffice.
Majority Verdict: England & Wales permits 10-1 or 11-1 verdicts after prescribed time. The judge must give a majority direction telling jurors they may now reach such a verdict. Proper handling of jury notes is vital to avoid perceived coercion.
Sentencing Guidelines: Non-statutory but binding frameworks issued by the Sentencing Council. Courts must follow the guideline in force at sentence unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice. The 2023 guideline for causing death by dangerous driving raised starting points and ranges.
Totality Principle: When sentencing for multiple offences, the court should ensure the overall sentence is proportionate to the combined offending, avoiding both over-punishment and double counting.

Conclusion

R v Raja & Idrak provides a timely illustration of the Court of Appeal’s dual role: guardian of fair trial standards and gatekeeper against technical appeals lacking practical prejudice. The decision:

Confirms that not every deviation from perfect directions vitiates a jury’s verdict—the “immaterial misdirection” principle.
Sanctions judicial flexibility in managing jury questions and alternative counts, so long as juror independence is protected.
Re-affirms that current sentencing guidelines apply at date of sentence and that serious, aggravating features of dangerous driving will attract lengthy custodial terms.

Practitioners should treat the case as a cautionary tale: meticulous adherence to direction precedents remains important, but on appeal, substance will trump form where the evidence is compelling. Equally, those convicted of catastrophic driving offences should anticipate stiff sentences undeterred by historical tariff comparisons.